Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series : 68

BHARTṚHARI

A study of the
Vākyapadīya
in the light of the
Ancient Commentaries.

by

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER, M.A. (LONDON,)

Sometime Professor and Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Lucknow University and formerly Vice-Chancellor, Lucknow University and the Varanasi Sanskrit University, Visiting Professor, Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, Poona.



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
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To

Raimond van MARLE

सस्नेहमुन्मील्य दृशं मम त्व-
मदृश्यतां हन्त गतोऽसि कस्मात् ।

Foreword

On the 15th of October 1964 the Deccan College celebrates the centenary of its main Building, and curiously enough this period coincides with the Silver Jubilee of the Postgraduate and Research Institute which, as successor to the Deccan College started functioning from 17th August 1939 when members of the teaching faculty reported on duty. When I suggested to members of our faculty the novel idea that the centenary should be celebrated by the publication of a hundred monographs representing the research carried on under the auspices of the Deccan College in its several departments they readily accepted the suggestion. These contributions are from present and past faculty members and research scholars of the Deccan College, giving a cross-section of the manifold research that it has sponsored during the past twentyfive years. From small beginnings in 1939 the Deccan College has now grown into a well developed and developing Research Institute and become a national centre in so far as Linguistics, Archaeology and Ancient Indian History, and Anthropology and Sociology are concerned. Its international status is attested by the location of the Indian Institute of German Studies (jointly sponsored by Deccan College and the Goethe Institute of Munich), the American Institute of Indian Studies and a branch of the Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient in the campus of the Deccan College. The century of monographs not only symbolises the centenary of the original building and the silver jubilee of the Research Institute, but also the new spirit of critical enquiry and the promise of more to come.

7th March 1964 S. M. KATRE

Preface

I had at first the idea of discussing in the Introduction to each volume, as it came out, of my critical edition of the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the ancient commentaries, the ideas expounded by Bhartṛhari in that particular volume. Later it seemed that, as there is a unity of ideas in the three *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya,* it would be better to present these ideas in a separate volume which could serve as an Introduction to all the four volumes of the critical edition. I had announced this on p. xv of my Introduction to *Kāṇḍa* III, pt. i (D.C.M.S., 21, 1963). In my Introduction to *Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa* I, p. xviii also, I had announced that a separate volume, dealing with some of the problems relating to the text and the ideas expounded in the work would be published in due course. The present work is meant to be a fulfilment of that announcement.

The *Vākyapadīya* has aroused a great deal of interest in recent times among scholars both in India and abroad. Papers relating to the grammarian Bhartṛhari and to his *Vākyapadīya* are being published in journals devoted to Sanskrit and Indology in India, Europe, America and Japan. I have discussed some of these publications in the section entitled 'Problems of Interpretation' and have indicated what exactly I have tried to do in this work. To put it briefly, an attempt has been made in this work, after giving a brief account of the problems relating to the text of Bhartṛhari's work, including his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali and to the commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya,* to expound briefly the philosophical ideas and the notions pertaining to General Linguistics and those underlying the forms of the Sanskrit language, found mainly in the *Vākyapadīya* and to a certain extent, in the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya.* As the whole of even the available fragment of the latter work has not yet been

published, it has not been possible to bring out all the linguistic notions lying embedded in it. But I have taken note of some of the notions found in the published portion and they are found to confirm what one can gather from the *Vākyapadīya*. The present work is chiefly a study of the *Vākyapadīya* on the basis of the four available ancient commentaries. It does not claim to expound everything that the *Vākyapadīya* contains. It deals only with the basic notions found in its three *kāṇḍas*. The last section of the third *kāṇḍa*, the one relating to complex formations (*Vṛtti*) is particularly rich in linguistic notions and some of them have been briefly explained here. The rest have not been dealt with, not only because they have been left for later treatment elsewhere, but also because some of them pertain particularly to the Sanskrit language whereas I have been anxious to bring out those notions like that of *sphoṭa* which concern language in general and not any particular language. The reason is that I look upon Bhartṛhari as one who has, in a philosophical background, made a contribution to General Linguistics. He may be said to have given a definite shape to the contribution of ancient India to General Linguistics, though his ideas go back to Patañjali in the grammatical and linguistic tradition and to the Vedas themselves as far as the philosophical side is concerned. As I have indicated briefly what I have tried to do here in the section entitled 'Problems of Interpretation', it is not necessary to say anything more here.

It will be found that the references in the work to the *Kārikās* of the first *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* have two numbers. The first one is their number in my critical edition published by the Deccan College and the second one within square brackets is their number in other editions such as those of Pt. Charu Deva Shastri and Pt. Raghunatha Sharma. The difference between these two numbers is eight because of my considering eight *Kārikās* after the 107th in other editions to be quotations in the *Vṛtti* and not as belonging to the *Vākyapadīya* itself. Both the numbers are given in order to facilitate reference.

It is now a pleasure to acknowledge the help which I have received from others in the course of publishing this work. I must, first of all, mention Pt. K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri, Śāstraratna, of the Dictionary Department, Deccan College. Because of his deep knowledge of *Vyākaraṇa* and of his being at home in English, I showed him some portions of the work in manuscript, especially those relating to the ideas expounded in the third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. He detected

some slips and made suggestions for improvement in some places, which I have gladly adopted. I am very grateful to him for this help. Sri K. L. Mankodi who was working as a research student under Dr. H. D. Sankalia in the Deccan College, translated for me into English an article in Gujarati by Muni Jambuvijayaji on 'Jain Acharya Mallavādin and the date of Bhartṛhari'. I thank him heartily for it. The laborious task of preparing the Index was kindly done by Sri S. B. Kulkarni, of the Marathi Dialect Survey Department, Deccan College, under the able supervision of Professor A. M. Ghatage. The excellence of it will, I am sure, be appreciated by all readers whose gratitude will naturally go to them. I offer my thanks also to Padmabhushan Professor V. Raghavan, Jawaharlal New Fellow, for lending me for perusal a type-written copy of Sri V. Swaminathan's Introduction to his edition of Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. My thanks are also due to Pandit Raghunath Sharma, Retired Professor of the Varanasi Sanskrit University for showing me in manuscript some portions of his commentary *Ambākartrī* on the second *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* and to the staff of the Sanskrit University and to Pt. Vraj Vallabh Dvivedi, Lecturer of the said University in particular, for forwarding to me the printed forms of this commentary as they gradually came out of the press. This has been of great help to me in understanding the second *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. The greatest help which I received was from the authorities of the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics, Deccan College, beginning with Dr. S. M. Katre, the Director, who, by inviting me as Visiting Professor for short periods during four years in succession, enabled me to take advantage of the excellent library facilities of the Deccan College and of the presence there of different types of scholars. In fact, some portions of the present work were placed before scholars in the form of lectures at the Centre of Advanced Study in Linguistics. I am deeply grateful to Dr. S. M. Katre and his colleagues at the Centre for this invaluable help.

K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER.

St. Ral Jilling,
P.O. Padampuri,
Bhimtal, Dt. Naini Tal, U.P.
20-9-1969.

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Chapter I

1. BHARTṚHARI AND HIS WORKS.

Mahāntaḥ kavayaḥ santu
mahāntaḥ paṇḍitās tathā /
mahākavir mahāvidvān
eko Bhartṛharir mataḥ //

The above verse, of unknown authorship, is current among Sanskrit scholars in India. In it, Bhartṛhari is described as a poet and as a scholar. Its author obviously looked upon the three śatakas on *Nīti*, *Śṛṅgāra* and *Vairāgya* and grammatical works like the *Vākyapadīya* as compositions of the same Bhartṛhari, a controversial matter on which something will be said later. It is the author of the grammatical works who is the subject of this study. Bhartṛhari is a great name in Sanskrit literature, grammatical and philosophical, Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain. About his life, nothing definite is known. Many stories, recorded in commentaries and elsewhere, make him a King, a brother, sometimes of Vikramāditya and sometimes of Śūdraka, who renounces the world and becomes a *Sannyāsin* towards the end of his life. In other details, many of them super-natural, these stories differ from one another. One of the stories has been dramatised by Harihara in his *Bhartṛharinirveda*.[1] In it, Bhartṛhari is presented as a disciple of Gorakṣanātha from whom he learns Yoga and renounces the world. I-tsing, the Chinese pilgrim who visited India in the 7th century. A. D. records a tradition that Bhartṛhari "became seven times a priest and seven times returned to the laity".[2] True to the tradition of his renunciation, there is a cave of Bhartṛhari in Chunagarh fort near Benares and another in Ujjain. Prof. A. W. Jackson has described his visit to the latter in the JAOS.[3] These popular traditions and stories have no historical value whatsoever. These stories are ordinarily connected with Bhartṛhari, the author of the *śatakas* and not the grammarian-

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1 Kāvyamālā, 29. Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1912. Translation-Gray-JAOS. XXV.

2. J. Takakusu—*A record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archepelego.* Oxford, 1896, p. 179.

3. Vol. 23, pt. 2, p. 313 ff.

philosopher. When I-tsing, who definitely speaks about the grammarian Bhartṛhari and his grammatical works, records that he wavered seven times between worldly life and renunciation and even quotes a verse in which the grammarian laments his own vacillation, he reminds us of some of the verses of the *śatakas* where man's struggle between the attraction of love and women on the one hand and of the peace of renunciation, on the other, is vividly described.[4]

If reliable information about Bhartṛhari's life is not available, his date is not definitely known either. For long, many scholars[5] were content to rely on I-tsing's statement that at the time when he wrote the account of his travels in India, it was forty years since the death of Bhartṛhari. That would point to 651 A.D. as the date of his death and the years preceding it as the period of his literary work. Some scholars, however, like Liebich, Kunhan Raja, Yudhisthir Mimamsaka and Sadhu Ram had not accepted this view. It can no longer he held. There is enough evidence to push back Bhartṛhari's date by at least two centuries. H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar and Frauwallner have definitely shown, on the basis of a Tibetan translaion of Diṅnāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya,* and the *Traikālyaparīkṣā* now not available in Sanskrit, that Diṅnāga has made use of the *Kārikās* of *Kāṇḍas* II and III of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya.* Frauwallner has proposed the following chronological relation: Vasurāta (the *guru* of Bhartṛhari) 430-490 A.D., Bhartṛhari 450-510 A.D. and Diṅnāga 480-540 A.D. This conclusion seems to be a reasonable one in the present state of our knowledge, though it cannot be looked upon as final. The sequence of the three writers seems to be fully established, though the actual date of each may have to be modified in the light of further evidence.[6]

This conclusion relates, not only to the date of Bhartṛhari, but also to that of his *guru* Vasurāta. In verses 478-484 of the *Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍa* II, Bhartṛhari throws some light on the history of the Science of Grammar.[7] From these verses, we gather that the great

4. D. D. Kosambi—*The Epigrams attributed to Bhartṛhari.* Group I, 84, 85, 135, (Singhi Jain Series No. 23.)

5. For example, Das-Gupta and De–*A History of Sanskrit Literature*—p. 161.

6. For Bhartṛhari's date, see—H. R. Rangaswamy Iyengar—Bhartṛhari and Diṅnāga-J.B.B.R.A.S. n.s. 26, 1951; Fraunwallner-Diṅnāga, sein Werk und seiṅe Entwicklung, WZKSO, III, 1959, pp. 83 ff; Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO, V. 1961, p. 125; Dr. Kunhan Raja-I-tsing and Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (Dr. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, p. 285, 1936. Pt. Yudhisthir Mimamsaka-*Samskkṛta Vyākaraṇa Śāstra ka Itihāsa, Bhāga* I, pp. 340 ff; Prof. Sadhu Ram–Bhartṛhari's date—J.G.R. Institute, IX. pp. 136 ff.

Saṅgraha of Vyāḍi had ceased to be studied as grammarians became more and more averse to a complete mastery of their subject and began to look for abridgements. It was then that the great master Patañjali incorporated all the doctrines of that work in his *Mahābhāṣya*. But only good scholars could understand even this work of Patañjali, at once deep and lucid. Persons like Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa who relied on dry reasoning divorced from tradition completely distorted the *Mahābhāṣya* which was really a summary of the *Saṅgraha*. Things came to such a pass that only the text of that work was available among the Southerners. At that stage, Candrācārya and others, eager to grasp the true meaning of the *Bhāṣya*, obtained the true tradition from Parvata and elaborated it. The *guru* of Bhartṛhari mastered that tradition, did his own thinking and gathered together the results in a composition and it is on that that the *Vākyapadīya* is based. Commenting on *Vāk*. II. 480, Puṇyarāja says that Bhartṛhari wants to say that only his guru Vasurāta was capable of understanding the full meaning of the *Mahābhāṣya*.[8] While explaining *Vāk*. II. 483, which refers to the acquisition of the grammatical tradition from Parvata, he records a tradition that Parvata meant the hill Triliṅga, a part of the Trikūṭa range. Here lay the true grammatical tradition composed by Rāvaṇa and inscribed on stone. A *brahmarakṣas* brought it to Candrācārya, Vasurātaguru and others. These scholars learnt the genuine traditions and principles of *Vyākaraṇa* from it, taught them to their disciples and thus developed them.[9] Vasurātaguru further meditated upon them and gathered them together in one composition, on which the *Vākyapadīya* is based.[10] Thus, in this context, Puṇyarāja mentions Vasurāta as the teacher of Bhartṛhari three times. He does it again in the concluding summarising verses 54 and 55 of *Kāṇḍa* II where he repeats that Vasurāta gathered together the traditions in a composition for the sake of his disciple Bhartṛhari and instructed him to write his own work on the basis of that. In all, Puṇyarāja connects Vasurāta and Bhartṛhari as *guru* and *śiṣya* four times. This relationship is confirmed by a much earlier writer Siṃhasūri who, commenting on Mallavādin's *Nayacakra* definitely says that Vasurāta was the *guru* of Bhartṛhari.[11] Siṃhasūri was much nearer to the time of Bhartṛhari than Puṇyarāja and may be presumed to have inherited the genuine tradition.

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7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.

Works attributed to Bhartṛhari.

1. *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* (*dīpikā* ?)
2. *Vākyapadīya, Kāṇḍas* I, II, III
3. *Vṛtti* on *Vākyapadīya* I and II
4. *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*
5. *Śatakas* on *Nīti, Śṛṅgāra* and *Vairāgya.*
6. *Bhaṭṭikāvya.*

1. *Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā.* That Bhartṛhari wrote a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali is recorded by I-tsing and by some ancient Indian writers. We actually have a fragment of a commentary of Bhartṛhari on the *Mahābhāṣya* up to P. 1.1.53. There is only one manuscript of this fragment. It was formerly in Berlin and is now in Tübingen, West Germany. In the colophons of this manuscript, the name of the commentary is given variously as *Bhartṛhariṭīkā, Mahābhāṣyaṭīkā* and *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā.* This unique manuscript has been edited by Sri V. Swaminathan and is now being published by the Benares Hindu University. It has also been edited by Sarvashri K. V. Abhyankar and Acharya V. P. Limaye and is being published by the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. There is every reason to believe that it is a fragment of the work mentioned by I-tsing and referred to by some ancient Indian Aeāryas. I-tsing gives the size of the commentary as 25000 ślokas. The manuscript which we have is only a fragment and its extent is, therefore, much less. The quotations from it given by Kaiyyaṭa in his *Pradīpa*, Vardhamāna in his *Gaṇaratnamahodadhi*, Śaraṇadeva in his *Durghaṭavṛtti*, Annaṃbhaṭṭa in his *Udyotana*, Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa in his *Udyota* and Vaidyanātha in his *Chāyā* are actually found in the manuscript which we have.[12]

Though we possess only a fragment of this commentary, the question does arise as to what its original extent was. Did it cover the whole of the *Mahābhāṣya ?* Did I-tsing mean that the complete commentary had 25000 ślokas ? Vardhamāna tells us that Bhartṛhari wrote a commentary on the *Tripādī* of the *Mahābhāṣya.*[13] Did he mean by *Tripāḍī* the *Mahābhāṣya* on the first three *pādas* of the first *adhyāya* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī ?* Is there a reference to this work in the expression *Tripadī* used by *Helārāja* in one of the concluding verses of his commen-

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12. See V. Swaminathan—Bhartṛhari's authorship of the commentary on the Mahābhāṣya–The Adyar Library Bulletin, XXVII, pts. 1-4, pp. 59 ff.

13. See Texts.

tary on the 3rd *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* where he compares Bhartṛhari who covered the three worlds with the three *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya* to Viṣṇu who covered the three worlds with his three steps? In that verse, the word *tripadī* comes immediately after '*trikāṇḍī*. It is quite possible that '*tripadī only* refers to the *trikāṇḍī* itself, that is, the *Vākyapadīya* and not to another work.[14] Helārāja's intention may have been only to pay homage to Bhartṛhari, the author of the all-embracing (*trailokyagāminī*) *Trikāṇḍī*, that is, the *Vākyapadīya* by comparing it to the all-embracing three steps of Viṣṇu. As stated before, the fragment which we have does not even cover the whole of the first pāda of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, as it breaks off at 1.1.53. Its extent has been calculated roughly as about 5700 *ślokas*.[15] At that rate, the extent of the commentary on three *pādas* could be about 25000 *ślokas*, the figure mentioned by I-tsing for Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Cūrṇi*, that is, the *Mahābhāṣya*. Does it mean that even in the seventh century A.D. Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* was known to cover only a small portion of the work? One cannot say anything definite about this. Later writers like Puruṣottamadeva, Līlāśukamuni, Śaraṇadeva, Maitreyarakṣita and Sīradeva quote Bhartṛhari's views on the meaning of sūtras P. 1.3.21, 3.1.16, 3.2.188, 7.3.34 and 8.3,21; Some of these *sūtras* belong to much later portions of the *Aśṭādhyāyī* than the first three *pādas* of the first *adhyāya*.[16] But it is not clear whether these writers are referring to Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* dealing with these *sūtras* or to some other work of his dealing with the whole of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. They are not of much help in determining the extent of Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*.

As the only available manuscript of the fragment of the commentary is full of mistakes and as external aids for correcting them or for filling up the gaps are very limited, the text is unintelligible in many places. A perusal of it makes one regret that only a fragment should be available and that too in such an incorrect form. It throws light on the great erudition of the author, especially on his deep acquaintance with Vedic literature. What it says about '*ūha*' as one of the objects of the study of grammar is an example.[17] Another striking feature of the commentary is the very large number of alternative explanations of Mahābhāṣya passages which it contains, introduced by expressions like

14. See Texts.
15. Pt. Yudhisthir Mīmāṃsaka—op. cit. p. 353.
16. Pt. Y. Mīmāṃsaka, op. cit. p. 353-355.
17. See *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, pp. 5-8 (edition of K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye. B.O.R.I. 1967.)

'atrānekaṃ darśanam', anye manyante, eke manyante, apare manyante, tatra kecid āhuḥ, apare bruvate, apara āha, apare varṇayanti and so on. Here and there it indicates other readings of the *Mahābhāṣya*. It is not a word for word commentary of it. It is rather in the nature of observations and comments, sometimes fairly lengthy ones, on selected words and points raised in it. As it was the habit of Patañjali to raise points of interest to students of General Linguistics, the remarks of Bhartṛhari on these points are particularly valuable and make one regret all the more the unsatisfactory nature of the text.

2. The *Vākyapadīya*. I-tsing has recorded that Bhartṛhari had written a work called the *Vākya-discourse* and that it contained 700 *ślokas*. He further says that *Bhartṛhari* had himself written a commentary on it consisting of 7000 ślokas. He also records that Bhartṛhari had written another work called *'Peina'* in 3000 ślokas. In all these statements, I-tsing is referring to the *Vākyapadīya* which becomes *Vākya-discourse* in his description. The *Vākyapadīya* which we have has three *Kāṇḍas*, usually called *Brahmakāṇḍa* or *Āgamakāṇḍa*, *Vākyakāṇḍa* and *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* respectively. I-tsing's *Vākya-discourse* refers to the first two *kaṇḍas* and his *'Peina'* is the third *Prakīrṇakaṇḍa*. I-tsing may have heard the name of the third *Kāṇḍa* in its Prākṛt form *'Paiṇṇa'* < Prakīṇa. He noted it as 'Peina'. He treats it as a separate work, as some ancient Indian writers also do. Vardhamāna, for example, refers to Bhartṛhari as 'the author of the *Vākyapaḍīya* and the *Prakīrṇa*'.[18] Helārāja, in his commentary on *Vāk.* III, sometimes refers to his commentary on the first two *Kāṇḍas* (not available) as a commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*. But he was also aware that this *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa* was a continuation of the two *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya*.[19] Bhartṛhari himself, in stanza 485 of *Kāṇḍa* II, says that the grammatical traditions would be fully discussed in the third *Kāṇḍa*,[20] making it quite clear that the third *Kāṇḍa* is an integral part of the *Vākyapadīya*. This cannot be set aside by the mere fact that some writers chose to give special consideration to it.

It is not possible to take all that I-tsing says about Bhartṛhari and his works as correct in all details. We have already seen how the date of Bhartṛhari's death, as inferred from I-tsing's statement that it had taken place in 651.A.D, that is, forty years before 691.A.D, the year in which he wrote his account of his travels, cannot be correct as Bhartṛhari lived

18. See note 13.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.

at least two centuries earlier. What he says about Bhartṛhari's works seems to be based, not on first hand information but on hearsay. It is vague and at best only approximately true. He gives the size of the *Vākya-discourse,* that is, the *Vākyapadīya,* as 700 ślokas.[21] The text of these two *Kāṇḍas* which we have has about 634 of them. This figure cannot be looked upon as final, because there is doubt about some of them and also about some which are not included in this calculation, so that it is not impossible that the figure given by I-tsing may be correct. When it comes to the third *Kāṇḍa,* the *Prakīrṇa,* the divergence is much greater. I-tsing gives its size as 3000 *ślokas*[22], whereas the text which we have has about 1320 of them. Here again, we have reason to believe that the full text of this *Kāṇḍa* has not come down to us. What is more, Puṇyarāja tells us that even in his day, some portions of the work had got lost. Our text has fourteen sections (*samuddeśas*) named *Jāti, Dravya, Sambandha, Bhūyodravya, Guṇa, Dik, Sādhana, Kriyā, Kāla, Puruṣa, Upagraha, Saṃkhyā, Linga* and *Vṛtti.* Puṇyarāja gives the names of three more *samuddeśas* : *Lakṣaṇa, Bādhā* and *Upamā.* Of these three, the *Lakṣaṇa* is referred to in the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* II, considered to be Bhartṛhari's own commentary on his *Vākyapadīya,* a point which will be discussed in the course of this work. In the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk.* II.76, we are told that it would be explained in the *Lakṣaṇasamuddeśa,* with arguments for and against, that the principles of interpretation (*lakṣaṇa*) are twelve, six or twenty-four in number.[23] Referring to this statement, Puṇyarāja says that, either through loss of tradition or through the mistake of copyists, the *Lakṣaṇasamuddeśa* was not to be seen in the third *Kāṇḍa* any more,.[24] But it was known to the author of the *Vṛtti,* the oldest commentary which we have and attributed to Bhartṛhari himself and known as such to Maṇḍanamiśra, Somānanda, Utpalācārya, Abhinavagupta, Jayantabhaṭṭa and many others as will be shown later. While evplaining *Vāk.* II.77, which mentions, among other arguments, the *bādhā,* that is, the setting aside of what one would think of spontaneously or what was taught before in a general manner, for proving the reality of the individual word, Punyarāja informs us that the author of the *Vṛtti* has given many examples of it and quotes a sentence of the *Vṛtti* where it is declared that the subject of *bādhā* would be dealt with in detail in the *badhāsamuddeśa.*[25] Unfortunately, this portion of the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa*

21. J. Takakusu. Ibid, p. 180
22. J. Takakusu. Ibid, p. 180
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. See Texts.

II is missing in the only manuscript of that work which we have. But Puṇyarāja had the text before him because he quotes from it. *Bādhā-samuddeśa*, from its very name, must have been a part of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* where all the sections are named *samuddeśa*. Puṇyarāja does not say, in this case, that it was already lost in his time. In this connection, I am aware of the view of Prof. Sadhu Ram that *Lakṣaṇa* and *Bādhā* cannot possibly be subjects dealt with in a work like the *Vākyapadīya* and that the author of the *Vṛtti*, that is, *Bhartṛ-*hari, was thinking of a commentary which he intended to write on the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* of Jaimini and in which he intended to have sections called *Lakṣaṇasamuddeśa* and *bādhāsamuddeśa*.[26] This is pure speculation. From the way in which the *Vṛtti* refers to these two *samuddeśas*, one naturally gets the impression that they were part of the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. It is true that *Lakṣaṇa* and *Bādhā* are topics of the Mīmāṃsā, but they can be topics of *Vyākaraṇa* also. In what way Bhartṛhari brought these two topics into the *Vākhyapadīya*, we cannot say. *Vākya* is also a topic of Mīmaṃsā, but the whole of the second *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* is devoted to that topic. *Jāti*, *dravya*, and *guṇa* are well-known topics of Vaiśeṣika but they form topics of separate *samuddeśas* in the 3rd *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. The fact is that Bharatṛhari had his own point of view on the basis of which he might have brought these topics also in the third *Kāṇḍa*.

Puṇyarāja also refers to an *Upamāsamuddeśa* in his commentary on *Vāk*. II.126. which gives an alternative view on the meaning of words. From the way he refers to it, anybody would understand that it was also a part of the third *Kāṇḍa*.[27] All this has been said here in the course of our consideration of the statement of I-tsing that the '*Peina*' had three thousand *ślokas*. As there is a tradition that there were more sections in it than are available now, it would be unwarranted to dismiss I-tsing's statement as quite impossible. The missing sections may have contained a large number of *ślokas*, in which case what I-tsing was told may have been approximately correct.

The *Vākyapadīya* presents some texual and exegetical problems. Bhartṛhari himself says that his *Guru* had, after having mastered the grammatical tradition, laboriously gathered and developed by Candrācārya and others and after having thought deeply on the subject himself, composed some work setting forth the genuine traditions. Bhartṛhari

26. Prof. Sadhu Ram—Authorship of some *Kārikās* and fragments attributed to Bhartṛhari (Journal of the Gaṅganath Jha Research Institute vol. XIII, p. 71 ff.).

27. See Texts.

identifies the *Vakyapadīya* with these traditions. That is how I understand his statement: *praṇīto guruṇāsmākam ayam āgramasaṅgrahaḥ*[28] = this collection of traditions was composed by my *Guru*. Here Bhartṛhari wants to tell us that what he has written in the *Vākyapadīya* is based on his *Guru's* teachings. *Praṇītaḥ* implies that his *Guru* had not only orally taught him but had composed something. Unfortunately, we do not have what his *Guru* wrote. It would not be unjustified to suppose not only that Bhartṛhari had received a good many of the notions and doctrines of the *Vākyapadīya* from his *Guru*, but that the wording of many of his *kārikās* owes a good deal to what his *Guru* had written. It is also possible that he has incorporated into the *Vākyapadīya*, in their original form or in a modified form, some of the *kārikās* taken from the works of other Ācāryas. A very large number of *kārikās* from the *Vākyapadīya* or purporting to be from it are found quoted in later works, grammatical and philosophical, Brahmanical, Buddhist and Jain. Not only do many of them show variant readings, but some of them are not to be found in the available manuscripts of the *Vākyapadīya*. This fact, together with the tradition of lost portions of the work, raises the problem of the genuine text of the *Vākyapadīya*. It is a very big problem. An attempt to solve it can be made only after all the quotations will have been collected, historically classified and critically studied.

3. A commentary on *Vākyapadīya* I and II. Called *Vṛtti*, or *Vivaraṇa* or *Tīkā*, it is the oldest which we have on the *Vākyapadīya*. A tradition more than a thousand years old, attributes this commentary to Bhartṛhari himself. As this tradition has recently been called in question, the matter will be considered later in a separate section.

4. *Sabdadhātusamīkṣā*. Somānanda and Utpalācāya knew a work of Bhartṛhari bearing this name. It has not been found yet but the information which the two Kashmiri writers give on this work is of a very precise nature. Somānanda criticises Bhartṛhari for straying away from the main task of a grammarian, that of explaining the form of the words of the Sanskrit language and going in pursuit of higher knowledge which is irrelevant to his main task. He further says that Bhartṛhari has done this, not only in the *Vākyapadīya* but also in his *Samīkṣā* where he has set forth the socalled higher knowledge, namely, *Pyśyantī*.[29] While explaining this, his pupil and commentator Utpalācārya clarifies that *Samīkṣā* means the work called *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*

28. *Vāk*. II. 484.
29. See Texts.

where the learned Bhartṛhari has declared that the Ultimate Reality is not limited by Time and Space and quotes two verses from that work in support of that statement. It is interesting to note that one of these verses is the same as what appears usually as the first of the *Nītiśataka* also attributed to Bhartṛhari.[30] This is relevant to another question which will be discussed later, namely, whether Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Śatakas*, is the same as the grammarian Bhartṛhari. All that we have to note here is that Utpala is very definite about Bhartṛhari being the author of a work called *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* which like the *Vākyapadīya*, spoke about *Paśyantī* as that higher knowledge which leads to liberation. The name of the work is in accordance with the philosophy of Bhartṛhari. The name means : Investigation into the word as the *dhātu*, that is, the root-cause (the Ultimate Reality.) This title agrees with Bhartṛhari's *Śabdādvaita*, the doctrine that the Ultimate Reality from which the universe proceeds is of the nature of the word. Though we do not now possess this work, it is clear from the way in which Somānanda and Utpala speak about it that they knew it to be a work of Bhartṛhari and to deal with *Śabdādvaita*. Besides these two writers, one can refer to atleast one more who mentions Bhartṛhari as the author of the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* and actually quotes a śloka from it.[31] It may not be out of place to mention that the presence of the word *dhātu* in the title of the work reminds one of the titles of some Buddhist works such as *Dharmadhātupraveśa*, *Saviśuddhadharmadhātujñāna* and *Vajradhātumaṇḍala*. The significance, if any, of this resemblance has yet to be determined.

5. *The Subhāṣitatriśatī.* Thus, there is reasonable certainty of Bhartṛhari's authorship of (1) the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, (2) the *Vākyapadīya* (3) the commentary Vṛtti on *Kāṇḍas* I and II of the *Vākyapadīya* (subject to the discussion which will follow (4) the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā*. One cannot say the same thing about his authorship of some other works which have been attributed to him by tradition or by some individual writers. The most important of these is the *Subhāṣitatriśatī*, three centuries of stanzas on *Nīti*, *Śṛṅgāra* and *Vairāgya*. It will not be an exaggeration to say that while the author of the *Vākyapadīya* has chiefly been known in grammatical and philo-

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30. See Texts. Also M. K. Sharma. *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* (Journal of the Sri Venkateswara Oriental Institute, vol. I, pt. 3, pp. 65 off).

31. Prof. G. N. Sastri, in his 'The Philosophy of Word and Meaning' p. 61, quotes from N.P. (?) p. 60, the following : *Dhātusamīkṣāyāṃ brahmavitprakāṇḍair Bhartṛharibhir abhihitam : Śuddhattvaṃ prapañcasya na hetur anivṛttitah/ Iñānajñeyādirūpasya māyaiva jananī talaḥ//*

sophical circles, the author of these three centuries of poetical stanzas has been far more known among Sanskritists in general during the last many centuries. At the mention of the name of Bhartṛhari, an average Indian Sanskritist would immediately think of the three *śatakas* on *Nīti, Śṛṅgāra* and *Vairāgya*. It is not possible to say definitely whether I-tsing knew about the three *śatakas* or not, because he does not mention them nor does he refer to them. When he says about Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* that it fully treats of the principles of human life as well as of the grammatical science and also relates the reasons of the rise and decline of many families,"[32] one feels that such a remark about this grammatical work is as strange as what he says about the *Kāsikāvṛtti*, namely, that "it exposes the laws of the universe and the regulations of gods and men."[33] One feels that I-tsing is not speaking from first-hand knowledge, but only recording what he understood of what he had heard and what he had heard seems to have mixed up the three *śatakas* and the *Vākyapadīya*. A Bhartṛhari had already attained fame as a great poet (*mahākavi*) in the 10th century A.D., because Somadeva calls him so in his *Yaśastilakacampū*.[34] The Jain writer Merutuṅga of the 14th century A.D. says in his *Prabandha cintāmaṇi* that the poet Bhartṛhari wrote the *Vairāgyaśataka* and other poems.[35] There is a tradition that the Bhartṛhari who wrote the three *śatakas* is the same as the author of the *Vākyapadīya*. It is recorded in Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita's *Patañjalicaritam* which is, however, not an ancient work.[36] It is not easy to say how old this tradition is.

When one wants to examine whether there is any real basis for this identification, one is faced with many difficulties. The most important of them is that the text of the three centuries of stanzas exists in a bewildering number of versions in the large number of manuscripts found in the different parts of India. The extent of their disagreement can be judged from the fact that while the total number of stanzas in all the three śatakas should be only 300, if one counts all the distinct stanzas in the different versions, the number comes to 852. It is obvious that a very large number of stanzas have been added gradually to the original number at different times in the different parts of the country. To try to restore, if possible, the original text of the three *śatakas* in the midst of this bewildering multiplicity of versions

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32. J. Takakusu—A Record of Buddhist Religion, p. 178.
33. Ibid, p. 175.
34. Kāvyamālā 70, II, p. 113.
35. Merutuṅga — *Prabandhacintāmaṇi* p. 121. (Singhi Jain Series. Shantiniketan, Bengal, 1933.)
36. See Texts.

and interpolations is a gigantic task, requiring infinite patience and critical acumen. But the challenge did call forth a scholar of the required mettle in the person of the late D. D. Kosambi who plunged into the task with tremendous zeal and has published the results of his labour.[37] They are inconclusive. As to the author of the three *śatakas,* his conclusion is : "for all that, we still do not know who he was."[38] He also says : "The solution which I have proposed is that the collection is an anthology of verses believed to have been Bhartṛhari's by later writers.[39] As far as the stanzas of the three *śatakas* are concerned, they have been presented by the learned editor in three groups in the order of probability. They show growth over the centuries but with a substaantial nucleus which must have been original. This nucleus consists of 200 stanzas as follows: Unplaced 1-7; *Nīti* 8-76, *Sṛṅgāra* 77-147 and *Vaināgya* 148-200. This nucleus forms Group I. Groups II and III, consisting of 201-352 and 353-852 respectively, have been classified as 'doubtful' and 'miscellaneous'. The remaining 100 stanzas out of the original 300, it is presumed, are lying scattered in these two groups, but it is difficult to identify them. All the rest, that is, 552 stanzas are the interpolations which took place over the centuries and are distributed in the various versions and recensions. Only a perusal of Kosambi's Introduction to his critical edition referred to above can give an idea of the extreme complexity and confusion which prevail in regard to the text of the three *śatakas.*

It is difficult to add to or modify what Kosambi said nearly twenty years ago. I would, however, like to make just one remark. On the authority of I-tsing, he believed that the author of the *Vākyapadīya* died about 652 A.D. As he was of the opinion that the author of the stanzas included in Group I (most probably part of the original ones) could not have lived as late as the 7th century A.D., the identity of the two authors was naturally unacceptable to him. Secondly, as he believed, again on the authority of I-tsing, that the author of the *Vākyapadīya* was a Buddhist, he was sure that he could not have written the three *śatakas* which do not show any trace of Buddhism.[40] These two arguments are rather weak. As I have said earlier, the date of

37. (a) D. D. Kosambi—'The Epigrams attributed to Bhartṛhari'—Singhi Jain Series, No. 23, 1948.

(b) D. D. Kosambi—On the authorship of the Śatakatrayī, Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, XV, 1946, pp. 64-77.

38. Ibid—Introduction, p. 81.

39. Ibid—Introduction, p. 78.

40. Ibid—Introduction, p. 79.

Bhartṛhari must be pushed back atleast two centuries earlier than the 7th century A.D. He must be assigned to some date between those of Vasubandhu — Vasurāta and Diṅnāga and that would take us to the 5th century A.D. Nor need Bhartṛhari's alleged Buddhism stand in the way of our accepting identity of authorship of the *Vākyapadīya* and the three *śatakas,* because if it is certain that the latter was the work of a Brahmanical writer, it is equally certain that the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* must also have been a devout Brahmanical writer.

Not only are these two arguments of Kosambi against identify of authorship rather weak but there is also a circumstance which would point to an opposite conclusion. One of the stanzas of the three *śatakas* is the following —

"Dikkālādyanavacchinnānatacinmātramūrtaye |
svānubhūtyekamānāya namaḥ śāntāya tejase ||

This usually comes at the very beginning of the *Nītiśataka* in the different editions. Kosambi's rigorous critical eye has relegated it to Group II (No. 256). In other words, it is a doubtful stanza. Now we have the authority of Somānanda and Utpalācārya that it is a genuine composition of Bhartṛhari, not taken from any of the *śatakas,* but from his *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā.* As pointed out before, Somānanda criticizes Bhartṛhari for straying away from his function of being a grammarian and indulging in the quest for true knowledge not only in his *Vākyapadīya* but also in his (*Śabdadhātu*) *samīkṣā* and ultimately propounding, not true knowledge, but a mere semblance of it. While explaining this portion of the *Śivadṛṣti,* Utpala says that the learned Bhartṛhari, by speaking about *Paśyantī* only, has propounded a mere semblance of true knowledge and quotes two verses from the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* of which the above verse is one.[41] Somānanda criticizes this verse of Bhartṛhari word by word. If this stanza is a genuine one of the three *śatakas* attributed to Bhartṛhari, the fact that it is also a genuine part of another work of Bhartṛhari, the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* would point to identity of authorship of the three śatakas and the *Śabdadhātussamīkṣā* and ultimately of the *Vākyapadīya* also.

But the evidence is insufficient, not, in any case, enough to upset the conclusion of Kosambi that we really do not know who the author of the *śatakas* was.

41. See notes 29 and 30.

6. *Bhaṭṭikāvya.* The identification of the author of the *Vākyapadīya* and other grammatical works with the author of the Bhaṭṭikāvya probably rests on the supposition that Bhaṭṭi is derived from Bhartṛ, the first part of the name Bhartṛhari. This supposition was probably strengthened by the fact that like the grammatical works in question, the epic poem Bhaṭṭikāvya also could have been written only by a great grammarian. It was written mainly for the purpose of illustrating Pāṇini's grammatical rules. The author of the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* is definitely called Bhartṛhari in some commentaries on the poem such as the *Jayamaṅgalā* of Jayamaṅgala, the *Vaijayantī* of Kandarpaśarman, the *Bhaṭṭicandrikā* of Vidyāvinoda and the *Mugdhabodhinī* of Bharatamallika.[42] On the basis of these commentarial identifications, some scholars have considered the two authors to be the same, while others have refused to accept this identification. The fact is that, while some commentators may have identified the two authors, the main Indian tradition never did so. It looked upon the author of the Bhaṭṭikāvya as a separate person. Moreover, there is no reference in the grammatical works to the epic poem nor any reference in the latter to the grammatical works. Historians are inclined to place the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* in the 6th century A.D. whereas we saw how Bhartṛhari, the author of the grammatical works cannot be placed later than the 5th century A.D. It seems to me that the identification of the two is baseless and, is not worth serious discussion.

References to other works :

In some later works, the opinion of Bhartṛhari on some grammatical points is quoted. For example, Puruṣottamadeva says in his *Bhāṣāvṛtti* on P. 1.3.21 that according to Bhartṛhari, *gata, vidha* and *prakāra* are synonyms.[43] Similarly, in his commentary on P. 3.1.16, he says that, according to Bhartṛhari, the suffix *kyaṅ* can be added to the word *'dhūma'* also, so that we can get the word *dhūmāyate*.[44] Līlāśukamuni, in his commentary *Puruṣakāna* on *Daiva* says that according to Bhartṛhari, the suffix *'kta'* taught in P. 3.2.188 in the sense of the present tense sets aside the suffix *'kta'* in the past tense. These authors do not specify in which work of Bhartṛhari these views are expressed. It was thought by some that the work in question was the *Bhāgavṛtti*, a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* which existed in the old days and which is attributed to Bhartṛhari by Sṛṣṭidharācārya in

42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts

his commentary on the *Bhāṣāvṛtti* of Puruṣottamadeva. But the *Bhāgavṛtti*, judging from some of the available quotations from it, criticizes the *Kāśikāvṛtti* and so is posterior to that work. It cannot, therefore, he attributed to Bhartṛhari who is much earlier than the *Kāśikā*. Besides, there are references to Bhartṛhari and the author of the *Bhāgavṛtti* as two different persons. For example, Śaraṇadeva does so in his *Durghaṭavṛtti*. Sīradeva, in his *Paribhāṣāvṛtti* says that the *Bhāgavṛtti* quotes Bhartṛhari. All that we can say then is that probably Bhartṛhari had written some work explaining the *sūtras* of Pāṇini.

Yāmunācārya, in his *Siddhitraya*, includes the name of Bhartṛhari in the long list of those who have written on *Vedānta*. Did he write a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* also ?[45]

45. See Texts.

2. THE COMMENTARIES ON THE *VĀKYAPADĪYA*.

a. The *Vṛtti*.

The basic portion of the *Vākyapadīya* in its three *Kāṇḍas* consists of *Kārikās*, stanzas in the *anuṣṭup* metre. On these *Kārikās*, four ancient commentaries are available, none of which is complete. The oldest of them is called *Vṛtti* or *Ṭīkā* and it covers only the first two *Kāṇḍas*. While it is available in a complete form as far as the first *Kāṇḍa* is concerned, it is full of gaps, some of them very large, for the second *Kāṇḍa*. In the manuscripts, the author's name is given as Harivṛṣabha. For the second *Kāṇḍa*, we have, besides the above-mentioned commentary, that of Puṇyarāja. For the third *Kāṇḍa*, the commentary of Helārāja is available. It has gaps in two places and in the manuscripts, they have been filled up with the commentary of one Phullarāja. Lastly, we have the commentary called *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva on the first *Kāṇḍa* and the *Vṛtti* thereon.

As far as the first commentary *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa I is concerned, a modified form of it called *Vākyapadīyaprakāśa* had already been published in Benares in 1887[1] and wrongly attributed to Puṇyarāja, inspite of the clear mention of Harivṛṣabha as the author in the colophon at the end of *Kāṇḍa I*. The genuine text of the Vṛtti, not only on *Kāṇḍa* I but also on the initial portion of *Kaṇḍa II* was edited by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri.[2] In his learned Sanskrit Introduction to his edition, he has critically examined the relation between the modified form of the Vṛtti called *Vākyapadīyaprakāśa*, published earlier in Benares and the genuine *Vṛtti*, published by himself and has come to the conclusion that the former is an abridgment and an adaptation of the genuine *Vṛtti*. I fully accept his conclusions. I do not, therefore, regard it as a fifth ancient commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*.

But there is a big problem to be solved in regard to the real *Vṛtti*, first published by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri in 1934 and by myself in

1. Benares Sanskrit Series, Nos. 11, 19 and 24, 1887.

2. Pt. Charu Deva Shastri—Vākyapadīya with (extracts from) the commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva—Ram Lal Kapoor Trust, Lahore 1934.

1966, with the full text of the *Paddhati*.[3] Is it a commentary by one Harivṛṣabha on the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari which consisted of *Kārikās* only or is it a part of *Vākyapadīya* itself, which, in that case, must have consisted of stanzas plus the commentary on them, written by Bhartṛhari or Hari for short, sometimes referred to as Harivṛṣabha as a mark of respect? Pt. Charu Deva Shastri, the first editor of the genuine *Vṛtti*, considered that the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* together constituted the *Vākyapadīya* and that the author of both was, therefore, Bhartṛhari. This ascription of both to Bhartṛhari was generally accepted by scholars. It is not that doubts had not occurred to students of the *Vṛtti*. They had occurred to me and I know of some others who had expressed their doubts to me. But they were just passing doubts. Recently, however, Dr. M. Biardeau has, in the Introduction to her French translation of *Kāṇḍa* I with the *Vṛtti*, challenged the attribution of the *Vṛtti* also to Bhartṛhari. She has expressed the opinion that the *Vṛtti* is by Harivṛṣabha whose name is mentioned in the colophons of the manuscripts and who was a different person from Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Kārikās*.[3a] It is now necessary to review the whole question, so that one may know where one stands. I do not consider it worth one's while to discuss seriously the view that Harivṛṣabha, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja are three names of one and the same person, namely, Helārāja. According to this view, we have one complete ancient commentary on the *Kārikās* by Helārāja. I do not accept this view. I do not see any reason for not accepting what they claim to be, namely, three different commentaries by three different persons.[4]

That Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Kārikās*, had himself written a commentary on *Vākyapadīya* I and II is mentioned by the Chinese pilgrim I-tsing, who visited India in the 7th century A.D.[5] Though it is now clear that what I-tsing has said about Bhartṛhari is incorrect in some respects, as, for example, in the matter of the date of his death, it is not necessary to discard his testimony as altogether incredible. One can make a critical use of it. He says that the first two *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya* contained 700 ślokas and that the commentary on them by the author himself contained 7000 *ślokas*. The extent of the

3. *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, with the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva (Deccan College Monograph Series, 32, 1966).

3a. M. Biardeau—*Vākyapadīya, Brahmakāṇḍa*, avec la *Vṛtti* de Harivṛṣabha Traduction, Introduction et notes. Publication de l' Institut de Civilisation indienne, fascicule 24, Paris, de Boccard, 1964.

4. Dr. K. D. Dvivedi—*Arthavijñān aur Vyākaraṇadarśan*, p. 8 (Hindustani Academy, Allahabad, 1961.)

5. J. Takakusu—op. cit. p. 180.

text, as recorded by him, agrees approximately, with that of the two *Kāṇḍas* which we have. As for the size of the commentary, it is difficult to say whether I-tsing has reported correctly or not, because what we have is incomplete. The *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* II, available only in one manuscript, is full of gaps, sometimes long ones. The work is in prose with many quotations, in verse or in prose. I-tsing, by saying that the commentary contained 7000 *ślokas*, could not have meant that it was composed in verse. It has long been the practice in India to calculate the extent of even prose works in *ślokas*, taking thirty-two syllables as equal to one *śloka*. In the absence of the complete *Vṛtti*, there is no need to reject I-tsing's statement as impossible. All that we have to note now is that in the 7th century A.D. I-tsing was informed that Bhartṛhari had written his own commentary on *Kāṇḍas* I and II. Is that the commentary which we have ? That is the problem. A very important problem too, as our interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya* would depend very much on how we answer this question.

The Kārikās and the Vṛtti are by the same author.

Pt. Charu Deva Shastri who edited the authentic text of the *Vṛtti* for the first time has drawn attention to the colophon at the end of the first Kāṇḍa, consisting of the *Kārikās* and the commentary, in all the manuscripts. It runs as follows —

> "*Iti Śrīharivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇaviracite Vākyapadīye āgamasamuccayo nāma prathamakāṇḍam samāptam.*"

This colophon, coming at the end of the manuscript containing both the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*, gives the name *Vākyapadīya* to both of them taken together. If that is so, it follows that both have been written by the same person. And that person, named Harivṛṣabha in the colophon, is no other than Hari, that is, Bhartṛhari, Vṛṣabha being added as a mark of respect. It is true that in the colophons of the manuscripts of the *Kārikās* only, the author's name is usually given as Bhagavadbhartṛhari, but that does not mean that Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha are not the same person. In fact, the colophon of one of the manuscripts of the *Kārikās* only reads as follows—

> "*Iti Śrīmadbhagavadbhartṛharivṛṣabhamahāvaiyākaraṇaviracite.*[6]

Here the author's name is given as Bhartṛharivṛṣabha, confirming that

6. Ms 5026 = Burnell, 307, India Office Library, London. See Wilhelm Rau- Uber sechs Handschriften des Vākyapadīya, Oriens, vol. 15, pp. 386-388.

Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha are the same person. It is true that colophons of Sanskrit manuscripts have been found frequently to contain errors and have, therefore, to be used with caution. One cannot, however, ignore them. After all, it is chiefly on the basis of colophons of manuscripts that one can attribute the *Vṛtti* to a separate person called Harivṛṣabha. It is chiefly the colophons of manuscripts which have given us the names of the works and authors which figure in any History of Sanskrit Literature.

Another argument[7] advanced by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri in favour of the identity of authorship of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* is that nowhere does the *Vṛtti* record any variant reading in the *Kārikās* whereas later commentators like Helārāja do.[8] One must admit that if there is an interval of time between an author and his commentator, variant readings of the original text commented upon are more likely to have arisen.

The view that the two authors are identical is not based solely on colophons of manuscripts or the absence of variant readings in the *Vṛtti*. Their evidence is corroborated by references in later literature. Quotations from and references to the *Kārikās* in later literature are legion. But we are here concerned with the *Vṛtti* and here the position is that for the last one thousand two hundred years atleast, the *Vṛtti* which we now have has been looked upon and used by very eminent Ācāryas of Ancient India as Bhartṛhari's own commentary on his *Kārikās*. Some examples are given below.

A. Maṇḍana Miśra (viith—viiith century A.D. ?) quotes the *Kārikās* of Vāk. I, 82-84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 90-91 in his *Sphoṭasiddhi*.[9] More relevant to our purpose is the fact that there are several indications in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* which make one think that Maṇḍana Miśra knew the *Vṛtti* also and that he looked upon it as the work of Bhartṛhari himself. Here are a few of them.

(a) It is stated in *Kārikā* 18. with commentary of the *Sphoṭasiddhi* that the sounds which the speaker utters differ from one another according to difference in intention and the consequent difference in the effort to manifest different *sphoṭas* even though the movements of the

7. Vāk. b. I. p. 17 (*Upodghāta*).

8. See Vāk. III, pt. 1, p. 35, l, 10; p. 60, ll. 13-15. (Deccan College Monograph Series, 21, 1963).

9. Maṇḍana Miśra-*Sphoṭasiddhi*, pp. 43, 53, 54, 53, 49, 49-53 (Deccan College Building Centenary Series, 25, 1966).

vocal organs may be the same. That the sounds differ from one another is mentioned in Vāk. I. 88. That the difference is due to difference in intention and the consequent difference in the effort of the speaker is not mentioned in the *Kārikā* portion of the *Vākyapadīya*, but in the *Vṛtti* portion. It is mentioned on as many as three occasions.[10] It is reasonable to suppose that Maṇḍana Miśra has taken the idea from the *Vṛtti* and has incorporated it in *Kārikā* 18 with commentary of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*.

(b) According to the *sphoṭa* doctrine, we ordinary mortals suffer from an incapacity to grasp the *sphoṭa* in any other way than through the sounds which have differentiation and sequence. We can learn only through the teaching of others. It is those who depend upon others for cognising the *sphoṭa* (*paradarśitadarśinaḥ*) that suffer from this incapacity. This idea is not mentioned in any *Kārikā* of the *Vākyapadīya*, but it is found in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 85. It is reasonable to think that Mandana is only repeating in *Kārikā* 21. with commentary of the *Sphoṭasiddhi* what the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 85 says. Both there and in Maṇḍana's commentary on *Kārikā* 21 of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, a distinction is made between us ordinary mortals and the *Ṛṣis*.[11]

(c) Again, I have no doubt that the two analogies given by Maṇḍana in the commentary on *Kārikā* 19. of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, that of mistaking a tree for an elephant from a distance and that of mistaking a rope in a dark room for a snake are taken from the *Vṛtti* on Vāk I. 89. This *Kārikā* of the *Vākyapadīya* mentions only such an error in general, but does not specify it. It is the *Vṛtti* on it which gives the concrete examples and they are reproduced by Maṇḍana in the commentary on *Kārikā* 19 of the *Sphoṭasiddhi*.

(d) It is well-known that the *Vṛtti* on the *Vākyapadīya* abounds in quotations, sometimes in verse and sometimes in prose, from previous works. One of these quotations is reproduced in the *Sphoṭasiddhi*, next to the very *Kārikā* in the *Vṛtti* of which the quotation occurs in the *Vākyapadīya*. For me, this is a strong indication that Maṇḍana Miśra took this from the *Vṛtti* on this *Kārikā* and not from the source from which the author of the *Vṛtti* himself took it. This is the *śloka* which tells us that consciousness and the word have this point in common, namely, that till they are differentiated, they cannot enter into

10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.

usage, cannot play any part in worldly transactions.[12] It is clear from the way in which Maṇḍana makes use of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* of the *Vākyapadīya* that he looked upon them as parts of the same work and, therefore, written by the same author.

B. Somānanda (9th century A.D.) criticizes in his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, Āhnika II,[13] the *Śabdādvaita* of the grammarians. It is the *Vākyapadīya* which he quotes for the purpose of refutation.[14] Immediately after quoting Vāk. I. 1 and 115 [123], he quotes, as though coming from the same work, the first half of the following stanza —

"Avibhāgā tu paśyantī sarvataḥ saṃhṛtakramā/

Svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ sūkṣmā vāg anapāyinī//[15]

Now this stanza is a quotation in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 134 [142], but Somānanda obviously looked upon it as coming from the same work as the previous quotation, that is, the *Vākyapadīya*, a clear indication that he looked upon the *Vṛtti* as part of the *Vākyapadīya*. It is the conception of *Paśyantī* embodied in this verse quoted in the *Vṛtti* which is analysed word for word and criticized by Somānanda, with the full consciousness that he was criticising, Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Vākyapadīya*.

C. One is led to the same conclusion in a still stronger manner from the way in which Utpalācārya (9th-10th century A.D.), a disciple of Somānanda and the commentator of the *Śivadṛṣti* quotes from our *Vṛtti*. He obviously knew it and looked upon it as the work of the author of the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*. Commenting upon Somānanda's quotation of Vak. I. 1, he says—

"Asatyavibhakānyarūpopagrāhitā vivartaḥ[16]

This is part of the sentence of the *Vṛtti* giving the definition of *vivarta*.[17] The interest of this quotation is that it is from the *Vṛtti* proper, that is, from the prose portion of it. Utpala makes other quotations also from the *Vṛtti* proper :

12. See Texts.
13. Somānanda—*Sivadṛṣṭi* (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies LIV.)
14. See Texts.
15. Ibid, p. 44.
16. Ibid, p. 44.
17. Vāk. I, p. 8, 1. 3. (Deccan College Monograph Series 32, 1966).

'Pratilabdhasamādhānā ca.'[18]
'Viśuddhā ca'[19]
'Praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca'[20]
'Pratisaṃhṛtakramāpyantaḥ satyapyabhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī.[21]

All these little phrases are found in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 134 [142].[22] So is the verse

"Sthāneṣu vivṛte vāyau kṛtavarṇaparigrahā /
Vaikharī vāk prayoktṛṇāṃ prāṇavṛttinibandhanā //

which is a quotation in the same *Vṛtti* from some older work, most probably *Itihāsa* mentioned there a little earlier. Somānanda is obviously criticising Bhartṛhari as the *Kārikā* quotations show and Utpala, while quoting from the *Vṛtti* which we have does not give the slightest hint that he was quoting from some other author than Bhartṛhari or some other work than the *Vākyapadīya*.

D. If there is any lingering doubt that these Kashmiri writers who quote from the *Vṛtti* thought of anybody else than Bhartṛhari, it is dispelled by another writer belonging to the same tradition, the greatest of them all, namely, Abhinavaguptācārya who says—

Tadāha tatrabhavān Bhartṛhariḥ—Pratisaṃhṛtakramāntaḥ satyapyabhede samāviṣṭakramaśaktiḥ paśyantī. Sā acalā ca calā pratilabddhasamādhānā ca sanniviṣṭajñeyākārā pratilīnākārā nirākārā ca, paricchinnārthapratyavabhāsā praśāntapratyavabhāsā ca."[23]

This is a fairly long quotation from the *Vṛtti*[24] and it is definitely associated with Bhartṛhari. There are other quotations from the *Vṛtti* in the same work, introduced by the word *Tatrabhavān*, Abhinavagupta's favourite way of referring to Bhartṛhari. There can be no

18. *Sivadṛṣṭi*, p. 38. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies LIV).
19. Ibid, p. 38.
20. Ibid, p. 39.
21. Ibid, p. 39.
22. Vāk. I. pp. 214-215 (Deccan College Monograph Series, 32, 1966.)
23. *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, vol. II, p. 226. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies LXII.)
24. Vāk. I. pp. 214-215 (Deccan College Monograph Series, 32.)

doubt that he, his *paramaguru* Utpala and the still earlier Somānanda, all looked upon the *Vṛtti* which we have as the work of Bhartṛhari.

E. Coming now from Kashmir Śaiva writers to grammarians, Helārāja who was one of the teachers of Abhinavagupta and who had written a commentary on the first two Kāṇḍas of the *Vākyapadīya* on the basis of the *Vṛtti* (*yathāvṛtti*) as he himself says,[25] quotes or refers to the *Vṛtti* which we have in his commentary on Kaṇḍa III. For example—

(i) *Ata eva purākalpe 'nṛtādibhir ivāpabhraṃśair api rahitā vāg āsīd iti brahmakāṇḍa uktam.*[26]

This is a clear reference to the *Vṛtti on* Vāk. I. 146 [154], p. 233 which runs as follows—

> *"Śrūyate purākalpe svaśarīrajyotiṣām manuṣyāṇāṃ yathaivā-nṛtādibhir asaṃkīrṇā vāg āsīt tathā sarvair apabhraṃśaiḥ."*

(ii) *Tathā ca vidyāvidyāpravibhāgam apravibhāgam brahmeti brahmakāṇḍa uktam."*[27]

This may be compared with the following phrase from the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 1 (p. 1-2).

> *'Vidyāvidyāpravibhāgarūpam apravibhāgam....brahma.....*

(iii) *Tathā ca yadadhiṣṭānā śrutayaḥ pratyāyyam artham abhiniviśanta iti brahmakāṇḍa abhihitam".*[28]

This is an echo of

> *"Yadadhiṣṭhānā yadupāśrayā yadādhārāḥ śrutayaḥ pratyāyyam arthaṃ pratipadyante tasya nimittatvaṃ* (Vāk. I. p. 101, l. 5).

What should be noted in the three quotations given above from Helārāja is that, in all of them, the *Vṛtti* is designated as the *Brahmakāṇḍa*, as in the colophons of the manuscripts. For him, the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* together constitute the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. In other words, he regard-

25. Vāk. III, pt. 1, p. 1, l. 7 (Deccan College Monograph Series 21.)
26. Ibid, p. 143, l. 14.
27. Ibid, p. 169, l. 6-7.
28. Vāk. C. p. 202.

ed both as having been written by the same author. Many sentences of Helārāja's commentary on the IIIrd *Kāṇḍa* are either *verbatim* reproductions or echoes of those in the *Vṛtti*, even when they do not appear as quotations. For example—

(iv) *"Yadā tvavayavaprabandhaḥ krameṇopalabdho bhavati atha śabdajātiviśeṣopādhiyuktā vyavahārā avatiṣṭhante"*[29] is a reproduction of the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 23, p. 55, l. 6-7. There are many passages of this kind.

F. Puṇyarāja's (11th-12th century A.D.?) identification of the *Vṛtti* which we have as the commentary of Bhartṛhari is even more explicit. He frequently refers to Bhartṛhari as the *Ṭīkākāra* (the Commentator), whether because of the latter's *'ṭīkā'* on the *Mahābhāṣya* or of the *Vṛtti* on the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*, is not clear. In his commentary on Vāk. II. 77-83, he says—

> *"Eteṣāṃ ca vitatya sopapattikaṃ sanidarśanaṃ svarūpaṃ padakāṇḍe vinirdiṣṭam iti granthakṛtaiva pratipāditam."*[30]

Here Puṇyarāja informs us that the author, that is, Bhartṛhari has, in his commentary, told us himself that he has explained in detail (*vitatya*) with all arguments and examples, the maxims of the Mīmāṃsā in the sections dealing with maxims (*lakṣaṇasamuddeśa*) of the chapter dealing with the individual word (*padakāṇḍa*). This is an obvious reference to the following passage found in our *Vṛtti*—

> *"Tatra dvādaśa ṣaṭ caturviṃśatir vā lakṣaṇānīti lakṣaṇasamuddeśe sāpadeśaṃ savirodhaṃ vistareṇa vyākhyāsyate."*[31]

Similarly, Puṇyarāja says

> *"Yat punar anena vṛttāv uktam udāharaṇamātram etad anyāny api vākyalakṣaṇāni darśayiṣyatīti tad vārttikakārīyalakṣaṇāder antarbhāvam apekṣyeti mantavyam"*[32]

Here there is a reference to Bhartṛhari's *Vṛtti*, but, unfortunately, we cannot verify this reference because the only manuscript of our *Vṛtti* begins with *Kārikā* 13 for *Kāṇḍa II*. The beginning is missing. The

29. Vāk. III, pt. 1, p. 18, l. 9-10 (D.C.M. Series 21, 1963).
30. Vāk. b. II, p. 46.
31. Ibid, II, p. 76.
32. Ibid, II, p. 50.

quotation which Puṇyarāja gives must have been taken from the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* II. 1-2. The same thing can be said about another quotation from the *Vṛtti* by Puṇyarāja.

> "*Esā ca ṭīkākṛtā sa ca tulyabaleṣu asaṃbhavād ityādinā bahuprakārā darśitā*".[33]

There is a big gap in our available *Vṛtti* from II. 77 to II. 153 and the above quotation was probably taken from this missing portion. But it is immaterial for our present purpose. The one quotation which has been traced in our present *Vṛtti* is quite adequate to show that for Puṇyarāja, it was the work of Bhartṛhari.

G. Among non-grammatical writers who considered the *Vṛtti* as part of the *Vākyapadīyam,* is Mammaṭa (end of the 11th century A.D.) who says in his *Kāvyaprakāśa*—

> "*Uktaṃ ca Vākyapadīye : na hi gauḥ svarūpeṇa gaur nāpyagauḥ gotvābhisaṃbandhāt tu gaur iti.*"[34]

The passage quoted is in prose and so it must be from the *Vṛtti* which has been identified with the *Vākyapadīya* by Mammaṭa.

H. Jayantabhaṭṭa (9th century A.D.), the author of the *Nyāyamañjarī* does the same. After having quoted Vāk. I. 1.

> "*Anādinidhanam brahma śabdatattvaṃ yadakṣaram /*
> *Vivartate'rthabhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ //*

he asks—

> "*Yat tu nityaṃ vā kiñcit tac chabdatattvam ityatra kā yuktiḥ* = whatever may be eternal, what reason is there for considering it to be the Word-Principle ?

And then says—

> "*Āha śabdopagrāhyatayā śabdatattvam*"[35]

This phrase, as the word '*āha*' indicates is a quotation and it is a quotation from the *Vṛtti* on Vāk I. 1. (p. 7.l.1.) From the way in

33. Ibid, II, p. 50.
34. *Kāvyaprakāśa* II, p. 33 (B.O.R.I. Edition).
35. Jayantabhaṭṭa—*Nyāyamañjarī*, pt. 2, p. 99 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 106).

which he says *'āha'* it is clear that he considered the authors of the *Kārikā* quoted and the phrase quoted to be the same, namely Bhartṛhari.

I. As for Vṛṣabhadeva (date uncertain) who has commented upon the *Kārikās* as well as the *Vṛtti*, there is no doubt at all that, for him, they together constituted a single work called *Vākyapadīya* on which he proposed to write a commentary.

"Kriyate paddhatir eṣā Vākyapadīyodadheḥ sugamā"[36]

If there is any doubt on this point, he removes it in the course of his commentary. While explaining the last part of the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 43

"Idam ācāryaiḥ śabdānuśāsanaṃ prakrāntaṃ anugamyate"[37] = "This science of the formation of words, set forth by the great teachers, is being followed", he adds—

'tan mayānugamyata iti'[38] = it is being followed by *me*

The *'mayā'* here naturally refers to the author of the *Vṛtti*. Introducing his comment on the next verse, Vṛṣabha says—

'Tadanugamanaṃ kurvan prathamataḥ śabdasya svarūpaṃ āha[39] = In following it, he first declares the nature of the word.

It is clear that according to Vṛṣabha, it is the person referred to by *'mayā'*, that is, the author of the *Vṛtti*, who is writing the next *Kārikā*. In other words, the *Vṛtti* and the *Kārikās* were written by the same person.

The oldest writer who shows an acquaintance with the *Vṛtti* among those who have been mentioned in the foregoing pages is Maṇḍana Miśra. We may yet come across older writers who knew it. If knowledge of a quotation in the *Vṛtti* may be taken as evidence of a knowledge of the *Vṛtti*, then Diṅāga must have known it, because he has made use of not only, the *Kārikās* of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa* of the IIIrd *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadiya* in his *Traikālyaparīkṣā* but also of two stanzas quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 1. As there is a possibility of Diṅnāga and the *Vṛtti* quoting from an unknown common source, this

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36. Vāk. I. p. 1, l. 8. (D. C. M. S. 32, 1966).
37. Ibid, p. 100, l. 2.
38. Ibid, p. 100, l. 19.
39. Ibid, p. 100, l. 20.

is not as good evidence as the borrowing or the making use of a prose passage of the *Vṛtti* would be.

This conclusion to which we are led by a consideration of colophons of manuscripts and references in later literature is further strengthened by the presence of some parallel passages in our *Vṛtti* and the available fragment of the commentary of Bhartṛhari on the *Mahābhāṣya*. Two such parallel passages have been pointed out by Mr. Swaminathan, the editor of the fragment[40] and a third one by Pt. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka.[41] Adding a few which I have myself noticed, I give them all below for the consideration of scholars.

(i) *Evam idam ūhyam idam anūhyam iti nyāyād avasthite liṅgavacanavibhaktīnāṃ samyag viniyogo vyākaraṇasya vyāpāraḥ*"[42] This may be compared with the following from the *Vṛtti*—

"*Idam ūhyam idam anūhyam iti nyāyād avasthite saṃyagvipariṇatau liṅgavacanādīnām vyākaraṇaṃ nibandhanam.*[43]

(ii) "*Sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvanis tasya vyāyāmād upajāyate.*"[44] to which may be compared the following from the *Vṛtti.*

"*Sphoṭaḥ śabdo dhvanis tasya vyāyāma upajāyate*".[45]

The interesting point here is that in both the *Vṛtti* and the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, this is given as a quotation either from the *Vārttika* or the *Mahābhāṣya*, but it is not found there, especially the striking word *Vyāyāma*. That they should resemble each other in having this sentence containing this particular word, not found in the existing *Vārttikas* or *Mahābhāṣya* is thought-provoking.

(iii) *Yadi tu goṇīśabdo 'pi nimittāntarāt sāsnādimati prayujyeta goṇīva goṇīti sādhur eva syāt. Aśve vāsvaśabdaṃ dhanābhāvadvārakaṃ prayuñjīta sa sādhur eva.*"[46]

40. V. Swaminathan—Bhartṛhari's authorship of the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* (The Adyar Library Bulletin, vol. XXVII, pts. I-IV, p. 59 ff.

41. Pt. Yudhiṣṭhira Mīmāṃsaka—*Vyākaraṇa Śāstra ka Itihās, Bhāg* 1, p. 347, (Ajmer, Vi. Saṃ 2020). This work in two volumes is a collection and arrangement of an enormous number of data on the history of Sanskrit Grammar. Though there can be difference of opinion about the dates of the very early writers, the author's arrangement of the data is valuable as far as the sequence of the writers is concerned.

42. *Mahābhāṣyadipikā*, p. 7, 1. 7-8 (B.O.R.I., P.G. & R.D. Series 8).

43. Vāk. p. 40, 1. 3.

44. *Mahābhāṣyadipikā*, p. 4, 1. 22.

45. Vāk. I, p. 62, 1. 8.

46. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* p. 11, 1. 10-11.

To this, corresponds the following *Vṛtti* passage.

> *"Goṇīveyaṃ goṇīti bahukṣīradhāraṇādiviṣayād āvapanatvasāmānyād abhidhīyate. Tathāvidyamānaṃ svaṃ asya so'yam asva iti."*[47]

(iv) *Sa ca nādaḥ śrotrasyānugrahe vartate. Tadanugṛhītaṃ śrotraṃ śabdopalabdhau samarthaṃ bhavati. Yathākṣṇor añjanam ityeke."*[48]

This is very similar to the following *Vṛtti* passages—

> *"Dhvanir upalabhyamānaḥ śrotram saṁskaroti; tacca saṁskriyamāṇam śabdopalabdhau dvāratāṁ pratipadyate.*[49]

Tathāñjanādidravyaṃ cakṣur eva saṃskaroti."[50]

(v) *'Yathā prokṣaṇaṃ pṛthivyā eva na ghrāṇasya'.*[51]

This is akin to the following *Vṛtti* statement.

> *"Pṛthivyāścodakena gandhapratipattikāle dṛṣṭo na ghrāṇendriyasya."*[52]

The *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa II* has also such parallel passages. For example—

> *"Yathaiva gataṃ gotvam evam ingitādyapy arthato mahiṣādiṣu dṛṣṭam. Vyutpattyāpi Karmaṇy āśrīyamāṇe gamivat viśeṣaṇaṃ durākhyānam upādadāno gacchati garjati gadati vā gaur iti."*[53]

Of the above, the following *Vṛtti* passage is an echo—

> *Yathaiva hi gamikriyā jātyantaraikārthasamavāyinībhyo gamikriyābhyo 'tyantabhinnā tulyarūpatvavidhau tvantareṇaiva gamim abhidhīyamānā gauritiśabdavyutpattikarmaṇi nimittatvenāśrīyate tathaiva girati garjati gadati ityevamādayaḥ sādhāraṇāḥ sāmānyaśabdanibandhanāḥ kriyāviśeṣās tais tair ācāryair gośabdavyutpādanakriyāyāṃ parigṛhītāḥ."*[54]

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47. Vāk. I, p. 230, l. 2.
48. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 20, l. 16-17.
49. Vāk. I, p. 145, l. 2-3.
50. Ibid, p. 145, l. 11.
51. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 20, l. 17
52. Vāk. I, p. 146, l. 1-2.
53. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 3, l. 1-3.
54 Vāk. b. II. 174.

Sometimes the idea is the same even though the words of the two passages may be different as in the following—

> *"Yastvādhyātmika indriyākhyaḥ prakāśaḥ sa ātmānam aprakāsayan bāhyam artham prakāśayati".*[55]

This expresses the same idea as the following *Vṛtti* sentence—

> *"Indriyāṇi tu śeṣibhāvamātrasaṃsparśenāsaṃsṛṭānyaparichinnatvalakṣaṇāni viṣayopalabdhau śeṣabhāvam upagacchanti."*[56]

Finally, it may be mentioned that Acharya V. P. Limaye has pointed out that both the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* and our *Vṛtti* refer to the views of one Dhyānagrahakāra or Dhyānakāra, the author of a lost grammatical work called *Dhyānagraha* or *Dhyāna*, for short. He remarks : "Incidentally, the identity of *Dhyānagraha* and *Dhyāna* and its solitary reference both in the *Dīpikā* and in the *Svopajñavṛtti* on the *Vākyapadīya* may also go to confirm or to at least strengthen the possibility of being a genuine commentary by Bhartṛhari on his own *Vākyapadīya*."[57] Bhāmaha also refers to a work called *Dhyānagraha* in stanzas 1-3 of the VI^th^ *Pariccheda* of his *Kāvyālaṅkāra* and says that it is a big boat for crossing the ocean of Grammar.[58] Of course, this does not prove identity of authorship, but it is an interesting coincidence that both these works happen to mention this ancient grammatical work.

Such, in the main, are the arguments which can be brought forward in favour of the view that the *Vṛtti* which we have is actually the work of Bhartṛhari whose authorship of the *Kārikās* has not been questioned by anybody.

The Kārikās and the Vṛtti are not by the same author.

Now follows another set of considerations leading to the opposite conclusion, namely, that the two were not written by the same author.

A. As pointed out before, the *Vṛtti* on both the first and the second *Kāṇḍas* records the opinions of others, introduced in general terms such as *'apara āha'*, *'apara āhuḥ'* *'apare tu'* *'kecit tu'* and so on.

55. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 4, l. 6.
56. Vāk. I. p. 116, l. 13—p. 117, l. 1.
57. See *"Dhyānagrahakāra* or *Dhyānakāra*. A pre-Bhartṛhari Grammarian (V. I. J. vol. IV, pt. ii, p. 228).
58. See Texts.

The problems regarding the word and the meaning were already old ones in Bhartṛhari's time and there was a great diversity of views on them and it is but natural that he should think it appropriate to mention some of them in his work. Opinions of authors are recorded not only in the *Vṛtti*, but also in the *Kārikās*, right through the three *Kāṇḍas*. Most of the passages of the *Vṛtti* where the opinions of others are recorded are not of much significance for our present problem. Where, on the other hand, the *Vṛtti* gives a different way in which the words of the *Kārikā* are explained by others, one begins to have doubts about the identity of authorship of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti*. For example, the *Vṛtti* first explains the word *'arthapravṛttitattvānām'* in Vāk. I. 13 as *'arthasya pravṛttitattavaṃ vivakṣā na tu vastusvarūpatayā sattvam asattvaṃ vā.*[59] Later, he goes on to say: *apara āha, arthasya pravṛttau tattvaṃ vyavahāre yannimittam."*[60]

This looks like the statement of the explanation of the word *arthapravṛttitattvam* by somebody else, especially because of the words: *apara āha.* This is not the statement of another view on a subject. It is another explanation of a word. If this way of looking at it is correct, it means that the *Kārikās* existed before the *Vṛtti* and had been explained by others. In other words, they were not written by the same author. Of course, it is still possible to hold that Bhartṛhari's *Kārikās* had already been commented upon by others before he himself undertook to explain them. But this seems rather far-fetched. The more probable explanation is that the author of the *Vṛtti* Harivṛṣabha, let us say, is explaining the *Kārikās* of Bhartṛhari which had already been explained by others. But, then, the theory of identity of authorship goes under. A similar doubt arises in one's mind when one reads the explanation of the word *'Jñānasaṃskārahetavaḥ'* in Vāk. I. 10. After having first explained this compound word as : *samyagjñānahetavaḥ puruṣasaṃskārahetavaś ca'* the *Vṛtti* adds : *'jñānātmakatvād vā puruṣasyaiva saṃskārahetavaḥ'*. In other words, in the former explanation, the former word was split up as : *jñānasya saṁskārasya ca hetavaḥ,* whereas in the latter one, it has been split up as : *jñānasya saṃskārahetavaḥ.* If the author of both was the same, why this alternative explanation ? The author must have known what he wanted to say and could have said it in one single explanation. Of course, it is open to a writer to want to express more than one meaning through the same word and that would require two different ways of analysing it. Nor is there, as in the previous example, the word *aparaḥ* or some such word to show that the second explanation

59. Vāk. I, p. 44, l. 3.
60. Ibid, p. 44, l. 6.

is by another. The second example may, therefore, be considered rather weak, as compared with the first one.

B. There is, however, another passage in the *Vṛtti* which is more detrimental to the view that the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* were written by the same person. Vāk. II. 42 says that the extra meaning which is understood when the individual words of a sentence are put together is the meaning of the sentence. This extra meaning sometimes plays a part in fixing the correct form of the individual word and sometimes it does not. The *Vṛtti* further says that this difference is explained in the *Mahābhāṣya* itself. And then adds—

> *"Ataś ca tatrabhavān āha—Yathaikapadagataḥ prātipadike 'ntaḥpadaṃ saṃskārahetur artho vacanaṃ prati.....bhavati tathaikapadagataḥ padasaṃskārahetur eva vibhaktiyogam praty ahetur bhavati grāmo grāmo ramaṇīya iti. Anekapada-saṃśrayas tu vākyārthaḥ pratinighātādivyavasthāhetur ākhyāyate iti."*

It is a pity that there is a gap in the words of *Tatrabhavān* quoted here. The following is a tentative translation of the passage—

"That is why *Tatrabhavān* has said : "Just as an extra meaning, understood from a single word becomes the cause of the addition of a particular case-affix and thus the inner cause of the formation of the correct form of the word, in the same way, such an extra meaning, understood from a word, while becoming the cause of the correct formation of the word, is not necessarily the cause of the addition of a particular case-affix. A sentence-meaning, depending upon many words, becomes the cause of the regulation of the loss of the acute accent etc."

It was pointed out before that the expression *Tatrabhavān*, not followed by any name, stands for Bhartṛhari when used by Abhinavaguptācārya. Sometimes, this author, as though to leave no room for doubt, gives the name Bhartṛhari immediately after. It is noteworthy that he never uses the mere name. *Tatrabhavad*, in some cose-form or other, is always there and even when not followed by the name, stands for Bhartṛhari. If *Tatrabhavān* in the *Vṛtti* on I. 42 also means Bhartṛhari, it means that the author of the *Vṛtti* looked upon him as another person and has quoted a passage from his work. He does not say from which work the quotation has been taken. Have we here a quotation from the real *Vṛtti* of Bhartṛhari or is it from some other work of *Tatrabhavān*? We cannot say. In the meantime,

the mention of *Tatrabhavān* as somebody different from the author of our *Vṛtti* is a little intriguing.

C. It is also relevant to point out that while there may be, as already pointed out, parallel passages here and there in the *Vṛtti* and in Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, there seems to be a marked difference in the style of the two works. The *Vṛtti* is written in a rather unusual style. There is a certain strangeness or obscurity about it which must be distinguished from the fact of being merely archaic. It gives the impression of having been composed under the influence of a different tradition of writing. Sometimes, it reminds me of the style of the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtras* of Patañjali. The impression of obscurity is not due to the presence of unknown words or to the author's use of his own new technical terms. Some of the obscurity is due to the nature of the subject matter itself. Some of it, however, is due to the peculiar construction of sentences and compound words. Sometimes the language is very terse. Too much is taken for granted. There are not those indications, usually found in other works, which compel one to understand the words and sentences in a particular way. There is a tendency to use long and rather involved sentences. Sometimes the whole commentary on a *Kārikā* consists of just one sentence. Those on Vāk. I. 2, 46, 54, 91, 139 [147]; II, 14, 17 may be mentioned as examples. Another noteworthy feature of the language of the *Vṛtti* is the addition of the word *'ātman'* to other words and though there is usually a distinct addition in meaning, sometimes it is not clear what extra meaning the compound word thus formed expresses.[61]

When one compares all this with the style of Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, one is struck by the difference, in spite of other resemblances. Though we have only a fragment of this commentary, there is enough of it to enable us to form a judgement in regard to its style. In contrast to the highly formal and literary style of the *Vṛtti*, that of the *Mahābhāṣya* commentary is more conversational. It consists of short and idiomatic sentences and reminds one of the style of the *Mahābhāṣya* itself. One does not find those long involved sentences which are a characteristic of the *Vṛtti*.. Both the works are commentaries and it is reasonable to expect a similarity of style in them. But one does not find this similarity of style, though, as pointed out already, there are parallel passages.

61. On the language of the *Vṛtti*, see my Introduction pp. xii—xvi to my translation of the *Vākyapadīya*, with the *Vṛtti*, *Kāṇḍa* I. (Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 26).

D. Now we come to another set of arguments against Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti,* advanced by Dr. M. Biardeau in her Introduction to her French translation of *Kāṇḍa* I with the *Vṛtti.*[62] The arguments given so far, in favour of or against Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti* were mostly based on references in later literature, data found in colophons of manuscripts, diversity of textual explanations and of style. Dr. Biardeau presents arguments of a quite different nature, based on difference of ideas between the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti.* They may be summarised as follows—

(i) Vāk. I. 8 says that monists and dualists have evolved different doctrines on the basis of the explanatory gloss of the Veda (*arthavādarūpāṇi*). The *Vṛtti* gives a forced explanation of '*arthavādarūpāṇi*' by saying *arthavādān arthavādaprakārāṇi śrutivākyāni* = explanatory gloss *and similar scriptural passages.* The author of the *Kārikā* only meant explanatory gloss. 'Similar scriptural passages' which can only mean *mantra* or *vidhi,* is an addition of the *Vṛtti.* Later, however, while giving examples, doctrines which grew out of explanatory gloss are mentioned, but none that evolved on the basis of *mantra* or *vidhi* is given. This shows that the explanation was artificial and not in accordance with the wish of the author of the *Kārikā.*

(ii) Vāk. I. 134 [142] mentions only three stages of *Vāk,* namely *Vaikharī, Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī.* After explaining these three, the *Vṛtti* adds—

> "*Saiṣā trayī caitanyagranthivivartavad anākheyaparimāṇā turīyeṇa manuṣyeṣu pratyavabhāsate*".[63]

This is an attempt on the part of the *Vṛtti,* under the influence of a later tradition, to introduce a fourth stage of Vāk from below. This is another discrepancy in doctrine between the *Kārikā* and the *Vṛtti.*

(iii) There is greater precision in the use of technical terms in the *Vṛtti,* compared to the *Kārikās,* especially in the use of the words *vivarta* and *pariṇāma.* In Vāk. I. 112 [120], Bhartṛhari uses the word '*vyvartata*' in the sense of *pariṇāma.* In Vāk. I. 47 and 109 [117], *vi-vṛt* means the manifestation of the word at the level of the

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62. M. Biardeau — Bhartṛhari — *Vākyapadīya, Brahmakāṇḍa* avec la *Vṛtti* de Harivṛṣabha. Traduction, Introduction et notes. (Paris, Editions de Boccard, 1964).

63. Vāk. I. p. 220.

places and organs of articulation. In Vāk. I. 18, it means mere manfestation. In I. 1. *'vivartate'* is obscure.

(iv) There is nothing in the *Kārikās* which supports the view that Bhartṛhari looked upon the manifestations an unreal. But in the *Vṛtti,* they are unreal, *'vivarta'* which is defined so at the very beginning.

(v) Bhartṛhari never uses the word *'avidyā'* in a technical sense. In II. 235, it has only an ordinary meaning. *'Vṛtti'*, on the other hand, uses the word in a technical sense. Also, the expression *pratya-vabhāsa*.

(vi) In the Kārikās there is no *vivartavāda* as far as the relation between Brahman and the cosmos is concerned. But *'dhvanis'* are the *vivarta* of *sphoṭa* and words and phonemes abstracted by grammar from the sentence are unreal. The *Vṛtti* transfers this scheme to the relation between Brahman and the cosmos.

(vii) In the *Kārikās,* the word *vikalpa* is used in the sense of option (Vāk. I. 8, A6.) differentiation by thought. The *Vṛtti* has the expression *avikalpajñāna.* The idea of *nirvikalpajñāna* occurs for the first time in the Śloka-Vāttika of Kumārila whereas Bhartṛhari is prior to him. *Vṛtti* shows knowledge of the *Ślokavārttika* and is, therefore, posterior to Kumārila.

(viii) Lastly, the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 136 [144] knows the two schools of *Mīmāṃsā, Bhāṭṭa* and *Prābhākara,* another proof that it is a much later work than the *Kārikās.*

On the grounds mentioned above, Dr. Biardeau comes to the conclusion that Hari-Vṛṣabha, the author of the *Vṛtti* is a later writer than Bhartṛhari and has not faithfully interpreted him. He has made him a *vivartavādin* which he was not. She considers the testimony of the colophons to be unreliable as they so frequently contain errors. She also considers the testimony of the literary references pointing to an identity of authorship as based on an early confusion of the two writers ("de bonne heure, les deux auteurs ont été confondus" Int. p. 4.) or due to the well-known Indian indifference to chronology. If it is due to the mixing up of the two writers, it must have taken place between Bhartṛhari (5th century A.D.) and Maṇḍana Miśra (7th-8th cent. A.D.). It is not clear, however, (1) why and how such a confusion took place so early, so soon after the author's own time, considering that such confusions usually take place when distance in

time has wiped off all memories, (2) how it was not noticed by anybody when the works in question were being much studied soon after the author passed away or during the long centuries which have elapsed since then. In matters of this kind, no piece of evidence, taken by itself, is conclusive. It is the cumulative effect of many considerations which usually leads to an acceptable conclusion. If it is possible to doubt the value of the arguments in favour of identity of authorship, it is equally possible to doubt the arguments and make little of the considerations pointing to diversity of authorship. What looks like two different ways of explaining the same text may be nothing more than the recording of the opinion of another on the subject, unconnected with the text. The fact that the word '*vivarta*' as a noun does not occur in the *Kārikās* may be only a coincidence. After all, the word '*vivartate*' does occur. The tradition of explaining Bhartṛhari as a *vivartavādin* is more than a thousand years old, as it is recorded in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and the *Pañjikā* and is associated with great names like Somānanda, Utpalācārya and Abinavagupta who were themselves not *vivartavādins* and had, therefore, no particular interest in making out Bhartṛhari to be one. It is more likely that they were just following a tradition. To say that the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 134 [142] has brought in a fourth stage of Vāk from below (par le bas' Int. p. 6) seems to be totally unwarranted, especially as Dr. Biardeau herself thinks that the *Vṛtti* on I. 14. has added a fourth stage from above ('un quatrième stade de la parole par le haut' Int. p. 6). Surely, it is not meant that the *Vṛtti* has recognised five stages of Vāk. ! If the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 136 [144] seems to know the two distinct positions of the Bhāṭṭas and the Prābhākaras, that does not prove that the *Vṛtti* is referring to the works of Kumārila and Prabhākara. After all, there is no citation from their works. The two positions for which they stand may well be much older and so received by them from tradition. Dr. Biardeau herself realises this possibibility when she says that one cannot deny the probable relation between the tendency attributed to Bādari (earlier than Śabara) and the Prabhākara school and the relation between Kumārila's position and Mī. Sū. 3.1.4-6. We must also make allowance for the transmission of ideas through oral tradition long before they were committed to writing. *Vivartavāda* is associated with Śaṅkara but can we be sure that it was unknown before him ? The fact is that there are too many gaps in our knowledge of the history of Indian thought and in the absence of a single quotation from Kumārila or Prabhākara in the *Vṛtti* which otherwise abounds in quotations, all from ancient texts, one has to be conscious in drawing conclusions relating to that history.

The mention of *Tatrabhvān* in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. II. 42 is cer-

tainly intriguing. If the expression refers to Bhartṛhari, then diversity of authorship of the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* is proved. But even this is not free from doubt. It is not theoretically impossible that the author of the *Vṛtti* meant somebody else. The text of the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II is available only in a single manuscript, with many errors and gaps and has not yet been critically edited (if it is at all possible to do so !). Only a single reference to *Tatrabhavān* has been found so far.

The question, therefore, is : Are the considerations which have been put forward sufficient to upset a tradition which is at least 1200 years old that the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* were written by the same author ? We should, of course, be ready to discard the tradition, no matter how old, if there is contrary evidence. But it seems to me that there is not enough evidence to do so. We should wait till at least the *Vṛtti* on Kāṇḍa II or rather as much of it as is available in manuscript is published and the same thing happens to the commentary of Bhartṛhari on the *Mahābhāṣya.* For the present, one can only continue to respect the tradition of identity of authorship, even if one is at times assailed by doubts. A firm decision on this problem is most desireable, because on that depends a reliable interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya.* The value of the *Vṛtti* and the other available ancient commentaries will be discussed in another section.

B. The Commentary Prakāśa of Helārāja

Though we do not have any ancient commentary of any one author on all the three *Kāṇḍas* of the *Vākyapadīya,* we know that Helārāja did write such a commentary. All that has come down to us, however, is his commentary called *Prakāśa* on the third *Kāṇḍa.* He tells us quite clearly, in one of the introductory verses to his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa* that he has written on the first two *Kāṇḍas* a work (*prabandha*) based on the *Vṛtti* and in accordance with tradition,[64] setting forth the accepted doctrines. The word '*prabandha*' can be applied to an independent work as well as to a commentary. In the course of his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa,* he refers to various points which he has already explained in his work on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* and on some occasions, he gives *Śabdaprabhā* as the name of that work. From at least two of the references, it is clear that the *Śabdaprabhā* was a commentary on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya.* In his commentary on stanza 37 of the *Jāti-*

64. Vāk. III, pt. 1., p. 1, 1.7 (D.C. Monograph Series, 21, 1963).

samuddeśa, he tells us that Time is not an independent substance as some believe, but a power of *Brahman* called 'sequence' which is responsible for the manifestation of all objects in a temporal sequence, through their different activities like birth and so on. He adds that he has explained this point in his commentary called *Śabdaprabhā* on 1.3. of the *Vākyapadīya*.[65] On another occasion, while explaining Bhartṛhari's statement that some extraordinary individuals can perceive universals like brāhmaṇa-hood with all their senses, he says that he has proved in detail the authority of tradition in his commentary *Śabdaprabhaā* on the first *Kāṇḍa*.[66] On some occasions, he does not name the commentary, but refers to what he has said in the *Brahmakāṇḍa*. It is legitimate to infer that he means the *Śabdaprabhā* on the *Brahmakāṇḍa* because he has already told us that what he has written on the first *Kāṇḍa* is called by that name. For example, he tells us that he has already explained in detail in the *Brahmakāṇḍa* that the expressive power of words, the expressed objects and their relation are one. They are mixed up as One in our inner Reality and they are manifested in two branches as the word and the object as two separate things. Similarly, the knowledge and the known are manifested as two separate things, but all this is Nescience (*avidyā*).[67] On another occasion, he tells us that he has already proved in the first *Kāṇḍa* that, as consciousness persists in all manifestations, everything proceeds from it and so there is fundamental unity.[68] On two occasions, he has told us that he has explained in detail in the *Brahmakāṇa* that *avidyā* is indefinable, that it cannot be declared to be identical with or different from the ultimate and that it is responsible for the beginningless manifestation of the individual souls as different from one another.[69]

It is quite possible that *Śabdaprabhā* was the name, not of Helārāja's commentary on the first *Kāṇḍa* only, but of his commentary on the first and second *Kāṇḍas* taken together. But I have not come across any passage in his commentary on the third *Kāḍṇa* in which he tells us what he has done in his commentary on the second *Kāṇḍa*, as he has told us so often what points he has established in his commentary on the first *Kāṇḍa*. That he did write a commentary on the second *Kāṇḍa* is certain because he has said so quite clearly in one of the introductory verses to his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*.

65. See Texts.
66. See Texts.
67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.
69. See Texts.

The only substantial thing then which we have of Helārāja is his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*. Except for two gaps, it is complete. In the manuscripts, these two gaps have been filled with the commentary of one Phullarāja as the scribes themselves have indicated.[70] We have no further information about this Phullarāja.

Not only are we the poorer for the loss of the *Śabdaprabhā*, but also because of the disappearance of three more works of his to which he often refers. From their titles, we can say that they dealt with topics closely allied to those of the *Vākyapadīya*. He tells us that in the *Kriyāviveka* — one of the three works — he has established that action is the main idea expressed by a sentence.[71] It was probably an independent work on the subject of the *Kriyāsamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. In a reference to another lost work, the *Advayasiddhi*, he tells us that there he has shown that the ultimate manifests itself as the experiencer and the experienced and that all that is experienced rests in consciousness.[72] From its title, it appears to have been a work propounding *Śabdādvaita*, word-Monism, the metaphysics of Bhartṛhari. Lastly, the third work the *Vārttikonmeṣa*, seems to have been a discussion of the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana. On one occasion, he tells us that he has explained in his *Vārttikonmeṣa* that, according to the author of the *Vārttikas* also, what is called gender is a condition of the three *guṇas*, a doctrine which Bhartṛhari has propounded in the *Liṅgasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya*.[73]

Helārāja's commentary is a very learned one, not only in respect of the philosophico-linguistic part of the Vākyapadīya, but also in regard to the technical side of Grammar (*prakriyā*). But for the connecting links which he supplies between one verse and another, the meaning of many a verse would be doubtful. At least, they would be liable to be interpreted differently by different readers. He is particularly helpful when he tells us that a particular stanza sets forth the views of some system of philosophy, as Bhartṛhari himself does not give any indication of it. His is not a word for word explanation of the *Kārikās*. His commentary is a statement, in his own words, of the main idea contained in each *Kārikā*. In the course of the statement, it is natural that sometimes the words of the *Kārikā* should be cited and

70. Vāk. III. pt. 1, p. 261, l. 8. to p. 268, l. 13 and p. 280, l,17 to p, 283, l. 1. (D.C. Monograph Series, 21, 1963.)
71. See Texts.
72. See Texts.
73. See Texts.

then explained or that they should become parts of his own sentences. But he does not cite each word of the *Kārikā* for the purpose of explanation. His attitude is that of an independent writer who has a mastery of the subject and does not depend upon the words of the *Kārikā* for the exposition of his ideas. He notes here and there other readings of the text of the *Kārikās*. That he knew other explanations is clear from his references to them as '*kecit*' '*apare*' and so on. He anticipates objections and answers them according to tradition.

Who was Helārāja? What we know about him is not much and not sufficiently definite. He tells us that he is the son of Bhūtirāja and that he was a descendant of one Lakṣaṇa (Lakṣmaṇa ?), a minister of King Muktāpīḍa of Kashmir.[74] Looking for other sources of information, we find that Kalhaṇa, in his *Rājataraṅgiṇī*, speaks about one Helārāja. He mentions him as an authority on the ancient history of Kashmir. Apparently he had written a work called *Pārthivāvalī*, consisting of 12,000 *ślokas* and that *Padmamihira*, another historian who had preceded Kalhaṇa, had taken the names of eight kings from Helārāja's work and included them in his lists.[75] Kalhaṇa wrote about the middle of the 12th century A.D. and looked upon Helārāja as a much earlier predecessor in the field of history. His description of him as a *mahāvratin* shows that he looked upon him as austere and pious. A much earlier writer than Kalhaṇa also speaks about Helārāja. I mean the great Abhinavagupta whose work lay at the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century A.D. While Helārāja calls himself the son of Bhūtirāja, Abhinavagupta pays homage to his teachers Bhūtirāja and Indurāja, son of Bhūtirāja. From his description, Bhūtirāja appears to have been a great figure among the Ācāryas of tenth century Kashmir. He is described as a form of Śrīkaṇṭha himself,[76] Śrīkaṇṭha in human form.[77] It was he who was Śiva himself that imparted Brahmavidyā to Abhinavagupta.[78] He is described as a great intellect, always ready to rescue the devoted from the miseries of the world.[79] Sometimes Abhinava actually quotes from Bhūtirāja.[80] Not only was Bhūtirāja one of the gurus of Abhinavagupta, his son was also his *guru*. In the concluding verses of his commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*, Abhinavagupta tells us that his

74. See Texts.
75. See Texts.
76. See Texts.
77. See Texts.
78. See Texts.
79. See Texts.
80. See Texts.

guru in the *Gītā* and *Sāhitya*, Indurāja, was the son of Bhūtirāja.[81] In the *Tantrāloka* also he refers to the son of Bhūtirāja as one of his *gurus*.[82] It is not clear whether here he means Indurāja or perhaps Helārāja who, as we know, refers to himself as the son of Bhūtirāja. It is possible that Helārāja and Indurāja were the sons of the same Bhūtirāja and that they were both teachers of Abhinavagupta. If so, it helps us to fix the date of Helārāja. A *guru* of Abhinavagupta must naturally have been his elder contemporary. It is possible that Abhinavagupta who is known to have written a grammatical work called "*Prakīrṇakavivaraṇa*" knew the "*Prakīrṇaka-prakāśa*" of Helārāja. In other words, Helārāja must be placed in the earlier part of the tenth century A.D.

Relevant to the question of the date of Helārāja is the fact that there are some parallel passages in the commentary of Helārāja on the third *Kāṇḍa* and the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyyaṭa on the *Mahābhāṣya*. Unfortunately, these passages do not enable us to decide whether there has been a borrowing and, if so, who has borrowed from whom. There is not enough evidence to accept the view of L. A. Ravivarma that it is Helārāja who has borrowed from Kaiyyaṭa whom he assigns to the thirteenth century A.D., following "Srīpāda Krishna Belvalkar and others" as he says.[83] A much earlier date must be assigned to Kaiyyaṭa, probably the eleventh century A.D., though it is not yet quite settled.[84] It is equally likely that it is Kaiyyaṭa who has borrowed from Helārāja. There is nothing to upset the tentative conclusion that Helārāja was an elder contemporary of Abhinavagupta and, therefore, belonged to the first half of the tenth century A.D.

C. The Commentary of Puṇyarāja

The next commentary which we have to consider is that of Puṇyarāja. As already pointed out, it was a mistake on the part of the editor to have ascribed the commentary on *Kāṇḍa I* which was published in the Benares Sanskrit Series in 1887 to Puṇyarāja. The colophon at the end of the commentary on *Kāṇḍa I* clearly mentions the author's name as Hari Vṛṣabha.[85] This should be compared with

81. See Texts.
82. See Texts.
83. See Introduction p. 4-5 of L. A. Ravi Varma's edition of the *Vākyapadīya*, 3rd Kāṇḍa, with the *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* (University of Travancore Sanskrit Series No. CXLVIII).
84. L. Renou-*Durghaṭavṛtti* I, Introduction.
85. See Texts.

the colophon at the end of the commentary on *Kāṇḍa II* where Puṇyarāja is distinctly mentioned as the author.[86] We are also informed that he studied the second or the *Vākyakāṇḍa* under the disciple of Śaśāṅka and then wrote his commentary. In view of this, it is not clear how the commentaries on both the *Kāṇḍas*. were published as those of Puṇyarāja. This mistake was pointed out long ago by MM. Pt. Haraprasad Shastri. It was again pointed out by Dr. Kunhan Raja in his article entitled "I-tsing and Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya" published in 1936 in the Dr. Krishnaswamy Aiyangar Commemoration Volume. I also pointed this out in 1963 in my Sanskrit Introduction to the commentary called *Ambākartrī* on *Kāṇḍa I* published by the Vārāṇasī Sanskrit University.[87] In spite of this, scholars still continue to refer to that commentary as that of Puṇyarāja. The fact is that we do not have Puṇyarāja's commentary on *Kāṇḍa I*, though it is certain that he had written it, as can be inferred from the way in which he begins his commentary on *Kāṇḍa II*. He tells us that the nature of the word, together with its purpose has already been dealt with. That it is expressive of meaning has also been already established. As there was a difference of opinion as to whether it was the individual word which was expressive of the meaning or the sentence, the second *Kāṇḍa* was being written in order to set forth the expressiveness of the sentence and to define its nature[88] From this it is clear that he had written a commentary on *Kāṇḍa I* also. Unfortunately, it is yet to be found.

But we have his commentary on *Kāṇḍa II*. In connection with Puṇyarāja also, there are problems of date and identity. He mentions Śaśāṅkaśiṣya as his *guru*.[89] Who was this Śaśāṅka and who was his disciple that Puṇyarāja has mentioned in the second *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya?* One cannot say for certain. Pt. Charu Deva Shastri has expressed his opinion that Puṇyarāja's *guru* might have been Sahadeva who wrote a commentary on the *Kāvyālaṅkārasūtra* of Vāmana and who was the disciple of Śaśāṅkadhara. Sahadeva speaks very highly of the scholarship of his *guru* Śaśāṅkadhara and from the way Puṇyarāja refers to his own *guru* as Śaśāṅkaśiṣya, disciple of Śaśāṅka, the latter also must have enjoyed the reputation of being a very great scholar.[90] Both *guru* and *śiṣya* belonged to Kashmir and

86. Vāk. a. II, p. 291.
87. Vākyapadīya with Ambākartrī — Upoḍghāta (gha) (Vārāṇasī Sanskrit University).
88. See Texts.
89. See Texts.
90. See Texts.

as Puṇyarāja also belonged to the same area, it is possible that he learnt the second *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* from them. All this is, however, based on slender evidence. It is just a possibility. Nor can we fix his date with certainty. While he knows the *Vṛtti*, I have not come across any clear reference to Helārāja or his works.

In a way, we are fortunate because we have two ancient commentaries on *Kāṇḍa II*, the *Vṛtti*, incomplete and full of gaps and Puṇyarāja's complete commentary. Puṇyarāja knew the *Vṛtti* and looked upon it as Bhartṛhari's own commentary. He must, therefore, have held it as authoritative. It would, therefore, be of interest to compare, these two commentaries and see how Puṇyarāja deals with the *Kārikās* on which another commentary, believed by him to have been written by Bhartṛhari himself, was before him. The task is not easy because we have only a single, fragmentary and defective manuscript of the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa II*. The first thing which strikes one is the difference in the language of the two commentaries. While Puṇyarāja's language is simple and lucid, that of the *Vṛtti* is anything but so. I have already pointed out the strangeness and obscurity of the style of the *Vṛtti*. Here I am concerned more with the contents of the two commentaries on the same *Kāṇḍa*. Speaking generally, one can say that the *Vṛtti* is more elaborate and more detailed than Puṇyarāja's commentary. Though Puṇyarāja must have held the *Vṛtti* in great respect as Bhartṛhari's own work, he does not always merely summarise it. Sometimes, he does that. He usually disregards those points mentioned in the *Vṛtti* which are connected with the main idea of the *Kārikā*. In other words, he avoids complications. The *Vṛtti* goes deeper than Puṇyarāja and gives a glimpse of the different views current in its days on the points dealt with. An example would make clear the points of difference between the two commentaries.

Vāk. II. 30 says that the word, that is, the sentence is an inner entity, one and indivisible, of the nature of knowledge or consciousness and when manifested by the sounds which have sequence, becomes the external sentence. The inner sentence, consisting of the word—part and the meaning-part, is the real sentence. Vāk II. 31. says that the sentence-meaning is also one and indivisible, of the nature of Intuition and it is manifested by the unreal word-meanings. Puṇyarāja does no more than just make this point clear in his brief commentary. The *Vṛtti*, on the other hand, goes deeper into the matter and elucidates the same idea by reference to various connected ideas which have a strong Sāṅkhya flavour. What the *Vṛtti* says may be stated briefly and rather freely as follows—

"The word is of two kinds : the inner and the outer. The inner one is of the nature of knowledge and is something to be manifested. The outer one is that which is produced by the movements of the vocal organs. The individual words which have no real existence are the means of understanding this inner indivisible word. This much has already been shown. In the same way, the inner indivisible sentence-meaning relates to outside objects which are differentiated and appears to be an accumulation of the meanings of individual words which really do not exist. Though it is one and indivisible, it is externalised as having sequence. The external world does not become part of worldly usage for us unless it is grasped by the mind and becomes one with it. Thus both the sentence and the sentence-meaning are inner realities.

Others think that the Self experiences the objects when it is reflected in the *Buddhi,* which, in that form, is reflected in the Self or with which the Self identifies itself or on which the Self throws its light. It is the *Buddhi* which experiences the objects, but the Self thinks that it experiences. Thus the power to experience and the power to be experienced, two distinct powers, seem to be merged in the *Buddhi* which gets the reflection of the object and which is illuminated by the Self. That is how worldly usage can proceed. The power to experience, which is a kind of consciousness and, therefore, eternal and unchangeable, cannot be transferred to the *Buddhi* which is constantly changing, but it appears to be transferred to it because of an erroneous identification of the Self with the *Buddhi.* It is the transformation of the *Buddhi* illuminated by the Self which leads to a particularized cognition. Thus one view is that the external word is transitory and an unreal appearance of the inner word and the external object reflected in the *Buddhi* is also transitory and it is that which is experienced. Another view is that all objects are external, but they have their unreal appearances which alone are experienced. This is the second view. That the external object, reflected in the bright and self-illuminating *Buddhi,* is experienced is the third view. According to all these views, when, from the inner word in which all differentiation is merged, the meaning in which also all differentiation is merged, is understood without abandoning their original differentiation, what remains is the *Buddhi* in which all multiplicity is resolved, in which the distinct powers of the expressive word and the expressed meaning are not separated, even though their distinction is not entirely abandoned."[91]

91. See Texts.

I do not claim that what I have given above is a lucid statement of the ideas contained in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. II. 31. It is all that I have been able to make out of it so far. My purpose here is only to show the difference between the *Vṛtti* and Puṇyarāja's commentary. I hope it is obvious that the *Vṛtti* tries to go deep into the subject.

D. *The Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*

If the *Vṛtti* is the oldest commentary which we have on the *Kārikās*, the *Puddhati* is the only ancient commentary which we have on the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* together. It is a great pity that we do not have the *Paddhati* on the *Kārikās* of *Kāṇḍa II* nor on the *Vṛtti* thereof which is itself available only in an incomplete form. The author of the *Paddhati* looks upon the *Kārikās* and the *Vṛtti* together as the *Vākyapadīya* and he informs us that many other lucid commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya* had been composed by earlier scholars.[92] It is a pity that not a single one of these commentaries has come down to us. Nor does Vṛṣabha give us an idea of his knowledge of them by quoting from or referring to them in his own commentary.

One would naturally like to know something about Vṛṣabhadeva, especially his date. Unfortunately, nothing much is known about him. All that he tells us in the introductory verses of his commentary is that he was the son of Devayaśas, an employee of King Viṣṇuguptadeva. He does not even tell us of which part of India Viṣṇuguptadeva was the king, nor to which dynasty he belonged. We know of two Viṣṇuguptas in Indian History. One belonged to the Imperial Gupta Line. A seal, discovered at Nālandā, describes one Viṣṇugupta as the son of Kumāra, probably Kumāragupta II. This Viṣṇugupta is probably the same as Viṣṇugupta Candrāditya, mentioned in one of the Gupta coins (J. Allen — Gupta Coins, p. 145). He lived at the end of the fifth and the beginning of the sixth century A.D. The other Viṣṇugupta belonged to the later Gupta line and was the father of Jīvitagupta II. He is mentioned in the Deo Baranark Inscription (Corpus. Ins. Ind. Vol. III, No. 46, p. 213). According to this inscription, his father was Devaguptadeva and mother Kamalādevī. An inscription of this Viṣṇugupta was found at Mangraon in the Shahabad district of Bihar. He probably belonged to the first half of the eighth century A.D. It is not possible to be certain that it is to one of these two Viṣṇuguptas that Vṛṣabhadeva refers. While the date of the

92. See Texts.

first Viṣṇugupta may be judged a little too early for Vṛṣabhadeva, the same thing cannot be said about the date of the second Viṣṇugupta. But it is not possible, from the traced quotations in his *Paddhati*, to assign a limit before or after which he cannot be placed because they are all from ancient works and, therefore, not very helpful to us.

CHAPTER II.

1. PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION

It is proposed, in this work, to present briefly the main ideas which form the background of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, available only in a fragment. These ideas have different aspects. Some of them are of a metaphysical character, others relate to epistemology or theory of knowledge, including knowledge produced by words in general while others still relate to the notions forming the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language. Both in the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* and in the *Vākyapadīya*, there are references to or discussions about the technical side (*prakriyā*) of the Pāṇinian system but the ideas contained in such references or discussions do not concern us here. I am concerned only with ideas of a general nature, philosophical, espistemological, linguistic or grammatical.

As far as the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* is concerned, the main difficulty is due to the uncertainty of the text, fragmentary and available to us only in one manuscript. The two 'editions' of it which are now being published, though very welcome, are no more than printed forms, with occasional corrections without manuscript authority, of the corrupt text of the manuscript. The result is that, in many places, the commentary is quite unintetligible or of doubtful meaning. One naturally hesitates, in these circumstances, to build too much on what one understands. One does find, however, some valuable ideas in the portions where the text is not too corrupt and whose meanings are therefore fairly clear. Use will be made of such ideas in the course of this work.

When it comes to the *Vākyapadīya*, the position is quite different. The main body of the work consists of *Kārikās*, of which there are a little under 2000 in all the three *Kāṇḍas*. Now *Kārikās* are different from *sūtras* in that they are not the result of a deliberate attempt on the part of the author to be brief, to economise even syllables, if possible. While both were intended to help the student to memorise the main points of a system, the *Kārikās* are written in complete sentences and some meaning can be understood from them even without a commentary. And yet they were always meant to be

understood with the help of further explanations. These further explanations supplied the context and brought out the full implications of the main idea expressed by the *Kārikā* itself. In understanding the meaning of a stanza, a knowledge of the context is absolutely essential and it is not always easy to understand it from the stanza itself. It is no wonder that many authors wrote commentaries on their own *Kārikās*.

Of the four commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya* described in the previous chapter, the first one, the *Vṛtti*, is looked upon by the authors of the other three and by subsequent tradition extending over many centuries as having been written by Bhartṛhari himself. Helārāja openly says that he composed his commentary on the first two *Kāṇḍas* according to the *Vṛtti* (*Yathāvṛtti*). Puṇyarāja held it in great respect and Vṛṣabhadeva has actually commented upon it. Helārāja and Puṇyarāja have always enjoyed the reputation of being authoritative interpreters of the *Vākyapadīya*, but this really is a reflected glory, because they closely followed the *Vṛtti*. Though no *Vṛtti* on the third *Kāṇḍa* is available now and was most probably not available even in Helārāja's time, considering that he does not claim that his own commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa* is based on the *Vṛtti*, he does refer, in the course of it, to the *Vṛtti* on the first two *Kāṇḍas*, in support of his own statements. For example, one may see his commentary on Vāk. III. *Jāti*, 6, 24, 29, 37, 46; *dravya* 11, 14, 15; *Sam* 2, 30, 32, 63, 68, 72; *Saṅkhyā* 16. It is well-known that Nāgeśa often refers to Helārāja as a great authority in his *Udyota*, *Śabdenduśekhara* and *Laghumañjūṣā*. We know that his authority derives from the fact that he closely follows the *Vākyapadīya* with the *Vṛtti*.

While tradition looks upon the *Vṛtti* and the commentaries based on it as authoritative interpretations of the *Vākyapadīya*, some recent writers have expressed doubts about their value in understanding Bhartṛhari. Under the influence of the fast growing studies on General Linguistics in the modern age, there is a tendency to look upon the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari as essentially a work of General Linguistics and not as a work of Philosophy or as a work on the Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. As the ancient commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya* bring out the philosophical and grammatical points which, according to them, are discussed in that work, there is a tendency to belittle these commentaries and to declare that they have misinterpreted the *Vākya-*

1. Dr. S. Varma — *Bhāṣātattva aur Vākyapadīya* — Bharatīya Prakāśan — New Delhi — January 1964.

padīya. One work in which this has been done is the "*Bhāṣātattva aur Vākyapadīya*" of Dr. Satyakama Varma. This work is in Hindi, but pp. 228-238 are in English and are entitled : "Synopsis and Argument (summary of the thesis). The last part of this English section is called : 'Bhartṛhari, a neglected linguist'. Both in the main Hindi part of the work and in the English summary, Dr. Varma declares his point of view. It would not be out of place here to refer to or to quote some of his statements as that would enable the reader to understand his point of view in his own words. He says—

"what, in modern parlance, is called the Science of Language or Linguistics, is just the subject of *Vākyapadīya*."[2]

"that just a cursory reading of his Tripadī on the *Mahābhāṣya* was sufficient to convince us that the original object of the VP was some linguistic, not grammatical investigations into the phenomenon of speech" (p. 228.)

"Thirdly, that even traditional commentaries on the work, not to speak of necessarily vague, unhelpful references to it in the passing here and there, are sadly misleading—missing the point completely—at many places; although for a linguist the same contexts should have opened up new vistas altogether, for a research" (p. 228).

Dr. Varma then explains his own method as follows—

"Our object has been a study of Bhartṛhari by Bhartṛhari himself or to put it otherwise, VP as explained by its own evidence and not by that of the misinterpreting commentaries and the clashing opinions that followed it." (p. 229.) Though the last quotation appears to be a sweeping condemnation of all the commentaries, Dr. Varma says in one place that among the ancient commentaries, only that of Harivṛṣabha (that is, the *Vṛtti*) makes an attempt to explain the meaning of Bhartṛhari.[3] He further says that the commentator Hari (that is, Harivṛṣabha) does not try to get into the complexities of grammar nor delve into the subtleties of *Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā* or other *Darśanas*.[4] Though theoretically Dr. Varma seems to have a higher regard for the author of the *Vṛtti* as an interpreter of Bhartṛhari than for Puṇyarāja or Helārāja or Vṛṣabhadeva, in practice he has hardly

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

ever followed the *Vṛtti* in understanding the meaning of the *Kārikās*. One cannot take any exception to the idea of studying 'Bhartṛhari by Bhartṛhari himself or of explaining the *Vākyapadīya* by its own evidence. If Bhartṛhari can be explained by Bhartṛhari's own words, that is, if the *Kārikās* can be explained with the help of other *Kārikās* only, by completely ignoring the commentaries, there can be nothing better. Dr. Varma has certainly ignored the commentaries, even the *Vṛtti*, which, he admits, tries to interpret the *Kārikās* faithfully. He has quoted more than 350 *Kārikās* but without taking the trouble of explaining them or translating them. His method is to declare what Bhartṛhari's view is on some topic or other and then to quote a *Kārikā* in support of that declaration. He nowhere cares to explain how that view comes out of the *Karikā* quoted, without doing violence to the language or to the context. In these circumstances he will have to pardon the reader for thinking that many of the *Kārikās* have been torn out of their context and do not mean what Dr. Varma declares that they mean. The following is an example. Stanzas 11-22 of the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya* describe the greatness of *Vyākaraṇa* which is therefore, the context. Stanza 16 runs as follows—

> *'Idam ādyaṃ padasthānaṃ siddhisopānaparvaṇām/*
> *Iyaṃ sā mokṣamāṇānām ajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ//*

It may be translated thus—

"This is the first step in the ladder leading to liberation; this is the straight royal road for all those who desire salvation."

This, in my opinion, is the meaning which one would normally understand, keeping in view the context and the meaning of words in the Sanskrit language. It is also confirmed by the commentary of Vṛṣabhadeva. Dr. Varma, who ignores the commentary, understands it differently. He says "that grammar does not deal with the sentence. Its sphere is the individual word. In his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*, Bhartṛhari looks upon his task as confined to the explanation of the individual word. To supplement it and for explaining the sentence, he composed the *Vākyapadīya*. At the beginning of the *Vākyapadīya*, he clarifies this distinction in sphere by saying : *Idam ādyaṃ padasthānam* (Vāk. I. 16.) That is, the sphere of *Vyākaraṇa* is the *pada*, the individual word"[5] Dr. Varma has completely ignored the most important word in that *Kārikā*, namely, *siddhisopānaparvaṇām* and has given to the

5. See Texts.

rest a meaning which has nothing to do with the context at all. Another example of the complete freedom which Dr. Varma has reserved to himself in understanding the *Kārikās* is the way in which he has interpreted Vāk. I. 103, without any reference to the context. He has completely ignored both the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* and has drawn freely upon his imagination in interpreting it.[6] His interpretations of Vāk. III. Dra. 1 and 14 are also examples of his boldness in deviating from a commentator like Helārāja whom even grammarians like Nagojibhaṭṭa follow faithfully.[7] These few examples are enough to give an idea of the way in which a large proportion of the *Kārikās* quoted are understood and interpreted.

While Dr. Varma has discarded the authority of the commentaries on the assumption that the *Vākyapadīya* is a work on Linguistics and not on Philosophy or Philosophy of Grammar as the commentaries assume in their explanations, Dr. M. Biardeau has chosen not to be guided by them on the ground that, being later than Bhartṛhari, they interpret the *Vākyapadīya* under the influence of later ideas.[8] She does not accept the old tradition that the *Vṛtti* is by Bhartṛhari himself, but holds the view that, very early, Bhartṛhari and Harivṛṣabha, the author of the *Vṛtti* were wrongly identified and that the mistake has since been perpetuated. The commentaries, so it is said, attribute to Bhartṛhari views which he did not hold, under the influence of later ideas.[9] Though this is her position theoretically, the translation which she gives in her work of the large number of quoted *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya* is, on the whole, in accordance with the explanation of the commentaries. Not only has she studied the commentaries carefully, but has also translated the *Vṛtti* into French. Her work contains plenty of evidence that it could not have been done at all had the author confined her study to the *Kārikās* and left the commentaries severely alone. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, in his 'Philosophy of word and Meaning', also points out divergence of views between the *Kārikās* and the commentaries[10] With all that, he is willing to be guided by

6. Dr. S. Varma — *Bhāṣātattva aur Vākyapadīya*, p. 14. He refers to this *kārikā* on pp. 10, 12, 54, 57 and 113 also. Obviously, he looks upon it as a key stanza of the *Vākyapadīya*.
7. Ibid, pp. 43-44 and 219 respectively.
8. Dr. M. Biardeau — Théorie de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le brahmanisme classique, pp. 260-261 (Paris, Mouton & Co., 1964.)
9. Dr. M. Biardeau — *Vākyapadīya, Brahmakāṇḍa-avec la Vṛtti* de Harivṛṣabha. Traduction, Introduction, Notes, pp. 44ff, (Paris, de Boccard, 1964.)
10. Dr. Gaurinath Sastri — The Philosophy of Word and Meaning pp. 24, 56 (Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1959.)

the commentaries in his interpretation of Bhartṛhari. Numerous are the quotations which he gives from the commentaries of Harivṛṣabha (whom he mistakes for Puṇyarāja), Puṇyarāja and Helārāja, in support of his understanding of the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*. Though Dr. Kapil Deva Dvivedi's work *'Arthavijñān aur Vyākaraṇadarśana'* does not claim to be specifically a study of Bhartṛhari, the *Vākyapadīya* is one of the many works, from the *Nirukta* of Yāska to the *Udyota* of Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, from which material has been drawn. Numerous indeed are the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyāpadīya* which have been quoted and in many places, the commentaries of Puṇyarāja and Helārāja have also been quoted. I have already drawn attention to the view of this writer that Harivṛṣabha, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja are three different names of the same commentator, namely, Helārāja, whom the writer obviously considers to be a very reliable guide for the understanding of Bhartṛhari.[11]

In the midst of so much divergence in the views of scholars regarding the commentators and the commentaries, it is necessary to clarify one's own attitude. In interpreting Bhartṛhari, one has to make a distinction between estimating his general philosophical position and understanding correctly the meaning of the individual *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*. Of course, the former task depends upon the latter but it often depends upon other considerations also, such as the way in which Bhartṛhari's position was understood by his contemporaries or by ancient scholars not far removed from him in time. If the *Vṛtti* is also Bhartṛhari's own work, there should not be much doubt about his general philosophical position. That, commentary, together with the texts quoted in it, would clarify many doubts about his philosophical position which would arise if one confines one's attention to the *Kārikās* only. As I have already reviewed the position as far as that commentary is concerned in the last chapter, it is not necessary to add anything here

A few words might be said about the value of the commentaries in our attempt to understand the *Kārikās*. I believe that the value is great. It is true that some commentators have a tendency to explain ancient texts in the light of later developments of thought. Not deliberately, of course, but in the sincere belief that the ancient authors did actually mean what is attributed to them. It is, therefore, necessary if one wants to stress the evolution of ideas, to use the commentaries

11. Dr. Kapildeva Dvivedi — *Arthavijñān our Vyākaraṇadarśana* p. 9 (Hindustani Academy, Uttar Pradesh, Allahabad, 1951.)

critically and with caution, so that the new may be kept distinct from the old. This caution should not, however, make us forget that the idea of handing down an old tradition faithfully was also one of the motives of those writers. Many are the occasions when the original writer or the commentator claims that he is writing according to tradition, while Bhartṛhari insists frequently that what he writes is in conformity with tradition (*Yathāgamam* — Vāk. I. 26; III. Bhūyo 2; *iti pūrvebhya āgamaḥ* — III. Sam. 11 and so on) Helārāja tells us that he wrote his commentary on the first two Kāṇḍas according to the *Vṛtti*, in other words, according to tradition. The desire to be true to tradition was a strong and abiding motive with the commentators. I am not unaware that, sometimes, when they were actually making innovations, they still believed that they were only faithfully following the tradition.

The commentaries help us to understand the *Kārikās* in several ways. There are three *Kāṇḍas* in the *Vākyapadīya* and in each of them, the *Kārikās* follow one another and the topics change many times in the course of each *Kāṇḍa*, though there may be no formal sub-divisions within it. It is only in the third *Kāṇḍa* that there are sub-divisions called *samuddeśas*, each dealing with one subject. Some *samuddeśas* are very long and embody a series of minor topics. Without some indication, it is sometimes difficult to know where one topic has come to an end and another topic begins. If one were left entirely to oneself and no commentaries were available, it would sometimes be very difficult to decide whether a given *Kārikā* continues the previous topic or begins a new one. In such cases, it is only the commentaries which can give us some help. Vṛṣabhadeva, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja usually tell us, before actually commenting on a *Kārikā*, the precise context in which it has been written. It is the context which enables us to understand that in the *Vākyapadīya*, the author proceeds from one topic to another in a somewhat logical sequence. It is when the context is known that there is a chance of the significance of the words of a *Kārikā* becoming clear. The commentaries (except the *Vṛtti*) give the context for each *Kārikā* and sometimes for the *Kāṇḍa* or *samuddeśa* as a whole. Sometimes, in the middle, they recapitulate the points already made and indicate what is coming.[12] These indications enable us to follow Bhartṛhari's thought step by step, to a certain extent. The fact

12. See Puṇyarāja's commentary on Vāk. II. 1, 30, 205, 228, 249 and so on and Helārāja's commentary on *Vāk.* III, *Jā.* 1, 42; *Dra.* 1; *Sam.* 1, *Bhūyo.* 1-2, 3; *Gu.* 1; *Dik.* 1; *Sā.* 10, 44; *Kri.* 1, 40. *'Kāia* 1; *Pu.* 1;*diṅga.* 1; *Vṛtti* 1, and so on.

that the *Vṛtti* does not do so has certainly diminished its usefulness. Seeing this defect, somebody has interpolated in it small phrases giving the context and it is this adapted form found in some manuscripts which was published in Benares in 1887 and wrongly attributed to Puṇyarāja.

It is well-known that Bhartṛhari often gives the views of others on the different topics which he expounds in the *Vākyapadīya*. These others are usually not specified by name. They are only referred to as *Kecit* or by some similar expression. The commentaries often tell us who is meant. A good example is Vāk. III. *Jā* 19. The topic which is discussed in this context is the view that all words denote the universal and it is sought to be shown that this view agrees not only with grammar, but also with the different systems of philosophy. It was objected that if the universal means something which exists in the different individuals of the same class and which causes uniformity of cognition and the application of the same word to all of them, how can words like *ākāśa, kāla, ātmā,* and *dik* denote such a universal ? *Ākāśa* is one, all-pervasive and eternal and does not exist in the different individuals of the same class and does not depend upon them for its manifestation. This objection was met on the basis of contingent divisions of *ākāśa*, the different objects of the world with which *ākāśa* comes in contact being looked upon as divisions of it. According to *Vijñānavādins,* this attempt to show that even words like *ākāśa* denote the universal is futile because, according to them, there is no such thing as universal at all. They do not believe in the reality of the external world. They believe only in the different momentary states of consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common properties while other things appear as distinguishing features. A word denotes only this thing which figures in the momentary consciousness and that is what is called the universal. This is somewhat like the grammarian's idea that the object or the meaning is what the word conveys or what figures in the mind. The universal is just something which occurs in the mind when the word is heard. In other words, it is *śabdārtha* and not *vastvartha*. That it is this which the *Kārikā* in question wants to say can be understood only from Helārāja's commentary. It cannot be understood by merely reading the *Kārikā*. If one ignored Helārāja's commentary, would not one miss this interpretation and thus risk missing Bhartṛhari's own intention ? Would one be able to supply a better context and a better explanation of the *Kārikā* ?

The risk involved in ignoring Helārāja's commentary can be illustrated by taking the case of Vāk. III. *Dra*. 1. It is the first stanza of the *Dravyasamuddeśa* in which Bhartṛhari explains the view that

all words denote *Dravya,* the ultimate substance as distinguished from the Universal described as the meaning of all words in the preceding *samuddeśa.* In the stanza in question, we are told that the words *ātmā, vastu, svabhāva, śarīra* and *tattva* are synonyms of the word *dravya* (substance) which is eternal. Helārāja says that these words are synonyms for the ultimate substance in the different systems of philosophy (*yathādarśanam*). It is called *ātmā* in *Advaita,, vastu* by the *Śākyas, svabhāva* by the *sattādvaitavādins* and *tattva* by the *Cārvākas.* By mentioning these different schools Helārāja wants to emphasise that it is not in Bhartṛhari's own system that these words are synonyms. What is called *'dravya'* by the grammarians, namely, the ultimate substance, is called by these other words by others. If this point made by Helārāja is ignored as some scholars have done[13], it would mean that the words are synonyms in Bhartṛhari's own system for which there is no evidence. As elsewhere, Dr. Varma, ignoring Helārāja completely and ignoring also the fact that this stanza is the beginning of the *Dravyasamuddeśa,* interprets it in his own way. What he says in Hindi may be put as follows— "In simple words, as long as the speaker or the hearer is not prompted by desire, there cannot be any question of the completion of expression or of understanding. Poeticians have accepted what is called universalisation (*sādhāraṇī karaṇa*) in the field of the understanding of poetry. This is something beyond the mind, belonging to the realm of the self. From the physical level of *abhidhā* to that of *bhāvanā* is the field of the mind. But it is not given to everybody to rise above personal connections and reach a universal and impersonal experience. The number of those who understand the word meaning but cannot grasp the fundamental idea is not small. Only those can attain the state of universal experience who, while undersanding the subject-matter, rise mentally above their personality. In other words, when leaving behind the physical words, connection is established with their soul or their stuff; it is only then that their meaning can be said to have been understood. It is in this sense that Bhartṛhari looks upon *śarīra, ātmā* and *vastu* to be the same".[14]

What is the relevance of all this to the *'dravyasamuddeśa'* ?

One may permit oneself to question the corectness of the commentator's interpretations of the *Kārikās* relating to the philosophical portions of the *Vākyapadīya* because there is something fluid about philosophy which deals with many shades of ideas and notions susceptible to

13. For example — M. Biardeau — Thēorie de la Connaissance, p. 275.
14. See Texts.

be understood differently by different persons. But this work is a mixture of philosophy, general linguistics and Sanskrit grammar. There are, in all the *Kāṇḍas* but especially in the third one, many *Kārikās* which deal with points bearing on the technical side of Sanskrit grammar (*prakriyā*), points already raised, in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. Helārāja constantly gives reference to *Mahābhāṣya* passages while explaining these stanzas. There is hardly any scope for criticism or scepticism regarding his explanation of such stanzas. What strikes one while reading his commentary is his mastery of the technical side of the Pāṇinian system of grammar, based on his thorough knowledge of the *sūtras, vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya* and only such a scholar can be a reliable guide in understanding those portions of the *Vākyapadīya.* Vṛṣabhadeva, Puṇyarāja and Helārāja generally agree with one another in their understanding of the philosophical position of Bhartṛhari and they may be regarded as the followers of the *Vṛtti* in this respect. In other words, these four commentators represent the traditional way of understanding Bhartṛhari. Whether they interpret him correctly or misinterpret him, as it is alleged, their interpretations are surely entitled to be studied and placed before modern scholars. They must be looked upon as ancient writers. Even if the *Vṛtti* is not by Bhartṛhari himself, it is the earliest commentary which we have and there are no echoes of earlier commentaries in it. If the modern student of the *Vākyapadīya* is interested in hearing the views of those scholars who consider that these commentaries misinterpret it, it is not unreasonable to assume that they would be inerested in knowing the views of these commentaries also. I shall, therefore, try in the following pages, to present the ideas of Bhartṛhari as they emerge from the explanations of these commentaries. I shall give as many references as possible to them. Not that everything is clear to me in these commentaries. There are many obscure passages in them, especially in the *Vṛtti* on the IInd *Kāṇḍa.* Apart from questions of authenticity, these doubtful and obscure passages are a stumbling block in the interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya.* One can only do one's best under the circumstances.

2. THE CONTENTS OF THE VĀKYAPADĪYA

As stated before, the *Vākyapadīya* consists of three *Kāṇḍas* and contains a little under 2000 *Kārikās*. From the title, it is a work dealing with the sentence (*Vākya*) and the word (*pada*). But these two subjects are dealt with in such a comprehensive manner that, ultimately, the work touches upon a large number of topics. It would be worth one's while to understand how these topics are arranged in the three *Kāṇḍas* and the logical sequence between them, if any. I shall, therefore, give a bird's-eye-view of the contents here, leaving a detailed treatment of some of them for the subsequent chapters.

In the *Vākyapadīya* itself, there is a statement of the subjects dealt with in it. There we are told that the work deals with eight subjects : two kinds of meaning (*artha*) : that which is obtained by analysis and that which is of a fixed character (*sthitalakṣaṇa*), two kinds of word (*śabda*) : that which is to be grammatically explained and that which is a means of explaining it (*pratipādaka*), two kinds of relation : causality and fitness to express the meaning and two kinds of result or purpose : spiritual merit (*dharma*) and the understanding of meaning.[1] The commentator gives us to understand that these are the eight subjects, not only of the *Vākyapadīya*, but of the science of Grammar in general. They are enumerated in Vāk. I. 24-26 and the *Vṛtti* thereon tells us that the whole content of the *Vākyapadīya* is condensed in them.[2] The other commentaries also take the mention of the eight topics quite seriously. The *Paddhati* says at the very beginning, long before coming to the *Kārikā* in question that eight subjects are dealt with in the *Vākyapadīya*.[3] The very first sentence after the *maṅgala-ślokas* in Helārāja's commentary mentions them in order to show how the subjects dealt with in the third *Kāṇḍa* come within the scope of the eight topics.[4]

These subjects are not dealt with in the order in which they are enumerated in Vāk. I. 24-25. To begin with, there are only three *Kāṇḍas* in the *Vākyapadīya* and not eight corresponding to these eight topics.

1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

The three *Kāṇḍas* are usually called *Brahmakāṇḍa, Vākyakāṇḍa* and *Padakāṇḍa,* or *Prakīrṇakāṇḍa,*. The first one is called *āgamasamuccaya* = collection of traditions, in the colophon at the end of it, and the word *āgamasaṅgraha* comes in Vāk. II. 484 and means the same thing.[5] The name is rather vague and its significance is not clear. It is true that the first two *Kāṇḍas* do contain an exposition of many traditional ideas but then so does the third *Kāṇḍa*. It can be said about the first *Kāṇḍa* that, in it, the author emphasises the importance of *āgama* tradition, oral as well as written. He stresses the superiority of *āgama* to *tarka* as a valid means of knowledge in regard to some matters such as determination of the correct form of words. There is a traditional way of doing it, handed down to us by Pāṇini and others. It has continuity with a long line of teachers. A knowledge of this tradition enables us to understand the correct form of words and to tell who is cultured (*śiṣṭa*) and who is not, when we hear people speak. The mere fact that the superiority of tradition to reasoning is formally set forth in the first *Kṇḍa* does not explain why the name *āgamasamuccaya* is given to this *Kāṇḍa* only, considering that *āgamas* or traditions have been expounded in all the three of them. The other name *Brahmakāṇḍa* is easier to understand. The opening stanzas of that *Kāṇḍa* endeavour to state the nature of *Brahman*. Not only the opening verses. Elsewhere also in that *Kāṇḍa* and, indeed, in the other two *Kāṇḍas* also, there are many references to *Brahman*, sometimes as *sattā* and sometimes as *Parā Prakṛtiḥ*.

It might be asked : if these eight topics exhaust the subject-matter of the *Vākyapadīya*, where does *Brahman* come in ? Is it included in one of these eight and if so, in which one ? As was stated before, the opening stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* speak about *Brahman*. Vṛṣabhadeva says that the first twenty-two stanzas are devoted to the description of '*phala*' (otherwise called *prayojana*) which is one of the eight topics.[6] Puṇyarāja also, in the very first sentence of his commentary on the second *Kāṇḍa*, hints that in the previous *Kāṇḍa*, the nature of the word as well as the result or purpose (*prayojana*) have been determined.[7] Helārāja also tells us that *prayojana* has been dealt with in the first chapter.[8] In all these remarks of commentators, it is emphasised that the first *Kāṇḍa* begins by a statement of the result or purpose, one of the eight topics dealt with in the work. The two results

5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.

or purposes actually mentioned by Bhartṛhari are *dharma* and *pratyaya*. Knowledge and use of correct words does two things : it brings about spiritual merit (*dharma*) and it brings about the understanding of meaning (*pratyaya*). Spiritual merit leads to *abhyudaya* which is usually understood as paradise (*svarga*). In fact, Patañjali, in his *M. Bhāṣya* on P. 6.1.84 actually mentions *svarga*[9] Bhartṛhari is not satisfied with merit leading to paradise. For him, knowledge and use of correct words can lead to liberation (*mokṣa*) also. To say that the purpose of the *Vākyapadīya* or of the science of Grammar in general is the acquisition of merit (*dharma*) is to say that one can acquire *svarga* and also attain *makṣa*. Bhartṛhari brings this idea out, not only in his *Vākyapadīya* but also in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya*. While explaining the purpose of the fourteen *māheśvara sūtras* which form the very basis of Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, Patañjali uses the words *puṣpitaḥ* and *phalitaḥ*, suggesting that they yield flowers as well as fruit. Commenting on these two words, Bhartṛhari equates flowers with paradise (*abhyudaya*) and the fruit with liberation (*niḥśreyas*)[10] and Kaiyyaṭa does the same in his *Pradīpa*, repeating the very words of Bhartṛhari. *Niḥśreyasa* or *Mokṣa*, as a purpose of Grammar is mentioned several times in the *Vākyapadīya*. In one place, Bhartṛhari says that *Vyākaraṇa* is the door leading to liberation[11] and in another that it is the straight royal road to take for those who desire salvation.[12] Again he says that by mastering the science of Grammar, one attains the supreme *Brahman*.[13] All this is found in the opening *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*. But Bhartṛhari comes back to this idea towards the end of the first *Kāṇḍa*. There he tells us that the purification of the word is the means to the attainment of the Supreme Self. One who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal Brahman[14] Patañjali had already mentioned, while explaining *RV*. 4.58.3. that one should study grammar in order to attain similarity (*sāmya*) with the great deity within, namely, the Word. Bhartṛhari interprets the word *sāmya* as *sāyujya* = Union, thus taking another step towards the idea of *mokṣa*.[15] Patañjali also must have meant something more than paradise when he mentioned attainment of similarity with the deity as the goal for the study of *Vyākaraṇa*,

9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See Texts.
15. See Texts.

but Bhartṛhari makes the distinction quite clear by explaining *sāmya* as *sāyujya*. The other expressions which he uses : *niḥśreyasa, apavarga, paraṃ brahmādhigamyate, brahmāmṛtam aśnute* and so on leave no room for doubt that Bhartṛhari understood both celestial happiness and liberation under the *phala* called *dharma* mentioned in Vāk. I. 25. So the tradition of the commentators that, by speaking about *Brahman* in the opening stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari is speaking about *phala*, the result to be attained, one of the eight topics is quite reasonable.

We can perhaps go beyond that and say that by speaking about *Brahman*, Bhartṛhari is not only speaking about the goal to be attained but also about the ultimate origin of everything. *Brahman* is the eternal and undifferential Word — Principle (*śabdatattva*). All cosmos, all differentiation proceeds from it. All differentiation consisting of all the experiencers, all the objects of experience and all experience itself and all the words expressive of the objects of experience proceed from the Word — Principle.

The Veda is the means of attaining this *Brahman* of which it is a manifestation. It is *āgama*, supreme knowledge. It is the source of all the traditional sciences, including that of Grammar. *Āgama* is more trustworthy than reasoning in some matters such as *dharma*. Reasoning which does not go against the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* is helpful. Reasoning not based on *āgama* is not reliable because the reasoning of one can be set aside by that of another. It is only by strictly following *āgama* that some individuals acquire divine vision.

Brahman, then, would come under '*phala*'. The other '*phala*' is the understanding of meaning. It is not clear how the understanding of meaning becomes one of the purposes of grammar in general or of the *Vākyapadīya*. Words convey a meaning even to one who does not know grammar. Grammar tells us what the correct forms of words are. It is not only in their correct forms that words convey a meaning but also in their corrupt forms as used by the uneducated and the uncultured. While spiritual merit can be attained only by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, it is not necessary to know them if all one wants to achieve is to convey the meaning. Even the corrupt forms of words can do that. Bhartṛhari says that there is no difference between the correct and the incorrect forms as far as the conveying of meaning is concerned. The only difference is that the use of the former leads to spiritual merit whereas the use of

the latter does not.[16] It is because the corrupt forms can fulfil this one purpose (*phala*) of conveying the meaning that a small section of the first *Kāṇḍa* is devoted to their consideration. The points which are made in this section are : (1) that an *apabhraṃśa* (corrupt form) is so always in regard to an original correct form, (2) that it can convey the meaning of the correct word and it is as the conveyor of that meaning that it is an *apabhraṃśa* and that, as the conveyor of some other meaning, it may be a correct word, (3) whether the form of a word is correct or corrupt cannot be determined merely by looking at its form because its meaning also has to be considered, (4) that, though a corrupt form may convey the same meaning as its correct form, the two cannot be looked upon as synonyms, (5) that though the corrupt form conveys the meaning, it cannot be looked upon as its expression (*vācaka*) as it conveys the meaning only after having brought the correct form to the mind.[17]

Thus, of the eight topics, the two purposes or results (*phala*) are dealt with in the first *Kāṇḍa*. But, after all, they cannot be looked upon as the central topics of the *Vākyapadīya*. The other six are certainly more important topics. Of them, Bhartṛhari begins with the treatment of *śabda*, that which is to be grammatically explained (*anvākhyeya*) and is the conveyor of meaning. It is from Vāk. I. 44. that the treatment of this topic begins.[18] Up to that point, we are told, the author has only dealt with preliminary topics. The real word is the *sphoṭa*, which is to be distinguished from *nāda* or *dhavani*. In the course of the exposition of the *sphoṭa*-doctrine, he gives us a glimpse of the different ideas which were held by different thinkers, referred to, ordinarily, in a general way as *pare*, *apare*, *ekeṣām* and *anyeṣām* and sometimes more specifically, as *purāṇagāḥ*, *ekatvavādinaḥ*, *nānātvavādinaḥ*, *abhivyaktivādinaḥ* and so on. It is in this context, that he makes certain distinctions indicated by such words as *dhvani*, *nāda*, *prākṛtadhvani vaikṛtadhvani*, *varṇa*, *pada*, *vākya*, *vṛttibheda*, *grāhaka*, *grāhya*, *vyañjaka*, *vyaṅgya*, *prakāśaka*, *prakāśya*, *pracaya*, *apacaya*, *kampa* and so on. This subject will be dealt with in detail in a later chapter. He describes the process of manifestation (*abhivyakti*) of the *sphoṭa* by the sounds (*dhvanis*) pointing out the part played by *Buddhi* and *Prāṇa* in the process. He tells us, not only what the manifested *sphoṭa* is, but also the part which it and the Word-Principle play in all our cultural life at the different levels of our consciousness.

16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.

He tells us that it is the word which is the basis of the distinction between the sentient and the insentient. All knowledge, all thought is intertwined with the word. The whole universe, consisting of the different objects of the world and the words which are expressive of them are evolved from the Word — Principle which is within us and which is identical with *Brahman*. Grammar, by giving us a knowledge of the correct words evolved out of the *śabdatattva* enables us to attain it and to become one with it. It is no wonder that the first chapter of the *Vākyapadīya* is called the *Brahma-Kāṇḍa*. It is not merely the two kinds of purpose or result and the nature of the expressive word which are dealt with in this *Kāṇḍa*. Something is said about the two kinds of relation and the two kinds of meaning also, but they are dealt with in detail in the later chapters.

In trying to define the word or the *sphoṭa*, the first thing which Bhartṛhari did was to distinguish it from the sounds which we utter and which some mistook for the word. It still remained to consider what the word is as a unit of communication and the nature of the meaning of that unit. This is done in the second chapter called *Vākyakāṇḍa*. It begins with an enumeration of the eight ways of looking at a sentence current in the different circles of thinkers of those days.[19] Some observations have then been made on the Vārttikakāra's definition of a sentence. The views of the *abhihitānvayavādins* and the *anvitābhidhānavādins* are then examined. It is stated that the indivisible sentence is the unit of communication and that its meaning is in the nature of an intuition. The arguments of those who believe in the reality of the individual word are set forth and then refuted. The whole *Kāṇḍa* is written in a polemical style. Here the opponent of Bhartṛhari is anybody who considers the individual word and its meaning also to be real from the point of view of communication. As against this, he maintains that only the sentence and its meaning have a reality. In the course of this controversy, all kinds of questions are raised. Though the orthodox view of the grammarians is that only the indivisible sentence and the sentence-meaning have a reality, the need for analysing them for practical purposes is admitted. We then get the individual word and its meaning at a lower level of reality. In connection with them some questions like the following are discussed : (1) what is the nature of the meanings which we obtain by analysis, (2) if we can analyse a sentence into parts, cannot the individual word also be so analysed and what would be the nature of the

19. See Texts.

meaning of the parts so obtained ? (3) are there words which cannot be analysted at all ? (4) when do words or word-elements directly express a meaning (*vācaka*) and when do they do no more than illuminate the meaning (*dyotaka*) which belongs to some other word-element ? (5) when a word denotes many objects, is it the same word which does so or is it a separate word with each meaning (*ekaśabdadarśanam* and *anekaśabdadarśanam*), (6) what is the difference between the primary and secondary meanings of a word ? (7) what is *śabdopacāra* and *arthopacāra ?* (8) What are the factors which enable us to determine and to specify the meaning of a word in its different occurrences ? (9) into how many parts of speech can a Sanskrit sentence be analysed and what is the exact definition of each part of speech ? (10) have individual phonemes any meaning ?

The opponent puts forward again and again his arguments in favour of the reality of the individual word and again and again they are refuted by the Siddhāntin who holds that only the sentence and the sentence-meaning are real. This idea runs right through this *Kāṇḍa* even when apparently other ideas are discussed.

From all this, it is clear that even though the second *Kāṇḍa* is called *Vākyakāṇḍa* there is a good deal of material in it relating to the ideas of ancient Indian thinkers on the nature of the individual word and its meaning. Though the questions have been raised in connection with the Sanskrit language, they have relevance to language in general. The answers given are applicable to other languages also. These discussions may be looked upon as Bhartṛhari's contribution to General Linguistics, including Semantics. Such discussions are found scattered in the first and third *Kāṇḍas* also. The *sphoṭa*-doctrine may be looked upon as a part of this contribution. Many questions discussed in the *Vākyapadīya* are the concern of modern linguisticians also, of course in very different circumstances.

It is the third *Kāṇḍa* which deals in detail with the meanings of individual words, obtained by an artificial but practical analysis of the sentence. The sentence is considered to express primarily a particularised action or process and when we analyse it, we get, first of all, the main word in it, the verb which directly denotes this process or action. Then, we get some other words, mostly nouns which denote the means or accessories (*sādhana*) that help in the accomplishment of that action or process. The third *Kāṇḍa* deals with the notions expressed by these verbs and nouns or their parts. It is, therefore, called the *padakāṇḍa* and Bhartṛhari himself says that in it, a detailed consideration is made of matters already briefly referred to in the previous

chapter.[20] Helārāja looks upon it as a natural supplement or continuation of the previous chapters.[21] It is very much bigger than the other two *Kāṇḍas* taken together and yet, as we have it, it is incomplete.

The chapter deals with very general and comprehensive notions first. The meaning of a word, whether it be a noun or a verb, has in it a very general element, something found in every word or part of a word irrespective of its grammatical status. Also, there is always a relation between a word and its meaning, whatever be the nature of the latter. Bhartṛhari deals with such general and comprehensive notions in the first three sections of this *Kāṇḍa*, entitled *jātisamuddeśa* (section on the universal), *dravyasamuddeśa* (section on the ultimate substance) and *sambandhasamuddeśa* (section on Relation). The meaning of all words and parts of words is either the Universal (*jāti*) as Vājapyāyana held or the substance (*dravya*) as Vyāḍi held. They are united with the word through some relation. It is that which enables the word to convey its own meaning. Otherwise any meaning would be understood from any word. These three notions have to be understood from the very beginning and so they are explained first. But they are not very useful in explaining the formation of words, just because they are of a very general nature. The language has not developed any special form to express them, because they are present in all forms and all kinds of words. To say that the universal is the meaning of all words and parts of words is to say that it is the meaning of nouns and verbs, of the stem and the root, of the primary and secondary suffixes.[22]

There are, however, certain notions which are not of such a general nature but are more useful in explaining the formation of words. They are obtained by analysis (*apoddhāra*). Whenever what is united in reality is divided for practical purposes, *apoddhāra* takes place. To analyse a sentence means to analyse the audible part as well as the meaning part of it. It is from the well-connected sentence-meaning that the word-meaning and the meaning of parts of words are obtained by analysis. Before the analysis, the word-meaning is well fitted in the sentence-meaning. It is analysed out of it by a kind of reasoning, by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). These notions which are useful in the explanation of the forms of words are obtained by observing the forms themselves or

20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.

inferred from the way in which Pāṇini deals with these forms.[23] The more important of these notions are those of the second kind of *dravya, guṇa, dik, sādhana, kriyā* and *kāla.* The last four have been grouped together because Bhartṛhari looks upon them as a kind of power (*śakti*), existing in substantial entities.[24]

Among the notions which are helpful in explaining the formation of words, the second kind of *dravya* is taken up first because the subsequent notions like that of *guṇa* (qualify) depend upon that of *dravya.*[25] Being the first among the things dependent upon *dravya,* the author next takes up the notion of *guṇa* and it is defined on the basis of indications found in the *śāstra,* that is, in the works of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali.[26] Among the things looked upon as powers (*śakti*), the definition of *dik* (Direction, Position) is taken up next and it is defined chiefly through inference.[27] The notions of 'means' or 'accessories' (*sādhana*), action (*Kriyā*) and time (*Kāla*) have been defined with the help of indications found in the *śāstra* itself. While defining 'means' as understood by the grammarians, the views of Vijñānavādins, Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas, Advaitins and the Sāṅkhyas on the same subject have also been briefly explained. While explaining the notion of *sādhana,* some allied notions are also defined and the difference between *hetu, kāraka, lakṣaṇa* and *karaṇa* is pointed out. *Sādhana* as power is a general notion. There is no limit to the number of powers of a thing, but they have been brought under six headings, beginning with *Karma* and with the addition of *śeṣa,* seven powers are recognised and they are dealt with, not in the order in which they are taught in P. 1.4, but in the order in which the case-affixes expressive of them are taught in P. 4.1.2.

The notion of 'means' or accessory presupposes that of 'action' because what is a 'means' is so because it helps in the accomplishment of an action. This is a very important notion, because it is the meaning of the most important of the words obtained by analysing the sentence, namely, the verb. So a whole section is devoted to a consideration and definition of this notion. The Sanskrit verb expresses action as associated with particular points of time. For this reason and because of the place of Time as a power in the metaphysics of Bhartṛhari, the subject is dealt with in detail in a separate section.

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23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.

Various views on Time, current in those days, are also mentioned in this section. The verb does more than express action qualified by Time. The notion of Time, as expressed by a verb, is directly subordinate to action. So is the notion of aspect (*upagraha*) expressed by the *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada* suffixes of a verb and a separate section is, therefore, consecrated to it. The notion of number (*saṃkhyā*) and person (*puruṣa*) are also subordinate to action, not directly as the notions of time and aspect are, but indirectly through the 'means' (*sādhana*) of which they are properties. Such 'means' as the agent (*kartā*), the object (*karma*) and instrument (*karma*) are qualified by some number or other. Similarly the agent is either the first, the second or the third person. By qualifying the 'means' of an action, they indirectly qualify the action too and that is why a section is devoted to each of them.[28]

So much for the notions expressed by a verb. Some of these notions such as 'means' and number are expressed by nouns also, whereas the notions of time, person and aspect are associated only with action as expressed by a verb. There is a notion associated with nouns and adjectives only in Sanskrit, namely, that of gender (*linga*).[29] Already in the *Mahābhāṣya*, the question of the nature of gender has been raised and an answer given. Bhartṛhari considers the notion to be important enough to devote a whole section to it (*liṅgasamuddeśa*). Here, as elsewhere, he develops a characteristic notion of gender which is a blend of his observations of the facts of the Sanskrit language, the statements on gender found in the *Mahābhāṣya* and the doctrine of the three guṇas of Sāṅkhya philosophy.

So far, the notions involved in simple formations, nouns or verbs, have been mentioned. While analysing a sentence, one tumbles upon complex or synthetic formations also. Five such have been recognised in Sanskrit Grammar : primary derivatives (*kṛt*), secondary derivatives (*tuddhita*), compound words (*samāsa*), 'retention of one' (*ekaśeṣa*) and denominative formation (*nāmadhātu*). Certain special notions play a part in these formations and some of them have been considered in a special section, the *Vṛttisamuddeśa*, the biggest in the third *Kāṇḍa*. The following topics, among others, have been discussed : (1) *Yugapadadhikaraṇatā*, the fact of denoting, the group as well as its constituents at the same time, a characteristic of *dvandva* compounds, (2) *ekārthībhāva*, the fact of both words together denoting

28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.

one thing, as in compound words, to be distinguished from *vyapekṣā*, mutual relation, found in sentences, (3) resemblances and differences between a sentence and a compound word, (4) *abhedaikatva*, the undifferentiated singular number expressed by the secondary word in a compound word, (5) the extension of the gender and number of one word to another, (6) the implications of the expression *anyapadārtha* in connection with a *bahuvrīhi* compound, (7) the meaning of negative compounds, (8) the gender and number of words expressive of the universal, (9) compounds involving comparison. Some of these topics have relevance to more than one kind of complex formation. They have been dealt with on the basis of statements found in the *Mahābhāṣya*, so that one can look upon many of the stanzas of the *Vṛttisamuddeśa* as indirect commentaries of that ancient work. This is true of some of the stanzas of the other two *Kāṇḍas* also. While Helārāja always gives references to *Mahābhāṣya* passages in his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*, he does so more frequently in the *Vṛttisamuddeśa* than elsewhere. Reference to the *Mahābhāṣya* are also found in the *Vṛtti* on the first *Kāṇḍa* and in the commentary of Puṇyarāja on the second *Kāṇḍa*.

We can now see that the third *Kāṇḍa* deals with the great diversity of the meanings of words and of parts of words obtained by *apoddhāra*. Diversity and differentiation form the chief subject-matter of this *Kāṇḍa*. Here we cannot but remember the three stages of *Vāk* that Bhartṛhari mentions in the first *Kāṇḍa*, namely, *Vaikharī*, *Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī*.[30] In the *Kārikā*, only the bare names occur and they occur in the context of the greatness of the science of Grammar. It is stated that this science is the supreme and wonderful source of the knowledge of the three stages of *Vāk*. These states are not defined or described anywhere in the *Kārikās*. It is the *Vṛtti* which gives some information about them. The relevant points in that information are the following. *Paśyantī*, the first stage is one and absolutely free from all differentiation and sequence. It is beyond all notion of correctness and it is beyond all worldly usage. It is indivisible, it is the inner Light, it is the subtle Word and it is imperishable. The second stage *Madhyamā* is purely mental and is not audible to others. It is accompanied by the subtle function of breath (*prāṇa*) and so it appears to have sequence. Being one with the mind which is sequenceless, it is also sequenceless, but appears to have sequence. *Vaikharī* is the word that is audible to others. *Prāṇa* plays a great part in it and so it has definite sequence and form. It is either highly mixed-up

30. Vāk. I. 134 [142]

or uttered in distinct phonemes. Even sound coming out of the axle of a cart or a drum or a flute or a *vīṇā* is *vaikharī*. It can have correctness or can be without it. It has infinite diversity (*apariṇāmabhedā*).

As the *Paśyantī* is One, the word and the meaning are not yet differentiated in it. It is the pre-mental stage. In the second *Madhyamā* stage, the word and the meaning are differentiated from each other, but each one is still a unity. This is the mental stage because the texts emphasize its association with the *Buddhi*. The last stage *Vaikharī* is the externalised stage. Its association is with *prāṇa* (breath) and *Karaṇa* (vocal organs). Here both the word and the meaning are fully differentiated, not only from each other but within each there is full differentiation. It is this which is known to the ordinary man and which is used in every-day life.

Is it an accident that just as *Vāk* has three stages, so has *Vākyapadīya*, which is, after all, a treatise on *Vāk*, in three *Kāṇḍas*? Would it be seeing too much in Bhartṛhari to say that he intended *Paśyantī* to be the chief subject-matter of the first *Kāṇḍa*, *Madhyamā* that of the second *Kāṇḍa* and *Vaikharī* that of the third? We saw how the first *Kāṇḍa* begins with a statement on *Brahman*, the undiffrentiated ultimate Reality to which *Paśyantī* is very near. There are also observations on *Brahman* later in that chapter. Though some other topics are also dealt with in it, it is not without reason that it is called the *Brahmakāṇḍa* traditionally. Though the other *Kāṇḍas* also refer to *Brahman* in different contexts, as, for instance, when the subjects of *Dravya* and *Kāla* are dealt with in the third, they do not give the impression that it is one of their important topics. But it is certainly so in the first *Kāṇḍa*. In the second one, the indivisible sentence and sentence-meaning form the main subject-matter. Thus differentiation into word and meaning has taken place and yet each is looked upon as an indivisible unit. In other words, there is some differentiation, but it is not complete because the unity is also preserved. Thus, its subject-matter may be looked upon as *Madhyamā*. We saw how, in the third *Kāṇḍa*, we are entirely in the realm of analysis and differentiation which is just the characteristic of *Vaikharī*. That all this is not pure imagination and that Bhartṛhari may have really meant his three *Kāṇḍas* to be representative of the three stages of *Vāk* is confirmed by one of the concluding stanzas of Helārāja's commentary. In that stanza, he definitely looks upon the third *Kāṇḍa* as the third stage of *Vāk*, namely, *Vaikharī*. The stanza runs as follows :

"Nirākāṅkṣeṇa vapuṣā gatā viśvajanīnatām/
Tṛtīyā Vāgavastheyam pratiṣṭhām upayātv itaḥ//

Vāk. C. pt. II. p. 272.

"Let this third stage of *Vāk*, having become common to all in its clear unambiguous form, establish itself through this (work of mine)." The third stage of *Vāk* is obviously *Vaikharī*. This is made clear by the adjectives which Helārāja uses while describing it. We saw how *Vaikharī* is what is known to the ordinary man and what is used in every-day life. It is externalised by the movements of the vocal organs and it is clearly apprehended by the hearer. That is why it is said to have an unambiguous form. It is not surprising that Helārāja, after finishing his commentary on the third *Kāṇḍa*, prays that the third stage of *Vāk*, the *Vaikharī*, should become well-established through his commentary. Unfortunately, we do not possess his commentaries on the first and second *Kāṇḍas*. It is only by seeing the concluding stanzas, if any, of his commentaries on them, that we can be sure whether, according to him, Bhartṛhari intended the three *Kāṇḍas* to be representative of the three stages of *Vāk*. But the stanza quoted above gives a hint that he may have attributed some such intention to Bhartṛhari. The name *Brahmakāṇḍa*, associating *Brahman*, so near to *Paśyantī*, with the first chapter, is also relevant in this connection.

Even if Bhartṛhari may have thus intended to emphasise one stage of *Vāk* in each *Kāṇḍa*, it is remarkable that he is ever conscious, right through his work, of the Ultimate Word-Principle, the *Śabdatattva*, *Brahman* out of which the whole cosmos and our experience of it consisting of an infinite variety of cognitions, objects and words expressive of them, are manifested. That runs like a thread through the work and gives it a kind of unity. Whether he is speaking about *jāti* or *dravya*, *śadhana* or *kriyā*, *dik* or *kāla*, he somehow or other connects it all with the inner *Śabdatattva*.

3. BHARTṚHARI AND THE *DARŚANAS*

Vyākaraṇa has long been considered to be a *darśana*, a view of life, a system of philosophy, in India, in addition to being grammar proper and a *Vedāṅga*, an auxiliary discipline of the Veda. When Mādhavācārya included the philosophy of Pāṇini in his *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, he was only giving expression to what had long been an accepted view. Though he has given the name of *Pāṇinidarśana* to the philosophy of the grammarians, it is the *Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari which he quotes in abundance in order to describe that philosophy, not the *sūtras* of Pāṇini or the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana or the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali. It is the *Vākyapadīya* which is the earliest work, among the grammatical treatises known to us, claiming to contain philosophical matter, besides ideas relating to General Linguistics and to the forms of the Sanskrit language. I deliberately say "among the grammatical treatises known to us" because I have a feeling that similar work had already been done earlier but has not come down to us. I am not thinking of the famous *Saṅgraha* of Vyāḍi about which we yet know too little. Judging from the quotations from that work found in the *Vṛtti* and in Helārāja's commentary, it must have contained a good deal of philosophical and linguistic material. Probably Bhartṛhari's own *guru* had already worked along that line. Atleast that is the impression which I get from *Vāk*. II. 484. There he tells us that his *guru*, no other than Vasurāta as Puṇyarāja and Siṃhasūri inform us, had, after having thoroughly studied the different traditions, and his own system, composed a digest of all of them.[1] Bhartṛhari says this to show that his *Vākyapadīya* is based on good authority. It is clear that he got much inspiration from his *guru* in writing this work.

That it was Bhartṛhari who was thought of as the main exponent of the grammarian's philosophy, the *Śabdādvaita*, is further shown by the fact that those who have opposed it in ancient times quoted passages from his works, especially the *Vākyapadīya* for first expounding it and then refuting it. This is what Śāntarakṣita of the 8th century A.D. has done in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*[2] and Somānanda of the 9th century A.D., has done in his *Śivadṛṣti*. Somānanda has gone a little further. He has questioned the right of a grammarian to go

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1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.

beyond his domain and start defining the nature of that true knowledge which leads to liberation. He accuses Bhartṛhari of having done thus, not only in his *Vākyapadīya*, but also in another work of his, the *Śabdadhātusanūkṣā*. Not with success, says Somānanda because, instead of identifying the true knowledge, he has been able to define only what looks like it but is not it. He has stopped short of true knowledge because he has halted at *Paśyantī* which is the ultimate for Bhartṛhari says Somānanda for whom, as a *Śaiva* of the *Pratyabhijñā* school, it is not *Vijñāna*, but only *vijñānābhāsana*, a mere semblance of true knowledge.[3] His commentator, Utpalācārya, has clarified this point by mentioning Bhartṛhari by name and quoting two stanzas from the *Śabdadhātusamīkṣā* in support of his statement.[4]

Thus Bhartṛhari's mistake, according to Somānanda and Utpalācārya is that, instead of confining himself to the business of explaining the notions underlying the forms of the Sanskrit language, he had proceeded to define true knowledge leading to *mokṣa*, though without success. In other words, Bhartṛhari had dabbled in philosophy, which, as a grammarian, he had no business to do.

It is clear from these ancient criticisms that Bhartṛhari was looked upon as having done something unusual in trying to give a metaphysical and epistemological background to what he had to say about language in general and the Sanskrit language in particular. For example, he is not satisfied with explaining the tenses which are expressed by the Sanskrit language but raises the more fundamental question of what Time is. What he says about it is naturally connected with his metaphysics, as will be explained in a later section. After defining Time philosophically, he takes up the different forms of the Sanskrit verb and tells us what aspects of Time they express.[5] On the basis of the same definition, he tries to explain the distinction between short and long vowels and slow and rapid utterances. Once he adopts this method, it is natural that he should be confronted with the notions current in the different systems of philosophy on Time. As he adopts the same method in regard to the other notions expressed by the forms of the Sanskrit language he is up against the ideas of the different systems of Indian philosophy all the time. It would be worth one's while to see what attitude he adopts towards them.

3. See Texts.
4. See Utpala's commentary on the *Śivadṛṣṭi* II 71-72, pp. 83-84 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies, No. LIV.)
5. Vāk. c. III. pt. 1, p. 80 ff.

In the course of the exposition of his subject in the *Vākyapadīya* and in his commentary on *Mahābhāṣya,* Bhartṛhari refers to the views of others. These others are usually referred to in a very general manner, by such expressions as *anye, anyaiḥ, anyeṣām, apare, kecit, kaiścit, keṣāṃcit, ekatvinaḥ, dvaitinaḥ, nānātvavādinaḥ, abhivyaktivādinaḥ* and *saṃsargavādinaḥ.*[6] Sometimes, but rarely, he mentions names. For example, Vārrttākṣa and Audumbarāyaṇa are said to have held the view that the classification of words into four kinds: *nāma, ākhyāta, upasarga* and *nipāta* is unwarranted.[7] He mentions Baiji, Saubhava and Haryakṣa as persons, who relied too much on mere reasoning and made a sad mess of the *Mahābhāṣya.*[8]

One difficulty of the *Vākyapadīya* is that, sometimes, what is presented as somebody else's view may very well be Bhartṛhari's view also. The view that the inner Word-principle is one and is manifested as the sentence is presented as that of others but he shares it too.[9] Sometimes one is not sure whether he shares it or not. For example, does he accept the view, held by some as he says, that the *sphoṭa* is a *jāti?*[10] In the stanza in question, there is at least the word *kaiścit* indicating that it is the view of others which is being expressed. But where there is no such indication, one is in real doubt. This is the case with the first stanza of the *Dravyasamuddeśa,* already referred to in the section on "Problems of Interpretation." All that the words of the stanza tell us is the words *ātmā, vastu, svabhāva, śarīra,* and *tattva* are synonyms of *dravya* which has been declared to be eternal. Are they synonyms in Bhartṛhari's system or does he want to say that while he uses the word *dravya* to denote the ultimate substance which remains the same in the midst of all changes, other systems have used other words to denote their ultimate substance? Helārāja understands it in the second way and tells us which the systems are. He says that the *Advaitins* call it *ātmā,* the *Bauddhas* call it *vastu,* the believers in *sattādvaita* call it *svabhāva,* the *Sāṅkhyas* name it *śarīra* and the *Cārvākas* refer to it as *tattva.* He may be right. If we are not prepared to accept what he says, we must be prepared to give an alternative explanation that would fit the context. Not at all easy, in the absence of any clue in this or any other stanza. Bhartṛhari often describes various shades of opinion

6. See Vāk. I, 45, 68, 70, 74, 81, 93, 102, 107; *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā,* pt. I, p. 3, l. 23-26, p. 7, l. 22, p. 17, l. 17, 19, 21 (B.O.R.I. edition).
7. See Vāk. II. 343.
8. Ibid., 481.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.

on different topics current among grammarians and others whose subject of study was the word in one of its aspects like the writers on *Śikṣā* and the *Nirukta*. The views of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Sāṅkhyas*, *Vaiśeṣikas* and *Bauddhas* are frequently brought in. It would be interesting to see what Bhartṛhari's general attitude is towards these other *darśanas*.

In his attitude towards the other *darśanas*, Bhartṛhari has been influenced by many factors. Among them, we must, of course, include the tradition of the grammarians, especially as recorded in the *Mahābhāṣya* which is, to a very great extent, the basis of the *Vākyapadīya*. There are one or two passages in the *Mahābhāṣya* which seem to have given a lead to Bhartṛhari in determining his attitude towards the other *darśanas*. While discussing the word *bahulam* in P. 2.1.57 and 6.3.14, the question is raised: why does Pāṇini, after having given these two *sūtras* which already cover all possibilities because of the presence of the word *bahulam* in them, give, after each of them, some other *sūtras* where these possibilities are elaborated, which, in other words, are a *prapañca* of the two *sūtras?* Would not the forms given as illustrations under the later *sūtras* come under these two *sūtras* themselves? The first answer given to this question is that everybody would not be able to think of all possibilities merely by the presence of the word *bahulam*.[11] A general rule, without reference to specific cases would not be very effective. Mere mention of specific cases, without enunciating a general rule, would become too long. So a compromise is made, consisting of the enunciation of a general principle, followed by the mention of some specific cases.[12] But another answer is given which is more interesting for us. The answer is given in the same words in the *Mahābhāṣya* on both the *sūtras*. The answer amounts to saying that *Vyākaraṇa* is common to all the Vedas, that its rules must explain the forms found in all the Vedas. It has to accommodate itself to all the Vedas.[13] We have to note here this idea of accommodation to all. We will see what modification it undergoes in Bhartṛhari's thought.

Another passage which has helped to determine Bhartṛhari's attitude also occurs twice in identical terms in the *Mahābhāṣya*. On the first occasion, the point raised is: if the knowledge of correct words leads to *dharma*, the knowledge of incorrect words, inevitable in a

11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.

good grammarian should lead to *adharma*. This argument is met by saying that the grammarians take the word as their authority. What the word says is their guide. By 'word', scripture (*śruti*) is meant here. And *śruti* actually says that the knowledge of the correct word leads to *Dharma* but nowhere does it say that the knowledge of incorrect words leads to *adharma*.[14] On the second occasion when the same point is made, the word *śabda* does not mean scripture (*śruti*) but the word in general. A question is raised about a sentence like *ayaṃ daṇḍo harānena* = here is the stick, take with it. Here there is connection (*sāmarthya*) between the stick and the action of taking, because the word *anena* refers to the stick. The question is: should there be loss of the *udātta* accent in *hara* according to P. 8.1.28. which says that a verb coming immediately after a word which is not a verb loses its *udātta*. It is understood that both the words should be in the same sentence and, as that is the case here, the loss of the *udātta* accent should take place.[15] But it does not. According to Kātyayana, there should be only one verb in a sentence. Where there are more verbs than one, there are more sentences than one. Here, though apparently, there is only one verb, really speaking there are two, because the verb '*asti*' has to be supplied after the word *daṇḍa*. Thus there are two sentences here and the words in question, *daṇḍa* and *hara*, not being found in the same sentence, there is no loss of *udātta* in *hara*. The justification given for supplying the verb *asti* is that grammarians take the word as their authority and that what the word says is their guide. Here the word *daṇḍa* does bring to our mind the idea of existence and the word *asti* which expresses it. The *daṇḍa* becomes first the agent of the action of existence and when connected afterwards with the word *hara*, becomes the instrument (*karaṇa*) of the action of taking.[16]

The principle which is emphasised in these two passages of the *Mahābhāṣya* is that grammarians go by what the words say rather than by how things really are. Thus, there are two ideas in the *Mahābhāṣya*: (1) that grammar is not attached to any particular Veda but accommodates itself to all of them, (2) that grammarians go by what the words say rather than by how things really are. Bhartṛhari has made use of both these ideas. It is a pity that we have anly a miserable fragment of his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* and that too in a single defective manuscript. Even the whole of that fragment

14. See Texts.
15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.

is not yet available to all because only a portion of it has been published. But even in that little portion there are indications that Bhartṛhari was familiar with these two ideas. Both of them have undergone modifications at Bhartṛhari's hands and it is in their modified form that commentators like Helārāja and Puṇyarāja make use of them for interpreting the *Vākyapadīya*. The passage in Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* where he refers to these ideas occurs in the discussion on the *Vārttika; Siddhe śabdārthasaṃbandhe*. The word *siddha* has been explained as *nitya* (eternal) and so a discussion ensues in the *Mahābhāṣya* as to what is *nitya* and what is *anitya*. Here Bhartṛhari explains the two kinds of eternality (*niyatā*) : *Kūṭasthanityatā* = absolute eternity, and *pravāhanityatā* = continuity, and speaks about three kinds of *anityatā*: when flowers of different colours hide the clearness of the crystal which comes into contact with them, it is *saṃsaragānityatā* = disappearance due to contact. When the green colour of the fruit *badara* turns into red when it becomes ripe, it is *vipariṇāmānityatā* = disappearance through transformation. When a thing is totally destroyed, it is *vastuvināśānityatā* = disappearance due to the destruction of a thing.[17] After discussing the matter, Patañjali concludes: *Kim na etena idaṃ nityam idam anityam iti* = what does it matter to us to know what is eternal and what is not ? Bhartṛhari's comments on this are interesting. He points out that *Vyākaraṇa* is not meant to be of help to any one in particular : *nedaṃ kasyacid ekasya sahāyabhūtam.*[18] It is common to all : *sarvasādhāraṇam*. When he elaborates this idea, he mentions the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Kṣaṇikavādinaḥ*, that is, the *Buddhists*. What has happened is that the idea that *Vyākaraṇa* has to accommodate itself to all the Vedas has been changed into the idea that it has to accommodate itself to all the *darśanas*.

In the same context he makes another comment which is also interesting for us. The idea behind Patañjali's question : "What does it matter to us to know what is eternal and what is not"? is, says Bhartṛhari, that it is not the business of grammar to discuss what is eternal and what is not so in the world. It is not its business to discuss the nature of external reality : *Kim asmākaṃ vastugatena vicāreṇa* = "Of what use is it to us to bestow any thought on the things of the world"? For the grammarian, the object (*artha*) is not what is found in the world. What is it then ? Bhartṛhari answers : *arthaścāsmākaṃ yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate* = "What the word presents

17. See Texts.
18. M. Bhà. dī, p. 28, l. 11-12. (B.O.R.I. edition).

is the object for the grammarian".[19] Now this is obviously an echo of the idea found in the *Mahābhāṣya* that, for grammarians, the word is the authority and that what the word says is their guide.

Thus the two ideas found by Bhartṛhari in the *Mahābhāṣya* and modified by him are : (1) that *Vyākaraṇa* is common to all systems of philosophy and has to accommodate itself to them, (2) that grammar is not concerned with defining the nature of external reality and that, for it, the object is what the word presents. In writing the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has kept these two ideas in mind and commentators like Helārāja are never tired of reminding us that Bhartṛhari has been guided by them. Helārāja puts these two ideas in the following words: (1) *Sarvapārṣadaṃ hīdaṃ śāstram*, (2) *Vaiyākaraṇānāṃ śabdārtho' rthaḥ, na vastvartho' rthaḥ*.[20]

It would not be out of place to take a few examples to see how these two ideas have been explained by Bhartṛhari in the *Vākyapadīya*. Ordinarily, in *śāstra* works, when the views of the other systems are brought in, it is for the sake of refutation. Here, the idea being : *sarvapārṣadaṃ hīdaṃ śāstram*, there is a spirit of accommodation. If the facts of the Sanskrit language can be explained from as many points of view as possible, so much the better — that is the attitude. There is also the idea that one's own views become clarified when the views of others and other traditions are fully considered.[21]

Vyākaraṇa is engaged in the task of explaining the notions expressed by the forms of the Sanskrit language. These notions are expressed by words like *jāti, guṇa, dravya, kriyā, sādhana, dik, kāla, saṅkhyā, puruṣa, liṅga* and so on. The philosophers, on the other hand, are engaged in analysing reality and in doing so, they arrive at certain categories which they call by such names as *dravya, guṇa, Kriyā, dik, Kāla* and so on. In a spirit of accomodation grammar tries to make its definitions acceptable to philosophers also, not merely to grammarians and laymen. Sometimes it takes a notion from the philosophers in order to explain a form of the Sanskrit language. These are the two aspects of the spirit of accomodation. In the *Jātisamuddeśa*, Bhartṛhari expounds the view that all words and even parts of words denote *jāti* or the universal. He shows it on the basis of statements found in Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali, on the basis of reasoning

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19. M. Bhā. dī, p. 28, l. 16-18. (B.O.R.I. edition).
20. See Helārāja on on *Vāk*. III, pt. 1, *Jā*. 11, 19, 35, 57; Sam; 1; Sā. 66.
21. See Texts.

and on the basis of the function of words (*śabdavyāpāra*). He then goes on to say that even by following the *Vaiśeṣika* line of reasoning, one can show that the universal is the meaning of all words.[22] The *Vaiśeṣikas,* while analysing reality, have recognised a category called *jāti* or *sāmānya* in any case. It is only a case of extending their line of argument a little further. But the matter is different with the *Vijñānavādins.* Bhartṛhari is anxious to show that they should also not have any difficulty in accepting the view that the universal is the meaning of all words. He does it, according to Helārāja, by combining the two ideas the application of which is now being considered.[23] The *Vijñānavādins* do not believe in the *jātī* at all. For them, everything is momentary and *jāti,* as conceived by the *Vaiśeṣikas,* being eternal, they cannot accept it. They believe only in successive and momentary states of consciousness. In them, some things appear as common properties and they are the universals and nothing more. They also figure in the cognitions produced by words. Here is where the grammarians and the *Vijñānavādins* meet, because, for the former, the object is what the words present to the mind, what figures in cognitions and not the external object. This idea, combined with the idea that *Vyākaraṇa* is common to all the *darśanas,* enables Bhartṛhari to accomodate himself to the *Vijñānavādins.*

In the second *Kāṇḍa,* Bhartṛhari proves very elaborately that the sentence and the sentence — meaning are indivisible units and that the individual word and its meaning have no reality. And yet grammar does analyse the sentence into parts. Why? In answer to this question, *Puṇyarāja* invokes the principle of accomodation to other *śāstras.* The *Mīmāṃsakas,* like some others, believe in the reality of individual words and their meanings. To accomodate them, as well as for practical purposes, the grammarian does practise an analysis (*apoddhāra*) of the sentence and its meaning.[24]

Another aspect of the spirit of accommodation is seen when *Vyākaraṇa* adopts a notion current in one of the *darśanas to* explain some formation in Sanskrit or when Bhartṛhari explains what happens in the realm of words by taking illustrations from the *darśanas.* Already, Patañjali had, on many occasions, explained some forms with the help of notions current in the *darśanas.* For example, in the *Mahābhāṣya* on the *sūtra* : *voto guṇavacanāt* (P. 4.1.44.) he quotes a stanza defining

22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.

the concept of *guṇa* which occurs in it.[25] According to that, *guṇa* is something which is not a substance, nor a universal, nor a movement but something which exists in a substance or thing and may disappear from them. This is really the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of *guṇa* and it has been used to explain the formations taught, not only by the *sūtra* under which the stanza occurs in the *Mahābhāṣya,* but by some others like P. 2.1.10; 2.2.11; 5.1.124 and 5.3.38. An example of the explanation of what happens in the realm of words with the help of an illustration taken from the *darśanas,* is seen in the *Dravyasamuddeśa.* It is declared there that all words denote *dravya* or the ultimate substance, namely, Brahman. Each word denotes it through some unreal form (*asatyopādhi*). The real is presented by the word through the unreal.[26] It is like the *Vijñānavādin's* explanation of what happens in cognition. According to him, the external world does not exist and yet objects figure in our cognitions as being external. In other words, the unreal appears in the real.[27] Similarly, according to the *Sāṅkhyas,* primordial matter (*pradhāna*) contains within itself the germs of all the later transformations and yet, it is free, in its own nature, of all the transformations. It consists of an equillibrium of the *guṇas* and is, therefore, quite different from that state in which there is disturbance of equillibrium. But, in actual life, it can be cognised only through its transformations which have not the same reality. Thus in all systems, there is a place for some sort of Nescience (*avidyā*) and the Reality can be apprehended only through the limiting factors of relatively unreal forms.[28]

The second idea the application of which we are considering is put in slightly different words by Patañjali and his successors. Patañjali says : *śabdapramāṇakā vayam, yacchabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam* = we are upholders of the authority of the word; what the word says is our guide. Bhartṛhari puts it in this way : *Kim asmākaṃ vastugatena vicāreṇa? Arthas tv asmākaṃ yaḥ śabdenābhidhīyate* = 'What is the use of our reflecting on the nature of things ? The object for us is what the word presents.' Helārāja expresses the same idea as follows : *Vaiyākaraṇānāṃ śabdārtho' rthaḥ, na vastvartho' rthaḥ* = "For grammarians, the object is what the words convey and not the external object." What it all amounts to is this : While grammar is accommodating, it is also conscious that it has its own point of view,

25. M. Bhā. II, p. 217, l. 1.
26. Vāk. III. pt. 1, Dra. 2. (p. 107, l. 20,) D. C. M Series. 21, 1963.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.

different from that of the *darśanas*. Grammar is not concerned with outside reality and it does not try to arrive at logical notions regarding it. It examines the forms of the language and tries to see what notions these forms embody. These notions have to be derived from the forms themselves and not by analysing outside reality. Otherwise, one would not be able to explain the forms through them. The eye of *Vyākaraṇa* is not turned towards outside Reality, but towards linguistic forms. Not to look at reality in the face is to be different from the philosophers. This makes clear the grammarian's point of view. It is from this point of view that Bhartṛhari, while being very accommodating, gives his own definition of such notions as *jāti, dravya, guṇa, liṅga* and *kāla*. These notions will be dealt with in detail in later sections. Here it will not be out of place to say a few words about some of them for the purpose of clarifying Bhartṛhari's attitude towards the other *darśanas* and his own point of view.

Let us take *jāti* first. It is something which exists in the different individuals of the same species, causes uniformity of cognition in regard to them and the application of the same name to them. This is similar to the *Vaiśeṣikas* conception of *jāti* or universal, but there is a difference. The *Vaiśeṣikas* do not accept *jāti* in a *jāti*. For them there are certain factors which prevent the universal from coming into existence. They are called *jātibādhakāḥ*. One of them is *anavasthitiḥ* = *regressus ad infinitum*. Where this results, they do not accept a universal. That is why they do not admit that there can be a universal in a universal. If it is admitted, one would have to postulate a third universal in the second one and a fourth in the third and so on and there would be no end to the process. But for Bhartṛhari the problem was different. If all words denote the universal, as he maintained, the word *jāti* also must denote a universal existing in the other universals. But this goes against the *Vaiśeṣika* view that there cannot be a *jāti* in a *jāti*. The problem is solved by invoking the second idea : that for grammarians, the object is what the word conveys and not the external object. It may be alright for the *Vaiśeṣikas* who are analysing reality to maintain that there cannot be a *jāti* in a *jāli*. But the grammarian is not analysing reality. He is examining the meaning conveyed by words and he finds that in all the universals conveyed by words there is a common point which can be looked upon as another universal.[29]

Similarly, Bhartṛhari has defined *dravya* and *guṇa* in his own way. It is a matter of presentation by words. What words present as a

29. See Texts.

thing to be differentiated or distinguished (*bhedya*) from other things through some attribute or other is *dravya*. This is not a definition of an external object, a *vastvartha*, but of a thing as presented by words, *śabdārtha*. Anything can be so presented and it would then be *dravya*. What is called action is so presented in *sukhaṃ sthīyate* = happily does one live. The action of living is here presented as something qualified, differentiated by the adverb 'happily'. It is, therefore, a *dravya*. Similarly, in *śuklataraṃ rūpam* = 'a whiter colour', a quality (colour) is presented as something which is distinguished from another quality. It has, therefore, become *'dravya'* or substance. When anything is presented as a *dravya*, it can be referred to by a pronoun as this or that.[30]

The counter-part of *dravya* is *guṇa* (quality). If *dravya* is something to be qualified or distinguished, *guṇa* is that which qualifies or differentiates (*bhedaka*) a thing from others of the same class. It is because of its presence in a thing (*saṃsargi*) that we are enabled to talk about it. It is because of *guṇa* that degree in a thing can be expressed. When a thing can be talked about only through its *guṇa* it is clear that it would depend upon it all the more for the expression of degree. We usually add suffixes expressive of degree to words which denote a quality. We do not say *ghaṭatara* or *ghaṭatama*, because the word *ghaṭa* does not denote a quality. It denotes a universal. If a thing is called *ghaṭa*, it is because there is the universal *ghaṭatva* in it and a universal does not admit of degree. If it exists in anything at all, the whole of it must be there. Whether there can really be degree in a universal or not is not the question here. That would be a question relating to external reality. What is emphasised here is that words are not capable of presenting the universal as admitting of degree. Whatever distinction of degree is made in a thing must be made through a *guṇa*. Even in expressions like *gotara* and *gotama* which look being expressive of degree in the universal denoted by the word *go*, Patañjali points out that degree is understood through a quality. A bullock which can pull a cart is called *'gauḥ'*, the one which can pull a cart as well as a plough is *gotara*. A cow which gives birth to a calf every year is *gauḥ*, the one which gives birth to a calf every year and a female calf at that is *gotarā*.[31] It is quality which distinguishes the two kinds of animals. Thus the three chief characteristics of *guṇa* as defined by Bhartṛhari are : (1) it exists in the substance (*saṃsargi*), (2) it distinguishes it from others of the same class, (3) it brings about

30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.

degree.[32] This conception has been derived by an examination of the forms of the language.

Bhartṛhari's insistence that grammarians have their own point of view is also seen in his treatment of gender. The Sanskrit word *liṅga* stands for two things which have different words in languages like English : sex and gender. Even where there are two distinct words, the two are often mixed up. When the word is the same, chances of confusion are greater. That is why, in answer to the question: *Kā strī nāma* = 'what is meant by feminine ?'[33] Patañjali gives a tentative answer which is a definition of the female sex and not of the feminine gender.[34] When the defects of the definition are brought out in the discussion, he says that grammarians cannot go by what the ordinary man understands by *liṅga* and that they must formulate their own definition[35] and proceeds to give his own definition.[36] On the basis of that definition, Bhartṛhari deals with the subject. After mentioning seven views on gender current in his day and after having pointed out the inadequacy of the *Naiyāyika* view of gender that it is a *jāti,* he gives his own view which is really his interpretation of the definition of Patañjali. It amounts to this : The three genders are the three states of the *guṇas*: *sattva, rajas and tamas.*[37] All of them exist in everything in three states but they cannot be seen by us. Only words expressive of objects can give us a knowledge of them. Each word conveys to us one of these states according to its gender. If it is a masculine word, it conveys the state called *āvirbhāva,* if feminine, it conveys *tirobhāva* and if it is a neuter word, it conveys *sthiti.* The fixed power of words regulates what gender should be conveyed. This restriction or regulation is what is called *vivakṣā.* It is the *vivakṣā* = 'the desire to express' of the speech-community which is meant here and not of the individual.[38] A word expresses only one of the three genders all of which exist in everything. Which particular one is known to us only from the usage of the cultured (*śiṣṭāḥ*).

This, in brief, is Bhartṛhari's definition of gender, based on the *Mahābhāṣya,* the *Sāṅkhya* philosophy and his own thinking. What

32. See Texts.
33. M. Bhā. II, p. 195, l. 25.
34. See Texts.
35. M. Bhā. II, p. 191, l. 25.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. See the *Pradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa on P. 4.1.3.

we have to note is that its basis is the second idea the application of which we are considering, the idea that, for grammarians, the object is what the word conveys. Bhartṛhari is very anxious that his conception should fit all the gender-forms actually found in the Sanskrit language.

Another example is Bhartṛhari's treatment of Time in the *Vākyapadīya.* The Sanskrit verb has different tenses which express different points of Time. For that reason he raises the question: what is Time ? Not only for that reason. His concept of Time plays an important part in his metaphysics, as will be shown in a later section. He refers to the different conceptions of Time held by the philosophers. For the *Vaiśeṣikas,* it is an eternal all-pervasive substance. For others, it is a standard of measurement for actions: an action of known dimensions used as a standard for measuring other actions. For some, it is nothing more than causality. For others still, it is a mere construction of the mind, or identical with the three *guṇas* and so on. In the midst of all this discussion, Helārāja suddenly reminds us that Bhartṛhari is not engaged in a philosophical discussion on the nature of Time. He is only examining the notion which is the basis of the Sanskrit tense-forms.[39] The Sanskrit verb is conjugated in three tenses, not to speak of the sub-divisions of each. One has, therefore, to examine the notion of Time which lies at the basis of this tense-distinction. Metaphysically, for Bhartṛhari, Time is the *Svātantryaśakti* of Brahman as a result of which the whole of the phenomenal world is presented to us in a temporal sequence.

When Helārāja says that Bhartṛhari is not indulging in a philosophical discussion on Time, he does not mean that he completely avoids a philosophical approach to the problems of language and grammar. All that he means is that in trying to understand the notions which are the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language, the object which the words present must be examined and not the external object. His point of view as a grammarian requires it. But Bhartṛhari is also an *Advaitin.* Helārāja has told us that it is as an *Advaitin* that Bhartṛhari takes his stand on all problems.[40] He is well aware of this double capacity of Bhartṛhari. Here and there he draws our attention to the slight difference of opinion on some matters caused by this double capacity.[41]

39. See Texts.
40. See Texts.
41. *See Helārāja* on Vāk. III. pt. 1, p. 265, 1, 2 and 5.

What has been said so far makes it quite clear that Bhartṛhari did his work in an atmosphere steeped in philosophical thought. The different systems of Indian Philosophy were undergoing great development at that time and some of the best thinkers were either his immediate predecessors or his elder contemporaries. It is natural to suppose that he was influenced directly or indirectly by all this philosophical ferment. It is, however, not easy to point to particular writers who may have influenced him more than others. Indirect influences may have had a greater part in the formation of his thought. Tantric influences have been suggested also. *A priori*, it is possible. Buddhist influences have also been alleged. Nor is it possible to make more definite statements on the basis of quotations found in his works. His commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* abounds in quotations from and references to earlier works. The *Vākyapadīya*, being a work in verse without even connecting prose-phrases, does not contain anything purporting to be a quotation, though one may suspect some of the stanzas to be quotations from previous works. As far as the quotations in the commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* are concerned, they contain plenty of evidence of Bhartṛhari's attachment to the Vedic and the Brahmanical tradition. The *Vākyapadīya* also gives the impression that Bhartṛhari was very anxious to be taken as an upholder of the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti*, and to link his philosophy with the Vedic tradition. This, of course, does not exclude other influences to which he was in any case very susceptible because of his spirit of accommodation. Nor do the quotations found in the commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya*, especially in the *Vṛtti*, the oldest of them all, help us to specify the influences. Some of these quotations have not yet been traced. Among those which have been traced, the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, the *Vārttikas* of Kātyāyana and the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali constitute a big portion. The others are well-known ancient works like the *Upaniṣads* and the earliest works of the different systems. Wherever any influence can be specified, it will be pointed out in the course of the exposition of the different topics in the coming sections.

4. BHARTṚHARI AND THE *PRAMĀṆAS*

Bhartṛhari was a grammarian, with his roots in the Vedic tradition, both ritualistic and philosophical and he had contacts with the other philosophical traditions of his day. It is in his *Vākyapadīya* and, to a lesser extent, in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya,* that one sees clearly his philosophical background. These works have been written in a particular metaphysical and epistemological setting. Something will be said about Bhartṛhari's metaphysics in a later section. Here it is proposed to put together and discuss some of his statements on valid knowledge.

Not being a regular *dārśanika* work, the *Vākyapadīya* does not contain a systematic discussion of the different means of valid knowledge. Bhartṛhari is chiefly concerned with the upholding of the authority of the science of Grammar. It can be authority only if it gives valid knowledge about something and it is in that connection that he makes certain statements on the relative merits of the different sources of knowledge. The position of Bhartṛhari may be stated briefly as follows :—The Veda is the means of attaining Brahman of which it is the image or symbol (*anukāra*). It is the source of all knowledge, of all the sciences and arts and of all the written traditions of human origin. The science of Grammar which is based on it has been handed down to us from time immemorial by an uninterrupted succession of teachers and students. It makes known to us the correct form of words, directly or indirectly. As it is the knowledge and use of the correct form of the words which leads to the acquisition of *dharma,* the science of Grammar becomes ultimately a science teaching what *dharma* is. Like the other *śāstras* teaching '*dharma*' in other spheres than that of words, this is also based on tradition (*āgama*). *Āgama* is our only source of the knowledge of *dharma*. Other means of valid knowledge such as perception and inference are not capable of giving us a knowledge of *dharma*.

This main idea, as given in the *Vākyapadīya,* requires explanation, especially as it involves Bhartṛhari's attitude towards the *Veda* and the *Āgama*. We ordinarily acquire knowledge when our senses come into contact with the external world. This is perceptive knowledge. Naturally, such knowledge would relate to objects which are present

at the time of sense-contact. But, in every day life, we also acquire knowledge of things with which our senses are not in contact. Even when we do not see fire, we infer its presence when we see smoke. This is inference which is, therefore, one way of knowing something with which our senses are not in contact. Another way is through words. When a reliable person tells us about an event which he saw and we did not, we get a knowledge of that event through his words. It is by making use of these three means of knowledge that we generally get on in this world. Bhartṛhari does not deny that these methods are capable of giving us valid knowledge of objects and events. But he knew the limitations of all of them. In a context where the question is: what is the nature of the meaning of the individual word obtained by analysing the sentence, he makes certain observations bracketing together perceptive knowledge and the knowledge acquired through words and points out that both are variable and unreliable.[1] What one understands from other people's words or when observing objects and events is very much coloured by one's own background.[2] The meaning understood from words depends upon the culture of the listener and can differ according to time and place. It can be sensibly different from what the speaker intended. Different persons get different perceptions while looking at the same thing or the same person may get different perceptions while looking at the same thing at different times.[3] Perceptual errors are also quite common. The sky looks like a surface and the fire-fly looks like light, but we know that it is all wrong.[4] The fact is that we ordinary mortals cannot see the true nature of things. Our perception and words are full of pitfalls.[5] It is true that the Ṛṣis are in a different position. Their perception is based on the true nature of things, but that cannot be formulated in words. It is not of much use in worldly transactions. In ordinary life, sages are like ordinary people.[6] They see things like them and use words like them.

Bhartṛhari recognises the usefulness of inference and reasoning in every day life. He points out that even perception would be incomplete without the help of inference. We cannot see the whole of a thing. We can only see some of it and infer the rest. What we see is enough to bring the universal of the object to the mind and it is that

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1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.

which is directly perceived.[7] It is also with the help of inference and reasoning that we understand the full meaning of words. The meaning of the Vedas would not be understood without their help. The two *Mīmāṃsas* are nothing more than reasoning applied to the words of the Veda relating to ritual and the Ultimate Reality. Neither can be understood from the words only. Constructive reasoning has to be applied to them, if one wants to understand their exact meaning. That kind of reasoning is the eye of those who cannot see the truth otherwise. It never goes against the fundamental teaching of the Veda because its only purpose is to grasp that fundamental teaching.[8]

It is not only the words of the Veda whose meaning is better understood with the help of reasoning. The words of a work like the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini can be understood properly only with the help of reasoning. One can go further and say that the understanding of the meaning of all words, whether they be of the eternal Scripture or of human compositions, depends upon reasoning. The reasoning consists, for example, in trying to determine whether a particular gender or number used by the speaker is significant or not. Sometimes it is and sometimes it is not. In P. 1.4.49, for example, where *karma* is defined the neuter gender is used. That does not mean that a word in some other gender cannot become *karma*. It can. The neuter gender has been used only because a noun, to be correct, has to be put in some gender and the neuter has been chosen because it is considered to be a kind of common gender (*liṅgasarvanāma*). It is not meant to exclude the others. Similarly, the neuter gender and the singular number, used in P. 4.1.92. which teaches a suffix expressive of the idea of offspring (*apatya*) should not be taken seriously. They are not meant to exclude the other genders and numbers. The suffix can, therefore, be added, for instance, to a masculine word ending in the plural number. Many of the *paribhāṣās* recognised in the Pāṇinian system, represent reasoning meant to reveal the meaning of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini. The relevant considerations for determining the meaning of words are given in *Vāk.* II. 316 and 316. Speaking generally, they amount to a strict determination of the context, taken in its widest possible sense, before deciding the meaning of words. It is easy to see that such a reasoning is closely connected with the power of the words themselves. In fact, its purpose is to determine the exact scope of the words. Context and other such considerations do not transcend

7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.

the innate power of words. When such a reasoning leads to a particular conclusion, the power of words must be deemed to have led to it.[9]

All reasoning which is not based on the words of some authority, but is based entirely on human intelligence is unreliable. To begin with, there are certain matters like *dharma* and *adharma* which are beyond the scope of human intelligence. *Dharma* can be known only through *Āgama*, Scripture.[10] To know *dharma* and *adharma* means to know which act will lead to which invisible fruit, because they are the invisible fruits of actions done by man. Only the Scripture can tell us that.[11] Human intelligence is unreliable even in regard to visible properties and results of objects and actions, what to say of invisible results. Objects in the world are constantly under the influence of all sorts of factors. With change of time and place and associations, properties of things change. One can, therefore, be never sure of them.[12] Human beings also differ greatly in their power of reasoning. What is established, after a great deal of labour, by one thinker, is upset by a clever one.[13]

If the knowledge obtained by the contact of the senses with the outside world and from the words of others is variable and unreliable, is there any other kind of knowledge which is reliable ? According to Bhartṛhari, there is. Another kind of knowledge is taking place all the time in us and it is rooted in ourselves. When one sees things or hears words it is also working. It is a kind of flash of understanding, not only of the data presented to us by the senses but also of what to do in a certain situation. It is a capacity to take in a situation and act. Bhartṛhari points out that all living beings, from the highest to the lowest, have it, including animals and birds. It is in the context of the consideration of the nature of the meaning of a sentence that Bhartṛhari is led to make certain statements of a much wider scope. After having disposed of the views of others regarding the nature of the meaning of a sentence such as that it is *saṃsarga* = interconnection, *kriyā* = action or *prayojana* = purpose, he declares that it is *pratibhā* = intuition. When we have understood the meaning of the words of a sentence, a flash of understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence takes place. It is quite different from the meanings of the

9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.

individual words.[14] It is sometimes understood even before the whole sentence has been uttered. It is not easy to explain this flash of understanding to others. But one cannot, for that reason, deny its existence. It is a matter of one's own experience. Everybody experiences it without being able to define it properly to oneself, what to say of explaining it to others.[15] Even though it is indefinable, we can see its effect and other circumstances connected with it. Its chief effect is that it connects together the meanings conveyed by the different words of a sentence. It relates to the sentence as a whole on which it rests.[16] The meanings of the individual words manifest it. If they did not, their cognition in the middle would serve no useful purpose. Thus, even though this Intuition, *pratibhā,* is indefinable, we can see its effect, we know where it rests and what manifests it.

It is something which arises spontaneously in all beings. It is like the power of intoxication which some substances develop when they become mature, without anything special being done to them.[17] It is due to this *pratibhā* that birds and animals engage in their natural activities, without any prompting or instruction. It is because of it that birds build their nests when the time comes and the cuckoo sings in spring.[18]

It is clear from all this that, as conceived by Bhartṛhari, *pratibhā* is something very comprehensive. It is a flash of understanding which takes in a situation and prompts one to do something to meet the situation.[19] One acts immediately without being conscious of doing any reflection in the middle. If one sees a pool of water on a very hot day, one instinctively goes and takes a dip in it. One does not pause to reflect. *Pratibhā* includes intelligence of a high order, intutive knowledge, the instinct of animals and birds and the spontaneous activities of newly-born babies. This kind of knowledge is far more reliable. It comes from within. While speaking about it, Puṇyarāja reminds us of Kālidāsa's statement that, when in doubt, cultured people rely on the voice of their own conscience. It was an inner *pratibhā* that told Duḥṣyanta that Śakuntalā was fit to be married by a *Kṣatriya.*[20] The knowledge that one's conscience gives is *pratibhā*

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14. See Texts.
15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 147 and Kālidāsa. *Śākuntalam,* Act I, 19.

and everybody accepts it as authority.[21]

This *pratibhā* arises in us in many ways. Among them, Bhartṛhari recognises six causes and, therefore, six kinds of Intuition. The six causes are : *svabhāva,*, *caraṇa, abhyāsa, Yoga, adṛṣṭa,* and *viśiṣṭopahita.*[22] The *Kārikās* themselves do not give examples of these six kinds. Some are easy to understand while others are less so. It is natural for us to turn to the earliest commentary, the *Vṛtti,* in such cases to see what kind of examples are given, especially as tradition looks upon it as Bhartṛhari's own work. Unfortunately, the text of the *Vṛtti* here is doubtful in some places. As for Puṇyarāja, after having given a very banal example of the first kind, he dismisses the remaining five by saying that the reader can guess examples himself.[23]

The first cause of *pratibhā* is *svabhāva* = Nature. Here one would naturally think of the instinctive knowledge of animals and birds which enables them to engage in activities appropriate to their species. In fact, Puṇyarāja gives the example of the monkey and its activities.[24] It is, therefore, interesting to see that the earliest commentary, the *Vṛtti,* gives other examples of intuition arising out of *svabhāva.* The first example is that of Primordial Matter (*Parā Prakṛtiḥ*) showing a predisposition to evolve into *mahat,* consisting of mere existence. This example is a little surprising. Matter is, after all, inert (*jaḍa*) whereas one associates *pratibhā* with the living, with what has consciousness in however rudimentary a form. It is compared in the *Vṛtti* to the spontaneous waking-up of one who was in deep sleep. The association of sleep with its effect (*ānanda ?*) is also mentioned in this connection, though its relevance is not clear.[25] The next cause of *pratibhā* is said to be *caraṇa.* This word usually means a Vedic school. The text of the *Vṛtti* where the example is given is uncertain but it may refer to the intuition of Vasiṣṭha and others who acquired special illumination by strictly observing the prescriptions of their Vedic school.[26] Such observance has always been considered to be the cause of spiritual merit, resulting in a special capacity to know things which others cannot know. The next cause of intuition is *abhyāsa* = practice. Again, by making a tentative

21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. Puṇyarāja on Vak. II. 152.
24. See Texts.
25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.

amendation of the text of the *Vṛtti,* one can perhaps say that there is a reference to the knowledge of those who can tell where water can be found for digging a well or a tank.[27] It is not everybody who can tell that. It requires long practice before one can become an expert in such prediction. The word *abhyāsa* comes in another context where also the knowledge of an expert is involved. The context is the unreliability of inferential knowledge or knowledge obtained by reasoning and the superiority of some other kinds of knowledge which cannot be set aside by mere reasoning. Here it is said that the knowledge of experts who can tell the genuineness of precious stones and of coins is of a superior nature and cannot be identified with inferential knowledge. How do they acquire this knowledge ? Through *abhyāsa* = practice, we are told. What is specifically denied is that it is inferential knowledge.[28] One can see that there is some resemblance between the knowledge of one who can tell where water can be found and that of one who can guarantee the genuineness of precious stones. Bhartṛhari does not actually use the word *pratibhā* in regard to the latter but insists that it arises through *abhyāsa* = practice, mentioned by him as one of the causes of *pratibhā.* Another noteworthy point is that this knowledge of genuineness is said to be indefinable and, therefore, incapable of being conveyed to others (*pareṣām asamākhyeyam*). We already know that this is a characteristic of all knowledge resulting from *pratibhā.* Vṛṣabhadeva insists that the expert's knowledge of the genuineness of precious stones cannot come under *pratyakṣa* or *anumāna* or *āgama.* It is not *pratyakṣa* because it is not caused by the *mere* contact of the senses with the object. It is not inference because it is not based on any ground of inference (*liṅga*). It is not *āgama,* because it cannot be communicated to others nor was it conveyed to the expert by the words of others, whereas traditional knowledge can be so conveyed. The next cause of *pratibhā* is said to be *Yoga.* It is said that through *Yoga,* one can know what is going on in other people's minds.[29] What is called *adṛṣṭa* is mentioned next as a cause of Intuition. It is an invisible force generated by one's own deeds in the previous lives. It determines many things in one's present life. Among them is its power to confer special knowledge on some. The example given in the *Vṛtti,* in this context, is the power of *Rakṣas* and *Piśācas* which enables them to enter into the bodies of others and to make themselves invisible. It might be said that this is a case of the invisible force resulting in a power to do unusual things and not in a special know-

27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.

ledge. It is, therefore, necessary to take this with what Bhartṛhari says in the other context, namely, that of the unreliability and the consequent inferiority of the knowledge produced by reasoning. There we are told that the *Pitṛs, Rakṣas* and *Piśācas* get some cognitions which are different from perceptive, inferential and traditional knowledge and which are the result of the force created by their deeds in their previous birth[30] (*adṛṣṭa*). The *Vṛtti* here explains that deaf people hear sounds in their sleep and that some persons can see minute things inside houses through thick walls without breaking them. This knowledge is attributed to their *adṛṣṭa*. The fact that, in these two contexts, *adṛṣṭa* is described as giving special knowledge as well as the power to do something special shows its two-fold character : intuitive knowledge of a situation plus the capacity to act in that situation. Lastly, there is the intuition caused by the grace of a special person (*viśiṣṭopahita*). The example given is that of the special knowledge which Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana gave to Sañjaya and others at the time of the *Mahābhārata* war, so that they could see the war, scattered over a big area, in its totality and in its details.

Thus, it is clear that *pratibhā* has been conceived in a very comprehensive way. It is something which comes from within, is found in all beings from animals and birds at one end and *Ṛṣis* like Vasiṣṭha at the other. Everybody accepts its authority.

Now we have to see what Bhartṛhari has to say about the source of *pratibhā*. From where does everybody get it ? There are some statements in the *Vākyapadīya* in different contexts having a bearing on this question and one has to see to what extent these statements present a single coherent view. After having described the *pratibhā* of animals and birds and the activities which it gives rise to, Bhartṛhari says (1) that it comes from *āgama*, understood by Puṇyarāja in the sense of *śabda*, (2) that it is accompanied by *bhāvanā* (3) and that *āgama* is differentiated according as it is proximate (*āsatti*) or distant (*viprakarṣa*).[31] Each of these points requires elucidation. At the other end of the scale, it is stated that the knowledge of the *Ṛṣis* is also based on *āgama*.[32] What is this *āgama* which is common to animals and birds at one end and to the *Ṛṣis* at the other ? The implication is that it exists in everybody. As *pratibhā* exists in everybody, its cause *āgama* must also necessarily exist in everybody. It is said to be

30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.

accompanied by *bhāvanā*. We are here reminded of the word *śabda-bhāvanā* which is mentioned in another context. Bhartṛhari has used that expression in connection with newly born babies. It is because of *śabdabhāvanā* that the newly born baby is able to make the first movement with the vocal organs or even to breathe.[33] It is because of it that the air coming out of the baby's mouth is able to strike at the different points of articulation and produce sounds. It is stated to be eternal and to be the residual trace of the use of words in its previous birth. The baby is able, not only to move its vocal organs, but also to understand and to will. The movements which it makes presuppose a certain will and effort involving the mind. It is not due to any instruction that the baby is able to make these movements but due to its own *pratibhā*, says the *Vṛtti*, while explaining the word *śabda-bhāvanā*. From the way in which the subject matter is treated in this context, the *śabdabhāvanā*, that is, the residual trace of the use of words in previous lives, is the cause of the *pratibhā*, Intuition. Thus, in the case of babies, their *pratibhā* comes from *śabdabhāvanā*. As animals and birds resemble newly born babies in not knowing any language, it must be assumed that in their case also the intuition has the same source. Bhartṛhari actually brackets babies and animals together in one context.[34] *Āgama*, as the source of *pratibhā*, would thus seem to stand for *śabdabhāvanā* (or *bhāvanā*, for short) in the case of all beings who do not know any language but who yet understand and act. It remains to see what *āgama* means in the case of average persons who know a language and in the case of *Ṛṣis* and *Śiṣṭas*. Residual traces of the use of words in previous lives exist in their case also. But they have also learnt a language. We have seen how intuition is aroused when one hears sentences uttered by others. In the case of adults, therefore, the residual traces and the hearing of the words of others work together in order to awaken the Intuition. In other words, *āgama* or the word is very near to them (*āsatti*). In the case of babies and animals, the residual traces alone are responsible for the awakening of the Intuition. But they are, after all, the result of the repeated use of words in previous lives, so that when an intuition is aroused by them, it is really aroused by words. The difference is that, in this case, the word is very distant (*viprakarṣa*). In the case of adults who know the language and whose intuition is aroused by hearing the words uttered by others, it is directly aroused by the words (*sākṣāc chabdena jani-*

33. See Texts.
34. Vāk. II. 117.

tām).[35] That words are the cause of the awakening of Intuition is the first statement which Bhartṛhari makes in this context and he seems to have used *śabda* in its widest possible sense to include even the residual traces of the words used in previous lives.[36] One must, however, remember that while the meaning understood from words is always in the nature of Intuition, one cannot maintain that, according to Bhartṛhari, it is always aroused in that way and in no other. He has enumerated six causes for the awakening of Intuition and some of them do not involve the use of words at all. '*Svabhāva*' is one of them and if the singing of the cuckoo in spring is an example of it, it does not involve the use of words. Nor can there be any use of words when the *Yogi* understands what is going on in the minds of others.

So far Intuition has been considered in relation to ordinary human beings, babies and animals and birds. The words *āgama* and *bhāvanā* have also been discussed in relation to them. *Āgama* has been taken in the sense of 'word' in general and *bhāvanā* has been understood as the residual traces, found in all beings, of the repeated use of words in previous lives. But we have still to consider the use of the word *āgama* in other contexts. We saw that it has been stated that the extraordinary perception which *Ṛṣis* have is due to *āgama*. The word is also commonly used in the *Vākyapadīya* for Tradition, chiefly written Tradition, *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, but it would also include the beliefs and conduct of cultured people (*śiṣṭas*), coming down from times immemorial even if not committed to writing. It has been declared to be eternal, something that shines uninterruptedly like one's own consciousness.[37] Those who take such an *āgama* as authority do not allow themselves to be deflected from their path by the arguments of those who rely on reasoning only. We saw how Bhartṛhari speaks with respect about the knowledge of the expert, born of his practice (*abhyāsa*) which enables him to guarantee the genuineness of precious stones. But there are some other persons than these experts who are sometimes called *Ṛṣis* and sometimes *Śiṣṭas* and who are credited with a special insight into things which other people cannot see. They are persons whose impurities have been burnt away by austerities (*tapas*) and whose cognitions are free from all limitations. They can see the past and the present. Their vision is divine (*ārṣam cakṣuḥ*). They can see things which are beyond our senses and our

35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.

mind.[38] The *Vṛtti* enumerates some examples of things which they can see and which ordinary persons cannot. They are : the supreme Inner Controller, the atoms, the unmanifested and undifferentiated Word-Principle (*Śabdabrahman*), the gods, the residual forces generated by action leading to particular results and to no other.[39] Helārāja discusses elaborately in order to prove the existence of such exceptional individuals while explaining Bhartṛhari's statement that they can see the universals of objects with all their senses. They can also see the eternal connection of these universals with their words and are in a position to teach it to others. It is interesting to note that Bhartṛhari compares their knowledge to that of experts who can tell the genuineness of precious stones.[40] It is practice which enables them to attain that skill. All knowledge tends to reach a higher stage by practice. Whatever admits of degree reaches its climax somewhere and knowledge reaches its climax in the omniscient. This argument is already found in the *Vyāsabhāṣya* on the *Yogasūtras* which are quoted by Helārāja in this context.[41]

How does it happen that some individuals are endowed with a special vision ? We have already seen that it is attributed to *āgama*. What is emphasised is that it is not absolutely spontaneous. If it were so, there is no reason why everybody should not have the same divine vision. It is due to the spiritual merit (*dharma*) which they had accumulated by strictly observing the injunctions of the written Tradition (*āgama* or *āmnāya*). If it were absolutely spontaneous all these injunctions would become quite useless. They have been laid down in order that men may strictly follow them, acquire spiritual merit and enjoy the fruits thereof. This is what Bhartṛhari means by saying that *āgama* or *āmnāya* is the cause of divine vision of the sages. The causality is as follows—*āgama*>*dharma*>*jñāna*.[42]

Thus the *āgama* which is the cause of the inner source of knowledge which exists in all, namely, the *pratibhā*, has to be understood somewhat differently in the case of animals and birds at one end and the sages at the other, though it is the same principle right through. In trying to understand it in relation to the sages, we have found that it means the written Tradition, *Śruti* and *Smṛti* and the *dharma* which it teaches.

38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.
40. See Texts.
41. See *Vyāsabhāṣya* on Y. Dar. I. 25.
42. See Texts.

It is, therefore, necessary to consider what Bhartṛhari says about *āgama* as *Śruti* and *Smṛti*.

The first thing to note is that for him, the *Śruti* is eternal and not the work of any person (*apauruṣeya*). Though eternal, it is not so in the *Mīmāṃsā* sense. The *Mīmāṃsakas* do not believe in the cyclic character of the Cosmos. Divisions of Time, such as *Yuga, Manvantara, Kalpa* and so on do not exist for them. They do not, therefore, believe in *pralaya*, Cosmic Dissolution, which, according to those who accept it, takes place at the end of a cycle. The Cosmos is eternal and it has always been full of differentiation as we see it now. *Na kadācid anīdṛśaṃ jagat* = 'the universe was never different from what it is now', is their principle. As the whole cosmos has no beginning, similarly scripture (*Śruti*) also has had no beginning and it has come down to us in an unbroken succession. It is not the work of any person (*akartṛkā*).[43] *Smṛti* (written Tradition) resembles Scripture in that it has also come down in an unbroken succession, but it is known to have been composed at different times by different persons. Bhartṛhari seems to be anxious to emphasise in the very next stanza that he held a different view on this subject. According to the *Vṛtti*, Bhartṛhari believed in the cyclic view of creation and dissolution and in the emergence of *Śruti* and *Smṛti* at the end of every *pralaya* and at the beginning of every creation. I shall come to this point a little later.

After having stated the nature of Brahman, he declares that the *Veda* is the means of attaining it. The *Brahman* is essentially *Śabda-tattva*, the Word-Principle. He adds that the *Veda* is the *anukāra* of Brahman, a point which will be elaborated presently. Though it is really One, it has been handed down to us in a differentiated form. It is of four kinds to start with : *Ṛk, Yajus, Sāman* and *Atharvan* and each of these has several recensions or schools or branches. Another differentiation of the One consists of the different ways in which the text of the *Veda* has been handed down, namely, *Saṃhita, Pada, Krama* and so on. The handing down of the *Veda* in different branches and recensions is due to the gradually decreasing capacity of man and the consequent inability to grasp the *Veda* as One, as a whole. Though handed down in different branches, it teaches one ritual and the branches supplement one another in order to give a complete idea of the ritual. Here the analogy given is that of *āyurveda* which, we are told, was one at first, but due to the decreasing capacity of man, was divided into many branches, though they all teach the same thing, namely, the

43. See Texts.

treatment of disease and the restoration of health. The *Veda*, then, is One at the time of Creation, is later diversified due to the incapacity of man and again becomes One at the time of Dissolution (*Pralaya*). All this is based on the cyclic view of the creation and dissolution of the cosmos.

As said before, the *Veda* is not only the means of attaining *Brahman*, but is also the *anukāra*, the Image of it. Really speaking, the *Veda* is the *Brahman* itself. To speak about it as an Image or Symbol is a metaphor. The *Vṛtti* explains the idea of *anukāra* by saying that the *Ṛṣis* who had acquired *dharma*, see the ultimate and eternal Word-Principle (*nityā vāk*) in the form of *Mantras*. Wishing to communicate it to their successors who could not realise *dharma*, they give them the *Veda* which is an image of the *Mantras*.[44] The ultimate Word-Principle which is one and without any inner sequence cannot be imparted to others in that condition. Only an image or symbol of it can be imparted and that is the *Veda*. Just as the forms which one sees in a dream are images or symbols of the forms which one has seen in the external world in the wakeful state, in the same way, the Veda is an image of the *Mantras*, that is, the Word-Principle which the *Ṛṣis* who had realised the *dharma* had seen. The analogy with dream experience has been taken by the *Vṛtti* on Vāk I.5. from the *Kārikā* itself, namely Vāk I.137 [145]. But this idea of the origin of the *Veda* goes back to Yāska who has something to say in his *Nirukta* on the transmission of the *Vedas* and the *Vedāṅgas*. What Yāska says, as interpreted by Durgācārya, may be stated briefly as follows—

The first *Ṛṣis* realised *dharma*, that is, they acquired it. It is implied that they acquired the *Mantras* also, without being taught by anybody. Their successors were of inferior calibre and could not realise the *dharma* nor acquire the *Mantras* by themselves. To them, the first *Ṛṣis* imparted the *Mantras* by establishing the relation of teacher and pupil. This second batch of *Ṛṣis* thus got the *Mantras* by listening to the words of their teachers. They are, therefore, *Śrutarṣayaḥ* = *Ṛṣis* through instruction. As man's capacity went on decreasing, the *Ṛṣis* began to worry as to how they could transmit their knowledge to future generations. So far they had been able to preserve the unity of the *Veda*. When they saw the gradually decreasing capacity of the later generations, they diversified the *Veda* for the sake of facility in learning. They also handed down the auxiliary sciences of the *Vedas* (the *Vedāṅgas*). The *Veda* was divided into different branches and

44. See Texts.

schools. The *Vedāṅgas*, such as *Vyākaraṇa* and *Niruka*, were also handed down diversified into schools. The word *bilma*, if derived from the root *'bhid'* = 'to divide', stands for the diversification of the *Veda* and if derived from the root *bhās* = 'to illuminate', stands for the light which the auxiliary sciences throw on the meaning of the Vedas.[45]

Now Yāska says all this in order to establish the authority of the *Nirukta* as a *Vedāṅga*, coming down from time immemorial and composed by the very *Ṛṣis* who have transmitted the *Vedas*. Three grades of these *Ṛṣis* have been mentioned by Yāska, in a descending order of spiritual and intellectual power. That the *Vṛtti* was influenced by the *Nirukta* in the interpretation of Vāk. I. 5 and 137 [145] is shown by the fact that, in the explanation of the former stanza, the relevant passage from the *Nirukta* is actually quoted and that, in the explanation of the later stanza, there is a reference to three kinds of *Ṛṣis*. What the *Vṛtti* says about the three kinds of *Ṛṣis* is not identical with what the *Nirukta* says, but the two points made in the *Nirukta*, namely, (1) the three kinds of *Ṛṣis* and (2) the diversification of the One *Veda* into many branches and schools, are mentioned in the *Vṛtti* also. What the *Vṛtti* says may be stated briefly as follows, though the extremely unsatisfactory text of the *Paddhati* on this passage diminishes considerably its usefulness.

The purpose of Vāk. I. 137 [145] is to point out that the *āgama*, that is, *Śruti* and *Smṛti* suffer an eclipse at the time of every *pralaya* and are remanifested at the time of every creation, a position very different from that of the *Mīmāṃsakas*. This presupposes that the ultimate eternal cause works in the manner of fully differentiated individuals, by means of sleep and wakefulness, the merging of everything within itself being sleep and the emerging of everything out of itself being wakefulness. When creation begins and Intuition of the whole (*pratibhā*) emerges, some *Ṛṣis* also emerge at the same time, see this Intuition and become one with it. As this Intuition has within it the seeds of everything that is to be, these *Ṛṣis* have a knowledge of everything. Some other *Ṛṣis* emerge when *Vidyā* emerges. They become one with the mind and the senses which are closely connected with *Vidyā*. Just as one sometimes hears sounds in a dream though the sense of hearing is not working, in the same way, these *Ṛṣis* see the whole *Veda* having the power of unity and diversity with their *Prajñā* (pure mind). A third set of *Ṛṣis* observe the properties

45. See Texts.

of things, beneficial or harmful to man and also see hints (*liṅgāni*) of the same in the *Veda* and compose the *Smṛti*, containing injunctions relating to visible and invisible results. As for the *Śruti*, it is at first imparted as seen by the *Ṛṣis*, that is, as a whole and undiversified and later it is imparted diversified into branches and schools.[46]

Thus one can see that the emergence and transmission of the *Veda* and the role of the *Ṛṣis* in it, as described in the *Vṛtti* and the *Kārikā* is an adaptation of what Yāska says. What we have to note is that we can now understand better what Bhartṛhari means when he says that the extraordinary perception of the *Ṛṣis* is due to *āgama*. At the very beginning of creation, the *Ṛṣis* emerge together with the *Pratibhā* and become one with it. They see the *āgama*, the *Śruti* and *Smṛti*, either with their *pratibhā* or with their *prajñā*. If with the former, the mind does not play any part in it and if with the latter, the mind plays a part in it. Though it appears that the *protibhā* or *āgama* of the *Ṛṣis* is spontaneous, it is really not so, because it is the result of their strict observance, in their previous lives, of the *dharma* taught in the *Śruti*.[47] If it were absolutely spontaneous, all teaching of particular modes of conduct found in the *Vedas* would be useless, as already pointed out before.

From what has been said before, it is clear that what *Śruti* and *Smṛti* transmit is that pure knowledge which is one of the aspects of the *Śabdatattva*. This knowledge includes, among other things, a knowledge of what the right thing to do is, what leads to *dharma* and what leads to *adharma*. It has been said that the *Ṛṣis* compose the *Smṛti* after having examined the properties of things, beneficial or otherwise, to man and after having seen indications of the same in the *Vedas*. That is how they come to know which object or action can lead to *dharma* and which would lead to *adharma*. Only they can say that, mere reasoning cannot lead us to knowledge. The science of Grammar tells us about each word what its correct form is, the form which, when understood and used, can lead to *dharma*. It is through *āgama* that *Ṛṣis* acquired this knowledge and they have transmitted this knowledge to us through unbroken tradition. That is what gives the *Vedāṅga* called *Vyākaraṇa* its authority. It is the desire to establish this which leads Bhartṛhari to make all these observations about the *pramāṇas* and about the emergence and transmission of the *Śruti* and the *Smṛti*.

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46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.

CHAPTER III

1. THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND OF THE *VĀKYAPADĪYA*



According to its title, the *Vākyapadīya* is supposed to deal with the *Vākya* and the *pada*. Of its three chapters, the second and the third are devoted to these two subjects. The first chapter, as already pointed out, is called *Brahmakāṇḍa*. It begins with a statement on *Brahman*. What is the relevance of a work devoted to a consideration of the sentence and the word beginning with a statement on *Brahman*?

I have already pointed out that Brahman would come under *prayojana* or *phala* (purpose, goal), one of the eight topics traditionally accepted as forming the subject matter of the *Vākyapadīya*, or the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* in general. The attainment of *Brahman* has been declared by Bhartṛhari to be the ultimate goal of the study of *vyākaraṇa*.[1] More will be said about this later. It is, however, not only as the goal to be attained that Bhartṛhari speaks about *Brahman*, but also as the ultimate source of everything. It is, therefore, the source of *vākya* and *pada*, the two main subjects of the *Vākyapadīya*. He begins with *Brahman*, in order to tell the story from the very beginning, so to speak.

The main ideas of Bhartṛhari regarding *Brahman* are given in the first four stanzas of Kāṇḍa I. Of course, there are many others where these ideas are supplemented or elaborated. In fact, one can say that, right through the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has this ultimate Reality in mind even when he is dealing with what appears to be purely linguistic or grammatical topics. It runs like a thread right through his work and gives it a kind of unity. When he is speaking about *jāti* or *dravya*, *sādhana* or *kriyā*, *dik* or *kāla*, he somehow connects it all with Brahman.

The main ideas, given at the very beginning of the *Vākyapadīya*, are :—

(1) The ultimate Reality, *Brahman*, which is without beginning

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1. See Texts.

or end, is of the nature of the word (*śabdatattva*) and from it are manifested all the objects and the whole Cosmos.

(2) This ultimate Reality is One, but it manifests itself as many because of its many powers. It does so, however, without losing its One-ness. It is not different from its powers but appears to be different.

(3) Of its many powers, Time is the most important. It is One, but divisions are super-imposed on it. On it depend all the different kinds of changes (*ṣaḍ bhāvavikārāḥ*) which bring about multiplicity in Being.

(4) The ultimate, which is One, contains the seeds of all multiplicity. It manifests itself as the experiencer, the experienced and the experience itself.[2]

Of these main ideas, the central one is the conception of *Brahman* as the word-Principle (*Śabdatattva*). For Bhartṛhari, this idea is an inheritance from the Vedic tradition. It is the knowers of the *Āmnāya* (*Veda*), he says, who have proclaimed that the whole Cosmos is a manifestation of the word (*śabda*) and, more specifically, that it has evolved out of *Chandas* (*Veda*).[3] The available Vedic literature, including both the *mantras* and the *brāhmaṇas*, is full of statements about *Vāk* and *Brahman* in different contexts.[4] Some of them certainly contain the idea that *Brahman* is the ultimate source of everything while others convey the idea that *Vāk* is the origin of everything. After that it is but one step to identify *Brahman* with *Vāk*., as *Ait. Br.* IV.21.1. does. The *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 112 [120] says that, in the *Vedas*, *Vāk* in which the powers of the experiencer and the experienced, the subject and the object are latent, has been declared to be the cause of everything in different contexts and quotes Vedic passages in support of the statement.[5] Some of these passages are in prose while others are in verse (*ṛk*). Unfortunately, they have not been traced in the Vedic texts which we know, but they certainly have a Vedic ring about them.[6] In ṚV.X.125, *Vāk* identifies herself with everything in the universe, implying that it is *Vāk* which manifests itself as everything.

The *Vṛtti* quotes some non-Vedic texts also as authority for this notion. They are said to be taken from *Purākalpa*, but it is not clear what text is meant by it.[7]

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2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Renou-Les pouvoirs de la Parole dans le RV-Etudes, I. p. 1-27.
5. See Texts.
6. See the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. I, 110 [118] and 112 [120].
7. See Texts.

The idea that *Brahman* is of the nature of the word (*Śabdatattva*) is based, not merely on ancient textual tradition, Vedic or non-Vedic, but also on reasoning. The stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* do not themselves present the reasoning. The *Vṛtti* does it, on the basis of certain statements found in the stanzas in different contexts, such as the one in which the place of the word in all our knowledge is described. The main argument is based on a principle which all systems of philosophy have adopted, namely, that the cause persists in all its effects and that the nature of the cause can be deduced by observing what persists in all the effects. We see that gold runs through all the objects made of gold. By looking at them, we can conclude that gold is the original material out of which they were all made. Similarly, the *Sāṅkhyas* argue that everything in the world is associated with pleasure, pain and delusion and so their root cause must be something which consists of these three qualities, and that is the *Pradhāna* or Primordial Matter. Applying the same reasoning we see that our knowledge of everything in the cosmos is interwoven with the word. A knowledge which is not so would not be knowledge at all.[8] We cannot cognise an object through the word, without cognising the word first. We find that all the manifestations of *Brahman* are inter-twined with the word and so it is concluded that their root cause, *Brahman*, must be of the nature of the word. That is, it must be *Śabdatattva*. If the word were merely a means of knowledge as the senses are, we should be able to cognise the object through the word even when the word itself is not cognised. We can see an object through our sense of vision without cognising the sense of vision itself. But we cannot cognise an object through the word without cognising the word itself first. Moreover, when we cognise an object through the word, our cognition takes the form of identity, unlike what happens, say, in inference. We say : 'because there is smoke, therefore, there is fire'. Here we do not identify smoke with fire. But our verbal cognition of a jar takes the form of identity. When we say: 'this is a jar', the word 'jar' is identified with the cognition as well as with the object which figures in it. Hence we conclude that the object is really not different from the word. It is the word which has become the object. As the object figures in the cognition and as the cognition in which the object figures is formulated in words, we conclude that objects and cognitions are essentially derived from the word, that they are products of the word. Consciousness of the word forms a part and parcel of our knowledge of objects. Their knowledge depends upon the word. That is what the *Vṛtti* means by saying that they are *śabdopagrāhya* and *śabdopagrāhi*. That is why their ultimate

8. See Texts,

source is of the nature of the word (*Śabdatattva*).[9] The *Vṛtti* quotes twelve *ślokas* which it calls *āgama* and which are yet untraced and they are supposed to explain the ideas contained in Vāk. I. 1. If the *Vṛtti* is by Bhartṛhari himself, it means that he is following ancient tradition as far as the main ideas of his philosophy are concerned. We are interested in the last one of these *ślokas* because it states the reason why *Brahman* is considered to be the Word-Principle. It says that this universe is really *Brahman* who creates all objects and phenomena in the form of words. Just because all that *Brahman* creates has the form of the word, therefore, *Brahman* itself must be of the nature of the word.[10] The fact that *Brahman* is called *akṣara* = Phoneme is also an indication of its being the Word-Principle. As everything else, the Phonemes also emerge out of *Brahman*. They exist potentially within the individual, as one with the Self, without any sequence. In that form, they cannot be used for communication. So they are manifested outwards, by a process which involves the *prāṇa* and the points and organs of articulation. That is, they are uttered. *Brahman* is called *Śabdatattva* because all phenomena assume the form of the word and also because it manifests itself as the uttered phonemes for the purpose of communication.[11] The Phonemes are a kind of overflow of the subtle word within.

Bhartṛhari lays great stress on the idea that *Brahman*, being the Word-Principle manifests all phenomena and objects in the form of the word and that all thought and all knowledge is intertwined with with the word. The universe consists of the infinite number of phenomena arranged in a temporal and spatial sequence and of the words which are expressive of them. The universals (*jāti*) of these phenomena and their words already exist in the Word-Principle as potentialities. As long as they exist only in that state, they cannot be known nor can they enter worldly usage. For that, the particulars which reveal them and which are also present in the Word-Principle have to emerge from it. Whey they emerge, the universals of the objects and the words inhere in them, are distinct from one another and stand towards one another in the relation of the expressed (*vācya*) and the expressive word (*vācaka*). In this way, the Word-Principle is the ultimate source of the universe consisting of the *vPcya* and the *vācaka*.[12]

In all this, the universe which is the result of the differentiation

9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.

of the One, has been described as consisting mainly of two things, the *vācya* and the *vācaka*. Sometimes, as in *Vāk.* I. 4, it is described as consisting of three things: the experiencer (*bhoktā*), the things experienced (*bhogya*) and the experience itself. To these three, the purpose of the experience (*prayojana*) is sometimes added as the fourth[13]. All this is clearly expressed in a stanza of unknown origin which the *Vṛtti* quotes. There it is stated that it is the subtle inner Word (*Vāk*) which evolves as the Intelligence and cognises the object which is a manifestation of itself and is expressed by the outer word which is also a manifestation of itself. It is the same *Vāk* which, as the speaker, utters the outer word. It manifests externally (*vyaktarūpeṇa*) the object which was within it in a latent form (*śaktirūpeṇa*). Thus *Vāk* evolves as the universe consisting of the individual experiencers, including speakers, the objects and phenomena of experience and the experience itself.[14]

Bhartṛhari stresses the importance and significance of all thought and all knowledge being intertwined with the word.[15] Here he differed from others like the *Naiyyāyikas* who held that it was possible to have a cognition of the pure object, free from intermixture with the word, in the case of persons who do not know the convention relating to the word and its meaning. Even in the case of people who do know the convention, there first takes place a knowledge of the pure object, free from intermixture with the word and it is this which is the cause of the awakening of the residual trace of the word and its subsequent remembrance. Even in what they call determinate knowledge (*savikalpaka*) the word does not qualify the object as the colour qualifies it. The object is not cognised as identical with the word. Before and after the word figures in the consciousness, there is no difference in the cognition of the object. The only difference is that, after, the word figures as the name of the object. The word becomes the means of our isolating in our cognition some attribute of the object which is really a bundle of attributes. It does not impose itself on the object, any more than the senses impose themselves on the objects which they illuminate. As the same word is applicable to the object and its knowledge, the illusion that the three are the same is produced. In reality, they are three different things.

We saw that Bhartṛhari looked at the whole thing quite differently. For him, there is no thought or knowledge which is not intertwined

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13. See Texts.
14. See Tests.
15. See Texts.

with the word. By word or *śabda*, he does not mean, in this context, the manifested word of any language which is uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. Because, this fact of all thought being intertwined with the word is true even in the case of new-born babies who do not know any language yet. Even their cognition is intertwined with the word. Otherwise they would not be able to understand and to act as soon as they are born. We see, however, that they are able to do both. They make movements of their vocal organs, either for making sounds or for eating. The baby is capable of applying its mind to the making of particular efforts to produce particular sounds, and to do particular acts. It is because it is born with the seeds of knowledge and of know-how. It is there in the baby as a residual trace, as a *śabdabhāvanā*. It is the residual trace of its knowledge of the language in a previous existence.[16] It is not something which was imparted to the baby by others. It is born with it. When, due to the working of its *adṛṣṭa*, the force generated by its deeds in a previous existence, its *śabdabhāvanā* is aroused in this life, the baby is able to understand and to act. It is assumed that when the baby acts, it has understood the situation and knows what to do, just like grown-up people. The commentary points out that it acts through its *pratibhā* and it would have no *pratibhā* if its *śabdabhāvanā* were not already there. It is emphasised that no human effort can impart this *pratibhā* to the baby. Human effort, can, at the most awaken it.[17]

If the knowledge of the new-born baby who does not know any language yet is intertwined with the word, it is only natural that what is called indeterminate knowledge (*avikalpajñāna*) should also be so, though it is usually considered to be that first moment of perception in which the name of the object does not figure. For Bhartṛhari, if it is knowledge at all, it has to be intertwined with the word, not, of course, the specific name of the object but a very general word such as the pronoun. Otherwise, one could not explain the clear cognition of the name in the next stage, the *savikalpaka* stage in which what was subtle and latent in the previous stage becomes clear and patent. When one hears a verse recited for the first time, one does not grasp it fully. One only grasps it in a very vague way. But even this vague cognition leaves an impression, a residual trace which, when awakened, causes the remembrance of the previous vague cognition. One only remembers that one had a vague cognition of the verse before, but not the verse itself. One just remembers that one did hear some verse or other.

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16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.

But the form of the remembrance is a proof that one's previous cognition was intertwined with the word. If it were not so intertwined, it would neither reveal itself nor reveal the object even vaguely. What it all amounts to is that what is called *avikalpakajñāna* is also mixed up with the word.[18]

This characteristic of knowledge exists in the cognitions of deep sleep also. We do give expression in words to our remembrance of our deep sleep experience. Some held the view that no knowledge at all takes place in deep sleep. Others, according to the *Vṛtti,* were of the view that, as in the wakeful state, in sleep also, there does take place a stream of cognitions. The only difference is that, in sleep experience, the seeds of the residual traces of the word are extremely fine and subtle. Such an experience, therefore, cannot enter into worldly usage. But intermixture with the word is there.[19] If it is a fact that we do give expression to our remembrance of deep sleep experience, it can be explained only on the assumption that the word in a very subtle form is mixed up with whatever experience we have in deep sleep. In Vedantic literature, our remembrance of deep sleep experience is supposed to find expression in some such words as the following: *sukham aham asvāpsam, na kiñcid avediṣam* = 'I slept soundly, I did not know a thing.' But the experience itself cannot be formulated in words, as the word with which it is intertwined is much too subtle (*sūkṣma*).[19]

All culture, all the arts and sciences are based on this fact, namely, that our knowledge is intertwined with the word. All communication depends upon that and on successful communication of thought depends the development of the arts and the sciences.[20]

It is this fact of knowledge being intertwined with the word which is the basis of the distinction between what is sentient (*sasaṃjña*) and what is not sentient (*visaṃjña*) in this world. Anything which has not this kind of knowledge and, therefore, cannot engage in purposeful activity is insentient. Anything which has this kind of knowledge can engage in conscious activity and is said to be sentient.[21] It is this fact which enables us to recognise and identify the objects which we see and to act towards them in an appropriate manner. Those who

18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.

are sentient can be *antaḥsaṃjñāḥ* = having the mind withdrawn from external objects and turned inwards, according to Vṛṣabha, or *bahiḥsaṃjñāḥ* = having the mind turned towards external objects. When it is turned inwards, it experiences the inner phenomena. This experience of pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappiness, also requires this intertwining with the word, because here also, there is need for recognition and identification. As for those whose mind is turned towards external objects, it goes without saying that their activities in regard to them depend upon their cognition of them being intertwined with the word. There is no Being endowed with consciousness whose awareness of himself or of others (*svaparasaṃbodhaḥ*) is not mixed up with the word.[22]

If consciousness or awareness of all kinds is thus intertwined with the word, the question naturally arises as to whether the two are different from each other or identical. To judge from the *Vṛtti,* both the views were held in the old days. Some were of the view that there cannot be any consciousness which has not the form of the Word. In other words, they held that consciousness and the word are two different things though one is never without the other. Others, on the other hand, held the view that what is called consciousness is just this fact of being the Word. The two are identical.[23] From the way in which Vāk. I. 118 [126] is worded, Bhartṛhari seems to favour distinctly the view that they are identical. He says that what is called awareness (*saṃjñā*) is the fact of having the form of the Word (*Vāgrupatā*). Consciousness in all Beings never goes beyond it, that is, it is never different from this fact of having the form of the Word.[24] Therefore, when Bhartṛhari says that Brahman is *śabdatattva,* the Word-Principle, he implies that it is Consciousness.

After going through all the texts referred to above, one begins to wonder what could be the nature of that *śabda* or *Vāk* which has been declared to be the very essence of *Brahman* and which runs through all its manifestations, which is there in the new-born baby, in the sleep-experience, in all the cognitions of the wakeful state and even in animals and birds. It is something but for which knowledge would not be knowledge at all. As Bhartṛhari puts it—

Vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed avabodhasya śāśvatī/
Na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi pratyavamarśinī//[25]

22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. Vāk. I. 116 [124]

"If knowledge were not of the nature of *Vāk*, that light would not illuminate at all. *Vāk* it is that causes recognition and identification (*pratyavamarśinī*)."

Knowledge would not be knowledge, would not illuminate if it were not *Vāk*, because it is *Vāk* that causes *pratyavamarśa*, recognition-cum-identification. What is *pratyavamarśa?* Unfortunately, the *Vṛtti* does not directly explain the expression, but makes certain statements in a rather obscure language. Vṛṣabha understands them as relating to the understanding of the sentence-meaning from the word-meanings. After reading all that he says, one does not feel satisfied that one has understood the central idea wihch Bhartṛhari wants to convey. On such occasions, one certainly feels regret that the *Śabdaprabhā* of Helārāja has been lost. One has, therefore, to see if one can get some help from any other source.

It is well-known that the *Pratyabhijñā* system of Kashmir has been much influenced by Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. Somānanda, Utpala and Abhinavagupta knew this work together with the *Vṛtti*. 'In fact, Abhinavagupta was steeped in the *Vākyapadīya*. His *Prakīrṇakavivaraṇa*, though now not available, was most probably a commentary on the *Prakīṇaka*, another name for the third *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*. There are many quotations in his works such as the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* and the *Isvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī*, from the *Vākyapadīya*. I have already drawn the attention of the reader to a passage in the *Śivadṛṣṭi* of Somānanda and to the commentary on it by Utpala where Bhartṛhari is criticised for forgetting that he was primarily a grammarian and indulging in philosophy. Such criticism, howevevr, did not stand in the way of Utpala being influenced by Bhartṛhari. Here I would like to refer *Kā*. 11 and 13 of *Āhnika* V of Utpala's *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*. They seem to be very relevant to an understanding of Vāk. I. 115 [123] and 116 [124]. It is in these two stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* that Bhartṛhari has declared that all knowledge is intertwined with the word (*śabda, Vāk*), that knowledge illuminates because it is *Vāk* and that it is *Vāk* which causes *pratyavamarśa*, without which knowledge would not be knowledge at all. In the two *kārikās* of Utpala referred to above, the same idea seems to be expressed, though with a slight variation in terminology. There it is declared that *vimarśa* is the very essence of *prakāśa* (knowledge). But for that, knowledge would not illuminate, though it may carry the reflection of the object. It would be inert (*jaḍa*), like the crystal. *Pratyavamarśa* is the very essence of consciousness (*citi*) which is the Supreme Word (*parā Vāk*), spontaneous and eternal. It is absolute

self-sufficiency, it is the Omnipotence of the Supreme Self.[26]

As in the two *Kārikās* of Bhartṛhari, the words *prakāśa, Vāk,* and *pratyavamarśa* occur in those of Utpala also. It would, therefore, be interesting to see how Abhinavagupta explains these words in his *Vimarśinī* on Utpala's work. What he says may be put briefly as follows —

What is called *pratyavamarśa* is a kind of inner formulation in words (*abhilāpa, śabdana*). This inner formulation does not depend upon any convention, just as formulation in uttered or manifested words does. That is why the new-born baby is also capable of doing it. It has also the 'I' consciousness which presupposes this formulation. That is why it can act in order to fulfil its needs. This consciousness of the Self is a kind of inner delight (*avicchinnacamatkārātmakam*). It is a kind of inner nodding of the head (*antarmukhaśironirdeśaprakhyam*). It is the background, or the source of such states of consciousness as find expression in words like 'this is blue', 'I am Caitra' and so on, the essence of which is the use of uttered conventional speech which arises in the *māyā* stage. Because it includes everything which later emerges out of it, it is called *parā*. It is called *Vāk* because it formulates everything, if not in uttered words, at least through conscious identification and recognition (*pratyavamarśeṇa, pratyavamarśavṛttyā, noccānavṛttyā*).[27]

As Utpala says in this context that *pratyavamarśa* is the very essence of *Citi* (Consciousness) and that it is *Parā Vāk*, so he says in another context that *ahaṃpratyavamarśa*, the 'I' Consciousness is the very essence of light or knowledge (*prakāśa*) and that it is of the nature of *Vāk*.[28] There also, the *Vimarśinī* of Abhinava and its commentary *Bhāskarī* make the following points clear : (1) that *pratyavamarśa*, subtle inner formulation (*sūkṣmābhilāpena sparśanam*) is the very essence of *Prakāśa*, consciousness, (2) that it is an inner acceptance, (3) that it is a kind of repose in one's freedom consisting of Self-Sufficiency, (4) that it is of the nature of *Vāk*. What is meant by *Vāk* here is something different from the uttered word which can be heard and which is, therefore, a *viṣaya*, a mere object. It is a very subtle inner formulation and is the ultimate source of the external manifested word which is differentiated into the expression and the expressed.[29]

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26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.

There can be no doubt that all this is based on Bhartṛhari and that Abhinava actually says so. While the *Vākyapadīya* says that *Prakāśa*, knowledge or consciousness is of the nature of *Vāk* which is *pratyavamarśinī*, that which recognises and identifies, Utpala says in different contexts that *avabhāsa*, knowledge, is of the nature of *vimarśa*, that *Citi*, Consciousness is of the nature of *pratyavamarśa*, of *Parā Vāk* and that *ahaṃpratyavamarśa*, Self-Consciousness is the very essence of *Prakāśa*, Light, knowledge. In all these contexts, *Vāk* is explained as something different from the word which is uttered and heard, though the ultimate source of it, as a very subtle inner formulation, identical with Consciousness itself. Abhinavagupta quotes Vāk. I. 115 [123], 116 [124] and 118 [126] and tells us[30] that it is Bhartṛhari, the author of these three stanzas whom Utpala has in mind when he says *viduḥ* in *IPK, V*.11. To explain that *prakāśa* without *vimarśa* or *pratyavamarśa* would not be *prakāśa* at all, these Kashmiri philosophers generally take the example of the crystal (*sphaṭika*). A crystal has this much in common with knowledge or consciousness that it can reflect objects. But there is a vital difference. When the crystal reflects an object, it is not conscious of itself as reflecting it nor is it conscious of the object which is reflected. That is why it is said to be inert (*jaḍa*). When we know something, we know ourselves as knowing it and know the object also. This mixture of the consciousness of the self and of the object is called *vimarśa*. It is this aspect of consciousness which enables one to recognise and identify things and it exists even in animals and in the new-born baby which does not know any language yet. As the baby grows and learns to think and to speak, it is this aspect of consciousness which is working all the time.

So far, an attempt has been made, with the help of the ancient commentaries and with the help of Utpala and Abhinavagupta, to understand the central idea of Bhartṛhari that the ultimate Reality is *Śabdatattva*, the Word-Principle. The next important idea in his metaphysics is that this *Śabdatattva* is a dynamic entity. Though it is One and never gives up its One-ness, it becomes many because it is endowed with many powers.[31] This diversity of powers is postulated in the *Śabdatattva* in order to explain the immense diversity of its manifestations which constitute the cosmos. It is maintained that it is simpler to account for the diversity of the cosmos on the basis of the multiplicity of powers of the Ultimate Reality than on the basis of the plurality of the ultimate entities as some of the other systems

30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.

do.[32] It is further stated that there is, really speaking, no difference between the ultimate Reality and its powers. The Almighty and its powers are one, this is one of the fundamental doctrines of Bhartṛhari's metaphysics. Though the powers are identical with the One who wields them and vice-versa, they appear to be different from one another.[33] The *Vṛtti*, however, says in one place that the powers are indefinable. One cannot say that they are identical with *Brahman*, because then, the powers being many, *Brahman* also would become many and that would go against Monism. Nor can one say that they are not identical with *Brahman*, because they have no existence apart from *Brahman*. They are indefinable in another way also. One cannot say that they exist, because they are never apprehended apart from *Brahman*. Nor can they be said to be non-existent, because their existence can be inferred from their manifold effects in the cosmos.[34] Bhartṛhari, however, says quite clearly that *Brahman* is not different from its powers. They only appear to be different. Not only do they appear to be different, but also opposed to one another (*virodhinyaḥ*) because their products are different from and opposed to one another.[35] In another sense, however, they are not opposed to one another, in spite of their effects being mutually contradictory, because, after all, they are all powers of the same ultimate Reality, they are all found in the same substratum.[36] Bhartṛhari sometimes uses the word *śakti* in a very comprehensive meaning. Anything which exists within in a latent form, only to emerge later and become patent is a *śakti*. When it emerges and becomes manifested, it becomes *vyakti* : In this sense, all the objects of the cosmos, all the categories recognised by systems of philosophy like the *Vaiśeṣika*, after a logical analyis of experience can be looked upon as powers (*śakti*) in the *Śabdatattva*, because, according to Bhartṛhari, they are all latent within it because they are manifested. These categories are never found isolated. They are found united in the same object and together they perform their different functions in order to enable man to attain his goals.[37] As they always function together, it is better to look upon them all as powers of one Ultimate Reality, rather than as absolutely different entities.

Though the word *śakti* is sometimes used in such a comprehensive sense, ordinarily it is used in a more restrictive meaning. Certain

32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.

particular powers which perform special functions are mentioned. Of these, *Dik* (Position or Direction), *Sādhana* (Means), *Kriyā* (Action) and *Kāla* (Time) are enumerated together in one stanza, just to emphasise that they should be looked upon as powers and not as independent entities, as the *Vaiśeṣikas* do.[38] A separate section is devoted to each of these powers in the third *Kāṇḍa*.

Among the many powers of the *Śabdatattva*, Bhartṛhari singles out one for special treatment, I mean *Kālaśakti*, the power called Time. It is mentioned at the very beginning of the *Vākyapadīya*,[39] and a special *samuddeśa*, a fairly long one, is devoted to it. It is declared to be the most important of the powers of *Brahman-Śabdatattva*. It is the power which brings about the manifestation of the phenomena in a particular manner. It would, therefore, be worth one's while to put together the main ideas of Bhartṛhari on Time.

As in other matters, here also Bhartṛhari not only expounds his own view but also refers to the views of others, not in a polemical spirit with emphasis on refutation but rather to clarify and to bring out the distinctiveness of his own view. Here and there, however, it is not clear whether he is giving his own view or that of others and even the commentaries, unfortunately, are not always helpful in deciding this point. Among the views of others, that of the *Vaiśeṣikas* is mentioned at the very beginning. For them, Time is an all-pervasive, immaterial, eternal substance (*dravya*). It is different from action but helps to measure objects in action. One can infer its existence from the notions of temporal anteriority and posteriority which we have in regard to action.[40] Others looked upon Time as a mere construction of the mind. It is not a substance of which the past, present and future are three aspects or powers. The different moments of an action are united by the mind and this mental unification becomes the cause of such expressions as 'quick' and 'slow'. There is nothing corresponding to quick and slow outside the mind.[41] According to some others, in the objects of the world which are constantly changing, the three qualities *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* are always present and so they have three powers and what is called Time is not different from those powers. Things are said to be existent or non-existent as these powers become manifest or not. What is called sequence is

38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.
40. See Texts.
41. See Texts.

nothing more than these three powers of objects. Through these powers, things appear or disappear. Manifestation of objects and their withdrawal, these are the two functions of these powers. In fact, non-existence is nothing more than non-manifestation.[42] Others still looked upon Time as equal to causality (*kāraṇaśakti*). The power called 'seed' allows the emergence of the sprout and prevents the emergence of the stalk. The sprout allows the emergence of the stalk, but not of the next stage. The stalk follows the same process and so on. Thus the cause itself regulates the succession of the different stages in the production of the effect. It performs the functions of permission and prevention, usually attributed to Time. But they can be accounted for without having recourse to Time.[43] Another view recorded is that Time is the Self itself (*ātmā*). It is the Self which perceives objects in a temporal sequence. The Self is incapable of seeing objects as they are and so sees them in a sequence. The sequence is superimposed on the phenomena. As the sequence originates from the Self, the latter is figuratively called Time. He is the ground on which the effect of Time namely, sequence can be seen. It is due to the moral force (*adṛṣṭa*) generated by his deeds in previous lives that the phenomena take place or do not take place for him.[44] Lastly some look upon Time as a Diety, having a form and great power. Helārāja says that this view is close to Bhartṛhari's own. What then is Bhartṛhari's view?

For Bhartṛhari, Time is the most important of the powers of the *śabdatattva-Brahman*. It is its creative power (*Kartṛśakti*). The *Vṛtti* calls it *svātantrya*.[45] It is called *Vibhu*, explained by Helārāja as *svatantra*. The same commentator says that according to Bhartṛhari, Time is the *svātantryaśakti*, Power of Complete Freedom of *Brahman*.[46] As there is no difference between power and that which wields it, Time is really *Brahman* or rather the most important aspect of *Brahman*. As the creative power, Time is responsible for the birth, continuity and destruction of everything in the cosmos. Everything has, of course, its own special cause, material or otherwise. But all these special causes depend upon Time. Time, is thus the auxiliary cause (*sahakārikāraṇam*) of everything.[47] It is compared to the stage-manager (*sūtradhāra*) of a puppet-show who pulls the strings and

42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.
45. See Texts.
46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.

makes the puppets (*yantrapuruṣa*) dance according to his wish. The whole cosmos is a collection of puppets (*lokayantra*) and Time controls their performance.[48] It is due to Time that the phenomena take place or do not take place. Some things appear at a particular time while others do not appear at that time. If a thing is produced at a particular time, it is because Time allows the power of its cause to be effective at that time. This function of Time is called *abhyanujñā* = granting of permission. If something does not appear at any time, it is because Time prevents its appearance through its second function called *pratibandha* = prevention. But for these two functions of Time, there would be confusion in the universe. If all things appeared at the same time, the whole edifice of causality would crumble. It is due to the march of Time that potentialities are realised. The potentialities are realised when they are urged on by Time. That is why Time is said to be the efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) of all effects. These effects continue for some time after they are produced and that is again due to the first function, *abhyanujñā*, of Time. Similarly, when they are at last destroyed, that is also due to Time.[49] The function of Time can be traced in all the different states of effects, so that it may be said to be the very essence of the universe. All living things, all things which are produced and are impermanent are controlled by Time, Eternal things are beyond its scope. Time (*kāla*) is so called because it brings forth (*kālayati*) objects out of their causes. Just as the mechanic turns the water wheel with his hand, in the same way, the Almighty turns all phenomena with his power called Time. All objects are attached to the string of Time, just as small birds, used by the hunter as baits to catch bigger ones, are attached to his string and are allowed to fly or held back according to his wish. Similarly objects are manifested when their time comes, once manifested, they continue to fulfil their purpose and once their purpose is fulfilled they perish. All this is controlled by the power called Time.[50]

The creation of the cosmos is for the experience of the creatures. At the time of Dissolution (*pralaya*), the seeds of the next creation are already there. At the end of Dissolution, forces leading to the next creation become manifest. As to where they become manifest, the systems differ. In the eternal atoms, say the *Vaiśeṣikas*, in the *Pradhāna*, according to the *Sāṅkhyas*. When the causes of the pheno-

48 See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.

mena are affected by these forces, there takes place in them an urge for mutual contact (*prayoga*). It is called *pravṛtti*. It is eternal action (*nityā kriyā*). It is through this urge that the causes become active, enter into contact with one another and produce the effects. When this primitive urge becomes manifest, it is guided by the universals (*jātayaḥ*) which seek substrata for themselves. Thus it is that particular effects are produced in which some universal or other inheres. That is why the universal is said to be the prompter (*prayojikā*) of the causes. Though the effects thus produced are different from their causes, they are unified by the power called *samavāya* = inherence so that their difference is not seen. The universals inhere in the objects and after that the qualities become manifest and finally the universals of the qualities. All this is due to the function called *abhyanujñā* of the power called Time.[51] In describing the process of manifestation of the phenomena after the end of Dissolution, Bhartṛhari has grafted some *Vaiśeṣika* ideas on his own fundamental doctrine that everything comes from the Word-Principle.

If the origin of things is due to the *abhyanujñā* function of Time, so is their continuity. It is not enough for a thing to come into existence. It must also continue if it is to fulfil its purpose. This continuity of objects is also the work of the first function. It is nothing more than the fulfilment of the different purposes with the help of the accessories. Nothing can fulfil its purpose without the help of accessories. That is why the function called *abhyanujñā* is said to cover, not only the production, but also the continuation of the objects.[52]

When objects are no longer able to fulfil their purpose, that is also due to Time, or rather, to its function called *pratibandha* = prevention. This function has two aspects. It prevents things from coming into being before their time and it also prevents them from continuing after their time is over. In its second aspect, it is called *Jarā*, Old age. It affects the powers of objects. It causes their deterioration. Understanding becomes weak in the case of sentient beings and inanimate objects dry up or decay otherwise. All the accessories which formerly enabled the objects to fulfil their purpose now desert them like ungrateful friends and they gradually lose their essential nature. Finally they perish[53] Thus, the birth, continued existence and decay of objects are due to the power called Time, with its two functions.

51. See Texts.
52. See Texts.
53. See Texts.

We have to admit the existence of Time to account for many of our verbal usages. We can say of a piece of cloth or of a jar that it was made slowly. The epithet slow is thus applied to the action of making these two things. These two objects are produced by two different actions and yet we apply the same epithet slow to both of them. The things made are not the same, the actions are not the same as they relate to two different things and the makers may not be the same and yet the same epithet is applied to both which shows that there is something which enables us to apply the same epithet to both. That something is Time. It is in relation to that that actions are slow or quick.[54]

The fact that actions are characterised as 'slow' or 'quick' brings us to another aspect of Time. It helps to measure or to determine action. *Diṣṭi, Vitasti* and so on are measurements of length; *prastha, droṇa, āḍhaka* and so on are measurements of volume; *suvarṇa, niṣka, pala* and so on are measurements of weight. Time is the means of measuring such an immaterial thing as action. The course of the Sun is measured by Time and we get such notions and expressions as month, year and so on. Number alone can measure everything, says Bhartṛhari.[55] To say about as action that it is 'slow' or 'quick' is to measure it in terms of Time. Time is One but it measures an infinite variety of actions. It is like the balance which, though one and the same, measures objects having different weights or like the hand of an expert and experienced merchant who can assess the weights of a great variety of objects.[56] On account of its two functions, granting permission and prevention, Time is responsible for the temporal sequence in which all phenomena take place and all objects appear. This sequence, which really belongs to the phenomena is attributed to Time which is really One and devoid of all sequence and differentiation. Some think of this sequence itself as Time. Not only sequence, but simultaneity also is a property of phenomena, but it is wrongly attributed to Time.[57] Again, the one Time is divided into eras like *kṛta, kali* and so on on the basis of the conduct of human beings living in these eras. Division into eras is not natural to Time but it is superimposed on it.[58] Other divisions are also in the same position. On account of difference in the activities of Nature, Time is divided into seasons, such as spring, summer and so on. It is like the same person

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54. See Texts
55. See Texts.
56. See Texts.
57. See Texts.
58. See Texts.

being called now a carpenter, a smith because of change in the work which he does.[59] Similarly, we speak about commencement time, execution time and finishing time of objects or actions, thus differentiating Time which is one into three. This differentiation is imposed on Time on the basis of the different activities which take place in regard to the object or the action. Before the object is produced, the object does not exist. But its maker has an idea of it and sets about gathering the necessary materials for making it. This is commencement time. Once the materials are gathered, he actually makes it. This is execution time. Lastly, he completes the making and this is finishing time. On account of the difference in the activities at the different stages, one speaks about three divisions of Time, but it is one.[60]. These three unreal divisions of Time are the same for all objects, no matter how small or how big they are. Parts must be looked upon as different from the whole. Even size must be looked upon as different from the object, that is, the whole. Difference in size, therefore, does not make any difference to it. As the whole is the same in all objects, it does not cause any difference in the duration of these three divisions of Time. It is those things which are different from the whole (*avayavin*) that bring about a difference in them. Some wholes have more parts than others and take longer to make while those that have a lesser number of parts take less time to make. The difference is due to the parts and not to the whole which is the real object. The execution time for a binary is the same as for the Himālaya and if we speak of it as different, it is because of the difference in the number of parts. Because the Himālaya has more parts than a binary, we say that the latter was made quicker than the former. A distinction in time depending upon parts is imposed upon or attributed to the whole.[61]

Thus Time is One but distinctions in its associates are attributed to it. Actions are its most important associates. They are brought about by Time in a sequence. It is due to them that distinctions like past, present and future are attributed to it. When an action is over after it was begun, it is said to be past and Time, as associated with it, is also said to be past. When all accessories (*sādhana*) are present as associated with it, it is also said to be future. Time as associated with an action which has begun but is not yet over is said to be

59. See Texts.
60. See Texts.
61. See Texts.

present. These three divisions of Time have their sub-divisions, making up eleven divisions in all as follows—five kinds of past, four kinds of future and two kinds of present.[62] It was said before that action which is complete gives Time the name of past. How can some thing which is gone and which is not there give a name to anything? It is explained as follows—The objects produced by the action which is past are preserved in memory. They are called past objects and it is they which give the name past to the time when they were produced. Time is grasped by us as conditioned by objects. Objects deposit in eternal time the form which they had when they were present. They are then said to be remembered and expressed in words as such. The very fact that things are remembered is a proof of the existence of Time.[63] The fact that we can conceive of objects yet to come is also a proof of the existence of Time. Objects yet to come are reflected in Time as in a well-polished mirror.[64] Thus all objects and phenomena are in the womb of Time which is dynamic and constantly creates and destroys them at the proper time and thus brings about world-order. The movements of the stars and planets, the two-fold course of the Sun (*uttarāyaṇa* and *dakṣiṇāyaṇa*), the creation and dissolution of the great elements, all this is due to the play of Time. What are called constellations or stars are only symbols of changes taking place in objects due to Time. There is an infinite number of such signs and symbols of Time in the cosmos as it passes regularly in cycles through the different seasons and ages.[65]

All divisions in Time are unreal and based on actions which are brought about by it. When Time is conditioned by a longer series of moments of action, we use the expression 'slow'. When it is conditioned by a shorter series of moments of action, we use the expression 'quick'. One is compelled to differentiate Time in this manner, because what is absolutely one and undifferentiated cannot enter into worldly usage (*vyavahāra*) .. So we divide it into past, present and future. But these divisions are unreal. They have only a practical value.[66] There is no need to postulate real divisions in it. It is true that there is great diversity of phenomena in the universe. But that can be explained on the basis of diversity of powers of One entity. There is no need to assume a plurality of causal entities or a real division of one entity. It is

62. See Texts.
63. See Texts.
64. See Texts.
65. See Texts.
66. See Texts.

better to look upon past, present and future as three powers of Time rather than as three real divisions of it.[67] With its powers called Past and Future, it causes the hiding, the non-perception, the non-manifestation of objects, either in the form of prior non-existence (*prāg-abhāva*) or posterior non-existence (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*). Objects are being constantly manifested or withdrawn from manifestation and that is what engenders the great diversity of the cosmos.

The three powers of Time mentioned above are enough to explain this diversity Of them, two hide objects and the third reveals them.[68] Between the two powers that hide objects, there is a difference. The power called Future is not opposed to the power called Present. It hides the object only as long as its causes are not mature. Once they are mature it allows the Power called Present to reveal it. That is not the case with Past. It never allows the past object to be revealed again. What is past is past, but it is the future which becomes the present.[69] In this connection, Bhartṛhari refers to some thinkers, identified by Helārāja as the *Sāṅkhyas,* who held the view that in the course of the cylic evolution of the cosmos, what is past sometimes does recur. Objects which have already fulfilled their purpose enter into the past, that is, they become merged in Primordial Matter (*Pradhāna*). Later, when their time comes, they emerge again and at the time of the next Dissolution, they again become merged in Primordial Matter. Bhartṛhari does not seem to have subscribed to this view. According to him, what is past is past. The power called Past is opposed to the Present. What recurs can never be the same as the past. It can, at the most, be something like it.[70]

It is worthy of note that, according to Bhartṛhari, Time is a power of the Word-Principle and yet it is itself credited with three powers, Past, Present and Future. In fact, he uses the word 'power' (*śakti*) rather generously. Even old age (*Jarā*) is called a power of Time, apart from these three. There is, really speaking, no contradiction in postulating a power, because Time, though a power, is identical with what wields the power, the *śabdatattva*. So all powers, including those attributed to a power, are those of the ultimate Reality, the Word-Principle. These three powers of Time have no sequence. They are always present and though their effects are mutually contradictory, they function without causing any disorder in the cosmos. They are

67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.
69. See Texts.
70. See Texts.

like three paths on which objects move about without any confusion. The traffic is regulated. What was at first in the path called Future, enters the path called Present and disappears into the path called Past. That is why all objects are said to have three paths or to undergo three transformations (*avasthāpariṇāma*) in the Yoga Philosophy.[71] Though the three powers are always present, they are mutually coordinated and between them, they perform the function of revelation and hiding of objects and thus bring about sequence of phenomena. This mutual coordination of the three powers of Time is compared to the mutual coordination of the three *guṇas, sattva, rajas* and *tamas* of the *Sāṅkhya* system. They are also eternal and present in everything and they have conflicting properties. Yet, they work in such a manner that a relation of primary and secondary or dominant and subordinate (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*) is established between them and the whole cosmos works without any confusion. As the powers Past and Future hide things, they are compared to *tamas,* darkness and as the power called Present reveals or illuminates things, it is compared to *sattva,* light. As for the *rajas* of the *Sāṅkhya* system, it stands for activity, it is a dynamic force and so it is akin, not so much to any of the powers of Time, but to Time itself, which is the dynamic aspect of the Word-Principle, its creative force. In this way, Bhartṛhari connects his conception of Time with the *Sāṅkhya* doctrine of the three *guṇas* while fully retaining its distinctness.

In this connection, it is possible to look upon an object and its properties as different from one another or as identical with one another. According as we look at it in one way or the other, the three powers Past, Present and Future would appear to have succession or to be simultaneous. If an object is different from its properties, it is the latter which change with time. They are yet to be, or present or past. The object itself remains the same throughout and it is not subject to these changes. One does not look upon it as going through these three stages. It is always present, but its properties, are past, present or are yet to be. But if an object and its properties are looked upon as identical, then, as its properties at any given moment are past, present or future and as it is identical with them, it means that the object is all the three at the same time. There is no contradiction in one and the same thing getting different designations due to external factors. Though Bhartṛhari only says that this is the view of some, Helārāja identifies it as that of the *Mahābhāṣya*.[72] Another view attributed to

71. *Yoga-Dar*. III. 13 with *Vyāsabhāṣya* or *Bhojavṛtti.*
72 See Texts.

some—those who like simplicity (*saṃkṣeparucayaḥ*), says Helārāja—is that Time need not be thought of as having three powers. As only two functions, that of granting permission and that of prevention, are attributed to it. it would be better to think of Time as having two powers only, corresponding to these two functions. The function called prevention can cover both past and future because, in both of them, there is a common point, namely, that of hiding the object. What is past is hidden and what is yet to come is also hidden and both are the outcome of the function called *pratibandha* (prevention).[73]

All that has been said so far was meant to explain the differences and the sequence in the transitory and changing phenomena of the cosmos. But we use expressions like 'short', 'long' and so on for the phonemes and words which the grammarians regard as eternal. How can the connection of time and its powers described above be applied to eternal things? And yet we do use expressions based on Time or duration in regard to them also. This difficulty is met by saying that distinctions of time found in the transitory manifesting sounds (*dhvanis*) are attributed to the eternal manifested phonemes and words[74] An analogy is also given. The two cognitions which find expression in these two sets of words: "This was done quickly" and "this was done slowly" are of equal duration, but on account of difference in the objects, we attribute difference to the cognitions also. The manifesting sounds of the phonemes or words have distinctions based on time. They can be of greater or lesser duration. But as the listener does not cognise the manifested phoneme or word as distinct from the manifesting sounds, distinctions based on time are attributed to the former also. The primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvani,*) heard as identical with the word, present the latter as having distinctions based on time which really belong to themselves.[75] The manifesting and the manifested elements are not separately cognised. As the cognition of the word depends on that of the manifesting elements, the properties of the latter are attributed to the former. Not only distinctions based on time such as short, long and so on but also such distinctions as nasal and non-nasal, really belong to the manifesting elemnets. The analogy of the cognitions 'quickly done' and 'slowly done' does not hold good here because the relation between a cognition and its object is not the same as the relation between the manifesting sounds and the word. The form of the object and

73 See Texts.
74 See Texts.
75 See Texts.

that of cognition are distinctly perceived but the manifesting sounds and the word are cognised as one.

Thus it has been shown that temporal distinctions are attributed to eternal words on the basis of such real distinctions existing in the sounds which manifest them. This has been said by the way. The point which Bhartṛhari wants to emphasise in this context is that the main power of the Word-Principle, namely, Time is One, without any real division but that we attribute divisions to it such as moment, day, week and so on.[76] We mentally unify a series of moments and give that unity the name 'month' or 'week' or 'Year' and so on. The smallest unit is the 'moment' and the highest Manu's Age (*Manvantara*). These divisions are creations of our minds.[77] In this context, there is a reference to a method of measuring time, consisting in allowing water collected in a vessel to escape through a hole or a tube (*nālikā*) in drops. This is the method of measurement through flow of water (*salilasruti*). Apparently, the time taken by the water in the vessel to escape through the tube was taken as the standard to measure the time taken by other actions in the world. Probably, it was also used to determine divisions of time such as day, week and so on. To the suggestion that the flow of water itself might be looked upon as Time instead of postulating another entity, it is answered that when the water in the vessel flows through the hole, some of it flows first and some of it later. This itself presupposes the two functions, permission and prevention, of Time.[78] But for that, all the water should flow out at the same time. No matter how big or small the hole is, the water can flow only gradually. It is because it is regulated by Time which is therefore, different from the flow of water.[79] The size of the hole through which the water flows does determine the time taken by the water to flow out completely. But no matter how quickly or slowly the vessel is emptied, the two functions of Time play their part. Time is an auxiliary cause in the production of effects, but the other causes also have to be there before the effect is produced. When the sprout should come out of the seed depends upon the two functions of Time, but not on them only. It also depends upon other factors such as soil, water and so on. Similarly, that only a certain amount of water can go through the hole in the vessel is determined by Time, but not by Time only.

76 See Texts.
77 See Texts.
78 See Texts.
79 See Texts.

It is also determined by the size of the hole. The cause and Time together produce the effect. There is, therefore, no justification in eliminating either of them.[80]

Time is different from the various actions taking place in the universe, but these actions serve to divide Time which, in reality, has no divisions. A bamboo-tree attains maturity quickly while the palm-tree takes a long time to do so. We can divide Time on the basis of these two different kinds of growth. We can speak about bamboo-growth time and palm-growth time. Objects and their conditions may change but that does not in any way affect Time which is a kind of ground or substratum of all objects and phenomena. Pedestrians and their traffic may stop, but the path remains unchanged.[81] When the activities of Nature, characteristic of spring, cease, we say that Spring has come to an end. Really speaking only the activities have ended. Sometimes, we speak as if Time is affected by these changes, but that is only a way of speaking. We say that the day is over, the night is past, the summer has ended and so on. But all these changes do not really affect Time. Some people go to the extent of saying that Time is nothing more than the different movements of the celestial bodies, merely because we make use of these movements to divide Time. The course of the Sun from its rise to its setting is called the day. We call night its course from its setting to its rise again. This course of the Sun, repeated fifteen times is called *pakṣa* (half-month). The passing of the *nakṣatras* by the Moon is given the name 'month' by us. Similarly, big divisions of Time such as *Yuga, Manvantara, Kalpa,* and *Mahākalpa* are all obtained on the basis of the movements of the stars and planets, described in the Science of *Jyautiṣa* (Astronomy). What it all amounts to is that the movement of something, of known measurement, is taken as the standard for measuring the movements of other things in the universe and is then called Time.[82] A large number of such known movements is used in different speech communities as measurements of actions. We use such expressions as *'divasam adhīte'* = 'he studies the whole day', *rātrim adhīte* 'he studies the whole night', *godoham āste* = 'he stays as long as it takes to milk the cow', and so on. In all these expressions, the known movements of objects, celestial bodies or ordinary ones, have been used to measure other actions such as studying and staying. If, for some reason, no external known movement is available for using as a standard of mea-

80 See Texts.
81. See Texts.
82. See Texts.

surement, one can always use one's own breathing movement for the purpose. Helārāja tells us that *Yogis* actually use the movements of their breath to determine objects.[83] This view of Time is attributed to *arvāgdarśanāḥ* (superficial thinkers) by Helārāja. It is natural that he should do so, considering that, according to Bhartṛhari, Time is One and undiffereniated and that any division attributed to it on the basis of the known movements of celestial bodies in unreal and done only for practical purposes.

The foregoing is a brief exposition of the main ideas of Bhartṛhari on Time. At one stage, Helārāja tells us that the purpose of Bhartṛhari in devoting a whole section of his work to Time is not to define it philosophically, but to examine and analyse that something which is responsible for our putting the Sanskrit verb in different tenses. After all, the main aim of the grammarian is to explain the forms of the language with which he is concerned. It is a fact that the tense forms of the Sanskrit language raise many problems. One problem, already discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* like so many others, is : how can the present tense be used in regard to eternal things ? How, for instance, can we say : 'mountains stand' (*parvatās tiṣṭhanti*). The mountain, to the ordinary man, iis an eternal thing. The notion of present is a relative one. It presupposes the notions of past and future. When we say of something that it exists, it is in relation to a state when it was not and to a state when it will not be any more. Nobody thinks of a mountain as being in those two states. How then can the present tense be used in regard to it. ? Another question raised is : how can the present tense be used to describe an action which is interrupted by other actions before it is finished ? Faced with such difficulties, some went to the extent of maintaining that an action can only be future or past, but never present. Another problem crops up, when two words, expressive of two different tenses, make up a sentence as in *bhāvy āsīt*, or *agniṣṭomayājy asya putro janitā*. In the first sentence, the first word expresses the future and the second word the past and yet the two have joined to form a sentence. How is this possible ? Innumerable such problems arise in connection with the tense forms of the Sanskrit language. It is, therefore, necessary, to have some idea of the notion of Time which lies behind all these tense-forms. It is to clarify this background notion of Time that Bhartṛhari has devoted a whole section to it and not to enter into a philosophical analysis of Time, says Helārāja.[84] We have seen, however, that

83. See Texts.
84. See Texts.

Bhartṛhari does want to connect his explanation of the Sanskrit language or of language in general with his metaphysical background. It is not an accident that a work which is supposed to deal with the sentence and the word begins with a statement on *Brahman,* the ultimate Reality.

After having explained all the main stanzas of the section of the *Vākyapadīya* devoted to Time, Helārāja sums up Bhartṛhari's view in a passage of which the following is a translation.

"This is then the conception of Time. Within Nescience (*avidyā*) which is the cause of the phenomenal world, there emerges, first of all, the phenomenal world (*saṃsāra*), consisting in the appearance of differentiation. Differentiation is spatial and temporal. Of the two, temporal differentiation comes first in the creation of the world. Consciousness in the form of *Paśyantī* is without any sequence, but when it is associated with the *Prāṇa* principle (activity) it shines as Time, as though it had sequence. This has been established by me in my commentary called *Śabdaprabhā* on the *Vākyapadīya* and so it should be understood from that work. The reality called *Brahman,* is without any sequence and consists of True knowledge and it is not affected by Time. Under the influence of Nescience, it assumes sequence and appears as this and that. Thus, through the intervention of Time, the phenomena appear in a temporal sequence to the individual selves, coming down from time immemorial. Because all differentiation consists of Nescience. All division of Time, adopted from different points of view, are also the creations of Nescience. Once True knowledge dawns, all differentiation disappears and, therefore, this division (of Time) also disappears. Therefore, to discuss whether it (the division) is right or not, would result in labour only. In the empirical stage, everything is unreal and the truth cannot be determined. This is the substance of what is meant."[85]

There are certain points to be noted in this summing up of Helārāja. He emphasises the main function of Time, namely, to present the phenomena in a temporal sequence. In the manifestation of the cosmos, he gives priority to the emergence of temporal order, under the influence of Time. But he mentions *avidyā* also. The ultimate Reality is One, without any inner sequence, but with infinite powers. It becomes many, that is, the cosmos emerges out of it, with all its multiplicity. Not only that. All this multiplicity is presented in a temporal order. *Avidyā* is said to be the cause of the One manifesting itself as many,

85. See Texts.

as the phenomenal world (*saṃsāra*). That the phenomenal world is also presented in a temporal order is due to Time. When the ultimate Reality is associated with *Prāṇa,* then it is that it assumes the form of Time, we are told. By *Prāṇa,* we have to understand activity in general, an inner urge to manifest, to become many, to set things in motion. It is particularly connected with physical activity. Within the body, for example, all the organic functions like respiration and blood circulation are attributed to *prāṇa.* If Helārāja has mentioned the role of *avidyā* in his summing-up, it is because Bhartṛhari himself uses the word in a stanza occurring in the section devoted to Time. He says—

> "The conception of Time varies according as it is looked upon as power, as the self or as a Deity. It is the first to be manifested in the state of *avidyā* and it does not exist in the state of true knowledge".[86]

Taking this stanza with the commentary on it by Helārāja containing his summing-up, we may understand the position as follows— 'The power called *avidyā* is responsible for the one becoming many, for the emergence of the phenomenal world. The power called Time is responsible for the phenomena appearing in a temporal sequence.' The word *avidyā* occurs once more in the *Vākyapadīya.* There the context is the consideration of the question whether the individual word and its meaning are real. The orthodox view of the grammarian is that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible and that they alone are real. They reject the contention of the *Mīmāṃsakas* that the individual words are also real. Unity and indivisibility represent truth and reality (*vidyā*) while division and multiplicity stand for *avidyā,* untruth and absence of reality. It is true that the different systems of grammar analyse the sentence into words and the words into roots and suffixes. Thus they move in the realm of multiplicity. About this analysis and division practised by the systems of grammar, it is declared that it is all *avidyā* and that this *avidyā* is the means of attaining *vidyā* that is, indivisible unity.[87] That untruth is the means of attaining truth is an idea expressed by Bhartṛhari elsewhere also. He says—'By treading the path of untruth, one attains truth.'[88] On both the occasions when he has used the word *avidyā,* it stands for the principle which causes the one indivisible Reality to become many, with the implication that the many are, in some way, less real than the One. Though the word comes only twice in the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya,* it comes in

86. See Texts.
87. See Texts.
88. See Texts.

many contexts in the commentaries. Not only does it occur in the oldest commentary, the *Vṛtti,* it occurs also in some of the quotations found in this commentary, showing that the principle for which it stands is older and if the author of the *Vṛtti* is Bhartṛhari himself as a very old tradition maintains, it is older than Bhartṛhari himself. In one untraced prose quotation found in the *Vṛtti,* it is stated that all phenomena in the form of concrete objects (*mūrti*) or of actions are only the functioning of the power of Nescience, that they cannot be described as identical with or as different from True knowledge and that the fact of being Nescience consists just in bringing about such phenomena.[89] Here *avidyā* is credited with the manifestation of both aspects of the cosmos, namely, the concrete objects situated in space and actions having temporal sequence, situated in Time. In a verse quotation, equally untraced, it is stated that the immortal *Brahman,* free from all change, is as though soiled by *avidyā* and manifests itself differentiated.[90] In both these quotations, *avidyā* is credited with presenting the One changeless Reality as having many forms, arranged in a spatial and temporal sequence. It is the principle of multiplicity and as this multiplicity has, in some way, a lesser reality than the One undifferentiated, it is called *avidyā,* Nescience. As I have already pointed out, Helārāja held the *Vṛtti* in great respect as he looked upon it as Bhartṛhari's own work. He brings in the principle of *avidyā* quite frequently in his explanations of the *Vākyapadīya.* According to him, the individual self, the see-er has his limitations due to *avidyā* and that is why he is part of the phenomenal world. He speaks about the distinct roles of *avidyā* and *Kālaśakti* in the manifestation of the cosmos, consisting of *mūrtivivarta* and *Kriyāvivarta.*[91] While explaining the statement of Bhartṛhari that the undifferentiated ultimate Reality (*avikalpita*) becomes differentiated and assumes an infinite number of forms, Helārāja says that it is due to the influence of *avidyā,* coming down from eternity.[92] The universe which is manifested under its influence consists, first of all, of an infinite number of experiencers (*bhoktā*) who are really identical with the ultimate Reality, being essentially of the nature of consciousness. But they appear to be different from it and different from one another, because of *avidyā.* They experience the universe which, like themselves, is an emanation from the ultimate Word-Principle. This universe consists of an infinite number of constantly changing and constantly inter-acting objects. Change

89. See Texts.
90. See Texts.
91. See Texts.
92. See Texts.

means the infinite number of processes, actions and states through which they pass all the time and which can all be brought under the well-known six transformations of Being, already recognised by Yāska (*ṣaḍ bhāvavikārāḥ*). These changes, being actions and processes, take place in Time, that is, in a temporal sequence and here it is that the power called Time plays its part. These changes are collectively referred to as *Kriyāvivarta* which is controlled by *Kālaśakti*. Changes presuppose things which change. They are the concrete objects of the universe, themselves the products of previous processes and actions and now involved in other such processes and actions and different from them. Not being processes and actions, they have no temporal sequence. But they have another kind of arrangement. They are arranged in space and so they have spatial sequence and this is due to the power called '*Dik*' (Direction, Position) of the ultimate Reality. They are involved in different processes because they have the capacity to help in their accomplishment. They become the means (*sādhana*) of their accomplishment. What is called 'means' is thus, not so much the object itself, but its capacity, though the two cannot be separated. Though the capacities are infinie in number, six have been recognised in the *śāstra,* the six *Kārakas*. The implication is that, all of them can, for practical purposes, be brought under one of them. All these objects, not being processes or actions, come under that part of manifestation called '*siddha*' = finished things, as distinguished from actions and processes which are in the course of being brought about and therefore called '*sādhya*'. From one point of view, then, the universe consists of two kinds of things : *siddha* and *sādhya*. The *siddha* objects are arranged in a spatial sequence and are collectively called *mūrtivivarta*. The processes and actions which are *sādhya* are collectively called *Kriyāvivarta*. To say that the universe consists of *siddha* and *sādhya* is equal to saying that it consists of *mūrtivivarta* and *Kriyāvivarta*, manifested respectively under the influence of *Dikśakti* and *Kālaśakti*.[93] In one context, Helārāja speaks quite clearly about the distinct functions of *avidyā* and *Kālaśakti;* the former brings about differentiation in the undifferentiated *Brahman* and the latter is responsible for the temporal sequence in which the differentiated phenomena are presented to the individual perceiver.[94] *Avidyā* brings about not only differentiation, but also limitation. The individual selves who come into being in the wake of the differentiation are limited in their knowledge and in their power to act.[95] On account of this limitation, one is not able to cognise

93. See Texts.
94. See Texts.
95. See Texts .

a thing as it is. Our cognitions are all *vikalpa* which involves selection and elimination. We only see some aspect or other of the reality as presented by *avidyā*. As the latter presents reality in bits and pieces, we can only cognise it as such.[96] Words closely follow our cognitions and so they can express only a part of reality. In fact, words cannot express even the whole of the limited aspect of reality presented by *avidyā*. They can only express a part of it. A word like *ghaṭa* = a jar, cannot express the whole of what the jar stands for. It can only express a part of it, namely, the universal *'ghaṭatva'* in it. If one wants to express anything else, one would have to use another word for it. If it is red in colour, the word *rakta* or its synonym would have to be used to express it.[97] The fact that cognition is coloured by the form of the object at all is its limitation or impurity and to have only an aspect of the object figuring in it is a further limitation. When the sages go beyond the worldly level, there comes a certain purity in their cognitions. Purity is of two kinds : initial and final. The knowledge of the omniscient which embraces all objects and does not arise through sense contact has initial purity. Dependence on sense contact is itself a kind of impurity. In its final finished form, it is free from the colouring of the forms of objects or of any differentiation. It is then pure consciousness, like the sea without the slightest ripple on its surface.[98] If our cognition or knowledge is limited and impure, the object itself is no less so. The impurity of the object consists in its coming within the range of our knowledge, either through the sense or through words, with some limiting factor or other, such as the universal. The pure object cannot come into worldly usage at all. It can neither be cognised nor expressed in words. It is alwayys cognised as associated with some limiting factor (*upādhi*) such as the universal. This is its impurity. This association with some limitation is a fall from reality.[99] The impurity or limitation of the word has already been made clear, namely, that it is incapable of expressing the whole of an object. It can only illuminate some aspect of it, leaving it to other words to illuminate other aspects of the same object. Thus all the three, the object, its cognition and the word expressive of it are all tainted with impurity.[100] All this is the result of *avidyā* which not only brings about multiplicity and differentiation, but introduces various kinds of limitations in the multiple.

96. See Texts.
97. See Texts.
98. See Texts.
99. See Texts.
100 See Texts.

From what has been said so far, it is clear that in explaining the metaphysical position of Bhartṛhari, the oldest commentary *Vṛtti* and those of Helārāja and Puṇyarāja, bring in the principle of *avidyā* as the cause of multiplicity and differentiation in the One. The word comes twice in the *Kārikās* and it seems to me that, on both occasions, it means much more than ordinary ignorance in the worldly sense. As I have already pointed out, on both the occasions, it stands for the principle which brings about differentiation in the One which is undifferentiated. In other words, it stands for a metaphysical principle and not for ordinary ignorance in the worldly sense. It is also significant that in both the stanzas (Vāk. II. 233 and Vāk. III. *Kāla*. 62.) the word *vidyā* also occurs, also in a metaphysical sense, standing for unity and indivisibility. In the second *Kāṇḍa* where the word occurs for the first time, we are told that the great differentiation, described in the different systems of grammar, consisting in various ways of analysing the sentence into individual words and their meanings and the words into roots, stems, prefixes and suffixes, represents *avidyā*, an artificial division into many of what is One and indivisible. When, ultimately, *vidyā*, knowledge of the indivisible word arises, it is free from all the differentiations adopted by *āgama*, the Science of Grammar. The artificial division serves as a means to the attainment of the indivisible reality, says Puṇyarāja, echoing what Bhartṛhari himself says a little later (II. 238.) namely, that 'treading the path of the unreal, one attains reality.'[101] I have already given before a translation of the stanza in which the word occurs for the second time in the *Vākyapadīya* and of Helārāja's summing-up found in his commentary on the stanza. On account of these considerations, I cannot agree with Dr. M. Biardeau when she says that the word *avidyā* comes only once in the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* (in II. 233.) and that there it means only ignorance in the worldly sense.[102] I have pointed out that the word occurs twice and that in both the contexts, it stands for a metaphysical principle, the division of the One, into many, a division which, in some way, has a lesser reality than the undifferentiated One.

Here a big problem arises: In Bhartṛhari's metaphysics, is the phenomenal world, manifested by the *Brahman—Śabdatattva*, through its powers, especially *Kāla* and *Dik*, not to speak of *avidyā*, unreal? Is it a *vivarta* in the Vedāntic sense or is it a *pariṇāma*, an unreal appearance or a real transformation? Did such a clear distinction

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101. See Texts.
102. M. Biardeau — Bhartṛhari — *Vākyapadīya, Brahmakāṇḍa* (French Translation) Introduction, p. 10.

between the two already exist in Bhartṛhari's time and was he consciously an adherent of one of them, to the exclusion of the other? These questions are not easy to answer on the basis of the texts which we have, especially because to-day Bhartṛhari's authorship of the oldest commentary on the stanzas, the *Vṛtti* has been questioned. If Bhartṛhari's authorship is certain as a very long tradition maintains, the questions raised above can be answered without much difficulty, because the position is clearly stated in that commentary. It is, however, necessary to remember that, even as long ago as the eighth or the ninth century A.D. when Bhartṛhari's authorship of the *Vṛtti* was taken for granted, two different answers were given to the questions raised above. For example, Śānrakṣita, the Buddhist Philosopher and author of the *Tattvasaṅgraha,* expounds briefly the *Śabdabrahmavāda* before rejecting it. For that, he makes use of the very first stanza of the *Vākyapadīya* which speaks about the nature of the ultimate Reality and of the emergence of the phenomenal world from it. It is significant that he interprets this stanza in two ways. He expresses the meaning of the stanza in his own words. In his first interpretation, he deliberately uses the word *pariṇāma* = 'real manifestation' to explain the word *vivartate* occurring in it. Kamalaśīla, his commentator, does the same.[102] In the second interpretation, it is stated that the *Brahman* which is always without any differentiation is looked upon by the world as differentiated because of the influence of *avidyā.* In the first interpretation, the word *avidyā* is not used while, in the second one, it is. Kamalaśīla also, while commenting on the second interpretation, points out that the manifestation is not real but that the average man looks upon the One Reality as many because of his vision being affected by the defect called *avidyā.*[103] Further, Kamalaśīla cites, in order to support the second interpretation, two *ślokas* from among the twelve quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 1. In the second *śloka,* referred to under foot-note no. 90 above, it is stated that the immortal *Brahman,* free from all change, is as though soiled by *avidyā* and manifests itself as differentiated. Thus Śāntarakṣita and his commentator Kamalaśīla, who had the *Vākyapadīya* with the *Vṛtti* before them and, presumably, looked upon both as the work of Bhartṛhari, knew two interpretations of *Śabdādvaita,* one of which looked upon the phenomenal world as real and the other as unreal. It seems to me that they had some difficulty in deciding the position of Bhartṛhari who preceded them by atleast three centuries. Vācaspatimiśra also knew these two interpretations as he refers to them in his *Nyāyakaṇikā.*[104]

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103. See Texts.
104. See Texts.

These ancient authors may have found the wording of the *Vākyapadīya* a little ambiguous. It sometimes appears to be so to modern readers also. In Vāk. I. 112 [120], for instance, there does not seem to be any difference in the meanings of the roots *pari nam* and *vi vṛt.* That is why Dr. Gaurinath Sastri writes : "It appears to us, therefore, that Bhartṛhari was not familiar with the difference in the connotations of the two terms (*pariṇāma* and *vivarta*) which is usual in later philosophical literature."[105] He makes a distinction between the views of Bhartṛhari as expressed in the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* and those of his commentators like Puṇyarāja and Helārāja. As Bhartṛhari says nowhere in the stanzas that the powers of the Word-Principle are unreal, he takes it for granted that, for Bhartṛhari, the phenomenal world which is a creation of the powers, is real and not a *vivarta,* a mere illusory appearance. According to him, the commentators have, under the influence of later Vedantic ideas, interpreted Bhartṛhari as an exponent of *vivartavāda.*[106] There is one fact which, unfortunately, vitiates the arguments of this scholar. He takes the commentary on the 1st *Kāṇḍa,* published in Benares in 1887, to be that of Puṇyarāja, whereas in the colophon, it claims to be that of Harivṛṣabha. In reality, it is an adaptation of Harivṛṣabha's *Vṛtti* as shown long ago by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri. This *Vṛtti* has been regarded for centuries in India as Bhartṛhari's own commentary. If there is any truth in this long tradition — in my opinion, it has not yet been proved to be untrue — this commentary is evidence of Bhartṛhari's own view and not of that of Puṇyarāja. I have already said something about how this commentary interprets the stanzas and shall say a few words more presently. As I have already pointed out, Dr. M. Biardeau does not accept the tradition that the *Vṛtti* is by Bhartrhari himself and regards Harivṛṣabha as a separate author who interprets Bhartrhari under the influence of later vedantic ideas. She has tried to interpret Bhartṛhari on the basis of the *kārikās* only and has come to the conclusion that nowhere in them is there any hint that the phenomenal world which emerges out of the Word-Principle is unreal. Her arguments are based on a deep understanding of philosophical issues. After a brilliant exposition and interpretation of the main notions relating to Bhartṛhari's *śabdādvaita,* she comes to the conclusion that, according to it, "the phenomena do not veil the Being, but reveal it, or rather, the Being manifests itself through

105. Dr. G. N. Sastri — The Philosophy of Word and Meaning, p. 56. (Sanskrit College, Calcutta, 1959).

106. Ibid, p. 57.

them. It is logically necessary for the system to postulate the Being as pure unity and non-differentiation in order to explain the profound correlation of the objective and subjective aspects of reality. But it is more pertinent for its proper content to postulate the Being to be the Word. The Being is not One and then many in the course of its evolution. Nor is it One really and many illusorily but it is One substantially and many phenomenally"........"One is therefore, justified in saying that the ontological unity holds within itself the phenomenal diversity, but that the phenomenal diversity is the only thing to which we have access, because it is the only thing which we need and which really interests us. Thus one understands why it would be inconceivable to look for and, *à fortiori,* to find in Bhartṛhari *avidyā,* metaphysical ignorance and *māyā,* cosmic illusion, which form the pivots of vedantic thought."[107]

I would totally agree with this interpretation if I did not feel that sufficient weight has not been given to the fact that Bhartṛhari does mention *avidyā,* not once but twice in the stanzas of the *Vakyapadīya.* It cannot be entirely an accident that the word occurs in connection with the two kinds of differentiation which are spoken of by Bhartṛhari : (1) The differentiation of the indivisible sentence into individual words and their meanings and of the words into roots, stems, prefixes and suffixes, (2) The differentiation of the ultimate Word-Principle into the multiplicity of the phenomenal world. I have already expressed my view that, in both the occurrences of the word, it means something more than ignorance in the wordly sense, that it stands for a metaphysical principle. It is not a question of how many times the word occurs in the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya.* It is quite enough that the word occurs twice, provided that the sense in which it is used is without ambiguity. In my opinion, in Vāk. III *Kāla.* 62. Bhartṛhari has used the word in connection with the power called Time which is mainly responsible for the manifestation of the many in a temporal sequence and which Bhartṛhari singles out for mention at the very beginning of his work. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, according to our philosopher, *avidyā* has something to do with the manifestation of the phenomenal world, though its relation to the other powers like *kāla, kriyā* and *dik* has not been clarified. If the phenomenal world is the result of *avidyā,* can it have the same degree of reality as what is *vidyā?*

107. M. Biardeau — Théoric de la Connaissance et Philosophie de la Parole dans le brahmanisme classique, p. 309-310 (Mouton & Co. Paris, 1964).

If it is insisted that the question whether, according to Bhartṛhari, the phenomenal world which emerges out of *Brahman-Śabdatattva* is real or not must he decided entirely on the authority of the stanzas then it is not enough to count the number of times the word *avidyā* is used in them or to see whether the noun *vivarta*, as distinct from the verb *vivartate* is used in them. It is also necessary to see how certain topics are treated. It is particularly necessary to see how the words *satya*='real', 'true' and *asatya*='unreal', 'false' are used in different contexts. One of them is where the question of the nature of the meaning of the individual word is discussed. One view on this question, associated with the name of Vājapyāyana, was that the meaning of the individual word is the universay (*jāti*). Another view, associated with the name of Vyāḍi, was that it is substance. To each view, a separate section is consecrated in the third *kāṇḍa*.

The universal is conceived as some common persisting factor which exists in all the individuals belonging to the same class, causes a uniform cognition and is the cause of the application of the same word to all of them. These persisting common elements are permanent and real whereas the individuals where they exist are transitory and unreal. Of course, the universals are only relatively permanent and real. Compared to the highest of all universals, the *mahāsāmānya* called *Sattā* = Being, which is the same as *Brahman*, these persisting elements called universals are not so permanent and real. *Sattā* or *Brahman* is the ultimate Reality, the highest universal and the other universals are appearances of this Being in the different objects of the world. The other view that all words denote substance or *dravya* is the result of our looking at the same thing in a different way. While it is true that we apply the same word to the different individuals belonging to the same class on the basis of uniformity of cognition, it is also true that we apply different words to the objects of the world on the basis of diversity of cognition. We call some things *ghaṭa* and some other things *paṭa* because there is diversity in the cognition produced by these two kinds of things. And yet the different things of the world are manifestations of one ultimate Reality.

In ordinary life, this ultimate Reality is not directly cognised by us. We cognise all kinds of things having all kinds of forms. Through all these manifold and different forms, it is the Ultimate Reality which we cognise. As these forms are cognised as different from one another, we apply different words to them. Words express what we cognise and as we cognise these changing and unreal forms, it is they which the words express first. But, through these, they express the ultimate Reality also. In fact, it is the ultimate Reality

which is their expressed meaning. Words are incapable of expressing the ultimate Reality directly because it is formless and we do not cognise it directly in ordinary life. There is, however, something which runs through all these unreal forms (*asatyopādhi*) and which persists when these forms disappear. That is *Brahman,* the ultimate Reality and that is the expressed meaning (*vācya*) of all words.[108] As an illustration of something transitory pointing to something permanent, the illustration of a crow sitting on a person's house is given. The crow is not a permanent feature of the house. It may fly away at any time. And yet, it may help us in distinguishing that house from others. When it flies away, we can still recognise the house with the help of some more permanent feature like a *vedikā* (platform, dais ?) observed while it was still sitting on the house.[109] The principle that the transitory and the unreal can point to something permanent is explained by another illustration. Gold is one but it is differentiated by the different forms of the ornaments into which it is converted. These ornaments have their names : *rucaka, kuṇḍala* and so on. Each one of these names denotes a particular shape but it does not stop there. It ultimately denotes gold itself. These different shapes come and go but gold persists. These shapes are not the real expressed meaning of these words. It is the substance gold which is their expressed meaning. We see gold in every ornament and not merely that particular shape.[110] Similarly, all the words of the language like *ghaṭa* which denote particular forms point to the ultimate Reality through these forms. It is that which is their expressed meaning. Just as, in the different ornaments, gold also exists, in the same way, in our cognitions of the different objects, not only do their forms figure, but also pure consciousness which is the ultimate Reality. There is no harm in saying that words are expressive of the different forms. What is emphasized is that they do not stop there but go further and point to the ultimate Reality also. Nor would there be any confusion if all words express the same thing, because every word would convey the ultimate Reality as coloured by the particular form or attribute which that word alone can bring to the mind. We are so made that we cannot cognise the ultimate Reality directly. We can cognise it only as coloured by some form or other. It is like a person looking at a landscape through a tube. He can see only as much as is visible through the hole of the tube. The tube only affects the vision of the person who looks through it and not the

108. See Texts.
109. See Texts.
110. See Texts.

outside world. It is not merely such things as tubes which restric. our vision. Attention concentrated on one thing takes it away from others. The particular beauty of a thing attracts our attention towards it and takes it away from other things.

What is to be noted here is that, according to Bhartṛhari, in ordinary life, we can neither cognise nor express in words the ultimate Reality directly. We can cognise it only through the limiting factors (*upādhi*) which make up the phenomenal world and these limiting factors are definitely called *asatya* = 'false,' 'unreal'. It is also these unreal limiting factors which words first denote before pointing to the ultimate Reality. They are called *asatya* because they are transitory and impermanent, compared to the ultimate Reality which is eternal (*nitya*). The Real is cognised through the unreal forms and the words express the Real through the unreal forms — this is Bhartṛhari's position as stated in the text referred to under note 108. He says in one place that, just as, when forms like an ear-ring, disappear, the gold that persists is real, in the same way, when all manifestation, that is, the phenomenal world disappears, the ultimate substance (*prakṛtiṃ parām*) that remains is real (*satyām*). He states elsewhere quite clearly that the ultimate Reality which, though free from all differentiation, differentiates itself into the subject, the object and the experience, is alone Real. He attributes this view to the followers of *Trayyanta*, that is, *Vedānta*.[111] There is, however, no reason to think that he did not consider himself to be one of them. He was not merely a grammarian and a linguistician. He was also conscious of being a philosopher belonging to the vedic tradition. All who belonged to this tradition did not hold the same view on all matters. Bhartṛhari may have differed from some of them on some matters. There is, however, no reason at all to think that in *Kā.* 72 of the *Sambandhasamuddeśa*, he is expressing the view of those from whom he differed. I believe that he is giving his own view and it agrees with what he says in *Kā.* 8 of the *Dravyasamuddeśa*.[112] He definitely uses the word *'asatya'* to describe the phenomenal world as cognised by the mind and as expressed by words and declares that alone to be *satya* which, though free from all differentiation, assumes differentiation. This point is very relevant in any consideration of the question whether Bhartṛhari propounded the doctrine of *vivarta* or not.

As I said before, already in the eighth century A.D., if not earlier, there were two interpretations of the *Śabdādvaita* of Bhartṛhari. One

111. See Texts.
112. See Texts.

can understand how these mutually exclusive interpretations arose. The use of the words *pariṇāma* and *vyavartata* as more or less synonyms in the same stanza (Vāk. I. 112 [120]) in the description of the emergence of the phenomenal world from the Word-Principle would naturally prompt some readers to think of the system as a kind of *pariṇāmavāda* while the occurrence of the word *avidyā*, and the characterisation of the phenomenal world as *asatya* would lead some others to understand it as *vivartavāda*. The history of the interpretation of *Vākyapadīya* immediately after Bhartṛhari is shrouded in mystery. What we know is that all the available ancient commentaries beginning with the *Vṛtti* which a very long tradition looks upon as Bhartṛhari's own, interpret the system as *vivartavāda*.

As has already been shown, the *Vṛtti* makes use of the metaphysical concept of *avidyā* in order to explain the emergence of the many from the One. It also explains the verb *vivartate*, occurring in the very first stanza of the *Vākyapadīya*, in terms of the concept of *vivarta* which became so prominently associated with the *vedānta* of Śaṅkara. It defines *vivarta* as 'the assumption by the One, without losing its One-ness, though apparent diversity, of separate unreal forms.'[113] Helārāja was very conscious of the distinction between *pariṇāma* and *vivarta* and emphasises on more than one occasion that Bhartṛhari upheld *vivarta* and not *pariṇāma*. Not only does he use the words *avidyā* and *vivarta* profusely in his commentary in all sorts of contexts, but he also warns us on some occasions not to commit the mistake of interpreting Bhartṛhari in the sense of *pariṇāma*. He goes further and tells us that even the word *vikāra*, used by Yāska in citing the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi that Being undergoes six modifications (*ṣaḍ bhāvavikārāḥ*) should be understood in the sense of unreal appearance and not of real modification.[114] On another occasion, he says that the ultimate Reality, being of the nature of consciousness, is free from all real change and so Bhartṛhari's system is not *pariṇāmavāda* but *vivartavāda*. He adds that he has made the distinction between the two clear in his commentary on the (first two *Kāṇḍas* of the) *Vākyapadīya*.[115]

I have pointed out that the *Vākyapadīya* begins with a statement on the nature of *Brahman* for two reasons : (1) because *Brahman* is the source of everything, including *vākya* and *pada*, the two main subjects of the work and (2) because *Brahman* would come under

113. See Texts.
114. See Texts.
115. See Texts.

prayojana or *phala* (purpose, goal), one of the eighth topics enumerated by Bhartṛhari himself and traditionally accepted as forming the subject-matter of the *Vākyapadīya*. After having dealt with *Brahman* as the source of everything and with the problems arising out of it, it remains to consider what Bhartṛhari has to say about *Brahman* as the goal to be attained. The attainment of *Brahman* has been declared to be the ultimate goal of the study of *Vyākaraṇa*.[116] Here, as in many other places, Bhartṛhari is anxious to appear as continuing a tradition going back to Patañjali himself. One of the first things discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya* is the aim of the study of the Science of Grammar. After having given a first list of aims and explained it, Patañjali gives a second list which includes '*yas tu prayuṅkte*' and '*catvāri*.' The former in the beginning of a verse and the latter is the beginning of *ṚV*. IV. 58.3. The verse tells us that he who is an expert and employs words correctly at the time of communication, being a knower of the use of words, attains unlimited success in the other world but is also tainted by incorrect forms.[117] This verse agrees with *Vā*. 9, of the *Paspaśāhnika* which says that through the use of the correct words, preceded by a knowledge of the Science of Grammar, divine happiness (*abhyudaya*) results and that is comparable to the words of the *Veda*.[118] The verse and the *vārttika* tell us that the aim of the study of *vyākarṇa* is the attainment of happiness here and beyond by acquiring merit (*dharma*) through the knowledge and the use of correct words. That by *abhyudaya* heaven is meant is made clear by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya* on P. VI. 1.84, where he quotes an earlier text which declares that even a single word, properly understood together with the *śāstra* relating to it and correctly used yields he desired fruit in heaven.[119] The *mantra* from the *ṚV*. quoted by Patañjali to state another aim of the study of grammar may be translated as follows —

> "He has four horns, three feet, two heads, seven hands; the Bull is tied in three places and He roars. The great God has entered human beings."[120]

While explaining this *mantra*, Patañjali says that grammar should be studied in order that one may attain similarity with the great God.[121] The great God is, of course, the Word as is clear from his explanation

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116. See Texts.
117. See Texts.
118. See Texts.
119. See Texts.
120. See Texts.
121. See Texts.

of the rest of the *mantra*. Thus acquisition of merit (*dharma*) leading to the attainment of divine happiness (*abhyudaya*) and similarity with the great God are mentioned as two separate aims of the study of *Vyākarṇa*. Though what is meant by the attainment of similarity with the great God is not further specified, it is necessary to mention that, at the end of the second *āhnika* of the *Mahābhāṣya*, Kātyāyana says that the Science of Grammar through which the phonemes are learnt regulates the Word, that it also makes known the Word on which the *Brahman* (that is, the *Veda*) rests and that the arrangement of the phonemes in the fourteen *māheśvara sūtras* (*varṇasamāmnāya*) has been taught for the sake of the working of the Science of Grammar, for the acquisition of the phonemes in their defectless form and for the formation of the short formulas (*pratyāhāra*).[122] While explaining this, Patañjali says that the particular arrangement of the phonemes in the fourteen initial *sūtras* is the basis of all verbal usage, that it bears flower and fruit (*puṣpitaḥ phalitaḥ*) that, like the Moon and the stars, it is not the creation of anybody but has come down from time immemorial, that it is the *Brahman* itself in the form of phonemes, that a knowledge of it leads to the same holy reward as the study of all the Vedas and that the parents of those who know it would be honoured in heaven.[123] The words flower and fruit (*puṣpitaḥ phalitaḥ*) occurring in this explanation of Patañjali are explained by Bhartṛhari, in his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* as standing, respectively for the visible result (*dṛṣṭaphala*) *abhyudaya*, happiness here and beyond and for the invisible result, (*adṛṣṭaphala*) *niḥśreyasa*, liberation.[124] Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* looked upon both *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* as two distinct aims of the study of grammar.

As for Bhartṛhari's own view of the two aims, there are certain clear statements and certain hints in the *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya*, but they have to be supplemented by the clarifications of the *Vṛtti* and by the explanations of both found in the *Paddhati*. The terms *Vāgyogavid*, *śāstrapūrvakaprayoga*, *dharma* and *abhyudaya*, found in the *Mahābhāṣya* are used in the *Kārikās* or the *Vṛtti*. But some new expressions and a few more details, not by any means adequate, are now availabe regarding the two aims of the study of grammar under consideration. The word *sāmya* of the *Mahābhāṣya* is now replaced by *sāyujya*. Bhartṛhari says—

122. See Texts.
123. See Texts.
124. See Texts.

> "It has been declared that the Self of the speaker, the Word which is within him is the great Bull with whom Union (*sāyujya*) is desired."[125]

What is meant by *sāyujya* is made clear in the very next stanza:—

> "Therefore, the purification of the word is the means to the attainment of the Supreme Self. He who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal *Brahman.*"[126]

What is meant by *sāyujya* then is the attainment of the Supreme *Brahman.* After having stated that grammar is the discipline which is nearest to *Brahman,* that it is the best of all modes of moral discipline (Vāk. I. II.), that it is the door which leads to liberation (Vāk. I. 14), that it is the straight royal road to take for those who want to attain liberation, Bhartṛhari concludes by saying —

> "That Supreme *Brahman* which, though One is interpreted in many ways according to different systems, is attained through a knowledge of grammar.[127]

According to Vṛṣabhadeva, Bhartṛhari, in proclaiming the attainment of *Brahman* to be one of the aims of grammar is only repeating what Patañjali had already said. We saw how he explains the *phalita* of Patañjali as *niḥśreyasa* and his *sāmya* as *sāyujya.* Vṛṣabha further points out that Bhartṛhari is not merely repeating Patañjali but has given some details not found in the *Mahābhāṣya.* He adds that even though Patañjali, by referring to the great God entering into human beings, has already spoken about *mokṣa,* liberation, as one of the aims of *Vyākaraṇa,* Bhartṛhari goes further and tells us, clearly and with arguments, what its nature is and how it is attained through *Vyākaraṇa.*[128] But he does not forget the other aim, namely, *abhyudaya,* happiness here and beyond. He is careful to keep the two aims distinct. We saw how he looks upon *abhyudaya* as the flower (*puṣpita*) and *niḥśreyasa* as the fruit (*phalita*) of the study of grammar. This does not necessarily mean that he considers *abhyudaya* as a necessary preliminary stage in the attainment of *mokṣa.* In the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 123 [131], the two aims are distinctly stated: *niyato' abhyudayaḥ, niyatā kṣemaprāptiḥ* = happiness here and beyond is certain and

125. See Texts.
126. See Texts.
127. See Texts.
128. See Texts.

attainment of the supreme Good (that is, liberation) is certain. The knowledge and the use of correct words not only leads to *abhyudaya,* but also to *mokṣa.* It is preliminary (*aṅga*) to both and Vṛṣabha tells us that the *Vṛtti* first describes it in its first aspect and next in its second aspect. The difference is that, for the attainment of *mokṣa,* mere knowledge and use of correct words are not enough. Bhartṛhari looks upon the process of attaining *mokṣa,* or of becoming one with *Brahman* as an ascent and the knowledge and use of correct words as the first step in the ladder which helps in that ascent.[129] Unfortunately, he does not say as clearly in the *Kārikās* what the other steps are. Here one has to rely on the *Vṛtti* which calls the whole process *śabdapūrvayoga,* an expression already found in Vāk. I. 20. Before considering the process, it is necessary to examine a passage of the *Vṛtti* which professes to describe the nature of the attainment of *Brahman.*

Ten different ways of looking at the concept of attaining *Brahman* are mentioned in the *Vṛtti* on I. 5. It is not clear whether they are ten different conceptions of *mokṣa* or ten different aspects of the grammarian's concept of *mokṣa.* Whatever they may be, they may be stated as follows—

(1) Attainment of *Brahman* means going beyond the limitation (*granthi*) consisting of the ego-sense (*ahaṅkāra*) in the form of 'I' and 'mine'. This seems to be the most important of the ten, because it is mentioned in another context also, as will be shown later.

(2) Others say that it is the merging of all the transformations into the Original Source (*prakṛti*). When one realises the distinction between *prakṛti* and *puruṣa* and the former, therefore, ceases to function and all its transformations merge into it and become one with it, the world-experience comes to an end for the liberated soul. The Word *apare* comes at the end of the statement of this view. It has been suggested that this is the *Sāṅkhya* view. But Vṛṣabha takes *prakṛti* in the sense of *Brahman* and sees here no reference to the *Sāṅkhya* conception. For him, it seems to be another way of stating the grammarian's conception, favoured by some scholars.

(3) Withdrawal of the senses from their objects (*vaikaraṇyam*). It is tempting to connect this conception with *Yoga* Philosophy. It is, however, of a very general nature and any conception of *mokṣa* would presuppose it. What is called *saṃsāra* consists of all the desires and

129. See Texts.

conflicts which arise when the senses come into contact with the objects of the world and if *mokṣa* means release from *saṃsāra*, the deliberate withdrawal of the senses from their objects is an essential step towards it. The *Yoga* system explains it fully and emphasises it, but Vṛṣabha does not connect *vaikaraṇya* with *Yoga*.

(4) Complete satisfaction or inner Joy irrespective of external means (*asādhanā paritṛptiḥ*). Joy sometimes results from contact with external objects but such joy is here excluded. One who has attained liberation experiences intense joy within, a joy which is not caused by the objects of the world from which the senses have been withdrawn. This joy is a natural corollary of the withdrawal. It is of this inner joy which does not depend upon external objects that Helārāja speaks at the beginning of his commentary on *Kāṇḍa* III when he says—

> *"Tṛptiṃ yat paramāṃ tanoti viṣayāsvādaṃ vinā śāśvatīṃ"* = "that which causes supreme and eternal joy, without the enjoyment of external objects."

Here he seems to be echoing the words *asādhanā paritṛptiḥ* of the *Vṛtti*.

(5) Knowing nothing except the Self, (6) Desire for nothing else than the Supreme Self, (7) Interest in the innermost Self and not in any adventitious object, these three ways of looking at *mokṣa* are closely connected and they are of such a general nature that any conception of it would necessarily imply them.

(8) The possession of all powers. According to Vṛṣabha, this refers to the eight powers beginning with *aṇiman*, described in the *Yogaśāstra*. Many would consider that this cannot stand for the attainment of the ultimate Reality and that it can only represent a lower stage of spiritual realisation.

(9) The non-intervention of the functions of Time in the lives of individual selves. This aspect of liberation is in accordance with the grammarian's conceptions. For him, one of the characteristics of *saṃsāra* is that the phenomenal world is presented in a temporal order by the two functions of prevention and permission (*pratibandha* and *abhyanujñā*) of the power called Time. To be under the influence of these two functions of Time is to be in *saṃsāra*; to go out of that influence is to go out of *saṃsāra*, that is, to be liberated.

(10) Negation of the Self (*nairātmya*). This seems to be totally opposed to 5 and 6 because it is the negation of Self, the attainment of which is stated to be *mokśa*. This may be the view of the *Mādhyamika* Buddhists. But Vṛṣabha who seems to consider the

ten views as being only ten aspects of the grammarian's conception of *mokṣa* explains *nairātmya,* not as the negation of the Self, but as its extreme indefinability and inexpressibility.[130]

Of the above ten aspects of *mokṣa,* the Vṛtti obviously considers the first to be the main one because it is mentioned again in another context. Under Vāk. I, 122 [130] it says—

> "The Great Word-Bull is the Lord of all, endowed with all powers. Those who know *vāgyoga* break the knot of ego-sense and are merged into it, with complete absence of differentiation."[131]

Here occurs the word *vāgyoga* which we found already in the *Mahābhāṣya.* There the exact meaning of the word was not clear, though the context tempted us to identity it with the expression *śāstrapūrvakaprayoga* found in Vā. 9. of the *Paspaśāhnika* and which has the meaning of knowledge of grammar and the use of correct words. But in the *Vākyapadīya,* it cannot mean that. It is probably identical in meaning with *śabdapūrvayoga* which occurs both in the *Kārikās* and in the *Vṛtti* and always in the context of the attainment of union with the ultimate Reality. *Śabdapūrvayoga* is clearly distinguished from *śāstrapūrvakaprayoga* in the *Vṛtti.* Under Vāk. I. 24-26, it says that the relation of the correct form of the word with its meaning, when known and when the word is used with knowledge of the *śāstra* (*śāstrapūrvake vā prayoge*) becomes auxiliary to the manifestation of spiritual merit (*dharma*).[132] This is more or less the meaning of Vā. 9. of the *Paspaśāhnika,* referred to above under foot-note 118. The expression *śabdapūrvayoga* is never used in a similar manner. It is never stated anywhere that *śabdapūrvayoga* leads to the manifestation of *dharma.* The expression occurs in Vāk. I. 20 and four times in the *Vṛtti* on *Kāṇḍa* I. In all the occurrences, there is a reference to the attainment of union with the inner, eternal, undifferentiated, sequenceless Word. It is not that the meaning of these passages is clear. Far from it. In Vāk. I. 20, we are told that words appear like reflections in the *Brahman* in the case of those who practise the *Yoga* of the Word (*śabdapūrvayoga*). One must assume that they appear without any sequence, because the very purpose of the *Yoga* is to transcend the sequence which is characteristic of the differentiated state. The elimination of sequence is essential for attaining union with the Word-Self. In the four passages of the *Vṛtti* where the word *śabdapūrvayoga*

130. See Texts.
131. See Texts.
132. See Texts.

occurs, there is not only a reference to the process of attaining union with the Word-Principle, but also an attempt to recognise stages in the process. In his commentary on Vāk. I. 14, Vṛṣabha actually says that the author of the *Vṛtti* is describing the stages within the process of attaining *Brahman.*[133] Unfortunately, these passages which are supposed to describe the stages are much too brief. In order to supplement what they say, one has to take the help of three verses quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 123 [131], which confirms what has been said in the *Vṛtti* proper. From an examination of these passages and the quotations, it appears that *vāgyoga* as used in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 122 [130] and *śabdapūrvayoga* as used in the other *Vṛtti* passages mean the same thing, namely, some kind of *Yoga* as a means of attaining *Brahman,* the Word-Principle. It is a pity, however, that the word is not explained anywhere in the *Vṛtti* but is taken for granted. One can only guess at the meaning from the context. It is significant that the word occurs both in the *Kārikā* and in the *Vṛtti,* because it shows that some kind of *Yoga* practice for the attainment of *Brahman-Śabdatattva* is an integral part of the philosophy of Bhartṛhari who, as I have already said, thought of the process as a kind of ascent from the differentiated to the totally undifferentiated.

The first occasion when the *Vṛtti* speaks about the different stages in the process of attaining *Brahman* is under Vāk. I. 14. in the course of the explanttion of the notion that grammar is the door to liberation. The essence of the process is the total elimination of all sequence. Sequence is based on diversity and difference. When there is no more perception of diversity and sequence in any form and the mind is concentrated on the undifferentiated Reality, union with it takes place. This is *śabdapūrvayoga.* As pointed out before, for Bhartṛhari, grammar is the first step in the ladder of ascent. Knowledge of the correct form of words as taught in grammar and its use in real life is then the first stage. That produces spiritual merit (*dharma*) in the aspirant and he goes beyond the senses and the mind, that is, he reaches *vaikaraṇya.* We have already met this expression in connection with the third aspect or the third way of looking at *mokṣa.* Here it seems to be presented as the second stage in the process of ascent towards union with the ultimate Word-Principle.[134] In the next stage, the aspirant sees the Word as free from all distinctions and reaches *Pratibhā,* the source (*prakṛti*) of all differentiation, though itself free from it. It is also the source of all manifested words and their mean-

133. See Texts.
134. See Texts.

ings. It is also called *Paśyantī.* It is from here that the Word descends into the stage of differentiation, that it becomes associated with the activity of *prāṇa* which ultimately strikes at the different points of articulation and gives rise to the different phonemes. Reaching *Pratibhā* or *Paśyantī* or *Prakṛti* is the third stage.[135] The next and the last stage consists in going from *Prakṛti* to *Parā Prakṛtiḥ.* The expression *Parā Prakṛtiḥ* occurs in Vāk. III. *Dr.* 15 in the sense of the Ultimate Substance in which the whole phenomenal world is merged and which alone is real. It also occurs in a quotation found in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 118 [126] where we are told that the Word which, though formless, assumes form by manifesting itself as the differentiated phenomenal world is the Ultimate Source (*Parā Prakṛtiḥ*).[136] By constant practice in *śabdapūrvayoga,* all sequence is completely suppressed and the aspirant now reaches the ultimate Reality in which even the barest outline of differentiation is totally absent. What is to be noted here is that mere acquisition of spiritual merit by the knowledge and the use of the correct forms of words is not enough for the attainment of *Prakṛti* or *Parā Prakṛti.* That may be enough for obtaining *abhyudaya* but for the attainment of *Pratibhā* or *Parā Prakṛti,* the aspirant has to practise *śabdapūrvayoga.* The *Vṛtti* says that when speech is purified by the adoption of the grammatically correct forms and all obstruction in the form of incorrectness is removed, there results spiritual merit which makes the attainment of happiness, here and beyond, certain.[137] But not the attainment of the ultimate Reality. Not yet. For thtt, the aspirant must continue the use of the correct forms of words and practise *śabdapūrvayoga.* He must fully realise the *Pratibhā* which is derived from the ultimate Reality and which is identical with the ultimate Being (*sattā*), the source of change and manifestation, endowed with the power of being the means of accomplishment and the thing to be accomplished (*sādhyasādhanaśaktiyuktām*). After this, says the *Vṛtti,* the attainment of the Supreme Good is certain (*niyatā kṣemaprāptiḥ*)[138] The *Pratibhā* which, in the former context, was described as the *Prakṛti* and distinguished from the *Parā Prakṛti,* is treated here as the latter, because nothing beyond it is mentioned. Whether it be *Pratibhā,* or *Prakṛti* or *Parā Prakṛti,* it cannot be reached by mere knowledge and use of the correct form of words, but requires *śabdapūrvayoga.* The word comes once more in the *Vṛtti* on the first

135. See Texts.
136. See Texts.
137. See Texts.
138. See Texts.

Kāṇḍa in the context of the three stages of *Vāk*, namely, *Vaikharī*, *Mahdyamā* and *Paśyanti*. These three stages of *Vāk* are mentioned only once in a *Kārikā* (I. 134 [142]). All that is said there is that grammar is the wonderful means of knowing them. The *Kārikā* only mentions their bare names. It does not define them nor add any detail in regard to them. It is the *Vṛtti* which describes them somewhat and gives some details. From this description and these details, one understands the following points—

1. The three aspects of the Word (*Vāk*) seem to be the three stages through which it passes whenever one speaks, when the Word which is at first quite internal is externalised for the purpose of communication.

2. The most external of all the stages, namely, the *Vaikharī* is described first. In this stage, it is uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. It is, therefore, closely associated with the organs of articulation. It is also associated with *prāṇa* which is what strikes against the organs of articulation at the time of utterance and brings about temporal sequence. As the *Vṛtti* describes it, *Vaikharī* is not merely the name of the fully externalised form of human speech. Such sounds as that of the axle of a cart, of a drum, of a flute and of a lute (*vīṇā*) are also included in it, apparently on the authority of the *Tai. Sam* 6.1.4 according to Vṛṣabha. In this way, the *Vaikharī* is said to have infinite varieties. Its chief characteristic is that it has fully developed temporal sequence. Going inwards, the next stage is called *Madhyamā*. Its association is chiefly with the mind, the intellect (*Buddhi*), not with the organs of articulation. It is the word as conceived by the mind before its actual utterance. As there is no actual utterance, there is no real temporal sequence in *Madhyamā*. But it is not absolutely without it. It is there in a subtle form. As it is *prāṇa* which brings about fully developed sequence in the *Vaikharī* stage, where sequence is only in an incipient subtle form, there *prāṇa* also must be presumed to be functioning in a subtle form. *Prāṇa* is gross and physical when it strikes against the organs of articulation. When it does not do that, it may still be there in a subtle form. The description of the next and the innermost stage, the *Paśyantī* is more detailed but also more obscure. It is also said to have infinite varieties (*aparimāṇabhedā*). It is also described as being of a lower and a higher kind and we are told that the higher kind (*paraṃ rūpam*) is beyond the range of verbal usage.[139]

139. See Texts.

What is of interest to us in all this is that while these three words seem to be the names of the three stages through which the Word passes in the process of verbal communication in everyday life, we found the word *Paśyantī* used by Vṛṣabha as the synonym of *Pratibhā*, the third stage in the ascent towards the attainment of the Word-Principle. In ordinary verbal usage one begins from *Paśyantī* and ends in *Vaikharī*. In *śabdapūrvayoga*, on the other hand, one begins the ascent from the *Vaikharī* and goes up to *Paśyantī*, otherwise called *Pratibhā* or *Prakṛti* and even beyond to *Parā Prakṛtiḥ*. The only thing which emerges from all these considerations is that *śabdapūrvayoga* or *vāgyoga* is a kind of meditation aimed at raising the level of consciousness to the highest stage of the Word. Absolute absence of differentiation and sequence of any kind is mentioned as the chief characteristic of this meditation. This point is emphasized in three verses quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 123 [131] in order to confirm what is said there. They may be translated as follows—

> "Taking his stand on the essence of the Word lying beyond the activity of breath (*prāṇa*), resting in one's self with all sequence eliminated,
>
> After having purified speech and after having rested it on the mind, after having broken its bonds and made it bond-free, After having reached the inner Light, he with his knots cut, becomes united with the Supreme Light.[140]

Making allowance for the repetitions, one can say that these three verses seem to describe in their own way, the meditation called *śabdapūrvayoga*. The process of going beyond all multiplicity and sequence is described. It is when the word has descended to the level of *prāṇa* and is externalised by the striking of *prāṇa* against the points of articulation that differentiation and multiplication become manifest. To rise above the level of *prāṇa* is the first step in the process called *vāgyoga*. The next step is to take the word to the level of the mind, as one of the verses says. The word is taken from the level of the organs of articulation to that of *prāṇa* and from there to that of the mind, says Vṛṣabha.[141] The breaking of bonds or the cutting of the knots is repeatedly mentioned. The bonds or knots are the limiting factors which bring about differentiation and multiplicity, *avidyā* and *ahaṃkāra, says* Vṛṣabha. And the last stage is the attainment of the inner Light, that is, the One, indivisible Word which is identical with the inner Self.

140. See Texts.
141. See Texts.

I hope that it is clear from the foregoing discussion of the aims of the study of Grammar that Bhartṛhari mentions *abhyudaya* and *niḥśreyasa* as two distinct aims in his interpretation of the *Mahābhāṣya*, does the same in his *Vākyapadīya* and that the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* also understand Bhartṛhari as having kept them as quite distinct from each other. The knowledge and the use of correct words produce spiritual merit which leads to *abhyudaya*, happiness here and beyond. It also enables the aspirant to practise *śabdapūrvayoga* which ultimately leads to liberation, which means going beyond differentiation and sequence, beyond *ahaṃkāra* and becoming One with the Inner Word which is the same as the Supreme Self. It is because Bhartṛhari keeps these two aims as quite distinct and never mixes them up that I find it difficult to follow Dr. M. Biardeau when she says—

> "On the other hand, if Bhartṛhari promises salvation to those who know and use correct language, this salvation remains indefinite; called sometimes *mokṣa*, sometimes *apavarga*, in the verses quoted above, it is also, on occasions, called *abhyudaya* which is the term usually employed in *Mīmāṃsā* and the Pāṇinian school of Grammar to designate both terrestrial prosperity and divine happiness after death as the reward of *dharma*.[142]

Again—

> "One would then have to think that Bhartṛhari, in his own way, which is not that of Vātsyāyana, employs in turn the terms *mokṣa*, *apavarga* and *abhyudaya* and makes them without distinction, the reward of the knowledge of language."[143]

The position of Bhartṛhari, as I understand it, is that the knowledge of the Science of Grammar and the use of the correct words as recognised in it leads to *dharma* which can do two things: (1) it can lead to *abhyudaya*, happiness here and beyond (2) it can enable the aspirant to practise *śabdapūrvayoga* that will, by stages, lead to his attainment of *mokṣa*.

142. Mr. Biardeau — Théorie de la Connaissance p. 268.
143. Ibid. p. 269.

2. THE DOCTRINE OF *SPHOṬA*.

The Word—Principle contains within itself the seeds of the whole cosmos which emanates from it. What the whole cosmos consists of is stated differently on different occasions without there being any contradiction between these statements. At the very beginning of the *Vākyapadīya,* it is declared that the *Brahman-Śabdatattva,* manifests itself as the experiencer, the object experienced and the experience itself. In other words, the many which emerges out of the One can be brought under these three headings.[1] On another occasion, a fourth category is added, namely, the purpose or goal of experience.[2] The *Vṛtti* quotes an ancient text which mentions *mūrtivivarta* = the manifestation consisting of the different objects of the world located in space and *kriyāvivarta* = the manifestation consisting of actions and processes taking place in time, as the two chief constituents of the cosmos.[3] In some places, Helārāja also refers to the universe as consisting of these two kinds of *vivarta.*[4] But these two categories can cover only what Bhartṛhari calls *bhoktavya,* the thing to be experienced and leave out the experiencer and his experience. A closely related way of looking at the same thing is to say that the universe consists of the *siddha,* finished concrete objects or what is looked upon as such and secondly, the *sādhya,* actions and processes in the course of being accomplished or what is looked upon as such. Lastly, one often comes across the statement that the universe consists of the *vācya* and the *vācaka,* that is whatever can be expressed in words and the words which express them. These two categories do not cover the whole cosmos. They cover the objective aspect of it but not the subjective aspect consisting of all the individual selves and their infinite experiences.

Whatever be the aspects or categories in terms of which one describes the cosmos, they all exist as seeds (*bīja*) or potentialities (*Śakti*) in the ultimate Reality and as one with it. When they emanate from it, they become actualities and present themselves as different not

1. Vāk I. 4.
2. Vāk. III Dr. 14.
3. Vāk. I. p. 9, l. 1.
4. Vāk. III, pt. i. p. 117, l. 9.

only from the One but also from one another. The words which convey the things and the things which are conveyed by the words also exist as potentialities or powers within it and emanate from it as distinct from one another.[5] Similarly, knowledge and the things known also exist as one within it and emerge from it as distinct from one another. The experiencers and the things experienced also, at first one with the ultimate, emerge as distinct from one another.

Of all the things which emanate from the *Brahman—Śabdatattva*, we are here concerned with the manifestation of the *vācya* and the *vācaka*, or in other words, of the *artha* and the *śabda*. In ancient days, there was a good deal of speculation in the circle of phoneticians (*śikṣākāras*) as to the origin or material cause of the audible word or sound (*śabda*). Some held that words or sounds were transformations of air, others held that they were transformations of atoms and others still that they were transformations of knowledge or consciousness (*jñāna*).[6] The first view seems to refer to the fact that, at the time of utterance, the effort of the speaker pushes the inner air outwards and when it strikes at the different points and organs of articulation, sounds are produced. Thus this view relates only to the most external or physical aspect of production of speech-sounds. The statement of the second view that words are transformations of atoms is not free from doubt. In what sense is the word 'atom' (*aṇu*) to be taken? Is it to be taken in the sense of the *Vaiśeṣikas* who recognise only four kinds of atoms, namely, those of earth, water, air and fire or is the word *aṇu* to be understood as equal to the *tanmātra* of the *Sāṅkhyas?* The *Vaiśeṣikas* do not recognise atoms of sound, because the latter is a quality of *ākāśa* according to them and only a substance can be in the state of atoms. The *Sāṅkhya* recognises five kinds of *tanmātra* of which *śabda* is one and some scholars like Nāgeśa are of the view that the word '*aṇu*' in the text in question refers to the *śabdatanmātra*. It is stated that when the *śabdaparamāṇus* are prompted by the inner air expelled by the speaker at the time when their power to produce their effects is mature, they are transformed into gross speech.[7] This is only a literal interpretation of the relevant text. What it really means is not clear.

We then come to the third view that it is knowledge (or consciousness?) which is transformed into audible words. Kaiyyaṭa

5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.

says in his *Pradīpa* on P. 1.4.29 that this was the view of the Bhāṣyakāra. The *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 107 quotes four stanzas from some ancient work which are supposed to state this view and they have been made use of by later writers like Nāgeśa. They describe the externalisation of the inner word through different stages.[8] The main idea is that it is the subtle inner Word (*Sūkṣmā Vāk*) that becomes the knower (*jñātā*) and then, in order to reveal himself, becomes the external word. To say that the subtle Word, which is no other than the Word-Principle, becomes the knower means that it takes the form of Mind (*Manas*) or Intellect (*Buddhi*) and ultimately becomes the fully manifested external word.[9] In the process described in these stages, there is mention of *vāyu* or *prāṇa* also. The *Pāṇinīya Śikṣā* also describes the process. It says that the Self cognises the objects with the mind and endows it with the desire to give expression to them. The mind strikes at the bodily energy and that energy sets the breath in motion.[10] What is to be noted in the process of the *Śabdatattva* becoming fully externalised word (*vyaktaśabda*) is that various things are involved in it, according to the authors of the *Śikṣā*, approvingly quoted in the *Vṛtti*. They are *ātmā*, *Buddhi* or *Manas*, *prāṇa* or *vāyu*, *tejas or kāyāgni* and *sthāna* and *Karaṇa* (points and organs of articulation). Bhartṛhari also seems to be referring to the process when he says that the power of the word becomes associated with the mind, the *prāṇa* and the points of articulation and thus becomes diversified.[11] That, before the word is fully externalised, the points and organs of articulation have to play a part is rather obvious. Its association with the mind and the *prāṇa* is perhaps not quite so obvious and so that is emphasized by the *Vṛtti* when it says that the word has two bases, the *prāṇa* and the *Buddhi*.[12] On the basis of what the commentary says, Bhartṛhari seems to have something like this in mind when he says that the power (*śakti*) of the word becomes associated with the *Buddhi*, the *prāṇa* and the *sthāna*.

The speaker has something to say and he thinks of the appropriate words for expressing it. His later utterance, consisting of making movements of his vocal organs, would depend upon the words which he has already thought of. These words which he has in his mind (*Buddhi*) are spoken of as a kind of power (*śakti*) because they will bring about the manifested words. But the *Buddhi*, by itself, cannot

8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.

result in utterance. It requires the help of *prāṇa*, the motor principle within. So, in a way, it transfers its power to *prāṇa* and so it now becomes the power of *prāṇa*. The power of the *Buddhi* and that of *prāṇa* cooperate with each other in producing the utterance. The motor principle (*prāṇa*) is One without differentiation and unless it is differentiated, the particular sounds which are required for the manifestation of the words cannot be produced. It is the points and organs of articulation (*sthāna* and *karaṇa*) which bring about differentiation in *prāṇa* the motor principle. When the *prāṇa* strikes against particular points and organs, the sounds required are produced and they manifest the words which are expressive.

When the process of externalisation is complete, the words uttered can be heard by others. But there are degrees in this process of externalisation and these degrees are referred to by the words *paramopāṃśu* and *upāṃśu*. These two degrees of externalisation are also available to the average man. When the words are still in the mind and the process of externalisation has not begun at all, though differentiation into word and meaning and into different sounds has begun and the words can be grasped only by the speaker's mind and not by the ear, it is a very early stage of externalisation and it is called *paramopāṃśu*. Here the *prāṇa* plays no part at all.[13] Another degree of externalisation is that in which the *prāṇa* begins to play a part and so utterance begins, but an utterance which others cannot hear and is audible to the speaker only.[14]

The word, thus externalised, whether completely or incompletely, is said to be expressive, *vācaka*. We saw that this word has a deeper source than the *Buddhi*. It comes from the Word-Principle within, the sequenceless subtle Word (*akramā Vāk*). As soon as it enters into the *Buddhi*, differentiation takes place. It stands now in relation to what it conveys. It is *Vācaka*, the expressive word and what it conveys is *Vācya*, the expressed. This is the *madhyamā* stage, if we look upon the three stages as relating to the process of externalisation which is taking place all the time at the time of communication. This differentiation into *vācya* and *vācaka* is an important aspect of manifestation. Both of them already exist potentially in the *Śabdatattva* as one with it and as identical with each other. The word and the meaning are differentiations of one and the same self and are not really

13. See Texts.
14. See Texts.

different from each other, says Bhartṛhari.[15] The power of being the conveyer, the symbol (*śrutiśakti, prakāśakatvam*) and the power of being the conveyed the symbolised (*arthaśakti, prakāśyatvam*) are always inherent in the *Śabdatattva* and it is they which are actualised or manifested when we try to say something.[16]

The first differentiation, then, which takes place as soon as the Word enters into the *Buddhi* stage is into *vācaka* and *vācya,* the expressive element and the expressed element. The first is not yet audible but is destined to become so when the process of externalisation is more advanced, when it is deployed as the sounds which are uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. The second is grasped by the mind of the speaker before he begins to speak and when the process of externalisation is complete, it is grasped by the hearer also. When the hearer also grasps it, communication has taken place. The first is called the word (*śabda*) and it is said to be expressive (*vācaka*) because it is eternally linked to the second, its meaning, its *artha* and when it is fully externalised, it has the capacity to bring the second to the mind of the hearer. The two, *śabda* and *artha* stand in relation to each other, they face each other and it is then that they are said to be *vācaka* and *vācya,* the expressive word and the expressed meaning. They are also said to be *kāraṇa* (cause) and *kārya* (effect). That is why Bhartṛhari has declared that the relation in which they stand towards each other can be looked upon as that of illuminator and illuminated (*prakāśakaprakāśyatvam*) and as that of cause and effect (*kārya-kāraṇarūpatā*). This subject will bedealt with in a separate section.

These two things exist even in the case of new-born babies which do not know any language yet. Originally then, the word which is *vācaka* has not the form of any particular language, but as the baby grows older and learns the language of the speech-community to which it belongs, it assumes the form of that language. Bhartṛhari emphasizes that the expressive word which stands facing the expressed meaning has primarily the form of the indivisible sentence and only secondarily of individual words and phonemes. It is the sentence which is primarily the expressive unit (*vācaka*). The expressed element (*vācya*) is also an indivisible, complex and complete idea involving some process or action together with the accessories that help in its accomplishment, all determining one another and intimately connected

15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.

with one another. The problem of communication is to transfer these two indivisible units from the speaker to the hearer. They can be transferred only through certain verbal elements which have not the same reality but which we have to make use of for want of a better method of transferring the two real elements, the *vācaka* and the *vācya*.

In Vāk. I. 44, according to tradition, Bhartṛhari begins his treatment of the two kinds of words, included among the eight topics declared by himself to form the subject-matter of the *Vākyapadīya*. There he tells us that, in connection with the expressive word, one has to distinguish between two things : (1) that element which is the cause of its manifestation, (2) that element, which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. Of these, the latter is the real word, the *vācaka* and the former is what manifests it. It is through the former that the indivisible expressive word is manifested and transferred to the hearer.[17] Patañjali, in his *Mahābhāṣya,* also makes a distinction between that which conveys the object, the meaning and that which is mere sound (*dhvani*) but he does not say anywhere clearly that the latter manifests the former. That element which, when manifested, conveys the meaning is the real indivisible word, the *vācaka*. It already exists in the speaker and the hearer, but it has to be awakened or manifested before it can convey the meaning. That which awakens it is called the *nimitta.* These two aspects exist only in the case of words which are expressive (*upādānaśabda*) and are, therefore, used for communication. The sounds which are uttered by the speaker awaken or manifest the expressive word, primarily the sentence, which already exists in the hearer. The manifesting sounds are, therefore, the *nimitta,* the immediate cause of its awakening. It is not they which convey the meaning. That is done by the indivisible, sequenceless word which is manifested, because it is eternally associated with it. It always carries, as it were the reflection of the object and that reflection is the meaning. Its main purpose is to convey it.

Judging from the *Vṛtti,* these two aspects were looked upon differently by others. When the speaker utters the expressive word, the sounds come out in a sequence and are heard by the hearer also in a sequence (*krama*). The speaker cannot but utter them in a sequence. He cannot utter them simultaneously. But the expressive word which already exists within him before utterance is without sequence and it is to manifest it that he utters the sounds. So some looked upon that indivisible sequenceless word (*labdhānusaṃhāra*) as the *nimitta*

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17. See Texts.

the cause of the sounds which the speaker utters and which have sequence. These latter can convey the meaning but not until the hearer has, through them, grasped the indivisible sequenceless word which is within him. It is that which conveys the meaning but as that is manifested by the sounds having sequence, they are also looked upon as conveying the meaning (*pratyāyaka*) by others.[18] The fact is that these others start from the speaker. But if one starts from the hearer, as Bhartṛhari seems to have done, the sounds having sequence which he hears are the cause of the manifestation of the indivisible sequenceless word which is within him and which, when manifested, conveys the meaning. Thus, what has sequence is the *nimitta* of what has none.[19] It is a question of point of view.

The fundamental idea in all this is that in the self of the speaker and of the hearer, the expressive word and the thing expressed are already present as one and undifferentiated before utterance. In that condition, it is like the yolk in the pea-hen's egg. All the variety and picturesqueness of the colours of the fully-grown peacock is already in it in a potential state. Later, it becomes manifest. In the same way, in the Self which is of the nature of the word, all the variety and differentiation of the gross expressive word and of the thing which is expressed exist in a potential state as identical with one another. It is not merely small units of speech which are merged or rather exist potentially in the Self but big units also. When the desire to speak arises again, the word which had merged before now emerges and assumes the form of sentences and words, appearing to have parts arranged in a sequence. This merging and emerging is the only activity of the word. There is no such thing as production and destruction of it.[20]

The hearer perceives the differentiated sounds in a sequence and through them grasps the word unity and, as the speaker, again manifests them through the multiple sounds. Thus one goes through three stages. To make these three stages clear, the analogy of the painter is brought in. The painter goes through three stages when he paints a picture : (1) he sees the object in a differentiated state, that is, he sees its parts separately, (2) he has a vision of the whole picture as he wants to paint it, (3) and lastly, he paints it part by part. Similarly, the hearer perceives the word differentiated into phonemes

18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.

which merge in him as a unity. As a speaker, he utters it in a differentiated state. Thus, the word goes through three stages.[21]

While the word goes through these three stages, its character of being both the conveyor and the conveyed, the illuminator and the illuminated, the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya*, is preserved. In so far as it conveys the object, the meaning, it is *grāhaka* and in so far as its own form is also conveyed, it is *grāhya*. In this respect, the word is like knowledge which also reveals itself while revealing the object. In fact, the word cannot reveal the object or convey the meaning unless it reveals itself first. To put it differently, nobody can understand a meaning from the word, unless he understands or recognises the word first. To reveal itself and to reveal the object are looked upon as two powers of the same word, two powers which are not essentially different from the word itself. Both the speaker and the hearer have to think of the word first before thinking of the meaning.[22] When the speaker wants to convey a meaning, he first thinks of the word which could express it. Similarly, the hearer has to recognise the word before understanding the meaning. To recognise the word does not mean merely to hear the sounds uttered by the speaker. It has to be recognised in all its distinctiveness. The mind has to play as much part in it as the sense of hearing. In fact, more. One is so accustomed to look upon the word as the means of understanding the object that one does not realise that one understands the word itself first.[23] Ordinarily, words are used to convey objects of the world or to promote actions relating to the objects of the world. So one does not realise the importance of the words themselves. The fact that the word conveys its own form first is brought home to us on some occasions. In grammar, for instance, operations are taught on the forms of words and not on their meanings, as in the world. The fact that, in some cases, the form becomes important shows that, ordinarily, it remains subordinate to the meaning which it conveys.

That the word reveals itself before revealing the object is the point where it resembles cognition and light, on the one hand, and differs from the senses on the other. The senses need not be cognised before they reveal the objects. They do so by their mere existence when they come into contact with the objects. Words, on the other hand, do not reveal objects by their mere existence. They have to be themselves cognised before they can reveal the objects. Thus, all words

21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.

have two powers: (1) that of revealing their objects or meanings (*grāhakatva*), (2) that of revealing themselves (*grāhyatva*).[24]

These two powers of a word are not really different from the word itself. They are identical with it and identical with each other, but, by a process of abstraction, we can look upon them as different from each other and proceed to do other things which are based upon the existence of real difference. One such thing is the use of the words 'name' (*saṁjñā*) and 'the named' (*saṁjñin*). Ordinarily, there is a difference between the name and the named. The word *ghaṭa* is a name and the object 'jar' is the named and they are different from each other. The jar is what the word *ghaṭa* reveals when it is uttered. The revealed is the named. We saw, however, that the word not only reveals the object but reveals itself also. It not only reveals, it is not only *grāhaka*, but it is also the revealed, the *grāhya*. This *grāhya* aspect of the word comes into prominence in the Science of Grammar, because grammatical operations are performed on the word as *grāhya*. This is what Pāṇini emphasizes in I. 1.68 of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. According to that, both the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya* are words in contrast to what happens in real life where it is only the name which is the word and the 'named' consists of an object or a process of the phenomenal world. In other words, in grammar, there is the relation of the 'name' and the 'named' between two aspects of the same word. In life, words are used to induce actions to be done on things of the world to which they are secondary. In grammar, words are mentioned in order that grammatical operations may be performed on those words when they come in actual speech. The former are secondary to the latter. Both in life and in grammar, operations are not done on what is merely secondary, but on what is primary, whether it be an object of the world or a word.[25]

From what has been said so far, it follows that every word is a *saṃjñā*, a name because it reveals something or other. Whatever object belonging to the external world it may reveal, it reveals its own form also. Thus, a word has two things which are its 'named' (*saṃjñin*), its own form and some object in the world. Its own form is an invariable element in what it presents as its *saṃjñin*, as its *grāhya*. It is that which is presented first. We saw that, in grammar, as contrasted with life, both the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya*, the *saṃjñā*

24. See Texts.
25. See Texts.

and the *saṃjñin,* are words. The word which is mentioned in a grammatical rule is the *grāhaka* or the *saṃjñā* and that which it brings to the mind of the speaker and on which the grammatical operation has to be performed is the *saṃjñin* or *grāhya.* Both are words or, rather, two aspects of the same word. The *grāhaka* aspect of the word is the *saṃjñā* and the *grāhya* aspect of it is the *saṃjñin.* Some looked upon the universal aspect of it *(jāti)* as the *saṃjñā* and a particular instance of it *(vyakti)* as the *saṃjñin.* The former is what comes in actual speech and the latter is what is mentioned in a grammatical rule. Others looked upon it vice-versa.[26] What is mentioned in a rule is always the *grāhaka* and what comes in actual speech is always the *grāhya.* A grammatical operation is done on what comes in actual speech and it can be done only on a particular instance of a word, with, of course, the universal inherent in it. The fact is that the universal and the particular always go togeher and boh are involved in a grammatical operation.

All this discussion as to whether it is the universal aspect or a particular instance of a word is the name is possible only on the view that there are infinite particular instances of one word and that its universal inheres in all of them. But there were some thinkers who looked upon the word as one without an infinite number of particular instances in which its so-called universal inheres. They did not see the need to accept the universal at all. Uniformity of cognition or cognition of identity can be explained, according to them, on the basis of the uniqueness and identity of the word without having recourse to the concept of the universal. They believed in the One-ness of the word. It is One in all its utterances, in spite of any variation in the circumstances.

Whether the word is looked upon as the universal or as a unique eternal entity, it is that which conveys the object or the meaning and it is manifested by its *nimitta,* namely, the sounds which are uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. The word *śabda* is sometimes applied to both these aspects of the word, the *nimitta* or the manifesting aspect and the *pratyāyaka* or the meaning-bearing aspect. It is a very general word and it is applied to many things. It is, of course, not convenient to have the same word to denote many things. But Bhartṛhari does use other words also in the course of his exposition of the subject. The more important among them are : *sphoṭa, dhvani, nāda, prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani.* Theoretically, any one of

26. See Texts.

them can be called *śabda.* We have to note two of them particularly, namely, *dhvani* and *sphoṭa,* because they are the special names of the two aspects of the expressive word mentioned in Vāk. I. 44, the stanza with which, traditionally, Bhartṛhari is supposed to begin his treatment of *śabda,* one of the eight topics of the *Vākyapadīya. Dhvani* is the name of the sounds which the speaker utters and which are the *nimitta,* the manifestors of the real word and *sphoṭa* is the name of the real word which, when manifested by the *dhvanis* conveys the meaning. It is the meaning-bearing aspect of the word.

The word *sphoṭa* has become quite famous. Grammarians have come to be known as the upholders of the doctrine of *sphoṭa,* the doctrine that the real expressive word is an indivisible entity called *sphoṭa* which is over and above the sounds (*dhvanis*) which are many in number and are uttered by the speaker in a temporal sequence in order to manifest the *sphoṭa,* the real expressive word which has usually the form of the sentence and which is an indivisible unity. The word *sphoṭa* occurs already in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali on P. 1.1. 70, but there it is not applied to the meaning-bearing element. There it means only the permanent aspect of a phoneme, shorn of all variations due to special circumstances. That which conveys the meaning is called simply *śabda.* Later commentators like Kaiyyaṭa say that by *śabda,* Patañjali meant the *sphoṭa.* This, according to some scholars, is an attribution to Patañjali of what he did not mean. They go further and say that even Bhartṛhari, who came much later than Patañjali, did not call the meaning-bearing unit *sphoṭa.* Here is what Dr. S. D. Joshi says—

(1) "Bhartṛhari has nowhere clearly stated in his *Vākyapadīya* that *sphoṭa* is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence and it is a meaning-bearing unit of language."[27]

(2) "What we get from Bhartṛhari's statement is that *sphoṭa* is manifested by the sounds produced by the articulatory organs."[28]

(3) "All this confusion has arisen in the mind of later grammarians because they identify Patañjali's conception of *śabda* with the concept of *sphoṭa.*"[29]

(4) "In the context of meaningful speech-unit, Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa.*"[30]

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27. S. D. Joshi—*Sphoṭanirṇaya* of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa—p. 29.
28. Ibid, p. 35.
29. Ibid, p. 39.
30. Ibid, p. 40.

(5) In this respect, the final view of Bhartṛhari seems to be that *dhvani* represents the articulate sound associated with gross matter whereas the *sphoṭa* represents a class sound, sorted and extracted by the listener from the gross-matter."[31]

Now, in order to understand Bhartṛhari's view, we have not only to study his statements in the *Vākyapadīya,* but, now that a portion of the fragment of his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* has been published, whatever material is available in that very unsatisfactory text should also be utilised in order to decide this point. Some difficulties do arise due to a lack of precision in Bhartṛhari's use of words, but by putting scattered statements together, one can arrive at a fairly reliable understanding of his view. I believe that Kaiyyaṭa follows Bhartṛhari. Many explanations and statements in his *Pradīpa* can be traced to the corresponding portion of Bhartṛhari's commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya.* He is indebted to the *Vākyapadīya* also. It is well-known that he often quotes the stanzas of the *Vākyapadīya* in support of his explanation of the *Mahābhāṣya.* While explaining the following well-known sentence of Patañjali defining what *śabda* is—

> "*Yenoccāritena sāsnālāṅgulakakudakhuravisāṇinām sampratyayaḥ sa śabdah*=That is the word '*gauḥ*' from the utterance of which one gets an understanding of animals having dew-lap, tail, hump, hoof and horns."[32]

Kaiyyaṭa says that by *śabda,* Patañjali here meant that entity which is over and above the phonemes, has the form of the individual word or the sentence, is manifested by the sounds, is expressive of meaning (*vācaka*) and is called *sphoṭa.*[33] This explanation of Kaiyyaṭa is based on Bhartṛhari's commentary on the same sentence. Apparently, Patañjali's sentence was understood differently by different people in Bhartṛhari's days, as he himself tells us.[34] Due to the unsatisfactory nature of the text, however, these different views are not clear. One of the views is fairly clearly stated and that is relevant for our purpose. The view is that the meaning-bearing *śabda* of Patañjali is the *sphoṭa* and that it is eternal. He further says that those elements which arise in succession and are not simultaneous are the manifesting elements (*vyaktayaḥ*) and consist of sounds (*dhvani*).[35] Thus, to the meaning-

31. Ibid, p. 40.
32. M. Bhā. I, p. 1, l. 10-11.
33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.

bearing element which Patañjali calls *śabda*, Bhartṛhari applies the word *sphoṭa* and characterises it as eternal. Further on, when Patañjali says that the word *śabda* is of two kinds, the eternal one and the transitory one, Bhartṛhari clarifies by saying that the eternal one should be understood as either the universal or the *sphoṭa* and that the transitory one should be understood as either the particular (*vyakti*) or the sound (*dhvani*).[36] Thus, once more Bhartṛhari identifies the eternal, meaning-bearing unit (*śabda*) with *sphoṭa*. In the *Vākyapadīya*, though the very general word *śabda* is normally used for the meaning-bearing unit, the word *sphoṭa* is also used and sometimes identified, with *śabda* and other meaning-bearing units like *pada* and *vākya*. While *sphoṭa* is presented as that which is manifested by the sounds, sometimes the phoneme, the individual word (*pada*) and the sentence (*vākya*) are also said to be manifested by them. The natural conclusion is that *sphoṭa* can have the form of any one of these and that it is identical with them.[37] In fact, the *Vṛtti* definitely identifies the *sphoṭa* with them.[38] These are further described as partless, indivisible and without any inner sequence. Though Bhartṛhari thinks of the *sphoṭa* in three forms, it is the sentence form of it which is the most important. For him, the meaning-bearing unit, *par excellence*, is the sentence and in the second *Kāṇḍa*, he establishes elaborately that it is that which is real and the expressive unit (*vācaka*). Phonemes and even individual words are only secondarily so. Primarily, it is the sentence which is *vācaka* and it is presented by Bhartṛhari as the *sphoṭa*. While it is true that the meaning-bearing unit is usually referred to as *śabda* in the *Vākyapadīya*, it is also true that the words *śabda* and *sphoṭa* are used as synonyms, sometimes, in the same stanza. For instance, Vāk. I. 77, says that after the manifestation of the word (*śabda*), the secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvani*) cause difference in the speed of utterance, but the essence of the *sphoṭa* is not affected by them. Here, obviously, *śabda* and *sphoṭa*, stand for the same thing and if *śabda* is the meaning-bearing unit, the *sphoṭa*, is automatically so. In view of all this, it is difficult to accept the view held by some that the application of the name *sphoṭa* to the meaning-bearing unit is the work of grammarians later than Bhartṛhari like Kaiyyaṭa and that Bhartṛhari, like Patañjali, uses only the word *śabda* for it. From the references given above, it is clear that Bhartṛhari does identify *sphoṭa* with the meaning-bearing unit, whether it be *śabda*, *vākya* or *pada*. Whether he was the first to do so, one cannot say, but he certainly does it. Kaiyyaṭa and others only follow him.

36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. See Texts.

Bhartṛhari's chief point is that what is called *śabda* is not the sounds uttered and heard in a sequence but an entity over and above them and it is that and that alone which can convey the meaning. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and Maṇḍana Misra who came after Bhartṛhari have understood this point fully. The former has rejected it, in his *Ślokavārttika* as an unnecessary postulation and has tried to explain the understanding of meaning from the phonemes directly, without the intervention of this entity. Maṇḍana Miśra, on the other hand, has accepted it and wrote his *Sphoṭasiddhi* in defence of Bhartṛhari against Kumārila. Both of them show a close acquaintance with the *Vākyapadīya* and have understood it in the same way, though one of them has rejected it and the other has accepted it. The identificaion of Patañjali's *śabda* with the *sphoṭa* is an accomplished fact in Bhartṛhari. Kumārila knew it and rejected it and Maṇḍana Miśra knew it and accepted it. There is no justification to look upon it as a misinterpretation of Bhartṛhari by later grammarians like Kaiyyaṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Nāgeśa and Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa.

It does not make much sense to maintain that *Bhartṛhari* believed in the *sphoṭa,* but that, for him, it is not the meaning-bearing unit, because the *sphoṭa* doctrine arose as a solution to the problem of the understanding of meaning. The problem was how to explain the understanding of meaning from the sounds which are uttered in a temporal sequence. As they are not simultaneous and cannot co-exist, they cannot co-operate in order to convey the meaning. The doctrine of *sphoṭa* is the grammarian's solution of the problem.

Bhartṛhari expounds the doctrine in the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya.* The exposition is not done in a polemical spirit as in the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Miśra which is written as an answer to the *Mīmāṃsaka* arguments against *sphoṭa.* Bhartṛhari just makes some positive statements about it one after another and in the end his conception of *sphoṭa* emerges out of them. In the *Vṛtti,* there is a reference to a view similar to that of the *Mīmāṃsakas* but it is only a passing reference and not a special mention for refutation.

For Bhartṛhari, the word is the *sphoṭa,* an entity over and above the sounds or phonemes. It is not a mere grouping of phonemes on the basis of their figuring in the same cognition and conveying a single unit of meaning. The sounds uttered by the speaker do no more than manifest this *sphoṭa* which is within him and within the hearer. Between the *sphoṭa* (the sentence or the individual word) and the meaning the relation is that of expression and the thing expressed (*vācya-vācakabhāva*). Between the manifesting sounds and the *sphoṭa,* the

relation is that of manifestor and manifested (*vyaṅgyavyañjaka-bhāva*). That it is an entity within us is emphasized zy Bhartṛhari. All of us instinctively feel the existence of it within us. It is manifested by the sounds (*dhvani, nāda*) and its unity exists primarily in the sentence.[39] The sentence is an indivisible unity and it is conceived in three different ways: (1) It is something which is heard by the hearer outside and in that sense, it is something external. But it already existed in the speaker before he uttered it and in that sense, it is something internal. It has two aspects, the word aspect and the meaning aspect. It is indivisible and eternal and, being eternal, it is the same in all the different utterances of it by different persons. It is this conception of the sentence which Bhartṛhari describes by saying: *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ* in Vāk. II.1. It means that the *sphoṭa* in the form of sentence is a partless indivisible unit. It is not looked upon as the common persisting element in all its different utterances. It is a single unchanging entity. (2) This first way of looking at the stentence does not explain one point. When we hear the same sentence uttered by different persons, we have the feeling that, though the utterances are different from one another, yet it is the same thing which is being uttered. There is a common element persisting in all of them. Some look upon that, the *jāti*, as the sentence. (3) The third way of looking upon the sentence is mentioned by Bhartṛhari in the expression *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*, occurring in the same stanza (Vāk. II.1). According to this the sentence is an internal entity, a knowledge or cognition. It is a unified entity, consisting of both the word and its meaning. It is one and without any inner sequence, but it is manifested by the sounds which have sequence. The external sentence conceived as a single entity (*eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*) or as a persisting common factor (*jāti*) is only a symbol of this inner sentence, just as the written alphabet is a symbol of the alphabet which is uttered.

Whatever be the form of the *sphoṭa*, sentence, word or phoneme—Bhartṛhari mentions all the three — it is manifested by the sounds. The process of manifestation is described elaborately in the *Vākyapadīya* with the help of as many as fifteen analogies, each illustrating one aspect of the doctrine. Each sound uttered by the speaker reveals it, the *whole of it*, the first one vaguely, the second one more clearly and so on until the last one, helped by the impressions left by the previous cognitions, reveals it in all its clarity and distinctness. The process is compared to the learning of a Vedic passage by heart by reading it or reciting it repeatedly. Each later recitation leaves a clearer im-

39. See Texts.

pression of the passage than the one left by the previous recitation. The last recitation, helped by these impressions, fixes the passage fully and clearly in the memory.[40] In the same way, each later sound manifests the *sphoṭa* more clearly than the preceding one and leaves a clearer impression of it. The cognition produced by each sound, taken by itself, is unnameable (*anupākhyeya*), because it is not enough to identify the *sphoṭa*. But each one of them is helpful in the rising of the final clear perception of it.[41] It is grasped clearly in the final cognition, the seeds of which had been sown by the sounds including the final one and which has gradually attained maturity. The sounds, while they manifest the word (*sphoṭa*) leave impression-seeds progressively clearer and conducive to the clear perception of it. Then, the final sound brings to the mind, which has now attained maturity or a certain fitness by the awakening of the impressions of the previous cognitions, the form of the word (*sphoṭa*) in a very clear manner.

The *sphoṭa* is a unity which already exists in the mind of the speaker and he utters the sounds in order to manifest it. His efforts to utter the sounds differ according to the *sphoṭa* which he wants to manifest and the sounds differ according to the efforts even though the movements of the vocal organs may be the same. The effort to manifest *'nadī'* is different from the effort to manifest *'dīna'* and so the *'n'* in *nadī* is different from the *'n'* in *'dīna'*. Therefore, the *sphoṭa* manifested by them would be different and, hence, the meanings conveyed by them would be different too.

In the process described above, mention was made of impression or residual trace of the cognition of the sound. It is the usual kind of impression, which, when awakened, causes the remembrance of the cognition which originally caused it. Each sound manifests the whole *sphoṭa* though vaguely and the impression has the whole *sphoṭa* as its object. When awakened, it causes the remembrance of the whole *sphoṭa*, the cognition of which becomes very clear at the time of the last sound because of the co-operation of the previous impressions which have the same indivisible *sphoṭa* as the object. The early vague cognitions of the *sphoṭa*, their residual traces and the cognition of the final sound have the same object, namely, the *sphoṭa*. What Bhartṛhari meant by early vague cognitions is not made clear in our texts but perhaps he had something like Śeṣakṛṣṇa's idea of it. This comparatively late writer explains it in his *Sphoṭa-tattvanirūpaṇa* as fol-

40. See Texts.
41. See Texts.

lows — When somebody wants to say *'Kamala'*, he has already said it vaguely as soon as he has finished uttering *'ka'* because all words not beginning with *'ka'* are now excluded and the word in question has to be one beginning with *'ka'*. As soon as he has uttered the second syllable *'ma'*, the field is further narrowed down. The word has to be one beginning with *'kama'* but the cognition is still a little vague because there are still several possibilities. It is only when the last syllable *'la'* is uttered that the word is grasped in all its clarity.[42]

Another point in the doctrine is that even though each sound causes the cognition of the whole *sphoṭa* which is thus its object, it has the form of the sound with all its properties such as accent, duration, timbre and so on. Whenever a cognition has one thing as its object and the form of another, it is an error. When we mistake a rope for a snake in the dark, the rope is the object of our error but the error has the form of a snake. The rope is the object because, after all, it is the rope which is in contact with the senses and not the snake. Similarly, the *sphoṭa* is the object of the cognition of each sound but it appears as the sound. In other words, when we finally get a clear cognition of the *sphoṭa*, it is through a series of errors that we come to it. Bhartṛhari here gives an analogy. From a distance, one mistakes a tree for an elephant. Later careful observation reveals the truth. We have come to the truth through an error. The sense is in contact with the tree and not with the elephant. The error has tree as an object and the form of the elephant. When, in the final correct cognition, the object and the form are the same, the previous error has played a part in it. It is error which has led to the truth. Similarly, it is through a series of errors, consisting in cognising the *sphoṭa* in the form of the sounds that we finally grasp it in the form of the *sphoṭa* itself. When the *sphoṭa* in the form of the sentence is being manifested by the sounds, there is at first, a cognition of parts in the form of phonemes and individual words.[43]

This error has some features which have to be kept in mind. Not only does the *sphoṭa* appear as the sounds or phonemes, but the latter appear as the parts of the indivisible *sphoṭa*. How it happens may be stated briefly as follows—The effort to utter the phoneme *'g'* by itself is different from the effort to utter *'g'* in the word *'gauḥ'* and both are different from the effort to utter *'g'* in the sentence *'gām ānaya'*. As the efforts are different, the resulting sounds are also different. But

42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.

they are looked upon, wrongly of course, as the same. They are wrongly identified because of the resemblance in the contacts and separations of the vocal organs necessary for producing these sounds. Being wrongly identified, their powers are confused. The sounds meant to manifest the *sphoṭas* of the phonemes, words and sentences differ from one another in their causes and effects. Their causes are different because they are the results of different intentions and efforts. Their effects are different, because they manifest different *sphoṭas.* As their effects are different, they are themselves different from one another, but they are wrongly identified. Their difference is not perceived. This failure to perceive the difference has two analogies, according to the *Vṛtti.* The shape of a cow is fit to manifest the universal called *gotva* and that of a 'gayal' is fit to reveal the universal called *gavayatva* but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two. Similarly, the moments of the action of turning are different from those of the action of pouring out. The former are the substrata of the universal called 'turning' and the latter of the universal called 'pouring out', but this difference is not perceived and so one sees resemblance between the two series of moments. In the same way, one sees resemblance between the sounds which are really different from one another, both in their causes and their effects. So one confuses them and mixes them up. The confusion takes the following form: because one sees resemblance between the sound '*g*' meant to manifest the word *gauḥ* and the one meant to manifest the phoneme '*g*', one thinks that the phoneme *g* is also manifested when the word *gauḥ* is manifested. One looks upon the phoneme *g* as part of the word *gauḥ*. Similarly, because one sees resemblance between the sound *g* meant to manifest the word *gauḥ* and the sound *g* meant to manifest the sentence *gām ānaya,* one thinks that the word '*go*' is a part of, a division within the sentence *gām ānaya* : One looks upon the sounds meant to manifest the sentence as manifesting the word and the phoneme also as its parts and that the sentence is nothing more than a collection of these parts. If, for the manifestation of two indivisible *sphoṭas,* one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the sounds or phonemes produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of these indivisible *sphoṛas.* Because of this confusion, one thhins that the *sphoṭas* in the form of the sentence, word or the phoneme have parts whereas they have none.[44]

Not only do the many appear to be parts of the partless *sphoṭa,* but the latter appears to have the properties of the former. It is the

44. See Texts.

manifesting sounds which can be short or long but the *sphoṭa* appears to be so. The *sphoṭa* is one but it appears to be many in the form of the manifesting sounds. Here the analogy of the reflection is brought in. The *sphoṭa* appears to have the properties of the manifesting sounds just as the reflection appears to have the properties of the medium of reflection. Several views were current about the nature of a reflection : (1) In the presence of the original, a luminous surface like that of water is affected and seems to reflect the original but it is only a change in the water. There is no reflection apart from the water. (2) The reflection exists in the water apart from it and has the original as its material cause. (3) The rays of the eye, turned back by luminous surfaces like that of water, mirror etc., see the original and that seeing is the reflection. According to the first view (*tattvapakṣa*), the reflection appears to be in the water and to have movements, but it is only the water which one sees in that condition. In the second and the third views (*anyatvapakṣa*), the reflection is something different from the water. There is no contact between the wind and the reflection and so there cannot be any movement in the reflection itself. Because the reflection is in contact with water and the latter with the wind, the movement in the water appears to exist in the reflection. According to all the three views, the reflection by itself is without any movement, but appears to have it because of the water. Similarly, the *sphoṭa* appears to be short, long or protracted because the primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvani,* to be explained soon) which manifest it are short, long or protracted or it appears to be of quick, medium or slow speed because the secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvani*, to be explained soon) are such.[45]

The invariable perception of the many before the perception of the one indivisible word is an error which differs from other errors. This error ultimately leads to the perception of the truth and so it becomes the path leading to it. Its occurrence is universal, its sequence is fixed and its form is also fixed. This is not the case with other errors. One man may mistake a rope for a snake while another may mistake it for a little stream. Thus the form of the error may differ from person to person. Nor is there any fixity in the order of the errors. Sometimes one mistakes a rope for a snake at first and later for a little stream of water. At other times, it may take place in the opposite order. In the case of the *sphoṭa* appearing as the sounds, the error takes place inevitably, it is a universal error. The individual *sphoṭa* of *gauḥ* appears as *g, au* and *ḥ* for everybody and it appears in the same order for everybody.

45. See Texts.

Why there is this peculiarity in this error is explained by Bhartṛhari by means of analogies. It was shown before that the cognition of the unreal sounds or phonemes as parts of the *sphoṭa* is a means to the comprehension of the latter which alone is real. The analogy of mistaking a tree from a distance for an elephant as a step towards its correct cognition has already been mentioned. Bhartṛhari gives another analogy based on *Vaiśeṣika* ideas. The cognition of the lower and irrelevant numbers is a means to the cognition of the higher and relevant number, even though they are different in many respects. The *Vaiśeṣikas* believe that from duality onwards to the highest number all numbers are produced by *apekṣābuddhi,* that is, the notion that relates to many unities before the next number is cognised. When two things are brought before us, we cognise each one separately as 'this is one' and 'that is one'. This is *apekṣābuddhi.* Then arises the notion of two. This is true of all subsequent numbers. Thus the previous numbers become the means for the production and cognition of the higher numbers though only one of them is relevant on a particular occasion.[46] Nor is there anything surprising in the fact that there is a fixity in the sequence in which the cognition of the *sphoṭa* takes place, namely, first the cognition of the sounds or phonemes as parts of the *sphoṭa* takes place and then the comprehension of the *sphoṭa* itself. This fixity in the order of cognition is comparable to the fixity in the order of the production of the effect in the phenomenal world, as when milk turns into curds or the seed becomes the sprout.[47] The two processes involve many intermediary stages all of which take place in a fixed order.

The cardinal fact about the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* is that, before it takes place, one cognises certain verbal elements which are unreal and appear to be parts of the *sphoṭa.* We ordinary mortals have no other way of comprehending it. We can do so only through the sounds which have differentiation and sequence and have not the same reality as the *sphoṭa.* We who can learn it only through the teaching of others suffer from a certain incapacity to perceive the *sphoṭa* directly.[48] We can do so only through the differentiated word elements. That is why all of us are subject to the same error. As this error is a means to the ultimate correct cognition it must necessarily precede it. The particular order in which the errors follow one another is a means to the final correct cognition of the *sphoṭa.* Therefore, there is a fixity in the order of the error too. It is only when the one indivisible *sphoṭa*

46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.
48. See Texts.

assumes unreal differentiation that it comes within the range of worldly usage. In this respect, it is very much like consciousness itself. Consciousness is really one, but it becomes differentiated when it illuminates the different objects of the world. It seems to take on the form of the different objects which it reveals. It is only when it does so that it enters into worldly usage. Similarly, as long as the word is only within us, one and undifferentiated, it cannot enter into verbal usage. Even though it is the unified word which is eternally associated with the meaning, it has to be manifested by the differentiated sounds before it can convey it. Thus consciousness and the word have to go through an unreal differentiation before they can play their part in the world. In fact, mind and the word are only two aspects which the Word—Principle (*Śabdatattva*) within us assumes when it evolves.[49]

While all this is true of us ordinary mortals, the great sages are credited with the power of cognising the indivisible *sphoṭa* directly, without going through the process of errors. Not only do they cognise it themselves, they also impart it to others.[50] That is what Yāska has stated in his *Nirukta,* I. 20.

Bhartṛhari mentions some details as to how the sounds manifest the *sphoṭa*. In order to do it, do they bring about in the sense of hearing or in the word (*sphoṭa*) itself a fitness (*saṃskāra*) which they did not have before? There were apparently three views on the subject: (1) The sounds bring about in the sense of hearing a fitness which was not there before (2) they produce a fitness in the word (*sphoṭa*) itself (3) they bring about a fitness in both.[51] It is the word *indriya* which is used in this context and the *Vṛtti* elaborates the idea by bringing in the words *śrotra, cakṣu, ghrāṇa*. The process of the perfection of the sense is not peculiar to the perception of the word. In the perception of the other objects of the world also, sometimes the sense has to be made fit to do its work. The application of ointment to the eye enables one to see better. Even more important is attention and concentration without which one may not see at all. Attention makes a difference to the sense of hearing but none to the object itself. An example of the object being previously made fit to be perceived is the smell of the earth. It is only when the heated earth is sprinkled with water that its smell is perceived. The sprinkling gives the smell a certain fitness to be experienced. Similarly, exposure of medicated oil to the sun brings *saṃskāra* to it. Its smell now becomes

49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.
51. See Texts.

fit to be perceived. In these cases, the sense is not affected.[52] The act of seeing an object was looked upon by some as an example of the perfection of both the sense and the object. They held the view that the sense of vision consists of rays of light and that it reaches out to the object at the time of visual perception (*prāpyakāri*). While going out, it gets mixed up with the all-pervading atoms of light outside. This is a kind of perfection of the sense of vision. At that moment, the object is also illuminated, that is, made fit, by the external light, to be perceived. Thus perfection comes both to the sense and the object. Bhartṛhari seems to go by this analogy and to have a preference for the view that both the sense (*śrotra*) and the object (*śabda*) are perfected by the manifested sounds. They make the ear fit to perceive the word and the word itself fit to be perceived.[53]

Coming to the process of manifestation itself. Bhartṛhari likens it to the process by which action or movement is manifested or cognised. Our perception of movement takes place as follows—A movement like lifting the hand (*utkṣepaṇa*) consists of a series of moments. Each moment consists in coming into contact with a point of space and then disappearing. It is replaced by the next moment which does the same. As these moments are transitory, they cannot co-exist and cannot, therefore, form a whole of which they would be parts and in which the universal of the movement of lifting the hand would inhere. Such a universal, different from the wider universal of movement in general, is accepted and if it does exist, it would inhere in each moment of lifting. Even though it inheres in each moment, it is not capable of being cognised because of too much resemblance between the moments of lifting and those of the moments of other movements like turning the hand. There is not yet enough ground for eliminating other movements. The moments of each movement are the result of a special effort to make that movement and they are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be cognised until a series of moments has been cognised. It is not enough to cognise one or two moments. The universal really inheres in each moment and it is also cognised. But the cognition is too vague and unnameable. After a series of moments is cognised, the direction of the moments becomes clear and so the cognition of the universal, inherent in each moment, also becomes clear. In other words, it now becomes possible to identify the movement as lifting and to eliminate turning and other movements. The process is similar in the percep-

52. See Texts.
53. See Texts.

tion of the words (*sphoṭas*). They are also manifested by special efforts. The effort to utter the word *gamana*, for instance, is different from the effort to utter the word *gagana*. So the two *g* sounds, produced by the two different efforts, are different, though they resemble each other because of the resemblance in the movements of the vocal organs. But this difference is not perceived. In other words, one does not clearly perceive whether it is the word *gamana* or the word *gagana* which is being uttered. But when all the manifesting sounds have been uttered and heard in a series, then the universal of the word *gamana* is clearly perceived and verbal usage based on it becomes possible.[54]

This mode of cognition of the word-universal is different from that of other universals accepted in other *śāstras*. The cognition of the universal *gotva* (the fact of being a cow) takes place when one sees the individual cow. The individual cow manifests *gotva* which is inherent in it. This is one kind of manifestation and cognition. When a lamp illuminates an object, it does not manifest an object inherent in it. That is another kind of manifestation and cognition. When, after perceiving the different moments of the movement of lifting the hand, moments which resemble one another, one perceives clearly the universal of the movement of lifting, it is another kind of manifestation and cognition. The manifestation of the universal of the word is like that of a movement like lifting the hand but there is a difference. The manifesting sounds of a word like *gauḥ* are different from one another, but the difffferent moments of a movement resemble one another. And yet after perceiving the different sounds of a word successively, the universal of that word is clearly perceived. The successive sounds of a word make it fit to be perceived, but only as possessing their own properties such as duration, timbre, accent and so on. This last point requires elucidation and that can be done only by putting together Bhartṛhari's ideas on *dhvani* as distinct from the *sphoṭa*.

The *sphoṭa* to be manifested may be a phoneme, a word or a sentence, though in describing the process, Bhartṛhari had especially the sentence *sphoṭa* in mind. The speaker wants to manifest, that is, to convey to the hearer the *sphoṭa* which is within him and for that purptse, he has to produce the sounds by means of vocal organs. His efforts to produce the sounds depend upon the *sphoṭa* which he wants to manifest. Only particular sounds, uttered in a fixed order, can manifest a given *sphoṭa*, whether it be that of a phoneme, a word or a sentence.[55] Efforts differ with our desires to manifest particular

54. See Texts.
55. See Texts.

sphoṭas and sounds differ according to difference in efforts. The sounds have temporal distinctions because they can be short, long or protracted. Following Vyāḍi, the author of the now lost *Saṅgraha* which is quoted in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 76, Bhartṛhari makes an inner distinction within the manifesting sounds. I refer to the distinction between primary sounds (*prākṛtadhvanis*) and secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvanis*).[56] The sounds are, after all, uttered to manifest the *sphoṭa* which is, therefore, their root cause (*prakṛti*). Hence, in their first moment, that is, at the time of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*, they are called *prākṛtadhvanis.* Those are so called without which the form of the *sphoṭa* would remain unmanifested and, therefore, unperceived.[57] Not only that. Even though the *sphoṭa*, being eternal, has no duration, it appears to have the duration of the primary sounds with which it is perceived as identical. It is the duration of the primary sounds which determines that the *sphoṭa* which is manifested is that of *a*, for example, and not that of *ā*. As soon as we hear the primary sounds, we perceive the *sphoṭa*. But the perception of the *sphoṭa* does not cease at once. It lasts a little while more in quick speech, a little longer in speech of medium speed, and longer still in slow speech. But this continuity of perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa* cannot be explained unless the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds of the succeeding moments, having the same duration as the sounds of the first moment, are called secondary sounds (*vaikṛtadhvanis*). They continue to manifest the *sphoṭa* already manifested by the primary sounds. To put it differently, the *sphoṭa* continues to be perceived again and again as long as the secondary sounds last. Those are called secondary sounds by which, the form of the *sphoṭa*, already manifested, is perceived again and again uninterruptedly for a longer period of time.[58] How much longer depends upon the speed of utterance (*Vṛttibheda*). As soon as the lamp is lit, one perceives the object and, if the light continues, one continues to perceive the object. The *sphoṭa* is perceived as identical with the manifesting primary sounds (though quite different from them) and as having their properties.[59] The secondary sounds, on the other hand, come after the *sphoṭa* is manifested and so their difference from the latter is clearly perceived and their properties are not wrongly attributed to the *sphoṭa*.[60] They are the cause

56. See Texts.
57. See Texts.
58. See Texts.
59. See Texts.
60. See Texts.

of the repeated perception of the same *sphoṭa* for a little while. Thus, a slow utterance of *a* means the perception of a series of *a*, that is, *a a a*. The slow utterance of *ā* means the perception of a series of *ā*, that is, *ā ā ā*. *a* slowly uttered can never become *ā*, according to Bhartṛhari.

In his commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* also, Bhartṛhari refers to this distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani*. There he puts it in this way :—'Among the sounds which manifest the eternal word, some are primary and some secondary. That sound which is produced by the contacts of the vocal organs and that which is produced by such a sound, these two are primary. Through these two, distinction in vowels can be perceived. That sound which comes from another sound is called secondary, because no distinction is perceived through it.'[61] Though the distinction here between primary and secondary sounds is essentially the same as in the *Vākyapadīya*, still it is somewhat obscure because here two kinds of primary sounds are mentioned of which the second kind is produced by the first, in which case the distinction between the second kind of primary sound and the secondary sound is not clear, because both are produced by sounds.

Bhartṛhari again refers to the distinction between these two kinds of sounds in the *Kālasamuddeśa* of the third *Kāṇḍa*. As we have already seen, there he gives his views on Time. According to him, Time is the *svātantryaśakti* of *Brahman* and is responsible for the temporal sequence of the objects and processes of the phenomenal world. In the course of his exposition, there is a reference to a method of measuring time which consisted in allowing water collected in a vessel to escape through a hole or tube (*nālikā*) in drops. This is the method of measurement through flow of water (*salilasrutiḥ*). Apparently, the time taken by the water to escape through the tube was taken as the standard of measurement for other actions, in the world. Kaiyyaṭa also refers to this method when he explains the word *tribhāgādhikāḥ* occurring in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.1.70. He says that when one recites a stanza or a Vedic passage quickly, nine drops of water escape through the tube whereas when one recites the same at medium speed, twelve drops of water escape through the tube.[62] Nāgeśa, however, takes the word *nāḍikā* as standing for the *suṣumnā nāḍī* and, therefore, sees here no reference to a method of measuring time.

61. See Texts.
62. See Texts.

Keeping this particular conception of time and this particular way of measuring it in mind, an effort is made to explain the distinction between short, long and protracted vowels which, being *śabda* or *sphoṭa,* are eternal and should not, therefore, admit of distinctions based on time. Some people apparently tried to explain the distinction away by saying that it was a mere assumption and gave another such assumption as an analogy. Our cognitions of two actions, one quickly done and the other slowly done, are of equal duration and yet, because the two actions cognised are not of equal duration, the cognition also appear not to have equal duration. This is a wrong assumption on our part. Similarly, difference of duration among vowels is a mere assumption, because, vowels, being *sphoṭa,* are eternal and cannot admit of distinctions based on time. But this explanation is not satisfactory, because if this distinction is a mere assumption on our part, it cannot explain certain facts. The quantity of water which flows from the tube when a long vowel is repeatedly uttered is greater by one third than when a short vowel is repeatedly uttered and the quantity which escapes when a protracted vowel is repeatedly uttered is greater by one third than when a long vowel is repeatedly uttered. A mere assumption on our part cannot make any difference to the flow of water from the tube and, as there is a difference, we have to accept that the difference of duration in the vowel is also real.[63]

It is to meet this difficulty that the distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* is again brought in. It is pointed out that, even though the word, in this case, the vowel, is eternal, it can be perceived only when it is manifested by the *dhvanis* which are not eternal entities and, therefore, admit of distinction based on time. These sounds are susceptible to increase (*upacaya*) and decrease (*apacaya*), that is, greater or lesser duration. They are heard as one with the phonemes (*varṇa*) which they manifest and, therefore, their properties are attributed to it. The phoneme cannot be cognised as apart from the vowels which manifest it. Therefore, the properties of the *vyañjakas*, namely, the primary sounds, become, so to speak, part of the very nature of the phoneme which is manifested. As the primary sounds are susceptible to increase and decrease, they can be short, long or protracted. Therefore, the phoneme is also perceived as short, long or protracted. This explains why, when the phoneme is heard in its different lengths or duration, there is difference in the flow of water from the tube. The perception of the primary sounds, with their particular duration, is not a process external to the phoneme because the latter cannot be per-

63. See Texts.

ceived apart from the former. Therefore any distinction based on time which is found in the former is transferred to the latter and becomes effective. This explains why there is difference in the flow of water.[64] This also explains why there is no force in the analogy mentioned before of the two cognitions of two actions of unequal duration also appearing to be of unequal duration, though as cognitions, they are of equal duration. It is pointed out that there is difference between the two cases. The relation between *dhvani* and *śabda* is not the same as the relation between a cognition and its object. The form of a cognition and that of its object are perceived as distinct from each other. But *dhvani* and *śabda* are perceived as one.[65] If a difference in *dhvani* did not affect the nature of the phoneme, the difference in the flow of water would be inexplicable. As it is, it does affect the nature of the phoneme. Therefore, the difference in the flow of water can be explained.

It is not merely such distinctions as short and long which are transferred from the manifesting sounds to the manifested *śabda*, but other distinctions also. The fourth part of a *mātrā*, manifested by the least amount of *dhvani* and a *dāśataya*, a Vedic passage consisting of ten parts and sixty-four (*pādas* ?) manifested by the maximum amount of sounds, do not differ in respect of time, both being eternal,[66] whatever difference there may be in their manifesting sounds. To explain this, an analogy is given. Just as the cognitions of an elephant and a mosquito, equal to each other as cognitions, yet appear to differ from each other on account of the difference in the objects which figure in them, in the same way, the real word which is *sphoṭa* is the same whether in a word or a sentence and yet appears to be different in each case on account of difference in the manifesting sounds.[67] Similarly, such distinctions as *anunāsika* and *ananunāsika*, *udātta* and *anudātta*, really belong to the *dhvanis* only, but are attributed to the word. These distinctions must be taken as belonging to the primary sounds. The secondary ones only cause difference in the speed of utterance. All the other distinctions in the phonemes, such as those of quantity, accent and timbre are supposed really to belong to the primary sounds and, therefore, to affect the cognition of the phonemes which are perceived as one with them.[68] The sounds in the first moment of utter-

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64. See Texts.
65. See Texts.
66. See Texts.
67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.
69. See Texts.

ance, that is, the *prākṛtadhvanis* manifest the word. The sounds which follow in the succeeding moments are like echos or reverberations (*anuraṇanarūpāḥ*) of those of the first moment. They are the *Vaikṛtadhvanis* and are the cause of the repeated cognitions of the word, otherwise called, speed of utterance. They are external to the word.[69]

The following, then, are the two main points made in the *Vākyapadīya* in regard to the distinctions between these two kinds of *dhvanis*.

(1) The *prākṛtadhvanis* are produced by the contacts and separations of the articulatory organs *before* the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* is cognised (wrongly, of course) as one with them. It cannot be otherwise. Hence, distinctions of duration, pitch etc., in the *prākṛtadhvanis* are attributed to the *sphoṭa* which is free from all such distinctions.

(2) The *Vaikṛtadhvanis* are the continuation, a kind of reverberation of the *prākṛtadhvanis* and they are produced *after* the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* : *śabdasyordhvam abhivyakteḥ* as Bhartṛhari puts it (Vāk. I. 77), *anuraṇanarūpā ye paścātkālabhāvinaḥ,* as Helārāja says (note no. 69.). That is why they cannot in any way affect the nature of the *sphoṭa*. They are responsible for the different speeds of utterance. The different speeds of utterance mean greater or smaller number of repetitions of the perception of the *sphoṭa*.

Even among those who held that the *dhvanis* manifest the *sphoṭa*, there was difference of opinion on details, as the *Vṛtti* points out: (1) Some were of the opinion that the *dhvanis* are perceived as identical with the *sphoṭa* and not as distinct from it. The process is similar to what happens when the red *japā* flower is placed next to a crystal. The crystal is perceived as red, the redness is not perceived apart from the crystal. According to the more orthodox view, it is the *sphoṭa* which is perceived as one with the *dhvanis,* so that the properties of the latter are wrongly attributed to the former.[70] (2) Some others were of the view that the *dhvanis,* without themselves being perceived, are the cause of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Here the senses are brought in as analogy. The senses and their properties are not perceived when, through them, we perceive the objects. That is what happens when we perceive the *sphoṭa* through the sounds.[71] (3) There was another set of people who believed that the perceptions of the

69. See Texts.
70. See Texts.
71. See Texts.

sphoṭa and of the *dhvanis* were quite distinct. Sometimes, especially from a distance, the sounds can be heard, but the words cannot be identified.[72] It means that the *sphoṭas* are not perceived, even though the sounds are. Thus, the two cognitions are quite distinct. (4) Ordinarily, the words *dhvani* and *nāda* are used as synonyms.[73] Sometimes, however, they seem to be distinguished, though the distinction is not presented as the normal view, but as that of some. It is said that, according to some, the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the *nāda* which results from the *dhvanis* produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs. This means that *nāda* is the product of *dhvani*. It is looked upon as a gross form or an accumulation of *dhvanis*.[74]

These views are only deviations in detail. But Bhartṛhari mentions another view of *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*, quite different from his own and attributed to those who held the word to be transitory. As several *Kārikās* of the *Vākyapadīya* are devoted to an exposition of this view, it will not be out of place to say a few words about it here, though the text is rather obscure in places. According to this view, the initial sounds which are produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs are themselves the *sphoṭas* and not the mere manifestors of the *sphoṭas*. As these initial sounds are momentary, the *sphoṭa* is momentary according to this view. The sounds which are produced by these initial sounds and by themselves and which spread in all directions in gradually decreasing strength and ultimately reach the ears of the hearer are the *dhvanis*.[75] The *sphoṭas* belong to the first moment and are the result of the contacts and separations of the vocal organs, while those of the succeeding moments are called '*śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ* = sounds produced by sounds. Whether they be the initial sounds or the subsequent ones, they are all transitory and last only for a few seconds. It is also clear that the subsequent ones are in the nature of a reverberation (*śabdasantāna*) of the initial one. The initial ones are the effects of the contacts and separations and the causes of the following ones. The reverbertion is looked upon as a chain of repetitions of the initial sound, a chain in which each link is weaker than the preceding one, but is none the less a reflection of the initial *sphoṭa*. The chain can be shorter or longer, but the initial *sphoṭa* and each link in the chain are looked upon as momentary. The reverberation of a drum lasts longer and reaches farther than that of the noise of a piece of metal. It is the initial

72. See Texts.
73. As in Vāk. I. 84.
74. See Texts.
75. See Texts.

sphoṭa which brings about the chain and the shorter or longer duration of the chain is attributed to the initial sound. The cognition of an elephant and a mosquito are of equal duration but the difference in the size of the objects is attributed to their cognitions. The fact that, according to this view, the initial sound produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs is called *sphoṭa* and the subsequent reverberation the duration of which is variable is called *dhvani* and also the fact that in explaining this view, the *Vṛtti* brings in the analogy of the drum-beat naturally reminds one of the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 1.1.70 where the words *sphoṭa* and *dhvani* occur and the illustration of the drum beat is used.

Among those who hold the word to be transitory, some were of the opinion that the *sphoṭa* and the *dhvani* were produced at the same time. They bring in the analogy of the flame and the light of the lamp. The flame and the light are produced at the same time. The flame, however, does not extend far, does not occupy much space whereas the light may spread far. From a distance, we may see the light, but not the flame. In the same way, from a distance, we may hear the sound and not the *sphoṭa*. But the two are quite distinct, just as the initial sound of a bell and its reverberation are quite distinct from each other.[76]

Another view of *dhvani* is stated in the *Vākyapadīya*, but it is not clear in which circles it was held, nor is it easy to get a clear idea of the view itself. The view appears to have been put forward as an answer to the question raised by some that, if the distinction between short, long and protracted and that between slow, medium and quick speeds of utterance are both due to the manifesting sounds, what is the difference between these two distinctions themselves? The meaning of the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. 105 and 106 is none too clear and the *Paddhati* on the *Vṛtti* of the latter stanza is particularly silent about the meaning of certain expressions like *abhimarśin, anuprakāśa, nādāntarāla, anuṣaṅga*. The view, however, may be stated as follows, though I wish I could make it clearer: "It is not due to any difference in the volume of the manifesting sounds (*śabdānāṃ pracaya*) that the distinction between short, long and protracted is perceived in the *sphoṭa* of the vowel-phonemes but to the greater or lesser intensity of contacts of the vocal organs at the time of utterance (*dravyābhighātapracaya*).[77] The contacts cause a vibration (*kampa*) and the vowels are perceived as short or long according to the intensity of the vibration. The sounds produced

76. See Texts.
77. See Texts.

while the vibration lasts determine whether the vowel is short or long. The intensity belongs to the contacts or to the resulting vibration, but it is attributed to the *sphoṭa*. When the vibration ceases, the reverberation of the sounds produced by it continues and it is the duration of the reverberation, called *nādajā nādāḥ* in the *Vṛtti* which determines whether the speed of the utterance is slow, quick or medium."[78] The above is a gist of the meaning of Vāk. I. 105 together with the *Vṛtti*. The point to note here is that the distinction between short, long and protraced vowels is attributed to the relative intensity of the contacts of the organs of articulation, resulting in the intensity of the vibration. In the view of Bhartṛhari himself, described earlier, the distinction was attributed to the volume (*pracaya*) of the *prākṛta-dhvanis* themselves and left at that.

The next stanza is intended to explain the same point further. Even when the vibration ceases, the sounds are produced from the *sphoṭa* itself as one flame is produced from another.[79] It is this statement which makes one think that the view was of those who held the word to be transitory. It is they who held that the first sound produced by the contacts and separations of the vocal organs was the *sphoṭa* and the subsequent ones produced by the *sphoṭa* were the *dhvanis*. The *sphoṭa* is produced by the contacts and while the vibration lasts. The subsequent ones are called *anuprakāśa* or *anuṣaṅga* because they follow the initial *sphoṭa*. We saw that Helārāja used the word *anuraṇana* to designate the secondary sounds in Bhartṛhari's own view. The *Vṛtti* in this contexts uses the words *anuprakāśa* and *anuṣaṅga*, but what it says about them is by no means clear. All that is clear is — especially because of the analogy of the flame — that these subsequent sounds are a kind of continuation or reverberation of the *sphoṭa*.

After this digression to describe the views of others, including those who looked upon the *sphoṭa* as something transitory (*anitya*), it remains to conclude this brief exposition of Bhartṛhari's own doctrine. As pointed out before, the *sphoṭa* is at first cognised erroneously in the form of sounds and correctly cognised only in the end. In other words, the initial error is set aside as often happens in the case of other errors. Ordinarily, an error is set aside in a negative way. If the rope was mistaken for a snake, the error is set aside when we say: 'no, this is not a snake'. This is the negative way of setting aside

78. See Texts.
79. See Texts.

an error. But it can also take a positive form, as, in the case of the erroneous cognition of the *sphoṭa* as the sounds. We do not say in the end : 'no, this is not *g, au, aḥ*'. We say instead : 'here is the word *gauḥ*'. This is the positive way of setting aside an error.

Thus, after a series of erroneous cognitions having the form of sounds, accompanied by a vague but progressively clear cognition of the *sphoṭa,* there is finally a clear cognition of it. *Bhartṛhari* describes this final clear cognition as a case of perception. It is not that one infers its existence from the previous vague cognitions. The latter lead to a clear perception of it. The previous cognitions also had the *sphoṭa* as their object, but the cognition of it was vague and that is why they had the form of sounds. When the comprehension of the *sphoṭa* itself is vague, it is natural that it should have the form of the sounds. It is a natural corollary of it. But when the final cognition reveals the *sphoṭa* in all its clarity and distinctness, it has no longer the form of the sounds. The error has given place to truth. Such a cognition can only be perception. The object and the form of the cognition are now identical. Another proof that the cognition of the *sphoṭa* is a case of perception, is that it is only perception which can reveal an object, at first vaguely and later clearly. When from a distance a tree is vaguely cognised, the cognition may take the form of an elephant. When finally, it is recognised to be a tree, the cognition is clearly a case of perception. When the expert jeweller finally sees the genuineness of a precious stone after a continuous gaze at it consisting of a series of comparatively vague cognitions of it, it is a case of perception. The other means of knowledge like inference, either reveal the object or do not reveal it at all. It is only perception which can reveal it, at first vaguely and finally clearly. That is why the *Naiyāyikas* and others recognise the distinction between *nirvikalpaka* and *savikalpaka,* within the perception only and not within the other forms of valid knowledge.

In Bhartṛhari's doctrine of *sphoṭa* as described in the foregoing pages, the following, among other things, have been distinguished.

(1) The *Brahman'— Śabdatattva,* from which the whole cosmos emanates.

(2) The self within everybody which is a spark of the *Brahman-śabdatattva* and in which the *śabda* and the *artha* exist in an undifferentiated state, as one with it.

(3) The integrated *śabda* and the integrated *artha* differentiated

in the *Buddhi* of the speaker and standing towards each other as *prakāśaka* and *prakāśya,* as *kārana* and *kārya.*

(4) The manifestation of the integrated *śabda* by the sounds uttered by the speaker at the level of the *Prāṇa* and the organs of articulation.

(5) The listener's hearing of the sounds as uttered by the speaker and his comprehension of the integrated *śabda* and that of the integrated meaning from it.

Of these different things which have been distinguished, what is Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* ?

The word has had a great fortune and it has been appropriated by various systems of thought. But the word does not always stand for the same thing in all of them. Even Bhartṛhari refers to some thinkers who looked upon it differently from himself and their view has been briefly described above. Later grammarians like Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa, though professedly followers of Bhartṛhari, understood it in their own way. Some have used the word for the ultimate Reality itself, conceived of as consciousness. Others have used it for the undifferentiated word and meaning, one with the *śabdatattva.* Others still have used it for the *śabda* and *artha* together, but differentiated in the *Buddhi.* Some other scholars reserve the word for the integrated *śabda,* as understood by the listener after hearing the sounds uttered by the speaker. What we have to understand is how Bhartṛhari himself looked upon it.

He describes the ultimate Reality, *Brahman* as *śabdatattva,* as we have already seen. He also uses the word *śabdatattva* when he refers to that principle within everybody which is manifested by the sounds. We have seen that it is the *sphoṭa* which is manifested by the sounds. This means that the *śabdatattva* within is the *sphoṭa.* This inner principle which is manifested by the sounds is the integrated word, the expressive element (*vācaka, prakāśaka*) and as it is eternally associated with the integrated meaning, the two may be taken together. That would mean that the integrated word and the integrated meaning, differentiated in the mind and facing each other, rather the two sides of the same coin, constitute the *sphoṭa.* From some passages, however, one gets the impression that the word stands only for the integrated word, differentiated in the mind, that is, for the expressive symbol only. While describing the process of its manifestation, Bhartṛhari emphasizes that, when manifested by the sounds, it is

grasped by the mind, giving us to understand that it is only in the *Buddhi stage* that the word can be called *sphoṭa*. In the *pre-buddhi* stage, it is the word *śabdatattva* which is used.

In the foregoing account of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*, I have not taken account of the polemics which have raged between the grammarians and the opponents of *sphoṭa* like the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Naiyāyikas* and the *Vedāntins*. It is because Bharttḥari has not followed that method in the *Vākyapadīya*. He has not presented the arguments of the opponents of *sphoṭa* as a *pūrvapakṣa*, to be answered one by one before the approved doctrine (*siddhānta*) is established. He has stated what he had to say about the *sphoṭa* in direct statements but not in a polemical style. It is true that in the *Vṛtti* there is a reference to *utpattivādinaḥ* = those who held that the word is produced and, therefore, transitory and not eternal, as the grammarians held, and to the *anityapakṣa*. But even there the arguments of these opponents are not presented systematically for the purpose of refutation. As I have pointed out in a previous section, there is a spirit of accommodation in the *Vākyapadīya* which prevented the adoption of the polemical style. Another probable reason for the absence of such a style may be that the controversy on *sphoṭa* started only after the work of Bhartṛhari had come to light. As far as we know, his is the earliest work in which the *sphoṭa* doctrine of the grammarians is officially expounded. The name and fame of Bhartṛhari called forth opponents of equal calibre — Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Vācaspati Misra, for instance. And also supporters of great eminence: Maṇḍana Misra, for instance. The polemical spirit is greatly in evidence in the works of these later writers. I have given a glimpse of this polemical style in my article entitled 'The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*' based on the *Sphoṭasiddhi* of Maṇḍana Misra.[80] Here I have given an account of the doctrine on the basis of the non-polemical text of Bhartṛhari and his early commentators.

80. See, K. A. Subramania Iyer — The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, (Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Vol. 5, pt. 2, pp. 121 ff.

3. BHARTṚHARI ON THE SENTENCE

To understand whatever Bhartṛhari says about language or speech, one has to remember the philosophical background in which he says it. To define a sentence is to say something about speech or language. While giving an account of his metaphysical background, I pointed out that, according to him, everything is a manifestation of the ultimate Reality, the *Brahman-Śabdatattva*. The speaker, the words which he utters, the objects which the words denote and the listener are all emanations from this ultimate word-Principle.

We are all born with *śabda* or *vāk* within us. It has been identified with our Self. We tried to understand what Bhartṛhari could have meant by this *Vāk*. We saw that it does not mean what we understand by language, though it is the source of all language. The newborn child has it, though it knows no language yet. What it has to do as it grows older is to transform the *śabdabhāvanā* which it has already got into knowledge of the particular language of the speech-community to which it belongs. This inborn *śadba* can be transformed into any language. There is not much information on the process by which this transformation takes place. The *Mīmāṃsakas* speak about the way in which the child learns the language. For them, the chief method is the observation of the use of the language by grown-ups (*vyavahāradarśanam*). They seem to conceive of the process as consisting in learning the meaning of individual words by the method of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Others like the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣitas* also include this method, among others, in their list of the ways in which the power of words to convey their meanings is understood (*śaktigraha*).[1] These philosophers do not speak about something being already within the child. For them, the knowledge of a language comes entirely from society.

Bhartṛhari does not speak about *śaktigraha*. He observed that man does not speak in individual words. Knowledge of language is not merely knowledge of the meaning of individual words. For him, the chief reality in linguistic communication is the indivisible sentence

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1. See *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* on *Bhāṣāpariccheda* 81.

and sentence-meaning. As pointed out in the previous section, though he speaks about the phoneme (*varṇa*) and the individual word (*pada*) as meaning-bearing units (*sphoṭa*), the main form of the latter is the sentence. That is why a whole *kāṇḍa* is devoted to a consideration of the sentence, though it says many interesting things about the individual word also.

As I pointed out in the previous section, in the first *kāṇḍa*, the process of the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* by the sound is described in an atmosphere free from polemics. No attempt is made to present the arguments of those who believe that the phonemes themselves constitute the word and that there is no entity called *sphoṭa* over and above them. Its existence over and above them is taken for granted. The only divergent view that is presented there is the one which looks upon the *sphoṭa* as a transitory thing of which the sounds constitute the reverberation. In contrast to all this, in the second *Kāṇḍa*, there is an atmosphere of polemics. The opponent of Bhartṛhari is any one who accords reality to the individual word and its meaning. The arguments of those who hold this view and their objections to the orthodox view of the grammarians are presented again and again and refuted.

What Bhartṛhari tries to establish is that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible units and that they alone are real (*satya*). Individual words and their meanings have neither definiteness nor reality. Communication is done with sentences and not with individual words. Communication means the transference of what the speaker has in his mind to the hearer. What he has in his mind may be a fact or a fantasy, but it exists as a unity and the word through which he communicates it also exists as a unity. This unity is the sentence. When the hearer also grasps this unity, both of the word and of the meaning, communication has taken place. These two unities exist in the mind of the speaker as distinct from each other, as the expressive word (*vācaka*) and the expressed meaning (*vācya*). It is only in that condition that communication is possible. There is a stage, not available to the ordinary man, where these two unities exist, not as distinct from each other, but as one. In that stage, communication is not possible. The knowledge of the *Ṛṣis* is in that stage. It is beyond the worldly level and it cannot be communicated. When there is complete absence of differentiation, there cannot be any communication. Communication includes subsequent effective action and that is why error (*upaghātajaṃ jñānam*), due to some defect in the

senses, is said to be beyond *vyavahāra* (worldly transactions).[2] Nor can there be any communication when there is extreme differentiation. The grammarian splits up the sentence into words and the words into root and suffix or into stem and suffix. With these completely differentiated elements, there cannoot be communication, that is, there cannot be worldly transaction (*lokavyavahāra*). Of course, it is necessary for the grammarian to split the sentence in this manner in order to do his work, that is, for *śāstravyavahāra*. But extreme differentiation is not helpful in worldly transactions. The knowledge of the sages, (*Ṛṣis*), extremely undifferentiated, is not communicable, because it cannot be formulated in words. But the sages do not always remain in that condition. They take part in everyday life also and then they are like everybody else. They cognise the phenomenal world, and formulate their cognitions in sentences like every body else.[3]

Sentence, then, being the unit of communication, Bhartṛhari enters into a detailed consideration of it. In order to establish his own view, he refutes chiefly the views of the *Mīmāṃsakas,* though he does not mention them, nor any particular author by name. Their view, briefly, is as follows — The sentence and the sentence-meaning are the result of joining together smaller units called words and word-meanings. This view is presented in five different ways :—

One way of presenting it says that the sentence is a collection (*saṅghāta*) of words, depending upon one another and jointly conveying a connected meaning. The individual words themselves constitute the sentence which is not something apart from them. A particular view of the sentence naturally results in a particular view of the sentence-meaning. Before a word enters into a sentence it has a certain meaning. When it enters into a sentence, it conveys that same meaning, neither more nor less.[4] But when words stand together in a sentence, a new meaning, over and above the meanings of the individual words, results and it belongs to the sentence.[5] This extra meaning consists in connecting together the meanings of the individual words. That is why the sentence-meaning, according to this view, is called *saṃsarga* = mutual connection. Some people believe that this new meaning exists in the meanings of all the individual words taken together and not in any one of them or in each of them. It is like number. The number ten, for instance, exists in all the ten objects

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.

counted, taken together and not in each of them. According to others, the sentence-meaning does not exist as distinct from the word meaning. The word-meaning is a universal, capable of denoting all particulars. In the presence of another word, it becomes restricted to one single particular. In that state it is called sentence-meaning.[6] As this is the *Mīmāṃsaka* view of the sentence, it is connected with a definition found in the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini. According to that, a set of words becomes a sentence if they convey a connected meaning, provided that, when they are in isolation, the meaning of each word is incomplete and requires to be completed.[7]

Another way of presenting the *Mīmāṃsaka* view is that the sentence is nothing more than the sequence of the individual words constituting it. It is not something verbal, it is not something which can be heard, because a sequence cannot be heard. Sequence is a property of time and it is superimposed on the individual words.[8] In this view of the sentence also, the sentence-meaning consists in connecting together the meaning of individual words, in particularising the meanings of individual words. If *śabda* (the word) is what is expressive of the meaning, here that capacity must be ascribed to the sequence and not to the individual words which can be heard.

What is to be noted in the two views given above is that, in both of them, the sentence-meaning arises when the meanings of individual words which, by themselves, consists of universals, are particularised when they are connected with one another. In other words, the sentence-meaning does not come from the words, but from their meanings which are incomplete and require one another (*ākāṅkṣā*). This view of the sentence-meaning is, therefore, *abhihitānvayavāda* = the connecting together of meanings conveyed by individual words through their power called *abhidhā*.

Some *Mīmāṃsakas* are of the view that the verb (*ākhyātaśabda*) is the sentence. They do not mean that the verb, by itself, is the sentence. They are well aware that, ordinarily, a sentence consists of many words of which the verb is only one, though it may be the most important element. All that they mean is that sometimes, from a mere verb, a complete meaning is understood. If, from a mere verb which denotes an action, a definite means to the accomplishment

6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.

of that action is also understood and thus its meaning is completed, it should be looked upon as a sentence.[9]

Whether the sentence consists entirely of the verb or whether there are also other words in it, in this view, the meaning of the sentence is of the nature of an action or a process. As soon as the verb is heard, a particular action, associated with a particular agent and other accessories and, therefore, different from other actions, is understood. When the other words of the sentence, expressive of the accessories and their qualifications are heard, they do no more than confirm the understanding of a particular action which has already taken place.[10]

Another view of the *Mīmāṃsaka* on the sentence is that it is the very first word of it. Their idea is that when one utters the very first word of a sentence, the meaning of the whole sentence is contained in it. The other words only make clear this meaning. The meaning of the whole sentence is in the very first word. Let us take the two sentences : *Devadatta, gām abhyāja* = "O Devadatta, lead the cow in" and *Devadatta, gāṃ badhāna* = "O Devadatta, tie the cow up." Though the word Devadatta seems to be the same in the two sentences, it is not so. They have been uttered to express two different meanings, namely, the meanings of the two sentences. The very first word of a sentence is uttered, not to concey the meaning of that word only, but that of the whole sentence. As the meanings of the above two sentences are different, the word Devadatta at the beginning of one is not the same as the word Devadatta at the beginning of the other. They only look alike. Each of them conveys the meaning of the whole sentence in which it is found but only vaguely. The listener wants some more help to be able to understand it clearly and the other words of the sentence are meant to give this help. They say nothing new. They only bring out what is already in the first word.

This view of the sentence is *anvitābhidhāna* = 'the conveying of what is already connected', because the very first word conveys its meaning as connected with those of the others. In the other view, namely, *abhihitānvaya,* the first word, like the other words, conveys only the abstracted, unconnected universal. But as these universals are incomplete and require one another, they become connected and the meaning which then emerges is the sentence-meaning. It does

9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.

not come from the words, but from the word-meanings. In *anvitābhidhāna,* on the other hand, connection with the meaning of the other words is part of the meaning of a word, because in worldly usage we never experience unconnected word-meanings. We experience them always as connected and the method of agreement and difference, (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) practised for abstracting the word meaning from the sentence-meaning, cannot eliminate what is always experienced.

If the very first word can be looked upon as the sentence and its meaning as the sentence-meaning, the same thing can be said about the other words. They also convey their meaning as connected with the meanings of other words. Each one of them can also be looked upon as the sentence. This is, therefore, another way of presenting the *Mīmāṃsaka* view and this will also come under *anvitābhidhāna* for the same reason. Like the very first word, every other word is deemed to convey its meaning as connected with the meanings of the other words.

In all the five views of the sentence described so far, the basic assumption is that the individual words and their meanings exist before the sentence is formed. When it is formed, the individual words figure as parts of it and their meanings figure as parts of the sentence-meaning. All these views, therefore, look upon the sentence as a whole having parts (*sakhaṇḍapakṣa*). The parts are as real as the whole.

It is this view in all its shades which is refuted in the *Vākyapadīya.* Against this *sakhaṇḍapakṣa,* Bhartṛhari puts forward the *akhaṇḍapakṣa,* the view that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are indivisible units and that they alone are real and fit for communication. Taking the stanzas and the commentary together, this view is expounded with the help of many analogies. The indivisible sentence is either internal or external. When it is fully manifested through utterance, it is external. Before that, when it is still in the speaker's mind, it is internal. In either case, it is an indivisible unity. It is essentially of the nature of light or knowledge because it illuminates, that is, it conveys an object. Because it is uttered, it assumes the form of external sounds which only manifest it. Though indivisible it appears to have divisions. It has two aspects, the word aspect and the meaning aspect. Both are indivisible, though both appear to have divisions. To explain this point, the analogy of a complex cognition (*citrajñāna*) and that of the cognition of a picture are brought in. A cognition which embraces many objects at the same time is a com-

plex cognition. As a cognition, it is one but because of the many objects which figure in it, one sees plurality in it, though it is indivisible.[11] Similarly, a picture such as a portrait is a unity and, as such, it has its colour. But in the different parts of it, different colours can be seen which, however, do not belong to the picture as a whole. Their plurality does not affect the unity of the colour of the picture.[12] The commentator adds some more analogies. The flavour of a drink made up of many ingredients is one and unique, though the flavour of the different ingredients may also be experienced. The man-lion (*narasiṃha*) of the legend is a unique Being though resemblance to a man and to a lion may be perceived in him. So is the animal 'gayal' (*gavaya*) a unique breed though one may see in it resemblance to a cow and to a deer. The colour of the fluid in the pea-hen's egg is simple and unique though the potentialities of the dazzling colours of the fully-grown peacock may be already in it.[13]

The doctrine of indivisibility of the sentence is also presented in three shades, represented by the expressions : *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*, *jātiḥ saṅghātavartinī* and *buddhyanusaṃhṛtiḥ*. These three shades of the doctrine have already been briefly described in the previous section in the course of the exposition of the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. Whatever shade of the doctrine one may adopt, the sentence meaning has been declared to be of the nature of *Pratibhā* = Intuition. I have already said something about it in the section entitled "Bhartṛhari and the *Pramāṇas*. There the subject came up in the context of valid knowledge. *Pratibhā* has been declared to be the most reliable source of it. It arises in many ways, six of which have been enumerated. In addition or rather even before this enumeration Bhartṛhari had already declared the word to be the cause of the awakening of this Intuition.[14] When the listener has understood the meaning of the words of a sentence, a flash of understanding of the meaning of the whole sentence takes place. It is quite different from the meanings of the individual words.[15] It is sometimes understood even before the whole sentence has been uttered. It is not easy to explain this flash of understanding to others. It relates to the sentence as a whole on which it rests. The meanings of the individual words manifest it. If they did not, their cognition in the middle would serve no useful purpose.

11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See p. 92, note 36.
15. See p. 87, note 14.

The doctrine of the reality and indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning was put forward in opposition to the *Mīmāṃsakas* who believe in the realitiy of the individual word and its meaning. The *Mīmāṃsā* developed in connection with the interpretation of Vedic injunctions. The principles of interpretation which were evolved are applicable, not only to Vedic texts, but also to *Dharmaśāstra* texts and even to the language of everyday life. These principles are based on the view that the sentence and the sentence-meaning are the result of joining together smaller units called words and word-meanings. The latter are the source of the former. The authority of the *Ṛk-prātisākhya* is invoked for this view. Allegedly it is stated there that the individual words are the source of the sentence. What is stated there is : *padaprakṛtiḥ saṃhitā.*[16] If the word *padaprakṛtiḥ* is taken as a *bahuvrīhi*, then the statement would mean that the connected text (*saṃhitā*, that is, the sentence) is that of which the individual words are the source. Of course, the compound can be taken as a *tatpuruṣa*, in which case we would get just the opposite meaning, namely, that the sentence is that which is the source of the individual words.[17] However, the *Mīmāṃsakas* take it in the first way and hold the view that the individual words exist before the sentence and are, therefore, real. It is they which constitute the material out of which the sentence is made.

This reality of the individual word and its meaning must be accepted, says the *Mīmāṃsaka* if Vedic injunctions are to be carried out as prescribed. There is the injunction : *Vrīhibhir yajeta* = one should perform the sacrifice with rice. If it is taken as an indivisible sentence, expressing an indivisible meaning, the sentence would enjoin just one thing, namely, a sacrifice to be performed with a particular material. If, for some reason, rice is not available, the ceremony must be performed with the nearest substitute, so that a Vedic injunction may not remain neglected.[18] But it would be impossible to use a substitute if the sentence is indivisible. Because, then, the whole sentence would teach just one thing, a particular ceremony of which rice is a part. If the ceremony is performed with something else, say, barley, the ceremony itself would become different, so that another ceremony would be substituted for what is enjoined and that is not allowed.[19] One can have a substitute for a material

16. *Ṛk.-prātisākhya* II.1.
17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.

but not for the ritual itself. The sentence being indivisible, it does not teach two things. It does not say : (1) that one should perform the ritual, (2) that it should be done with rice. That would imply that the sentence has two parts but we started with the assumption that he sentence is indivisible. So the sentence teaches only one thing, a ritual having a particular material. When rice is not available and the ritual is done with some other material, it would not be a mere substitution of material but of the ritual itself. But that is not allowed. When the Veda enjoins one ritual, it would be wrong to perform another.

This difficulty disappears in the view that words and word meanings are real and that the sentence is not indivisible. The injunction *vrīhibhiḥ yajeta* must accordingly be interpreted as follows—There are two words in it : *vrīhibhiḥ* and *yajeta*. The latter says that one should perform a sacrifice. We also understand as an implication that it should be done with some material or other. But the verb *yajeta* does not indicate any particular material.[20] But the word *vrīhibhiḥ* supplies the answer by saying that the sacrifice should be performed with rice. It should be looked upon as a positive injunction and not as a restriction. It specifies but does not exclude other things. It enjoins rice in the first instance but it does not prevent the use of a substitute.[21] The substitute can be used without interfering with the meaning of the root *yajeta*. In other words, by substituting, say, barley for rice, one would only be using a substitute for a material and not for the ritual itself. Thus there would be no violation of Vedic injunction.

For interpreting Vedic injunctions, for arriving at an understanding of their correct meaning, the sage Jaimini has laid down six clues (*pramāṇas*) in his *Mī. Sūtras*, in their descending order of strength. Where there is conflict between any two of them, pointing to opposite conclusions, the clue mentioned earlier in the *sūtra* should be followed in preference to what is mentioned later. The principle behind this relative strength is that a clue which brings the idea to the mind quicker must be considered to be stronger than the one which brings the idea with delay (*arthaviprakarṣa*). All these clues are found within the sentence itself and their relative strength, not to speak of their very existence, depends upon the divisibility of the sentence and the reality of the divisions. To accept the indivisibility of the sentence, says the *Mīmāṃsaka* would go against the fundamental principle of interpre-

20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.

tation of a sentence laid down by no less a person than the venerable Jaimini himself.

Similarly, there are certain other principles followed in the world and in the *śāstras* and they would all become inexplicable if the individual word and its meaning are denied any existence. One such principle is *prasaṅga*, that is, the single performance of a subsidiary action accepted as helping a primary action other than the one to which it belongs. The principle is followed in the world also. When the teacher is giving instruction, to one pupil and other pupils come and profit by it, it is a case of *prasaṅga*. It can be seen in *vyākaraṇa* also. P.1.1.27 not only gives the name *sarvanāma* to certain words but it also tells us incidentally that in the name, the '*n*' does not become '*ṇ*' as it normally should. This principle would not work if the individual word had no meaning. Another principle is called '*tantra*', dealt with in the tenth chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtras*. An example from the world of the observance of this principle is that of several students using one lamp for their study. The use of the word *tapara* in P.1.1.70 in two meanings[22] is an example of *tantra* taken from *vyākaraṇa*.[23] Another principle is *ūha*. It consists in the modification of a *mantra* prescribed for a *prakṛtiyāga* (model sacrifice) in order to suit the circumstances of a *vikṛtiyāga*. The modification usually consists in picking out one word of a *mantra* and substituting another for it. Obviously this would not be possible if the individual word were not real. *Atideśa* (extension or transference) is the subject of the seventh and eighth chapters of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*. It means the transference of the details of the model sacrifice to those which are modelled on it. In *vyākaraṇa* also some *sūtras* like P.1.1.53 are actually called *atideśa-sūtras*. Such transference involves the removal of a word from its original context and placing it in a new one and that presupposes the reality of the individual word.[24] How to determine the order in which the different minor acts belonging to a sacrifice are to be performed is discussed in the fifth chapter of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*. Many indications are given there. The order in which grammatical operations are done is important for arriving at the correct forms of words. The clues given in *Mīmāṃsā* for determining order all depend upon the reality of the individual word and its meaning.[25] Much space is given in *Mīmāṃsā* to the question of what is primary and what is subsidiary,

22. The two meanings are : (1) *taḥ paro yasmāt so 'yaṃ taparaḥ* (2) *tāt paraḥ taparaḥ*.
23 See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. See Texts.

In the process of threshing the corn to be used for making the sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*) for instance, the threshing is subsidiary to the corn to unhusk which it is done. Among the different actions constituting a Vedic sacrifice, some are directly useful while others are only indirectly so. For instance, the threshing of the corn is directly useful for the performance of the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice while the *prayāja* is so only indirectly. This distinction between primary and subsidiary, directly useful and indirectly useful presupposes the existence of parts in the sentence and sentence-meaning.[26] Arguing on the grammarian's own ground, the *Mīmāṃsāka* says that the distinction between *paryudāsa* = a negation in which the negative particle is connected with the verb and *prasajya pratisedha* = a negation in which the particle, is connected with the noun is possible only if the particle, the verb and the noun can be isolated from the sentence, that is, if they are real and expressive.[27]

It is further pointed out that unless the words and word-meanings are real, the connection of a *dvandva* compound with a plural verb would be inexplicable, because its meaning, being indivisible, would involve no differentiation and plurality and there would be no occasion for the use of the plural number in the verb. Nor would it be possible to connect the action denoted by the verb separately with each one of the objects denoted by the compound word, because, in the doctrine of indivisibility, they have no separate existence. If, like a sentence, a compound word and its meaning are also indivisible, all discussion about the relative importance of the first term or the second term of a compound becomes futile and yet grammar does indulge seriously in such discussion and arrive at decisions. Equally futile would be discussions as to whether the different terms of a compound word give up their original meaning or not.

It is not merely the *śāstras* which proceed on the assumption that individual words and their meanings are real. The average man in the world does the same. For example, when the sentence *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is uttered and a listener understands *vanād ānīyatām* but does not understand the word *pika*, he enquires about the meaning of that word only. Obviously, in his consciousness and in that of the speaker, the word figures as a separate word and has a reality.[28]

26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.

It would become tedious to describe in detail all the arguments of the *Mīmāṃsakas* to prove the reality of the individual word. The few examples which have been given above are enough to show their way of reasoning.

All these arguments of the *Mīmāṃsaka* are met by Bhartṛhari by having recourse to his spirit of accommodation which has already been referred to in the section on Bhartṛhari and the *Darśanas*. Grammar is common to all the *Darśanas* and, as far as possible, it must accommodate itself to all of them.[29] While strongly upholding the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence-meaning, Bhartṛhari admits the need for splitting them into parts in order to serve practical purposes. The purpose which he has in mind is the fulfilment of the task of the grammarian, namely, the explanation of the unit of communication, the sentence. It cannot be uderstood as it is by us ordiary mortals. It has to be artificially split up into parts (*apoddhāra*) as a means of explaining the sentence. This does not mean that these parts are real. Once the analysis is done by grammar, the results can be made use by others for their own purpose.[30] The *Mīmāṃsaka*, for instance, can use the analysed parts in order to interpret Vedic injunctions and Vedic ritual. It does not matter whether the analysed divisions are real or not.

They have not the same degree of reality as the sentence. We can infer that *Patañjali* also held the same view. The very fact that he says that the authors of the *padapāṭha* of the Vedas have to follow the *śāstra* in doing their work of analysing the *Saṃhitā* text of the Vedas shows that, according to him, the *padapāṭha* is man-made and not handed down from time immemorial as the *Saṃhitā* text is.[31] It is the result of a grammatical analysis of the *Saṃhitā*. Puṇyarāja goes further and professes to quote a passage from the *Mahābhāṣya* in which Patañjali is represented as saying that the individual words are unreal, that the sentence is one and undifferentiated and that the division of a sentence into words is done only for the sake of instructing the ignorant.[32] This passage is, however, not traceable in the *Mahābhāṣya* which we have.

While Bhartṛhari, in a spirit of accommodation admits the need, for practical purposes, of analysing the sentence into words he insists

29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.

that the words have no reality. He emphasises the indefiniteness of the word. It appears in different forms in different sentences. The word *'rājan'* for example, does not convey the idea of a king through a particular form, but through one of its many inflectional forms. If the individual word had a reality, it would have a fixed form. It would not be changing constantly. The compound word *rājapuruṣa* could be understood to mean : Shine ! O man ! and yet that is not its meaning. That shows that what looks like an individual word has no reality.[33] How is one to determine the limits of an individual word considering that its form changes from sentence to sentence ? If the limits of a word cannot be determined, how can its meaning be fixed ?[34] Another reason why it is difficult to determine the form of a word is that different schools of grammar analyse the same words differently. *Vaira, vāsiṣtha, giriśa* and *ekāgārika* have been derived differently by different scholars.[35] We divide a word into root and suffix or stem and suffix and assign a meaning to each of these divisions. Sometimes, even if one of them is missing, we still understand the meaning. In *ahan,* we do not see any suffix after the root and yet it conveys the meaning assigned to the suffix. In *iyān,* there is no stem to see and yet its meaning is there. In *pacanti,* there are two suffixes *śap* and *jhi* but in *atti,* there is only one, namely, *tip* and yet, apart from the meaning of the roots, the meaning conveyed is the same.[36] What is taught as the meaning of the suffix in one system is looked upon as the meaning of the stem in another.[37]

Bhartṛhari's point in this context is not that before the sentence meaning is understood, the listener does not understand anything else. He admits that he understands in the middle certain partial meanings before understanding the meaning of the whole sentence. What he emphasises is that these partial meanings or word meanings have no reality. They have no reality because they are unfit for communication (*vyavahāra*). Secondly, each subsequent word in the sentence conveys its meaning as mixed up with those of the preceding words and so the meanings conveyed by the preceding words are, in a way, abandoned in their original form. So the utterance of the preceding words was really useless. Therefore, when the sentence-meaning is ultimately understood, it would not be due to the preceding useless words. The understanding of the meanings of the preceding words

33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.

was only a temporary and, therefore, an unreal phase.[38] The fact is that the understanding of these partial meanings in the middle is only a means to an end and once the end, namely, the understanding if the sentence-meaning, is achieved, the intermediary meanings are abandoned. What, is accepted at first and later abandoned is called the means (*upāya*). It is well-known that there is no fixity in the means. They are obtained by analysis and the analysis is done differently by different scholars.[39] To see word meanings within the sentence meaning is like seeing *naratva* and *siṃhatva* in a *narasiṃha* : They do not exist there but the mind creates the fiction that they do exist. The *narasiṃha* of the legend is a different being altogether. Similarly, in the animal called *gavaya*, one sees resemblance to a cow and to a deer. But the universals (*jāti*) *gotva* and *mṛgatva* do not exist there. The animal has a totally different *jāti* in it.

As to the argument that sometimes we make an enquiry about just one word in a sentence when we have understood the meanings of the other words, showing that both the speaker and the listener are conscious of the existence of individual words, it is pointed out that there is a fallacy here. When one thinks that one does not understand one word only or that there is doubt about one word only, one is mistaken. It is the meaning of the whole sentence which is in doubt. The sentence *vanāt pika ānīyatām* is quite different from the sentence *vanād ṛkṣa ānīyatām*. To say that *vanād ānīyatam* is common to both is itself an error. The so-called common part itself does not exist. It is an artificially created part. Both the sentences are indivisible. There is no such thing as doubt about one word in a sentence. It is really the meaning of the whole sentence which is not understood.[40] Just as one indivisible cognition appears to resemble another indivisible cognition in one part and to differ in another part, in the same way, even though the two sentences are indivisible and differ from each other completely, one perceives resemblance and difference between them in parts. The cognition of blue resembles that of green in that both are cognitions, but differ from each other inasmuch as the contents of the two are different. Or the point might be illustrated by taking two pictures, the colour of one of which is green-blue while that of the other is green-yellow. The two would resemble each other partly and differ from eash other partly. But in reality, they are two different partless wholes. Similarly, two sentences which appear to resemble

38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.
40. See Texts.

each other in having common words are really indivisible wholes.[41]

The meanings which we seem to understand in the middle before the meaning of the whole sentence is understood are not real and cannot be taken seriously. As the words of the sentence are gradually grasped, one understands the meaning in a particular manner, but when the whole sentence is grasped, the meaning appears to be quite different.[42] Those sentences in which, after the meanings of many words are understood, a negation follows, those meanings have to be discarded and cannot be taken seriously.[43] From the sentence : *dhava-khadira-palāśāc chedanīyā na,* the meaning understood until the last word is heard, is that the *dhava, khadira* and *palāśa* trees are to be cut. But, as soon as the last word is heard, just the opposite meaning is understood which shows that the meaning of the individual word is unreal. It is better not to take it as real even before the negative particle is heard. Sometimes, when the meanings of the individual words are considered, they amount to condemnation, but when the meaning of the sentence as a whole is understood, it is found to be praise. Sometimes, it is just the opposite.[44] One is compelled not to take the meanings of the individual words seriously, but to discard them.

Just as the *Mīmāṃsaka* holds that the meaningless phonemes, when grouped according to meaning, become the word and convey the word meaning, in the same way, the unreal and, therefore, meaningless individual words convey the sentence meaning.[45] It is the sentence and the sentence meaning which are real and which come first. A sentence is not a putting together of previously existing elements. Words and word meanings are what we get when we artificially analyse the sentence. The indivisible sentence and sentence meaning are not understood at the beginning. They are understood only through the unreal words and their meanings. As already pointed out, the latter are only the means to the ultimate understanding of the sentence and the sentence-meaning.[46] It is not possible to explain or to define the sentence except through the unreal words and word meanings.[47] When we onalyse the sentence artifically into words and assign meanings to

41. See Texts.
42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.
45. See Texts.
46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.

them, it is as parts of the sentence that meanings are assigned to them and not as isolated elements. Here the analogy of the senses is brought in. The senses have each their function but only as integral parts of the body and not in isolation. The words and the sentence stand in the same relation to one another.[48]

It may appear strange that what is contrary to experience should be proclaimed as the truth. The individual word and its meaning are experienced by everybody but they are not accepted as real. The sentence, in its limitation as individual words and the sentence meaning, in its limitation as word meanings, are declared, to be real. The fact is that only that which is validly cognised can become the object of verbal usage and worldly transactions. It is with the sentence and the sentence meaning as with consciousness. Pure consciousness is the reality but it is never experienced in that form. It is always experienced as coloured by some object or other.[49] It always appears as this or that. Philosophers have declared that in its pure form, it is beyond the mind and the words. Similarly, the sentence and the sentence meaning, in their pure form,are indivisible and devoid of any differentiation. But they appear to have differentiation in the form of words and word meanings. But these differentiations are not real and are not fit for communication. It is because they are not fit for communication that they are said to be unreal.[50]

In contrast to this, the sentence and the sentence meaning are said to be real because they are fit for communication.[51] In themselves, the word meanings are isolated. It is the sentence which connects them together. The sentence meaning it is which makes meanings of the individual words fit for communication. It is their very soul, so to speak, says Bhartṛhari.[52]

The chief characteristic of the sentence is that there is a certain completeness about its meaning. This completeness does not depend upon any particular number of words which the sentence must have nor on any particular kind of word such as the verb which it must contain. A sentence is considered to be really complete when it contains a verb expressive of some action or process, as its eternal idea together with other words expressive of the accessories (*sādhana*)

48. See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.
51. See Texts.
52. See Texts.

which help in the accomplishment of the action and of the qualifications of these accessories. Needless to say that all sentences are not equipped with a full set of such words. That does not mean that such deficient sentences are incomplete and, therefore, lose the claim to be called sentences. It is, however, essential that such action or procss should be understood from the word or words uttered before there can be completeness. If the words uttered include a verb, some action or other would be automatically understood. Even if no verb is uttered, it is our nature, with the help of the context and the situation, to supply some process mentally and thus bring about completeness. The action or process mentally supplied may be origination, existence or destruction, depending upon the words actually uttered and heard and the context.[53] This mental supplying of the required process is called *arthādhyāhāra* = insertion of an idea. Some scholars go further and say that it is not only the required idea which is mentally supplied but also the word which is expressive of it. That would be what is called *padādhyāhāra* = insertion of the word. It is only after this insertion is mentally made that what is uttered becomes fit for communication. This insertion is for the sake of making what is uttered a complete sentence which alone is fit to be used for communication. What is uttered may be a single word only and that too a noun. Such a noun can express only an incomplete meaning. But it may be pregnant with some action or process which we then supply mentally and so the single noun becomes a sentence fit to be used for communication, ending in effective worldly transaction.[54] The example usually given in the texts is the word *dvāram* the door. When uttered in a particular situation it would naturally bring to the mind the idea of closing, so that one would understand from that single word either the command or the request : 'close the door'. Similarly, if the single uttered word is a verb, it would directly express some action or process. But even an action requires some accessory or other for its completion. As in the case of the isolated noun, an isolated verb also sometimes brings its accessory to the mind, either due to the nature of the acion denoted by it or due to some peculiarity in the situation. Thus completeness is achieved and the single word has become a sentence.[55] Puṇyarāja gives the verb *varṣati* = '(it) rains' as the example and suggests that it would be completed by bringing to the mind the god (of rain) as the agent and water as the object. As to how the gap in the idea conveyed by the single word, noun or verb, is mentally filled up for the

53. See Texts.
54. See Texts.
55. See Texts.

sake of completeness, there was difference of opinion. Do we mentally supply the missing word first and, through that, supply the meaning required or do we supply only the meaning or the idea which is needed? The first view; already referred to as *padādhyāhāra* = insertion of the word' is also known as *śrutārthāpatti* = 'understanding of the meaning from the word'. Where the only word uttered is a noun, it would convey some accessory or other to an action. But action and accessory (*sādhya* and *sādhana*) always go together and so the word expressive of the accessory, with the help of the context and the situation, would bring some suitable verb to the mind and thus the single word would be completed and turned into a sentence.[56] If the required word is not supplied and yet the meaning is completed, it would mean that the uttered noun itself would, in addition to expressing the accessory, also bring the main idea, namely, action to the mind. To make the same word bring both the action and the accessory to the mind is not right. It is against our common experience. This view is associated with the *Mīmāṃsaka*.[57]

Bhartṛhari does not subscribe to this view. The word actually uttered cannot bring the word not uttered to the mind, because its function is only to convey its own meaning. Nor can its meaning bring the un-uttered word to the mind, because there is no relation between the two. Nor can the uttered word bring the meaning of the un-uttered word to the mind because there is no relation between a word and the meaning of some other word. A fourth possibility is that the meaning of the uttered word would bring the meaning of the un-uttered word to the mind. But that would be a case of inference and not of verbal cognition. The conclusion is that when a single word, noun or verb is uttered, it brings, without the intervention of another word, but with the help of the context, any other meaning which is required to complete it. This is Bhartṛhari's view.[58]

Completeness of meaning is then the test of a sentence. That is why even a single word can be a sentence if somehow completeness of meaning is achieved. For the same reason, even long phrases do not constitute a sentence if their meanings are incomplete. A phrase consisting of many words is not a sentence if it still requires some other word or words for the completion of its meaning. That is the case with intermediary sentences, syntactically connected with the main sentence

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56. See Texts.
57. See Texts.
58. See Texts.

Such intermediary sentences are no better than individual words.[59] Such sentences may all contain a verb but that does not make any difference. We have already seen that even the meaning of a verb sometimes requires to be completed with the help of some accessory which would help in the accomplishment of the action denoted by the verb. That is why any definition of a sentence based on the presence of one or more verbs has to be understood in this light. The two *vārtikas* defining a sentence given by *Kātyāyana* under P.2.1.1. in the context of the definition of syntactical connection (*sāmarthya*) have to be interpreted in accordance with this conception of the sentence.[60] Both these definitions mention the presence of one single verb in a sentence. But they should not be understood to mean that where there is more than one verb, the words would not constitute one sentence. There can be more than one verb in a sentence provided that one of them is the main one and the other subordinate to it.[61] Just as many words ending in the suffix *ktvā* can be subordinate to one verb and be in the same sentence, in the same way, more than one verb can be subordinate to the main verb found in the same sentence.[62] More than one verb can result in there being more than one sentence if they are independent of one another. Not if one of them is the main one and the others subordinate to it. Here Bhartṛhari gives the sentence : *mṛgaḥ paśyata yāti* = 'the deer goes, see !' as an example. Though there are two verbs here, they are connected with each other and so there is only one sentence. The opinion of those who interpret these three words as constituting either one sentence or two is rejected.[63]

In the foregoing discussion, there has been talk about completeness or incompleteness of meaning. Bhartṛhari clarifies his conception of completeness. Unless the incompleteness is verbal, that is, comes out of the words themselves, the meaning must be considered to be complete. Incompleteness is more in the way of saying a thing rather than in the thing itself. Nobody can say everything. Certain things are implied. They need not be openly expressed in words. They are left to be understood. What is actually expressed does not become incomplete unless there is incompleteness in the words themselves.[64] When somebody says : 'Devadatta cooks', the sentence is complete though how and what he cooks is not mentioned. From the word

59. See Texts.
60. See Texts.
61. See Texts.
62. See Texts.
63. See Texts.
64. See Texts.

'cooks', an average listener would understand a complete meaning. What he understands would not be considered incomplete merely because all the details connected with Devadatta's cooking are not mentioned. The listener may have the desire to know the details but such a desire is not aroused in him by any incompleteness in the words which he heard.[65] It is aroused by the nature of the act of cooking. But that sort of desire to know more does not render the sentence incomplete.

The complete meaning expressed by a sentence is a complex thing in which some process or action occupies the central position and is associated with its accessories and their qualifications, all amalgamated into an indivisible whole. When we proceed to analyse the sentence and the sentence-meaning, it is this central element, the process or action which is first analysed. The accessories and their qualifications are analysed later. The accessories are there for the accomplishment of the action. Of course, compared to the ultimate purpose to fulfil which the action is accomplished, the latter is secondary, but that is not always openly expressed in the sentence.[66] Moreover, there is no absolute fixity about what is a process and what is an accessory. It all depends very much upon how the speaker wants to present them.[67] What is presented as a process by one speaker can be presented as an accessory by another. In the sentence : *Devadattaḥ pacati* = 'Devadatta cooks', the action of cooking is presented as a process, because it is conveyed by a verb. In the sentence : *Devadattaḥ pacikriyāṃ karoti* = 'Devadatta performs the act of cooking', the same action is presented as a thing, a finished object and not as a process, because it is conveyed by a noun. The fact is that all objects in the world are bundles of powers or capacities and it is open to the speaker to present an object in the light of any one of its capacities.[68] The word does not touch the essence of an object. It stands far from it and does no more than bring it to the mind in some one of its many aspects, according to the intention of the speaker. It picks on some capaciy or function of the object and presents it in that form. What the word presents has no fixity. It is not real.

As sated above, when we analyse the sentence meaning, it is its central element, some action or process which is first identified. It is the verb, the most important word of the sentence which expresses it.

65. See Texts.
66. See Texts.
67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.

The verb always presents the action or process in a very general way.[69] But each one of these actions or processes comprises an infinite number of varieties on account of difference in the results aimed at or in their mode of performance. But the verb by itself cannot go into all these varieties. If the latter are also to be conveyed, many other words would have to be used for the purpose. Sometimes two different verbs may be used in two different sentences but the action denoted by these two verbs may be the same. The fact is that every action is susceptible of infinite variation but there is no adequate variety of verbs to indicate all this infinite variety in the action. That has to be understood from the nature of the action itself or through the context and the situation. That is what actually happens. The verb itself directly denotes only the action in general, but the listener understands it in a particular form according to circumstances.

From the foregoing account, it is clear that, according to Bhartṛhari, the indivisible sentence is the unit of communication and that its meaning is undestoord in a flash (*pratibhā*). This meaning is also something indivisible, a complex cognition in which the central element is an action or process with its accessories closely associated with it. This idea of indivisibility and reality of the sentence and the unreality of the individual word is very old in India, if we go by what Yāska says in his *Nirukta*.[70] This Nirukta passage has been differently understood by different scholars.[71] What is of interest to us is that Bhartṛhari refers to this passage and gives us an idea of how he understood it. The context in which he makes the reference is as follows — As already pointed out, the *Mīmāṃsaka* believes in *Śrutārthāpatti*. When a sentence consists of a single word, whether it be a noun or a verb, it does no more than convey its own meaning. This meaning brings to the mind any other meaning required to complete it, not directly but through the word to which the other meaning belongs.[72] Thus, the single word is made up into a sentence.

Bhartṛhari does not accept this interpretation of what actually happens. We have already seen how he understands it.[73] The main point in his interpretation is that we mentally complete the meaning of a sentence consisting of a single word by bringing in whatever other meaning is required without mentally adding any word to the word

69. See Texts.
70. See Texts.
71. See John Brough — Audumbarāyaṇaś Theory of Language. B.S.O.S. Vol. IX, Part I, pp. 73-77.
72. See Texts.
73. See note **58.**

actually uttered. In other words, if the word actually uttered is a noun, it would not only convey its own meaning, but also that of a suitable verb for completing its own meaning and if it is a verb, it would not only convey its own meaning but also that of a suitable noun for completing its own meaning, without, in either case, any other word being brought to the mind. Only the required meaning, without its word, would be understood with the help of the context and the situation. The consequence of this way of looking at it, says the *Mīmāṃsaka,* is that when the sentence consists of a noun only, it would bring to the mind its own meaning, namely, some object or other *plus* some action or other for the sake of completeness, whereas when the sentence consists of a noun and a verb, the noun would convey only some object or other. Thus, there would be indefiniteness in the meaning of a word and that would go against the clear statement of Yāska in his *Nirukta* regarding the meaning of a verb and a noun. His statement is : *bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam* = 'an action or process is the main meaning of a verb', and *sattvapradhānāni nāmāni* = things or objects form the main meaning of nouns. It is on the basis of a clear distinction in the meanings of words that they have been put under four categories : noun, verb, preposition (*upasarga*) and particle (*nipāta*). Bhartṛhari's interpretation of the single-word sentence, says the *Mīmāṃsaka,* would completely upset Yāska's four categories and the meanings which he has assigned to the verb and to the noun. If the individual word is unreal, as Bhartṛhari maintains, what is the use of speaking about four parts of speech and assigning meanings to them ?

It is when faced with this challenge of disloyalty to the ancients that Bhartṛhari tells us what the ancients really meant. Yāska mentions Audumbarāyaṇa with respect in the passage referred to under note 70. Bhartṛhari also mentions him and couples him with another ancient name, namely, Vārtākṣa. These two scholars, says Bhartṛhari, seeing that the sentence exists always in the mind (of the hearer, according to Puṇyarāja) and that it is that which is connected, in the world, with the meaning, have declared that the four-fold classification of words is unacceptable. Both in the world and in the Science of Grammar, the easy, comprehensive (*vyāptimān*) and universal treatment of sentences on the basis of individual words is resorted to for the sake of convenience. In the world, transactions are not always based on reality. Therefore, apart from the sentence, there is nothing which is not a mere creation of the world.[74]

74. See Texts.

Such then, according to Bhartṛhari, is the nature of the sentence meaning. Though both of them have an external aspect, they are inner realities. They are not only in the mind but have deeper roots. They are derived from the Self, which itself is a spark of the *Brahman-Śabdatattva* which represents total knowledge. Though inner realities present in everybody, they have to be awakened before communication can take place. The process of awakening has been described in the section dealing with *sphoṭa*. The sentence is the chief form of *sphoṭa,* though Bhartṛhari does speak about it as *pada* and *varṇa* also. It is not only referred to as *sphoṭa,* but also as *śabda*. It is manifested by the sounds which are uttered in a sequence. Whether it be the process of the sounds (*dhvani, nāda*) manifesting the *pada* or of the *padas* manifesting the *vākya* or of the *padārthas* manifesting the *vākyārtha,* the process is the same and has the same features of which the main ones are : (1) the manifestation takes place, in a progressively clear manner, (2) before the sentence and the sentence meaning are fully manifested and grasped, we seem to cognise some other elements, the individual words and their meanings but they are not real, (3) they are only the means by which the final clear cognition takes place. It is not an accident that these main features of the process are brought out by Bhartṛhari both in the first *Kāṇḍa* where the process of manifestation is described and in the second *Kāṇḍa* where the reality of the sentence and the sentence meaning and the unreality and the character of being mere means to an end of the individual words and their meanings are emphasised. The *Kārikās* in which these features are mentioned in the two *Kāṇḍas* have a striking similarity of wording and ideas.[75]

75. See Texts.

4. THE RELATION BETWEEN THE WORD AND THE MEANING.

Of the eight topics which are traditionally considered to form the subject matter of *Vākyapadīya,* Relation accounts for two. Bhartṛhari emphasises *Yogyatā* = 'natural fitness' and *Kāryakāraṇabhāva* = 'causality', as the two main relations between the Word and the Meaning. Other possible relations between them are mentioned or discussed but it is these two which are recognised and emphasised. When words uttered by others are heard, three things are understood : (1) their own form, (2) their meaning, (3) the intention of the speaker. Of these three things, the first is closest (*antaraṅga*) to the word.[1] The hearer understands it even if he does not understand the other two. It is never apart from the word and is distinct for each word. Between the word and the meaning, the relation is that of the expressed and the expression (*vācya—vācakabhāva*), otherwise called natural fitness (*Yogyatā*). What is noteworthy is the statement that between the word and its form also, there is the same relation. In other words, the form is also looked upon as a kind of *vācya.* We already saw in the section dealing with *sphoṭa* that the word had two aspects, that of being the conveyor and the conveyed, the illuminator and the illuminated, the *grāhaka* and the *grāhya.* In so far as it conveys an object, it is *grāhaka* and in so far as it conveys its own form, it is *grāhya.* To say that it is *grāhya* is to say that it is *vācya.* No doubt, once understood, it becomes expressive (*vācaka*) of the meaning, but in the first instance, it is *vācya,* something conveyed. Between the word and the speaker's intention or idea, the relation is said to be causality. The reason given by Helārāja for recognising causality as a relation is interesting. According to him, it has been done in order to accommodate those who hold that words do not denote external objects in the very existence of which they do not believe. Words do no more than bring to the hearer's mind the idea which the speaker had when he decided to speak. That idea was the cause of the words which he uttered and which are, therefore, the effects of the idea. In their turn, the words heard by the listener cause a similar idea to arise in his mind. Now it is the idea in the mind of the hearer which is the effect. Thus, in this relation of causality, the word and the meaning can be alternately cause or effect. In either case, the relation between the two is causality. As grammar is not linked to any particular system of

1. See Texts.

philosophy, it tries, as far as possible, to accommodate all of them or at least some of them.[2]

Both the relations, natural fitness and causality require to be elucidated. It is not merely words which, because of a natural fitness, bring things to the mind, that is, cause knowledge. The senses also do it.[3] Mention must be made of signs also which cause inferential knowledge. But there is a difference between these three things. The senses are only a means in the production of knowledge. They do not form part of the knowledge itself. They are themselves not cognised, while they produce cognition. They resemble words in one important respect, namely, that they cause cognition through a natural fitness. As for signs, they do, like smoke in the inference of fire, enter into the cognition which they cause but stand apart from the thing cognised. The word, on the other hand, is not a mere cause of the cognition which it produces. The thing cognised appears to be one with the word itself. To present the thing as one with the word is just what is called giving expression to it.[4] The difference between the senses and the word is that the former produce cognition without themselves being cognised whereas the word has itself to be cognised, identified before it can cause the knowledge of something else. Not only that. The object cognised becomes identified with the word.[5]

The natural fitness of a word to convey a meaning is made known to us through convention (*samaya, saṅketa*) which is understood as the observation of the use of words by elders. This use follows the natural capacity of words to convey their meaning and does not create it. Human beings cannot create this relation between the word and its meaning, whether we look upon the latter as eternal or transitory.[6] Whether the relation is natural fitness or causality, what is noteworthy is that the meaning is understood as indentical with the word. Both the word and the object meant are designated by the same word. If the word which brings the object to the mind is *ghaṭa*, the object is also *ghaṭa*. One can go further and say that the cognition which the word produces is also *ghaṭa*. The word and the meaning are identified. This happens only because the word is expressive of the meaning and the meaning is what is expressed by the word. The two belong to

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.

each other, a relation denoted either by the expression *asyedam* or *so'yam*. The word is the illuminator and the meaning is the illuminated. The meaning is, as it were, reflected in the word and the word which is grasped has the meaning reflected in it. Though the word and the meaning are different, there is a kind of identity between the two. That is why we can use the expressions *asyedam* = 'it belongs to that' as well as *so'yam* = 'it is that', in regard to them, the former being based on difference (*bheda*) and the latter on identity (*abheda*). Of the two, the latter is the true relation. This has not been established by any particular person or persons.[7] It was always there. Grammar cannot create this relation. It only makes known what is already there. As already pointed out, it is a kind of fitness on the part of the word to convey a particular meaning. This fitness can be understood only by observing the usage of the elders (*samayopādhiḥ*).[8] There are indications in the *Mahābhāṣya* which show that Patañjali also held the same view.[9] The author of the *Saṅgraha* held the same view, judging from a quotation.[10] There are indications of the relation of causality also in the *Mahābhāṣya*. On hearing the word, we get a cognition having the form of the object. On seeing an object also, we get a cognition having the form of the object and the object appears to be external too. Similarly, an object which figures in the cognition produced by the word also appears to be external, though it is not so. As the word is the cause of the cognition having the form of the object and as the object which figures in the cognition is identical with the external object, the word appears to be the cause of the external object also. Thus the relation between the word and the meaning or the object is causality. It is also understood by the observation of the usage of elders. The identification of the object which figures in the cognition with the external object is, of course, superimposition. It is a kind of error. The object which figures in the cognition is the meaning of the word and also its effect. The external object also appears to be so because the two are wrongly identified. All words cause cognitions in which objects figure whether there is anything corresponding to them in the outside world or not. When words are used to describe past events, they produce cognitions in which persons and events of the past figure, though they are not present in the external world at the time. While explaining the use of the present tense in the expression *Kaṃsaṃ ghātayati* = 'he causes

7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.
9. See M. Bhā.I. p. 433, l. 24.
10. See Vāk.I, p. 81, l. 4-5.

Kaṃsa to be killed', Patañjali says that this is said of a story-teller who, while describing the fortunes of past heros from birth to death, sees them in his mind and reveals them as present in his mind.[11]

The understanding of the meaning as one with the word is *adhyāsa* = superimposition, because at this stage, they have become different and yet the meaning is understood as one with the word. Identity is superimposed on two things which are distinct from each other.[12] Whatever be the relation, it really exists between the correct form of the word and the meaning and not between its corrupt form and the meaning. It is admitted that the corrupt form of a word can also bring the meaning to the mind, either directly as in the case of the uneducated who only know the corrupt form or indirectly, that is, after having brought the correct form to the mind as in the case of the educated who know both. But corrupt forms of words are not expressive (*vācaka*) of the meaning. They only enable one to infer their correct forms. The relation is between the correct form and the meaning.[13]

It has been stated before that grammar is based on the assumption that the relation between the word and the meaning is eternal. It is necessary to understand the full implications of this idea. Eternality is understood in two ways. Something which had no origin and which would always remain unchanged is eternal. This is absolute eternality (*Kūṭasthanityatā*). It is in this sense that *Brahman* is eternal. Something which is present in different substrata but does not perish with the substrata is also eternal. A particular jar may be destroyed but the 'jar-ness', the universal in it is eternal. A particular jar may be destroyed, but the jarness which existed in it is eternal and it continues to exist in other jars. There is a continuous stream of jars and even though individual jars may perish, 'jar-ness' continues to exist somewhere or other in the stream. This continuity is also a kind of eternality. Something which assumes different forms but can be recognised to be the same is also eternal in both senses, that of unchangeability and that of continuity. The word as the ultimate Reality is unchangeable and imperishable, that is, it is *kūṭasthanitya*. When we recognise a word in its thousand utterances, it is eternal in the sense of continuity. The meaning of a word is the universal and that is eternal in the sense of being unchanging and imperishable. According to the view that all

11. See M. Bhā.II, p. 36, l. 14-18.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.

words denote *Brahman,* limited by some factor or other, the meaning is again eternal. The *Vākyapadīya,* however, emphasises the eternality of meaning in the sense of continuity and finds support for its view in the *Mahābhāṣya.* It was realised that there may be nothing in the external world corresponding to the meaning which the word brings to the mind. The word *śaśaviṣāṇa* is the classical example. The word brings something to our mind but there is nothing corresponding to it in the external world. Another example is the word *alātacakra* = 'fire wheel'.[14] There is nothing corresponding to the meaning of this word in the outside world. Or the word may mean something perishable. If there is no object in the external world corresponding to the meaning of a word or, even if there is, such an object is perishable, how can the relation between the word and such a non-existent or perishable object be eternal? For the relation to be eternal, is it not necessary that the object should also be eternal? In answer to this objection, it is stated that the word invariably brings its meaning to the mind, whether there is anything corresponding to it in the external world or not. The fact that the meaning invariably comes to the mind constitutes its eternality and this eternality is called *pravāhanityatā* = 'stream-like eternity, continuity.' The statement of the *Mahābhāṣya* is : *nityo hy arthavatām arthair abhisambandhaḥ* = Eternal indeed is the relation of the meaningful ones with their meaning.[15] In the same context but a little later, Kayyaṭa says that the meaning of a word is what appears in the mind. Whenever it is uttered, a meaning having the form of some object arises in the mind. The very fact that a meaning invariably comes to the mind whether an object corresponding to it is present or not is taken as a proof that the relation between the word and the meaning is eternal.[16]

In this connection, it is interesting to note that another criterion of eternality, proposed by some is not accepted by Bhartṛhari. It was suggested by some that certain meaningless words and syllables have the power to produce some visible or invisible results. The meaningless words uttered by Śabaras can cure snake bite which is a visible result and the sacred formulae current in the different religious sects, when uttered properly, are deemed to produce some invisible beneficiary result. It was claimed that this showed that there was some fixed relation between words and things, that words had the power to influence events. But this is not the kind of relation on which the

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14. See Texts.
15. M. Bhā.I, p. 7, l. 10.
16. See Texts.

śāstra is based.[17] The results which the utterance of some words might produce depends on the mere sequence of their phonemes, created by some great personality and not on their expressive power. Ordinary words in the language do not produce results such as the curing of snake poison but that does not mean that there is no natural relation between them and their meanings.[18]

It has so far been shown that the very fact that the meaning invariably comes to our mind when we hear the word is taken as a proof that the relation between the two is eternal. This emphasizes that the meaning is primarily something mental. Whether something corresponding to it is actually present in the outside world is immaterial. This idea that the meaning is what figures in the mind is made use of by Bhartṛhari to explain many expressions which would otherwise remain unexplained. A distinction is made between the Being, the Existence of an object in the external world and its Being in the form of a meaning which figures in the mind. The former is called Primary Being (*Mukhyasattā, Sampratisattā*) and the latter Secondary Being (*Upacārasattā*). It is the view of Bhartṛhari that words move in the realm of this Secondary Being.[19] They convey meanings which have this Secondary Being, whether they have anything corresponding to them in the outside world or not. The very fact of figuring in the mind is looked upon as a kind of Being. Unless word meanings are taken to have this kind of Being, if they are taken to have Primary Being, certain difficulties would arise. It would be difficult, for instance, to explain negation in language. The external object has a fixed form. It cannot co-exist with existence and non-existence at the same time.[20] If a word brings to our mind something having Primary Being, it would be difficult to connect its meaning with affirmation or negation. If what the word *vṛkṣa* = 'tree' denotes has Primary Being, as soon as it is heard, the external existence of the tree would also be understood and so it would not be possible to make a sentence by adding the word *asti* = 'exists', to it, because the latter word denotes primary Being and it has already been conveyed by the word *vṛkṣa* itself. Nor would it be possible to make a sentence with the word *nāsti* = 'does not exist', because it would be a negation of the Primary Being conveyed by the first word and that would result in contradiction. It is not merely existence which can be neither affirmed nor denied if a word denoted an object having Primary Being.

17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.

Other processes would be in the same position. For example, one could not say *aṅkuro jāyate* = 'the sprout comes out,' because the word *aṅkura* would not only convey the meaning of sprout but also that it has primary Being, that is, that it exists and if it already exists, one cannot say that it is born, that it comes out. To say that what already exists is born is a contradiction in terms.[21] The expression *aṅkuro'sti* = 'the sprout exists' would be equally inexplicable, if word meanings are understood to have Primary Being. To exist really means to sustain or to maintain oneself. That which maintains and that which is maintained are the same and that involves contradiction. So much for *jāyate* and *asti*, two of the six well known forms of a process or action recognised already by Yāska in his *Nirukta*. The same difficulty would arise in regard to the remaining four also.

All these contradictions which result if word meanings are looked upon as having Primary Being disappear when it is understood that they move in the realm of Secondary Being. The basis of the Secondary Being is the fact that we determine things in our mind and use words to express what we have determined.[22] Even what is present before our eyes does not become the object of verbal usage until we have determined its nature in our mind.[23] Our mind enjoys a certain amount of freedom in determining things. The mind separates and analyses what is united in reality : Objects in the world are concrete united things, bundles of substance and attributes. Our mind analyses these into substance and attributes separately and following this analysis, we use some words expressive of the substance and others expressive of the attributes. It is our mind which conceives a relation of action and accessory between things which we see and, according to that, in the sentence which we use, some words express action and others express its accessories. The relation of action and accessory between the two is a conception of our mind. As long as something does not figure in our mind, we would not use a word to express it. The meaning which figures in our mind can be connected with any other idea such as affirmation (*asti*), negation (*nāsti*), birth (*jāyate*) and so on. What is more, even things which are totally non-existent outside our mind can be spoken of if they figure in our mind. When we utter a sentence consisting of nouns and a verb and expressive of an action closely associated with its accessories, the action is not there yet and nothing can, therefore, be an accessory in relation to it.

21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.

Therefore, the things denoted by the nouns and the verb have an existence only in the mind. This kind of Being which consists in something figuring in our mind is the basis of the use of all words. As Bhartṛhari puts it—

> "No meaning of a word can go beyond this Secondary Being which is not opposed to things which are opposed to each other, which is resorted to by different words in order to present difference and opposition, which has no temporal distinction but exists in things belonging to different times, which is the cause of the use of words to express meanings. It has been shown as something different from Primary Being in the *Mahābhāṣya*.[24]

The reference here is to the statement in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 5.2.94 which runs as follows : *na sattām padārtho vyabhicarati* = no meaning of a word is without this (Secondary) Being. Both the speaker and the hearer project this Secondary Being externally, that is, what figures in the mind appears to exist outside the mind. But the word really denotes what figures in the mind. It is called *aupacārikī sattā*, that is, Being based upon *upacāra*, the application of a word to a thing other than its normal one. The word *sattā* = 'Being' is normally used for existence in the outside world which is, therefore, its primary (*mukhya*) meaning. To use it for the mere fact of figuring in the mind, irrespective of whether there is anything in the outside world corresponding to what figures in the mind or not is *upacāra*. The past and the future can only figure in the mind and so they have only Secondary Being. The present, on the other hand, not only figures in the mind but it has also external Being.

If word-meanings have this secondary Being, expressions which were found to be inexplicable become intelligible. The sentence *vṛkṣo'sti* = 'the tree exists' would mean that the tree which figures in our mind has Primary Being also and the sentence *vṛkṣo nāsti* = 'the tree does not exist' would mean that the tree which figures in our mind has no Primary Being. The words *asti* and *nāsti* would concede or deny external Being to what has Secondary Being. The expression *aṅkuro jāyate* = 'the sprout is born (comes out)' can also be explained on the basis of this Secondary Being which is capable of assuming all forms. What already exists in its finished form cannot be said to be born. Nor what is totally non-existent. What the expression means is : When the causes are about to produce their effects, what

24. See Texts.

is yet to be is thought of as already being there and to that we give the name *aṅkura* and we present it as the agent of the action of being born. That which is said to be born has, therefore, two characteristics : it is yet to be but it is thought of as being already there. The two ideas are lumped into one. Thus there is *upacāra* here. This mixed thing is the agent of being born. There is further *upacāra* when this agent becomes the object (*karma*) of the action of attaining one's own form which is the meaning of being born. The agent which thus becomes the object through *upacāra* is said to be born. When the agent and the object are based on *upacāra*, the action is also based on it. Explained in this way, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* is seen to be based on Secondary Being (*upacārasattā*). The agent, the object and the action are all the result of *upacāra*. There is *kartṛkalpanā*, *karmakalpanā* and *kriyākalpanā*, the postulation by the mind of the agent, the object and the action.[25]

The expression *abrāhmaṇa* can also be explained on the basis of Secondary Being. In this expression, the word *brāhmaṇa* denotes the quality of being a brahmin attributed, say, to a *kṣattriya* because of resemblance or by mistake. This attribution is thus the object which is going to be negated. It has come through *upacāra*. In order that there may be negation, there must be something to be negated and this *upacāra* supplies it. The negative prefix *'a'* denies Primary Being to the brahminhood attributed to the *Kṣattriya*.[26] Word-meanings having this Secondary Being are compared to a crystal which is very clear. When it is in contact with a blue object, it appears to be blue without giving up its own clarity. The clarity of the crystal consists in its being able to assume various colours, according to the colour of the objects with which it comes into contact. Some objects like jasmine flowers, we are told, have a colour akin to the clarity of the crystal and do not completely hide it. Others like red *japā* flowers completely hide its clarity. The Secondary Being is very much like crystal. The meaning of the word is based on it. It can, at the time of the understanding of the meaning of the sentence, enter, like a crystal, into relation with allied or opposite things. Affirmation or positive entities are to this Secondary Being what jasmine flowers are to a crystal. Negation or negative entities are like *japā* flowers. They hide or disregard what has Secondary Being.[27]

25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.

The fact that word meanings are based on Secondary Being leads us to some more fundamental notions on which the relation between the word and the meaning is based according to Bhartṛhari. In a consideration of this relation, three things are involved : the word (*śabda*) the meaning, object (*artha*) and knowledge (*jñāna*). In our day to day life these three things constantly play a part. All of them have a certain limitation, a certain impurity, as it is called. To take knowledge or cognition first, it has already been pointed out that it is the basis of our use of words.[28] Words convey things as they figure in our cognitions. Our cognitions of things are of a determinate nature (*vikalpa*). They consist in determining some aspect of a thing out of the rest. They can, therefore, present a thing only partially. Apart from that, the very fact of cognition or knowledge or consciousness being coloured by the form of an object is a kind of impurity.[29] Purity of consciousness belongs to the omniscients only. Their knowledge is independent of all sense contact and embraces all things in the world. Dependence on sense contact itself is impurity and being free from it, the knowledge of the omniscients is said to be pure from the very beginning.[30] The knowledge of one who, by practising meditation, gradually gets rid of the taint of objects and attains the state in which only pure consciousness shines is also said to be pure. This is final purity.[31]

If the impurity of knowledge consists in being coloured by the object, that of the latter consists in coming within the range of direct or verbal cognition only through some limiting factor, through some aspect of it. A thing as it is cannot be known or spoken of. It is only some aspect of it such as the universal in it which comes within the range of our cognition and our verbal communication. A thing as such is beyond all verbal usage. It comes within the range of verbal usage only through some limiting factor (*upādhi*) like the universal which is, in a way, different from it (*para*).[32] An object like a cow is in itself neither a cow nor anything else. It can be called a cow only through its connection with 'cow-ness' (*gotva*). In itself, it is beyond the range of all verbal usage. The fact that it can come within the range of verbal usage only if it is coloured by some factor such as the universal is a kind of impurity.[33]

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28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.

This way of looking at the impurity of knowledge and of objects makes it easier to understand the impurity of words. No word can express reality fully and faithfully. A word can only present a part of reality which, even though partless, appears to have parts through nescience. The different objects of the world may be looked upon as parts (*pradeśa*) of the ultimate Reality which in fact, is partless. What is more, any given word cannot express the whole of even any one part. It can only denote an aspect of that part. A word like *ghaṭa* cannot express one part of reality fully. It just expresses a part of that part, namely, the universal in it. Anything else which that part may possess requires another word to express it. If it is red in colour, another word such as *rakta* has to be added to express it. What words actually express is almost equal to a reversal of reality, looked at either from the point of view of a *Vedāntin* or of a Buddhist. The One *Brahman* is presented by the words as many on the basis of different limiting factors. Or they present what is within us as external to us, according to the *Vijñānavādins*. In either case, there is cognition of the opposite of what is real. According to the *Śūnyavādins*, there is no external reality at all. The different forms which occur in our consciousness cannot have reality. They are mere dreams and it is these unreal forms which words express. In other words, they present what does not exist (*abhāva*). In any case, verbal usage relates only to an aspect of a part of reality or to what is determined by an external factor or to a reversal of reality or to what does not exist at all.[34] In this respect of presenting reality in a distorted form, words are like defective senses. With a defective eye, one sees two moons instead of one; with jaundice, one sees the conch as yellow. Thus, to one with defective senses objects produce a cognition in which a different form than what they have figures. Words also produce a cognition in which reality appears distorted. It may be that words convey the full reality undistorted to sages with undiminished vision. But even sages are like ordinary people at the worldly level. At that level, they also, like ordinary people, cognise things through their senses and the mind and then use words to express them.[35] Due to a certain incapacity born of *avidyā*, our determinate cognitions are not capable of seeing things as they are. They see them in an unreal form and words convey these unreal forms supplied by our determinate knowledge (*vikalpa*). All words do this, those which convey positive things and those which convey negative things like *atīta, abhāva* and so on. In this respect, there is no difference between words expressive

34. See Texts under no. **33.**
35. See Texts.

of positive enttities and those which are expressive of negative entities. All of them are equal as far as their relation with the meaning is concerned.[36]

As has been said, words express the unreal which figures in our determinate cognitions and do not touch the undifferentiated reality. They move in the world of differentiation. Universals are unifying elements, but even words expressive of universals are associated with differentiation, because one universal is understood as different from the others.[37]

If our cognitions and words present positive entities in a distorted form, that is, in a form that does not exist, if even positive entities are determined by something external, it means that they are not different from negative entities which are also determined by something external.[38] A negative entity, that is, non-existence enters into usage in terms of something positive. Non-existence is always of something positive like a jar or a piece of cloth.[39] In its real and ultimate form, non-existence is beyond the range of verbal usage.[40] It comes within the range of verbal usage only when connected with some positive entity. In this respect, it resembles a positive entity which also enters into verbal usage in terms of its previous non-existence. It exists only between its previous non-existence and its eventual disappearance or destruction.

All this similarity between existence and non-existence, between a positive entity and a negative entity in verbal usage has been spoken of on the assumption that they are two distinct things. In reality, they are not so. If they were totally different from each other, they could not be spoken of in terms of each other. The fact is that the one Ultimate Reality, called the Self appears in the state of differentiation, as existence and non-existence. The Ultimate Reality is of the nature of light and is essentially without any differentiation or sequence. It is the great Being (*mahāsattā*) and is the very opposite of non-Being. Through Nescience, it becomes the cause of the phenomenal world. When it appears externally as 'this' in the present time and fulfils some purposeful activity it is said to be existence or a positive entity. When it is something past or yet to come and exists

36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.
40. See Texts.

only within us as a residual trace and does not come within the range of the senses and does not fulfil any purposeful activity common to every body, it is said to be non-existence and a negative entity.[41] It is not, however, totally non-existent because it can be remembered or imagined. To the person who remembers it or imagines it, it does fulfil some purpose. So what is called previous non-existence is nothing more than the inability of an object to be perceived by the senses. The same is true of what is called destruction. There is no such thing as non-existence, devoid of all power, being present even when all residual trace is obliterated. Things either exist in the present, capable of being perceived by the senses or exist in the form of residual traces of past perceptions, capable of being awakened in memory or they can be imagined. They are never non-existent and so there is no such thing as non-existence.[42]

It is not possible to look upon existence and non-existence, positive and negative entities as two real effects of two different causes, because causality itself as understood by others, is untenable. Causality is either *asatkāryavāda* = the doctrine that the effect is something totally new, or *satkāryavāda* = the doctrine that the effect, already existent, is manifested. According to the former view, the effect is a new entity, while according to the latter, it is already latent in the causes and only becomes manifest later. In either case, the function of the so-called cause cannot be logically explained. The notion of causality is bound up with the notion of existence and non-existence being two distinct things which is not right. The fact is that they are not two distinct things. They are only two appearances, due to Nescience, of One Ultimate Reality and not two real transformations of it. As the ultimate Reality does not appear as it is the whole of the phenomenal world is a kind of non-existence and there is no point in making a distinction within it between existence and non-existence. Everything has relative existence (*sāṃvṛtena rūpeṇa*). Whatever appears is a thing and what is not a thing cannot appear.[43] The fact is that, according to the sages, birth and destruction are nothing more than manifestation and hiding of an object. A positive entity, before its manifestation and after its hiding is called a negative entity. What is called the previous non-existence of a jar is the state of being just clay and what is called its destruction is the state of being potsherds.[44] The fact is that all this multiplicity is pervaded by a certain unity, namely, *Brahman,* but it

41. See Texts.
42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.

appears as many, as existence and non-existence. If something intangible like non-existence can appear in four forms : *prāgabhāva* = previous non-existence, *pradhavaṃsābhāva* = non-existence after destruction, *atyantābhāva* = absolute non-existence and *itaretarābhāva* = mutual non-existence, there is nothing surprising in the Ultimate Reality appearing in two unreal forms, existence and non-existence. That which comes within the range of the external senses and fulfils a purpose is existence or positive entity and that which does not come within the range of the senses and does not fulfil any purpose is non-existence or negative entity. But this differentiation is unreal. What is real is beyond all differentiation, beyond the range of words and the mind, with no beginning and no end. Those who know the final portion of the Vedas have declared Monism to be the truth and not dualism, presupposed by the performance of actions.[45] Differentiation is due to Nescience. It is this differentiation which appears in our cognitions and words do not touch the undifferentiated reality but only express what figures in our cognitions. They express even the universals as distinct from other universals. Even when they express universals which stand for unity, they are still associated with differentiation. Similarly what is called *viśésa* in the *Vaiśeṣika* system is different from other *viśeṣas*.

The foregoing remarks of a metaphysical or epistemological character about existence and non-existence, casuality and the three kinds of impurity in connection with knowledge may seem rather remote from the subject matter in hand, namely, the relation between the word and the meaning. And yet Helārāja points out that they are not really remote but are connected with it. He states as follows what, according to him, is the main idea of Bhartṛhari in this context:—*Brahman,* the Ultimate Reality is beyond all differentiation and representation. It is endowed with all powers. Words express this Reality, according to occasion, either as a positive existent thing or as non-existence, as limited by this or that factor. Those words which express negative entities are similar to those which are expressive of positive entities as far as their relation with the meaning is concerned.[46]

Therefore, in everyday life, it is the norm for words to express the limited Reality and it has been so stated in the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra.* Therefore all the different views of the followers of the different systems

45. See Texts.
46. See Texts.

of Philosophy are out of place. Ordinary people do not follow the conclusions which may have been reached by different thinkers. In the matter of using words in accordance with our cognitions both the scholar and the child are equal. On that basis, they proceed to exchange views. Ordinary people understand things in a superficial manner and use words accordingly. Grammar explains words as used by ordinary people. In this attempt, it takes the help of the views of the ordinary man. From the indivisible sentence, by a process of abstraction, one derives the root expressive of action, the nouns expressive of things which help in its accomplishment and so on for the sake of explaining the forms.[47] The notions used by grammar to explain the forms are worldly notions. In worldly usage, all words whether expressive of positive or negative things, are in the same position. Therefore, the meanings of words have continuity (*pravāhanityatā*) and our cognitions bring their words with them. Thus the relation between the word and the meaning is eternal.

47. See Texts.

CHAPTER IV

1. BHARTṚHARI ON GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS.

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In the last paragraph of the last chapter, it was stated that, according to Bhartṛhari, grammar tries to explain the formation of words used by cultured people in the world and makes use of notions adopted in the world for the purpose. The sentence and the sentence-meaning are really indivisible units and it is they which are used for communication. This view is established by refuting the other view that what is called a sentence is only a putting together of pre-existing individual words and that what is called sentence meaning is that extra meaning which results when the meanings of individual words are brought together. But, after refuting this view, the grammarian concedes that, even though the individual word and its meaning are not of much use for *vyavahāra* = 'communication and worldly transactions', they have other uses. When he says other uses, he does not mean only that they are useful for others like the *Mīmāṃsakas*. He means that they are useful for grammarians also. They may not be real, but even what is not real has some use. They are a means to an end (*upāya*). They are the means to an understanding of the sentence and the sentence meaning. For two reasons then : (1) in order to accommodate others like the *Mīmāṃsakas* who believe in the reality of the individual word and its meaning and (2) because they are a means to the understanding of the sentence and its meaning, the individual word and its meaning have to be obtained by means of an analysis. The spirit of accommodation towards the other *Darśanas* which, we saw, is a characteristic of Bhartṛhari's thought, shows itself here also. As Helārāja does on many occasions, Puṇyarāja draws our attention to this characteristic in this context. He says that Bhartṛhari accepts for practical purposes what he has rejected on purely theoretical grounds. The Science of Grammar must accommodate itself to all the *darśanas,* because it is common to all of them (*sarvapārṣada*).[1] We must remember that even when the grammarian upholds the indivisibility of the sentence, he does not deny that before the hearer grasps it in its unity, he does hear words and word-meanings in the middle. He does not deny that, psychologically,

1. See Texts.

this does happen. All that he says is that these words and word meanings are not real, that they are only a means to an end. The hearer cannot understand the indivisible sentence and the sentence meaning straightaway at the very beginning.[2] If the sentence is analysed and words and word meanings obtained by an artificial differentiation in the expressive power of words (*saktibhedāt*), all the needs of the *Mīmaṃsaka* would be fulfilled and all the difficulties and objections which he raised against the theory of indivisibility would be met.[3]

To agree that the indivisible sentence has to be divided for practical purposes is a kind of climb down for the grammarian but he has to do it because he cannot perform his task unless the sentence is analysed. It may be a climb down to divide the sentence. Bhartṛhari is aware of it. That is why he has declared that when the Science of Grammar gives the various ways of analysing the sentence and of analysing the words into roots, stems and suffixes, it is Nescience (*avidyā*) which it describes.[4]

If the analysis has to be done, how is it to be done? Here we have to remember that Bhartṛhari has not done the analysis himself. He is not an original grammarian. He did not deal directly with the forms of the Sanskrit language, analyse them and write a grammar. That had already been done. But he tells us how it was done. Or rather, he explains certain ideas already found openly expressed in the *vārttikas* of Kātyāyana and the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali as to how the analysis is to be done.

The word used for analysis is *apoddhāra*. It has a fairly wide meaning. Whenever what is united in reality is divided merely for practical purposes, there is *apoddhāra*. A word conveys an object, a meaning and in that sense, it is *grāhaka*. But it has itself to be cognised before it can convey its object, its meaning. In that sense, it is *grāhya*. As a *grāhaka*, it is a name (*saṃjñā*); as a *grāhya*, it is the named (*saṃjñin*). Ordinarily, they are two different things. Here, by *apoddhāra*, the same thing is looked upon as two things.

To analyse a sentence means to analyse the audible part as well as the meaning part. The analysed meaning is *apoddhārapadārtha*. The unanalysed meaning is *sthitalakṣaṇa* = something having a fixed

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

character. These two kinds of meaning constitute two out of the eight topics of the *Vākyapadīya,* as we have already seen. No analysis would be possible if the *sthitalakṣaṇa* meaning of the sentence were absolutely indivisible. So the grammarian has to come down from that position and look upon the sentence-meaning differently. As the whole process of analysis is a kind of concession to the *Mīmāṃsaka,* the latter's conception of the sentence meaning has to be adopted for the purpose of analysis. The *Mīmāṃsaka* conception is that it is *saṃsarga,* as we have already seen. It is the interconnection of the meanings of the individual words. It is a meaning in which the meanings of the individual words determine one another, delimit one another. When they delimit one another and become well connected, the resulting sentence-meaning is somewhat different from the meanings of the individual words. It represents a particularisation of all of them and rests on all of them together.[5] It is from this well-connected sentence-meaning that the word meanings have to be taken out by analysis. Before the analysis takes place, the word meaning is well fitted into the sentence-meaning. It is artificially analysed out of it by a kind of reasoning, says the *Vṛtti.*[6] It is emphasized that the word meaning which is analysed out of the sentence was very well fitted into the sentence meaning (*atyantasaṃsṛṣṭaḥ*) before that. What is emphasized is that the sentence-meaning is not an interconnection of previously isolated word-meanings.[7]

Bhartṛhari makes it quite clear that it is from the sentence-meaning considered as *saṃsarga* (and not as *pratibhā* or something else) that the analysis takes place. The sentence-meaning is an interconnection between some action or process and the accessories which help in its accomplishment. It is this interconnection which contains the seeds of the analysis. An absolutely indivisible sentence would be quite incapable of being analysed. If the sentence-meaning is an interconnection, the elements connected together can be analysed out of it. The process of sentence analysis is similar to that of the analysis of the word into stem and suffix.[8] Strictly speaking, as the grammarian believes that it is the sentence which is used for communication and is, therefore, the expressive element (*vācaka*) it should really be the object of his attention. The function of the grammarian is to explain the formation of the expressive word, namely, the sentence. But the

5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.

sentence cannot be directly explained grammatically. It can be explained only through the individual words and their meanings. There is no limit to the number of possible sentences and it would be difficult to find common features among them. It would be easier to find common features in the analysed words and so it would be easier to explain the sentence through them.[9] The grammatical derivation of the word, therefore, becomes the means (*upāya*) for the grammatical explanation of the sentence.[10]

In order to analyse the sentence into words, it is necessary first to analyse the sentence meaning into parts. Words can be analysed only on the basis of meanings. Grammar explains the formation of meaningful forms. Unless something has a meaning, it cannot be called a form at all. A meaningless phoneme is not an object of attention for grammar.[11]

In analysing the meaning of a sentence certain considerations have to be kept in mind. When we take a sentence like : *Devadattaḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyāṃ mṛduviśadam odanaṃ pacati* = 'Devadatta cooks rice, soft and with well separated grains, in a metal pot with wood-fuel', and analyse its meaning, we find that it includes several notions. First of all, there is the idea of cooking, an action conveyed by the verb '*pacati*'. Then, there is the notion of a particular person. Devadatta, who does the cooking and is, therefore, the agent (*kartā*). He does it with wood-fuel which is, therefore, the instrument of the act of cooking (*karaṇa*). He does it in a metal pot which thus becomes the *adhikaraṇa*, the receptacle. The result of the cooking is the cooked rice (*odana*), the object of the action (*karma*). The cooked rice is soft, with the grains well separated (*mṛduviśada*), a quality (*guṇa*) which resides in the substance (*dravya*), namely, the cooked rice. In addition to these notions, one understands from many of the words in the sentence, the notion of singular number and from the word *kāṣṭhaiḥ*, the plural number also. Lastly, the verb conveys the notion of the present time also. Thus, from the analysis of this sentence, emerge the notions of action, agent, object of action, means of action, singular number, plural number, substance, quality and present time. These notions are useful to the grammarian in his task of explaining the formation of words (*anvākhyāna*). In fact, they are analysed out of the sentence for that very purpose.[12]

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9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.

What is interesting to note here is that this analysed meaning has been described as *'laukikaḥ'*. The analysis has been done in order to help the grammarian in doing his job, namely, the explanation of the formation of the words current in the world and it is only natural that he should follow the world as much as possible. The word *laukika* is used by Bhartṛhari in order to distinguish it from what is current in the world of scholars, in the *śāstra*. The fact is that the different *śāstras* whose task it is to analyse the reality outside also arrive at certain notions and sometimes use the same words as the grammarians to designate them. The other *śāstras* analyse the reality outside, grammar analyses the sentence and the average man just uses the language. In using the language, the average man also has to handle certain notions though he may not have arrived at them consciously, by logical thinking. But he has them. So the grammarian is placed between the scholars of the other *śāstras*, on the one hand and the average man, on the other. His task is to analyse the sentence and its meaning and arrive at notions which will help in explaining the formation of words. Is he to understand these notions and define them according to the other *śāstras* or according to the average man who uses the language? Bhartṛhari, by using the word *laukikaḥ*, seems to say that the grammarian should prefer the average man. The latter, of course, does not know what is going on in scholarly circles and so cannot follow them. Besides, scholars are notorious for differing from one another. Whom is the average man to follow? So, in practice, he does not bother much about what happens in scholarly circles. The grammarian, on the other hand, cannot ignore the average man, because he has undertaken to explain the average man's language.[13]

So the grammarian follows notions current in the world. But he is also practical. If a notion current in any *śāstra* could help him in explaining the forms of the language, he has no hesitation in adopting it. Sometimes he is not satisfied with a worldly notion nor with a notion current in a particular *śāstra*, but develops his own notion in a particular matter. All this is clearly seen in the case of the notion of *guṇa* (quality). The notion of *guṇa* is used by the average speaker in many ways. We have expressions like *dviguṇā rajjuḥ* = 'a rope having two strands', where *guṇa* means an equal part (*samānāvayava*), *guṇavān ayaṃ deśaḥ* = 'this country has many advantages' where *guṇa* means 'good natural features like rivers and mountains', *guṇavān ayaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ* = 'this Brahman is virtuous' where *guṇa* means

13. See Texts.

good conduct, *guṇabhūtā vayaṃ'iha* = 'we are here the minor ones' where *guṇa* means secondary or unimportant. In the *M. Bhā* on P. 4.1.44 Patañjali quotes a stanza defining *guṇa*.[14] As Kaiyyaṭa explains it, *guṇa* is something which is found in things or substances and which can cease to be there. The same *guṇa* can be found in different kinds of things or substances. The *jāti* or the universal cannot be found in different kinds of things, it can only be found in different things or individuals of the same kind. Nor does it leave a thing as long as the thing lasts. It (the *guṇa*) is sometimes an effect as the colour of a jar and sometimes not so as the magnitude of *ākāśa*. Action or movement is always an effect and so it cannot be a *guṇa*. The whole, as distinct from its parts, in a thing or substance. It exists in its parts and when the conjunction of its parts is destroyed, the whole disappears also. It can also exist in different kinds of things. The jar is a whole and so is a piece of cloth. Thus the whole which is a substance seems to share the characteristic of *guṇa* mentioned above and it is to exclude it from the sphere of *guṇa* that the definition specifies that it should not be of the nature of substance. Thus Kaiyyaṭa's explanation of the stanza quoted by Patañjali makes *guṇa* something which is not substance, nor universal, nor movement but which exists in substances and things and may disappear from them. Now this is really nothing more than the *Vaiśeṣika* definition of *guṇa* and it is used to explain some forms through P. 4.1.44 (*paṭu-paṭvī*) and P. 5.1.124 (*jaḍa-jāḍyam*). But Bhartṛhari gives his own definition of *guṇa*. According to it, it may be sometimes the universal, sometimes a quality, sometimes the form of the word and sometimes a relation. In any case, it is due to the presence of one of these that a certain word becomes applicable to a certain thing. Not only does *guṇa* serve to give a name to a thing, but it is also through it that a thing is distinguished from others of the same class. It is *bhedaka*. Another important characteristic of *guṇa*, as defined by Bhartṛhari is that it is through it that degree in a thing can be expressed.[15] What is noteworthy is that this is really the worldly notion of *guṇa* put in an intelligible form. Helārāja says that this has been officially stated by Bhartṛhari in order to set aside the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of *guṇa*.[16]

As the main purpose of the grammarian is to explain the forms of the language, the notions which form the basis of the explanation

14. See Texts.
15. See Texts.
16. Vāk.III, pt. i, p. 192, l. 13-15.

have to be derived from the forms themselves. Whether they are taken from the world or from the other *śāstras,* they must be justified by the forms themselves. Pure logical notions and categories arrived at by a scientific analysis of reality will not serve the purpose because they would bear no relation to the forms actually found in the language. No scientific definition of *liṅga* in the sense of sex is of any use in grammar because it would not explain what is called gender in words. The grammarian must think of some other notion to explain gender. As Patañjali puts it, the grammarian cannot go by the worldly conception of *liṅga* but must evolve his own notion of it.[17] And he proceeds to do so and it is that notion which is expounded in the *Liṅgasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya.*

Bhartṛhari affirms that there are open statements or hints in the works of Paṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali on these notions and he undertakes to evplain them with the help of these statements and hints.[18] These notions have been isolated and identified by grammatical tradition and Bhartṛhari promises to be faithful to tradition (*yathāgamam*) in explaining them.

As an example of a notion derived from the forms themselves and for which there are hints in the *śāstra,* we may take that of *sādhana.* An action or process which is the meaning of the verb, the main word in the sentence, requires many accessories for its accomplishment. Cooking, for instance, requires a cook, fuel, material to be cooked, a vessel to cook in and so on. These accessories are called *sādhana* = the means. How is one to understand the notion of *sādhana?*. Is *sādhana* the name of something concrete or is it only a capacity, a power, a *śakti* ? Bhartṛhari says that it is only a capacity, a *sāmarthya.*[19] Every object in the world is a bundle of powers or capacities. Words present them, now in one capacity and now in another and not in a fixed form. It is in that capacity that it can be an accessory to an action and not in its bare form. This conception of *sādhana* was arrived at in order to explain forms which are found in the language. This conception explains the fact that, in a language, the same thing can be presented now as this *sādhana* and now as that. That is how the notion of *karmakartā* can arise.

Apoddhāra, grammatical analysis, consists in dividing the sentence meaning into parts and ascribing each of them to one of the divisions

17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.

of the audible part of the sentence. The recognised method for doing this is that of agreement and difference (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*). Kātyāyana had already referred to this method.[20] The principle is quite simple. Whether it be the analysis of the sentence into words and word meanings or the analysis of the word into root and suffix or stem and suffix and their meanings, the method is to assign recurrent parts of the meaning to recurrent parts of the audible element. The recurrence of certain audible parts and certain meanings is *anvaya* and the disappearance of certain audible elements and their meanings is *vyatireka*. We assign the recurring meanings to the recurring audible elements and the non-recurring meanings to the non-recurring audible elements. This is the meaning of the *vārttika* referred to above and Bhartṛhari takes it as his basis.[21]

If language were a very logical affair, this method would work perfectly. As it is, it does work fairly well and not only Pāṇini's system, but all systems of grammar are based on it. But Bhartṛhari knew very well its limitations. So he warns us not to apply it too rigidly. When we analyse the word *vṛkṣāṇām*, we can see three audible elements : *vṛkṣa, nuṭ, ām* and three meanings also : the idea of tree, the idea of relation and the plural number. But how can we assign these three meanings to these three audible elements ? We are bound to think of *bhavatām* where there is no *nuṭ* and yet all the three meanings are there too. Similarly, in *pacati* we are taught to see three elements, the root, *pac*, the *vikaraṇa śap* and the suffix *tip*. We have no difficulty in assigning a meaning to the root *pac*. It means the action of cookiing but what meaning are we to assign to *śap*? In *atti*, there is no *śap* and yet the same kinds of meanings are conveyed by it also. So we have to admit that a meaning cannot be assigned to all the audible elements. Some of them will have to be admitted to be either meaningless or, at the most to be merely helping the other elements which are meaningful. *Nuṭ*, for instance, has no meaning of its own; it only helps the inflectional suffix *ām* to express relation. Similarly, *śap* has no meaning of its own. It only supports *tip* in expressing its meaning. It is only where the method of agreement and difference can be applied without any hitch that particular meanings can be assigned to particular audible elements. It cannot be so applied in the case of *nuṭ* and *śap* and so no fixed meaning can be ascribed to them.[22] It is no wonder that, using the same method

20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.

of analysis, that of *anvaya* and *vyatireka,* diifferent grammarians or different systems of grammar reach different results. All analysis is only a hint at the reality, which is a whole, a synthesis. One can tell somebody the way by pointing to something which is associated with that way, it may be a tree or an anthill or a mountain, it does not matter. The enquirer will understand the way alright. In the same way, no matter how one analyses a word, the whole word in its unity would be understood. One may analyse the word *bhavati* into two parts, the root *bhū* and the suffix *ati* or one may analyse it into three parts, the root *bhū,* the *vikaraṇa* a (*śap*) and the suffix '*ti*'. Both kinds of analysis would fulfil the purpose of explaining the whole word *bhavati*. Similarly, the word *gauḥ* can be derived from the root *girati, garjati, gacchati, gavati* or *gadati*. Each one of these roots would point to something which the object called cow has and that is enough as the basis of derivation.[23]

This attitude of the grammarian towards his own task makes him rather tolerant, which explains that so many systems of Sanskrit Grammar arose in India. It should not, therefore, be difficult for a *Vaiyākaraṇa* brought up in the Pāṇinian tradition, to regard with tolerance and understanding the different Sanskrit Grammars which are being written in the modern age in different western languages, on the basis of an independent analysis of the facts of the Sanskrit language, however much they may differ from the Pāṇinian system.

23. See Texts.

2. THE MEANING OF WORDS OBTAINED BY ANALYSIS—THE UNIVERSAL AND THE SUBSTANCE.

If an analysis of the indivisible sentence and the sentence meaning has to be done to fulfil practical purposes, the question arises as to the nature of the meaning obtained by such an analysis. Here also there was difference of opinion and Bhartṛhari records as many as twelve views on the subject. They are not mutually exclusive views. They are rather statements of the different aspects of the same thing. While a few may be mutually contradictory, some may be looked upon as complementary to one another. It is a pity that none of these views is described or expounded in detail. There are only hints of them. Nor are they mentioned in any logical order. To make matters worse, the *Vṛtti* on the *Kārikās* dealing with these views is not available.

The first view is that the meaning of a word is in the nature of a generality and does not involve any particular form or sensory image. It is admitted by all that from words like *apūrva, devatā* and *svarga,* we do understand something, but that something has no particular form or shape. The fact that the meaning of these words does not involve any form or sensory image does not affect their meaningfulness. The meaning of the other words in the language like '*go*' = 'cow', *aśva* = 'horse', and so on does involve a shape and form. The form involved in the meaning of the word *go* is different from that involved in the meaning of *aśva.* What is contended is that this form is irrelevant to the meaning of these words. It so happens that the thing meant by these words has a form which can be perceived by the senses, so that whenever these words are uttered, that form also comes to the mind. It does not mean that the meaning of every word should involve a form perceptible to the senses. If it does involve it, it is just an accident and, therefore, irrelevant to the meaning of the word. The form does not come within the range of the word, because there are so many words in the language like *apūrva, devatā* and *svarga* whose meanings do not involve any form at all. It is better to take as the meaning of a word that which is invariably present in every case.[1]

The second view is that the meaning of a word is in the nature of the universal. But a universal must have a substratum and so when a word conveys the universal, the substratum, that is, the parti-

1. See Texts.

cular in which it inheres is also necessarily understood with it. The question is whether the substratum or the particular is also the meaning of the word. Some held that both the universal and the particular must be considered to be the meaning of the word whereas the upholders of the second view considered the understanding of the substratum, the particular to be a by-product. The word is really not expressive of these particulars. It is expressive only of the universal.[2] When one hears the word *ghaṭa*, for instance, one understands only what is common to all the *ghaṭas* and not all the possible forms and shapes of a jar. When one understands an action from a verb, one also necessarily understands that that action must have accessories which help in its accomplishment. That does not mean that these accessories are also part of the meaning of the verb. They are necessarily understood in a general way but remain outside the range of the meaning of the word.

Thus, in this second view, a distinction is made between the expressed meaning of a word and what is necessarily implied in it. Though the latter is also necessarily understood from the word, it lies beyond the range of its expressive power. There were, however, some who did not see any ground for distinguishing between what is expressed and what is implied. They were of the view that whatever is understood from the words must be looked upon as its meaning. What is understood may be in the nature of an action and its accessories or it may be in the nature of the universal and the particular in which it inheres. The whole thing must be considered to come within the range of the expressive power of the words. Within what is understood, something may be primary and the rest secondary to it. Action may be the primary part and the accessories secondary to it. The particular in which the universal inheres may be the primary part, being directly connected with action and the universal the secondary part, being only indirectly connected with action. But everything, the primary as well as the secondary parts, comes within the range of the expressive power of the word. This is the third view.[3]

The fourth view differs from the previous one only to this extent that it makes no distinction between the primary and the secondary. Everything that is understood is on the same footing as everything else. Within what is understood, there is neither accumulation nor option.[4] If a word denotes all the forms taken on by the individuals

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

or particulars coming under it, it would always have to be put in the plural number. If, on the other hand, it denotes an indefinite number of such forms, there would be indefiniteness, with regard to number. That is why the author says : *avikalpasamuccayaḥ*. What it appears to mean is that the exact number of forms and shapes is not present to the mind. The *Pañjikā* of Kamalaśīla on the *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, while explaining this stanza, gives the following example. The word *brāhmaṇa* is like the word *vana* = forest. When one hears the latter word, one does not understand the different trees constituting the forest as alternatives, nor does one understand them as added to one another. They are understood in a general way. Similarly, when one hears the word *brāhmaṇa*, one does not understand the qualities of a brahmin like austerity, birth and learning as alternatives nor does one understand them as added to one another. They are understood as a whole as belonging to a *brāhmaṇa* and not to any one else.

A fifth view on the same subject was that a word like *ghaṭa* denoted the relation between an object and its properties like the universal, qualities like colour and actions which inhere in it. This relation cannot be seen apart from the object in which these properties are supposed to inhere. So it has been said to be unreal.[5] Some, like the Buddhists, do not believe in the reality of the universal in any case. The *Advaitins* do not believe in it either. According to the Buddhists, the only thing which is real is the momentary object with its uniqueness. The word, however, presents something more than this and all that is unreal.

The sixth view is, in a way, the opposite of the previous one and yet there is resemblance between the two. In the previous view, what the word denotes is unreal. It does not touch reality which is momentary and unique. According to this view, what is real is also eternal. In this view also, words cannot touch reality directly because they denote various unreal limiting factors (*upādhi*) and it is through them that they point to the eternal ultimate Reality.[6] This is a view to which Bhartṛhari attaches much importance as he devotes a whole section to its exposition in the third *Kāṇḍa*.

According to the seventh view, the form of the word itself should be looked upon as a kind of meaning conveyed by the word. It will

5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.

be remembered that, in the course of the exposition of the *Sphoṭa* doctrine, it was pointed out that the word was not only *grāhaka* (conveyor) but also *grāhya* (what is conveyed). The form of the word is identified with the meaning. The form which is thus identified is *abhijalpa* and it is as *abhijalpa* that it should be looked upon as something conveyed by the word.[7] The process of identification is also called by the same name. When the form and the meaning are identified, there are two possibilities. Either the thing meant by the word is more important or the form of the word is more important in regard to the action which is to be performed. Ordinarily, in the world, the thing meant is more important, because it is on that that the action is performed. In the Science of Grammar, ordinarily, the operation that is taught is to be performed on the form itself. Sometimes, however, it is to be performed on some other verbal form which it brings to the mind. In that case, the other verbal form becomes the thing meant and is more important than the form of the word.[8]

The eighth and ninth views are stated together because of their close resemblance. An object in the world is nothing and powerless (*aśakti*), except as the word presents it. It has no power to make itself known independently of the word. It is the word which presents reality either as an action or process or as a concrete finished thing. Instead of looking at reality as nothing one may look upon it as everything potentially (*sarvaśakti*). In other words, the object has within itself the power to make known the universal or the qualities like colour or the actions or processes which inhere in it. But which particular thing is to be made known depends upon the wish of the speaker and the words which he uses in regard to the object having all the potentialities. The word becomes eternally associated with one of the things inherent in the object and is said to be expressive of it.[9]

The next view draws attention to the fact that both the word and its meaning are mental entities. The relation of illuminator and illuminated can exist between two things only if they both belong to the same level. The word which is the illuminator and the expressive element is something mental and so what it illuminates, the thing expressed, must also be something mental. Though the meaning is also something mental, it seems to have the form of the external object. Though an inner entity, it seems to be something external. It is neces-

7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.

sary that it should be understood as something external. Otherwise, its connection with action would not be understood. Actions cannot be performed on purely mental entities and words are supposed to convey objects which are susceptible to action. But when the mental object conveyed by the word is superimposed on the external object and is understood as external, it is also understood as susceptible to action.[10]

The eleventh view seems to be a repetition of the first one. All that it says is that the meaning of some words involves some form or shape while that of others consists in the mere understanding (*saṃvinmātram*) of something, of an idea or of a concept.. Examples of each have already been given under the first view. The meaning of some words has an object corresponding to it in the external world and that object may have some form or sensory image. This form also comes to the mind when the word is heard and it colours the meaning of the word. Where the meaning of a word has no object corresponding to it in the external world, no form or shape can become associated with it, because no such thing is perceived in the external world.[11]

The last view proclaims the rather indefinite nature of the meaning conveyed by and understood from words. The whole thing depends upon the cultural background of the speaker and the hearer.[12] Puṇyarāja points out that a *Vaiśeṣika* may use the word *ghaṭa* to convey a whole as distinct from its parts while a *Sāṅkhya* would understand from the word a mere combination of qualities and the *Jainas* and *Bauddhas* a collection of atoms. With regard to the same thing, one's views undergo change. The same person sees the same thing differently at different times, due to his coming under different cultural influences. To one and the same word are attributed many meanings by one and the same person or by different persons according to circumstances. The net result of all this is that the meaning of the analysed individual word is something indefinite and varies according to circumstances.

As in the case of the sentence meaning, there were different views about the sentence also. When, for practical purposes, it is analysed, into how many different kinds of words is it to be analysed. Bhartṛhari tells us that it is analysed into two, four or five kinds of words[13]

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10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.

This division of the sentence is based upon an artificial division of the sentence meaning which is really indivisible. When we divide the sentence meaning, we get two kinds of notions : action and accessory to action. That which expresses the former is called the verb (*akhyāta*) and that which expresses the latter is called noun. Thus we get two kinds of words : verb and noun. Every word found in a sentence on analysis would come under one of these two in this two-fold analysis of the sentence. The so-called particles (*nipāta*), prepositions (*upasarga*) and post-positions (*karmapravacanīya*) would come under them. Some particles express a peculiarity belonging to a thing (*siddha*), the meaning of nouns and would, therefore, come under them. It makes no difference whether a word expresses a thing (*siddha*) directly or expresses a peculiarity in it. Some particles like '*svaḥ*' are primarily expressive of things (*sattvapradhāna*) and so would come under nouns. Particles like *hiruk* would come under verbs because they are primarily expressive of actions. It is not merely words ending in verbal suffixes (*tiṅ*) which are verbs. Any word which is primarily expressive of a process is a verb. That is why prepositions and postpositions and particles would also come under verbs because they can also express some peculiarity in a process. In this way, those who uphold a two-fold analysis of the sentence try to bring every kind of word under the verb or the noun.

But particles and prepositions are classed separately by those who want to emphasise their special feature. They do not express a meaning directly but express a peculiarity in the meanings of nouns and verbs and so they are classed separately. Particles (*nipāta*) and prepositions (*upasarga*) differ from one another also because the former can express a peculiarity found in things and processes whereas the latter can express a peculiarity in processes only. Postpositions (*karmapravacanīya*) are brought under preparations on the ground that, ultimately, they express a peculiarity in an action or process. In this way, some analyse the sentence into four kinds of words : the verb, the noun, the particle and the preposition.

Some, however, insist on putting postpositions in a separate category and so analyse the sentence into five kinds of words. They do so because of the special functions which the *karmapravacanīya* performs, namely, the delimitation of a relation. It differs from a preposition because it refers to an action that is past and not to one that is present. Relations are of many kinds. The six *kārakas* are all relations. The accessories which help in the accomplishment of the action stand towards the latter in one of these six relations. But there are relations which are different from these six. They are brought

about by action or by some service rendered through action. The Bhāṣyakāra has stated (*M. Bhā.* I, p. 463, 1. 13.) that when any one of the six relations called *kāraka* is not meant as such, it becomes *śeṣa* = 'the rest', that is, relation in general. The rest includes, not only the six *Kāraka* relations when not meant as such but also those which are the results of a previous relation of action and accessory. The relation of master and servant in the expression *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the King's man', implies a previous *kāraka* relation, that of donor and recipient or some other relation. The previous relation such as that of donor and recipient is the cause and the later relation of master and servant is the result. But the causal action is not mentioned in the expression under discussion.[14] Where no verb is used, there are two possibilities : either there is no postposition in the expression or there is one. Where there is no postposition, the very nature of the things related brings the causal action to the mind and we understand that the relation must have been preceded by some particular action involving the two things. In the expression *upagor apatyam* = 'the offspring of Upagu,' there is the relation of father and offspring, brought about by the act of procreation. In *vṛkṣasya śākkā* = 'the branch of the tree', there is the relation of whole and part, brought about by the tree's action of standing and supporting. Sometimes, the relation has not the power of bringing any particular action to the mind. For instance, in the sentence *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the King's man', the relation is that of master and servant (*svasvāmibhāva*) and it may have been due to one of many actions such as maintenance, abduction, purchase and begging, as suggested by the author of the *Bhāṣya* (See *M. Bhā.* I, p. 463, 1. 12.). From the expression, 'the King's man', the particular action which was the cause of the relation of *sva* and *śvāmin*, is not understood. Sometimes, however, there is a postposition in the expression in question and it throws light on the particular action which has brought about the relation. In the expression *vṛkṣaṃ prati vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes at the tree', *prati* is a postposition. The verb expresses the action of flashing. There is also the action of aiming. The flashing is aimed at the tree. The tree is the aim. Between the tree and the action of aiming, there is the relation called *lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāva*, and it is the postposition '*prati*' which specifies or delimits it. The action of aiming is not mentioned in the expression. The second case affix after the word *vṛkṣa* tells us that there is a relation between the tree and the flash. It is the word *prati* which specifies it. Its function, therefore, is to specify the particular relation brought about by the action which is not mentioned.

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14. See Texts.

That is what Bhartṛhari means when he says that a *karmapravacanīya* does not express an action, in this case, the action of aiming. Such an action does not come to the mind from the sentence. Nor does it directly express the relation because the second case-affix after *vṛkṣa* does it. Nor does it bring any other action to the mind. All that it does is to specify the relation, namely, *lakṣyalakṣaṇabhāva*.[15] To take another example, in the sentence : *Śākalysya saṃhitām anu prā-varṣat* = 'it rained after (the recitation of) *Śākalya's saṃhitā*, there is the relation of cause and effect between the *saṃhitā*, and rain and this relation is due to the action of reciting the *saṃhitā* text. The postposition *anu* tells us that it is due to this action. It does not directly express the relation of cause and effect because that is done by the second case affix which is specially taught (P.2.3.8.) instead of other case endings. The real function of '*anu*' is, therefore, to delimit the relation, to say that it is brought about by the particular action of recitation. This function is called *sambandhāvaccheda*.

While Bhartṛhari refers to this variety of views among grammarians in regard to the number of the kinds of words or parts of speech obtained by an artificial analysis of the sentence, he seems to be more interested in the nature of the notions expressed by these two or four or five kinds of words obtained by an analysis of the sentence and of the individual words into root, stem and suffix. In fact, the analysis of the sentence into individual words depends upon the analysis of the sentence meaning into smaller units. It is found that some of these smaller units of meaning are of a more general nature than others. They are expressed by all the smaller units into which not only the sentence, but even the individual word can be analysed. They are not, therefore, very significant for the derivation of the characteristic forms of the Sanskrit language. But, as they run through all the forms, they are dealt with first by Bhartṛhari. The notions of universal and substance are of such a general nature and they are expounded in the first two sections of the third *kāṇḍa*.

On the subject of the very general meaning which runs through all the forms, two views were current and the names of two ancient grammarians are associated with these two views. *Vājapyāyana* held the view that all words and parts of words denote the universal (*jāti, ākṛti*) and *Vyāḍi* held the view that they denote the substance (*dravya*).[16] These views were put forward on the basis of the study

15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.

of the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, as implications of the way in which he explained the formation of words. As the different systems of Philosophy developed in the country, their influence was felt in grammatical circles and we see their full influence in the *Vākyapadīya*. Bhartṛhari does not speak only as a grammarian concerned with the formation of the words of the Sanskrit language, but also as a philosopher concerned with the explanation of experience and reality. The mixture of these two points of view is an important feature of the *Vākyapadīyam,* as I have already pointed out in the section on Bhartṛhari and the *Darśanas*. He puts forward arguments, drawn not only from the *sūtras* of Pāṇini, but also from philosophical circles in order to expound the idea that all words denote the universal or that they denote the substance (the particular, the individual).

It may be said at once that, according to Sanskrit grammarians, there is no contradiction or incompatibility between these two views. They are two ways of looking at the same thing. In framing his *sūtras,* Pāṇini has sometimes assumed the universal (*jāti*) to be the meaning of all words and sometimes the particular, the substance (*dravya*). Each notion has its own scope.[17] Both are the meanings of words, though in particular cases, one of the two may be more important than the other.[18] The word conveys and the hearer understands both at the same time. The word cannot convey the two, one after the other. The power of the word called *abhidhā* is deemed to convey only the universal or the substance (the particular) while the other is deemed to be understood by the hearer as a by-product.

Those who hold that a word conveys primarily the universal mean that in all the occurrences and instances of an object like a tree, there is something common which causes a uniform cognition and the application of the same name to all of them. This is the universal which the word denotes. All kinds of words and even parts of words do so. A noun like *gauḥ* = 'cow' conveys the universal of the cow, its 'cow-ness', but as such a universal must exist somewhere, as it cannot be thought of without a substratum, the particular or the individual is also understood. Similarly, by the power called *abhidhā,* the verb denotes the universal aspect of an action or process, present in the different moments of it and causing the cognition of identify and the use of the same word. It is the root part of the verb which does this. The suffix part of a verb conveys the universal of the

17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.

accessory (*kāraka, sādhana*) of that action in a very general way and so it plays a subordinate part in the cognition produced by the verb. The nouns in the sentence convey the universals of the accessories in a more specific way and the universal of the action conveyed by the verb enters into relation with them through the particulars where they reside.[19] In the particular (*vyakti*) there is not only the universal but also the power called accessory (*sādhana*). It will be shown later that, for the grammarian, what is called accessory or *sādhana* is essentially a power, the power to help in the accomplishment of the action in some way or other. This power can naturally enter into direct relation with action, but the universal does so through this power. In the individual or the particular, there is not only this power but it has also some number or other, usually expressed by the suffix part of the verb. This number enters into relation with action through the power of the accessory. The universal of action, like all universals, is eternal; but any particular instance of it, that is the individual aspect of it is a process (*sādhya*) and, therefore, not eternal.[20] As the prepositions (*upasarga*) do no more than express a peculiarity in the action conveyed by the verb which is a universal, their meaning also is in the nature of a universal. Words expressive of qualities like *śukla* = 'white' denote their universal aspect. Even proper names denote the universal and permanent aspect of particular persons who are constantly changing from infancy to old age.[21]

Vyākaraṇa claims to be an explanation, not only of the words used in the world but also of those found in the Vedas. Its theories and practices have, therefore, to be satisfactory from both points of view. In the many discusions found in the *Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali references to the Vedic language and ritual are many. Following Patañjali, Bhartṛhari is anxious to point out that in declaring the universal to be the meaning of words, one does not go against Vedic injunctions. The Veda prescribes various acts to be done with various kinds of materials. Where the prescribed material is not available, the act is accomplished with a substitute. The question now arises as to whether substitutes would be possible if Vedic words are understood as standing for the universal. The substitute may belong to another class and, therefore, have a different universal. The use of it would mean a violation of Vedic injunction, It is, therefore, necessary to show that, even according to the view that the word denotes the universal, substitutes can be used wihout violating Vedic injunction. Bhartṛhari does this on the

19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.

basis of the meaning of the individual word, the purport of the sentence and the context. He takes the Vedic injunction *khādire badhnāti*, he ties (the sacrificial animal) to a post made of *khadira* wood,' as an example. The meaning of the individual word has been said to be the universal. But it cannot be connected directly with the action enjoined by the sentence as a whole, in this case, the action of tying the animal to the post. The animal can be tied only to a particular post made of *khadira* wood and not to a post in general. Only a particular post has the power or the capacity to have the animal tied to it. This capacity and the universal namely, the fact of being made of *khadira* wood reside in a particular post. Unless the capacity is there, the mere universal would not serve the purpose. The word *khādira* means not only something made of *khadira* wood but also something which has the capacity to act as the post. It, for some reason a post made of that particular wood is not available the word can still denote something which has the requisite capacity, though not made of *khadira wood*.[22] In other words, a post made of some such wood as *kadara* may be substituted.

Even if one does not take the view that the universal stands for capacity, a consideration of the meaning of the sentence as a whole leads to the same conclusion. The verb is the most important word in the sentence. Here the verb *badhnāti* = 'ties', denotes an action resulting in loss of independence of the animal. Such an action has to be accomplished in any case. If it cannot be accomplished due to the non-availability of *khadira* wood, some other wood like *kadara* may be substituted. The meaning of the sentence namely, the tying of the animal resulting in loss of independence is the main thing. Whatever is helpful in bringing this about may legitimately be taken.[23]

Thirdly, a consideration of the context also leads to the conclusion that substitutes are possible. In the context where the tying of the animal is taught, other actions like its killing are also taught. This is an indication that the animal must be well tied to the post. Therefore, something which has the fitness to be used as the sacrificial post must be taken. *Khadira* wood has this fitness, but if it is not available, something else which has this fitness must be substituted.[24]

Thus, on a consideration of word meaning, sentence meaning and the context, the universal stands for that which has the requisite capa-

21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.

city and, therefore, substitutes would be possible where the prescribed material is not available. The injunction *khādire badhnati* is so interpreted that it does not make alternatives impossible. Its positive aspect is retained. It is not taken as a restriction.

When we hear a word, we first understand its form before grasping its meaning. Even when we do not understand the meaning, we grasp the form. Thus, the form also becomes the *abhidheya* = 'what is conveyed', of the word. It was said about the meaning that it was in the nature of a universal. The form is also a universal. It persists in all the utterances of a word at different times by different persons and enables us to recognise the same word in all of them. What is more, the word and its meaning appear as one.[25] As both the form and the meaning are universals, the universal of the meaning is understood as identical with that of the form. In other words, the universal of the form is superimposed on that of the meaning. It is because the form is superimposed on the meaning that the former is called the expressive word (*vācaka*) and the latter the expressed sense (*vācya*). Superimposition presupposes the existence of two different things, but in reality, according to grammar, word and meaning are initially one and later differentiated. It is at this stage that we postulate superimposition. It is only a postulation at a certain stage because, in reality, the two are one. This superimposition is not man-made, as when we say : 'this man is a lion'. It is eternal, just as much as the relation of *vācya* and *cācaka* between word and meaning is eternal. To say that the form of the word is also a universal is to say that the *sphoṭa* is a universal, because the word is really the *sphoṭa,* an entity over and above the sounds which manifest it. How the grammarian understands this process of manifestation has been described elsewhere. Suffice it to say that the universal of the word is fully and progressively clearly manifested by each sound of the word, just as each moment of a movement like lifting the arm manifests it fully and progressively more clearly or just as a passage, not fully learnt by heart at the first reading is progressively memorised by repeated readings or just as the genuineness of a precious stone, not absolutely clear at the first gaze, becomes so progressively.[26].

It has been said that the word is superimposed on the meaning. This is seen in the fact that both about the word *gauḥ* and the object *gauḥ* which it denotes, we can use the expression *ayaṃ gauḥ*. This

25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.

superimposition is something like our speaking about a red cloth when what is red is not the cloth but the red substance with which the cloth has come into contact. Helārāja, following *vaiśeṣika* conceptions, puts it this way : redness exists in the colour red, the red colour exists in a substance like 'lac', the cloth comes into contact with this substance and we see the cloth as red through the contact called *saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*. We superimpose on the cloth something which belongs to the colour. Similarly, the universal of the word is superimposed on the universal of the meaning when we say : *ayaṃ gauḥ*.

Bhartṛhari attributes another function to the universal of the word. If all words denote the universal existing in the different instances of the same thing, what does the word *jāti* = 'universal' itself denote ? It cannot denote the universal existing in the different universals because the *Vaiśeṣikas* who believe in the universal also declare that there cannot be a universal in a universal. Similarly, what does the word *śabdajāti* = 'word-universal' denote ? If it also denotes a universal it must denote a universal which exists in the different word-universals like *gośabdatva* = 'the universal of the word *'go',' vṛkṣa-śabdatva* = the universal of the word *vṛkṣa* and so on. But again the *Vaiśeṣika* principle that there cannot be a universal in a universal comes in. To remove this difficulty, it is stated that the universals of the words *jāti* and *sābdajāti* play the part of such a universal in the universals by means of superimposition. That is how we can use the word universal only once in the expression 'these universals' while speaking collectively about all the universals existing in objects as we use the word 'tree' only once in the expression 'these trees'. Similarly we can use the word *'śabdajāti* only once in the expression *śabda-jātaya imāḥ* (these word-universals) while speaking collectively about all the universals existing in the words. In both these expressions, the universals denoted by the two words *jāti* and *śabdajāti* play the part of a universal within a universal,[27] which, according to the *Vaiśeṣikas* is not possible.

But this is only an attempt to get over the difficulty caused by the *Vaiśeṣika* conception by using the idea of *adhyāsa*. Even without having recourse to the idea of superimposition, it is possible to show that all words denote the universal. If the idea of *adhyāsa* is not brought in, one would say simply that *all* words denote the universal, without adding that the universal of the word and that of the meaning

27. See Texts.

are understood as one. By *all,* one would mean not only words like '*go*', *aśva* and so on but also words like *jāti*. The objection based on the principle that there cannot be a universal in a universal may be alright for the *Vaiśeṣikas.* The Grammarians look at the matter differently. Their concern is to find out the nature of the meaning conveyed by words. What they find is that in all the universals conveyed by words there is a common point or characteristic which can be looked upon as another universal and can be called by the name *jāti*.[28] After all, the *Vaiśeṣikas* who believe in the universal do so because of the existence of a persisting common characteristic in the individuals. Grammarians go by how things are presented by words. They are not really concerned with things as they really are, but with things as conveyed by words. If a quality is conveyed by words as a common characteristic, it becomes a universal for them. The word *śyāma* = 'dark' is considered ordinarily to denote a quality. But Pāṇini gives the name *sāmānya* to the meaning of that word in the compound *śastrīśyāmā* according to his *sūtra*: *upamānāni sāmānyavacanaiḥ*[29] (P. 2.1.55). If words present action as a persisting common characteristic, it also becomes a universal. It may be found that, in such matters, grammar is more true to worldly usage than to the traditions of particular systems of thought. To the grammarian, *artha* means what the word conveys and all words convey the universal as a matter of fact. The universal so conveyed may or may not have an external existence. But the fact remains that the word, through its function called *abhidhā* does convey it and so that is the meaning of the word.[30] Those who hold that all words convey the substance or the individual or the particular also rely upon word function or the way in which words present things to establish their view. They claim that all words can denote *dravya,* some primarily and directly, others indirectly and secondarily. They also say that whatever may be the reality, a thing as conveyed by words may possess the characteristics of a *dravya* which are (1) a capacity of being referred to by the pronouns 'this or that', (2) a certain completeness or independence, (3) association with gender and number and so on.[31] A quality like 'whiteness' may or may not have these attributes, but as presented by the word, it can have them. This will be further explained later.

In considering the question on the basis of word function,

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28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.

Bhartṛhari was acting as a grammarian or a linguist. He was following the principle of the grammarian : *śabdāartho'rthaḥ*. But he was more than that. He was also a philosopher and in that capacity also, he is anxious to establish that all words convey the universal. He was aware of the existence of different systems of philosophy and he was anxious that his conclusions should be acceptable to all of them. He was conscious of the fact that grammar was not attached to any particular system of philosophy but was common to all of them or was above all of them. Helārāja is never tired of reminding us that it is *sarvapārṣada*.[32] So an attempt is made in the *Vākyapadīya* to show that, without going against the fundamental principles or the methods of the different systems, it can be established that all words denote the universal. Taking the *Vaiśeṣikas* first, it is pointed out that they accept the universal as one of their six primary categories. According to them, it is something as a result of which a large number of mutually differing individual objects produce a uniform cognition and are called by the same name. It pervades the whole of its substratum and not merely a part of it. These characteristics of a universal may be found in something which covers all the universals themselves and that something may be looked upon as a universal in the universals, and it can cause the peculiar effects of a universal already mentioned.[33] The same thing can be said about *viśeṣa*, another positive category accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. It stands for the distinguishing feature which exists in eternal substances and enables us to distinguish one eternal substance from another, one atom from another, for example.[34] If all the *viśeṣas* do this, that is their common feature which enables us to apply the word *viśeṣa* to all of them. They also thus become a kind of universal and it is this common point which the word *viśeṣa* denotes. Of course, this common point is not a universal of the genuine type, but it is similar to it. Similarly, in all types of non-existence there is a common point similar to a universal, though not of the genuine type and that enables us to apply the word *abhāva* to all of them.[35]

The question now arises : how can words like *ākāśa, dik, kāla, ātmā* and *samavāya* denote the universal, considering that what they denote is One and not conceived of as comprising divisions or individuals. The universal is a common feature existing in many things, leading

32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.

to uniformity of cognition and the application of the same name. There is no such thing to which the name *ākāśa* can be applied, because it is conceived of as a single eternal entity. This doubt is answered by saying that *ākāśa* means space. It is so called because it gives room to the objects of the world.[36] The objects themselves are mutually impenetrable and do not give room to one another. Even though space is one, we can make divisions within it by a process which is the reverse of what we do in the case of universals. What is called a universal is something which unifies, brings about identity (*abheda*) between things which are really different from one another. *Ākāśa* is one and so unity is already initially there. But all objects in the world are in contact with it. These points of contact may be looked upon as so many divisions of *ākāśa,* though, of course, the divisions would only be secondary ones and not primary ones.[37] Each one of these divisions would be *ākāśa.* The space occupied by a jar would be so just as much as the space occupied by a piece of cloth. There would thus result an infinite number of *ākāśas* and there would be a common feature in all of them, namely, the fact of being *ākāśa.* The word would thus denote that common feature, a kind of universal though only of the secondary type, the divisions themselves being of the secondary type.[38] One may even go to the extent of looking upon the divisions as primary and not secondary. The objects which are in contact with *ākāśa* may themselves be looked upon as its divisions. The incorporeal (*amūrta*) *ākāśa,* divided by these objects, becomes their substratum, their location (*deśa*). The objects as divisions are *deśa* and *ākāśa* as the location is *deśa.* Thus *ākāśa* and the objects become *deśa* to each other.[39] In this way of looking at things, the divisions are primary and not secondary. Ordinarily, when we have the idea of two things being in conjunction as *ākāśa* and an object, it is based on a difference between the two things. Even when we see the conjunction, we continue to see the two things as different from each other. The two things which come into contact (*saṃyoga*) make a kind of whole but they are not essential parts of that whole, because we continue to perceive them as apart from the whole. They can be looked upon as divisions of the whole only in a secondary sense. But when two things are related to each other by inherence (*samavāya*) the position is different. When we see a sphere, we do not see its two halves as distinct from the sphere. They form

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36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.

the very body of that sphere. They are, therefore, real or primary divisions.[40] We can say that there are as many inherences as there are pairs of things intimately united by inherence and the word *samavāya* denotes the common point in all pairs so united and which causes the cognition called *ihabuddhiḥ* = the idea of something existing in a particular place and nowhere else. The Soul (*ātmā*) is One but it can be looked upon as many because of the many organisms with which it is associated. The common point in the many would be the universal.[41] We have already seen that Time is also really One but that divisions are made in it on the basis of the actions with which it is associated.

According to *Vijñānavādins,* this attempt to make secondary divisions in *ākāśa* and to find a common feature or universal in all of them is futile because there is no such thing as universal at all in anything.[42] They do not believe in the reality of the external world. They only believe in the different states of consciousness and, in them, some things figure as common properties while others figure as distinguishing features. A word denotes only this thing which figures as a common feature in our cognitions and that is what is called the universal, not something which exists in the external world. That is what occurs in the mind when the word is heard. In other words, it is the meaning of words and for grammarians also, it is the meaning of words. To this extent, both agree.

The question as to how words like *ākāśa, ātmā,* and *samavāya,* can denote the universal considering that these things are considered to be one and eternal was answered on the basis of contingent or secondary divisions in these things. It was assumed that in regard to other things in the world, the individuals which differ from one another and the common feature which exists in them were real. According to *Advaita,* however, *Brahman* is the only reality. Everything else, that is, all distinctions such as the universal, the particular and so on are unreal. The categories of the *Vaiśeṣikas* are only the powers of *Brahman.* These powers are inferred from their effects. Though the various objects of the world, produced by the powers of *Brahman* are different from one another, they join together in order to accomplish human goals.[43] Their interconnection is not, however, an entity over and above them. In perception, the mind, the senses and

40. See Texts.
41. See Texts.
42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.

the objects must come together but this coming together (*sāmagrī*) is not an entity over and above these hings themselves.

Thus,, it has been shown that the different systems of thought in their own way, consider the universal to be meaning of words. And this universal is eternal, though the individual or the particular in which it inheres and which manifests it is transitory. The universal requires the individual for its manifestation. Before the latter is produced, it already exists in its causes and it prompts, as it were, these causes to bring the individual into existence.[44] In what sense it prompts them is explained by the texts in this way. A potter, for example, has the universal of a jar in his mind before he makes a particular jar and then proceeds to assemble the necessary material. Even before he has made a jar, the universal has already acted as an accessory (*sādhana*) in the act of producing the jar. It has prompted the potter and so has played the part of a prompting agent (*prayojaka kartā*).[45] Once the particular jar is made, it is connected with action, not as the prompter in its making, but as the thing accomplished (*nirvartyakarma*). Both before and after the act of making the jar, it is connected with action. That is how, even before the jar is made, one can say : 'he makes the jar,' a sentence in which the jar which is not yet ready is connected with the action of making as its accessory. That, before its production, it is a universal and after its production, it is an individual does not matter, because the universal and the individual are not so different from each other as a cow and a horse are.[46]

As the universal is connected with action even before the individual is produced, it is that which is the accessory of an action, and not the individual. That is why all Vedic injunctions and prohibitions must be understood as relating to the universal and not to the individual. Through the function called *abhidhā*, the word conveys the universal only and not the individual also. It is true that we see the universal always as inhering in the individual. We never see them separately. But, whatever may be the case in sense-perception, as far as verbal cognition is concerned, it is the universal which figures in it.[47] As an illustration, it is pointed out that the word *face* can only denote the face reflected in water or any other bright surface and not the

44. See Texts.
45. See Texts.
46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.

reflecting surface also.[48] Similarly, the word *ghaṭa* denotes the universal of a jar and not the individual jar in which it inheres and which manifests it. Words convey objects according to convention and convention rests on the universal and not on the individual. Even though the word does not convey the individual by the function called *abhidhā*, the latter does serve to qualify the knowledge of the universal which arises from the word. In perceptual knowledge the senses themselves are not perceived and yet they serve to distinguish one sense perception from another. We never confuse visual perception with auditory perception.[49]

According to Monists, everything in the universe is an unreal manifestation of *Brahman*, the only Reality. Rather than look upon all this variety as consisting of independent entities which must cooperate for accomplishing human goals, it is simpler to look upon all things as manifestations of One Reality due to its manifold powers. What is called the universal is only a power of *Brahman*, as everything else is. Universal and particular are relative terms. In everything there is a stable, persistent, uniting element as well as a transitory, perishable element. The former is true and real and is called the universal and the latter is untrue and unreal and is called the particular or the individual.[50] That the persisting, uniting element is true has been endorsed by Patañjali himself. In such gold ornaments as *rucaka*, *svastika* and *kuṇḍala*, the particular shape of the ornament is impermanent. These shapes are mutually exclusive whereas gold is the persisting, uniting essence of all. It is, therefore, true, it is the universal. But its truth and its permanence are relative. Both gold and fire are *tejas*, according to the *Vaiśeṣikas*. Though their qualities are mutually exclusive, the fact of being *tejas* is the persisting and uniting element in them. That is, therefore, more real than the fact of being gold or fire. But even that is relative. The quality of being substance (*dravya*) in the *Vaiśeṣika* sense is wider and more unifying than that of being *tejas*. If we go on seeking wider and wider realities, we ultimately come to *Brahman*, the only reality which is everywhere and in everything. It is, therefore, the highest kind of universal, the *mahāsāmānya*. It is the Great Being, the *mahāsattā*. It is this great Being which appears as unreal manifestations. The different universals are nothing more than this Being as it exists in the different unreal things with which it is associated.[51] What is called 'cowness' (*gotva*)

48. See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.
51. See Texts.

is this great Being as it exists in a cow, just as what is called horse-ness (*aśvatva*) is this great Being as it exists in a horse. It is split up into universals like *gotva, aśvatva* and so on. All words express this great Being as it exists in the different limiting factors. Because of the limiting factors, the great Being which is the highest of all the universals and which is the persisting element in everything appears as the different minor universals. To say that all words ultimately denote this highest universal means that all noun-stems, all roots, all suffixes like *tva* and *tal,*[52] denote it. In a word like *gotva,* the stem '*go*' denotes this Being as it exists in the cow whereas the suffix *tva* denotes it in a more general manner, apart from any substratum. In the meaning of the word as a whole, the two are correlated.[53] It is not merely noun-stems, but roots also denote this Being. The only difference is that they present it as something having parts arranged in a sequence; in other words, as an action or a process. Action is nothing more than Being appearing as something having parts arranged in a sequence, something appearing as *sādhya,* a process. Roots denote Being as a process. When Being is presented by a word like a noun-stem as something not having parts arranged in a sequence, as a *siddha,* a finished thing, it is called *sattva. Sādhya* and *siddha* or *kriyā* and *sattva* are the two unreal manifestations of *sattā* and they are presented by noun-stems and roots respectively.[54]

That all actions are transformations of Being had already been stated by Yāska. He quotes with approval the view of Vārsyāyaṇi that *bhāva* (Being) undergoes six transformations (*vikāra*).[55] Helārāja deliberately says that by *vikāra,* unreal manifestation (*vivarta*) is meant, as otherwise Being would lose its unchangeable eternal character. When Being manifests itself as action, it takes one of six forms, expressed by the words *jāyate asti, viparivartate, vardhate, apakṣīyate, vinaśyati.* All actions and processes, by whatever other names they may be called, would come under one of these transformations.[56] A thing is first born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes change, change means growth and then decay and finally destruction. Owing to the power of *Brahman* called Time, the One Being appears as different actions or processes, not at the same time, but in a sequence. Sequence is the essence of Time. Time is not a substance apart from the actions which appear in a sequence. It is a

52. See Texts.
53. See Texts.
54. See Texts.
55. See Texts.
56. See Texts.

power of *Brahman* on account of which actions appear with sequence within them. It has been been said that all actions are manifestations of Being. Destruction (*vinaśyati*) is also mentioned as one of the six transformations. The reason is that what is called destruction is nothing more than *tirobhāva* or hiding or remaining in a potential state. There is no real destruction. When a thing exists in its causes as a potentiality, that is what is called destruction or hiding.[57] This condition exists before a thing is produced and after it is destroyed in the worldly sense. When, due to the activity of the accessories, the process of hiding becomes perceptible and is conveyed by a verb, it is called *apakṣīyate* in its first stage and *vinaśyati* in the last stage. Thus, out of the six transformations mentioned by Vārṣyāyaṇi, two relate to the process of hiding or disappearing (*tirobhāva*).[58] Hiding or existing in the causes in the form of a potentiality is a form of Being. The same thing can be said about birth. To say that some thing is born amounts to this : that it has moved from the previous condition of existence as a mere potentiality in its causes, but has not yet reached a condition where it can be said to exist.[59] Birth is not the coming into being of something which it did not exist at all before. It stands for that intermediate stage between existing in the causes as a potentiality and existing as an actuality, a state conceived of as a process. Among the six manifestations of *Sattā* (Being), the first four represent the coming into being of some new feature. In that sense they stand for birth.[60] Birth and death would thus cover all the six.[61]

It has been shown so far that all words denote directly the persisting, unifying and relative elements called universals and indirectly, the highest universal called Being. One important point about these universals is that some of them require a particular shape or disposition of parts for their manifestation while others do not. Cow-ness or horse-ness, for example, requires that the animal in question should have a particular shape, a particular anatomical structure before it can be manifested. The fact of being earth (*pṛthivītva*) or the fact of being water (*aptva*) does not require any particular shape for the purpose.[62] A clod of earth, a jar and a mountain can all manifest earthness equally well, even though they have different shapes. A

57. See Texts.
58. See Texts.
59. See Texts.
60. See Texts.
61. See Texts.
62. See Texts.

drop of water and an ocean can manifest 'water-ness' (*aptva*) equally well. Secondly, a quality like red is supposed to perish when its substratum perishes. But an universal like *ghaṭa-tva* (*jarness*) is not destroyed simply because its substratum, an individual *ghaṭa* is destroyed. A universal requires the individual for its manifestation but not for its very existence.[63] If one individual is destroyed, there are others to manifest it. This raises the question as to what happens when all individual beings and things are destroyed as is supposed to happen at the time of the great Dissolution (*pralaya*).

There was difference of opinion among ancient Indian thinkers on the subject of the great Dissolution. The *Mīmāṃsakas* held that there was no such thing as the great Dissolution. The world has always been similar to the present one. Secondly, this universe is not the only one. There are countless such universes. So somewhere or other, there are bound to be beings and things in which the universals inhere. There is no possibility of the universals being left without any particulars to manifest them.[64] The *vaiśeṣikas* believe that the universals are eternal. They also believe in the periodical occurrence of Dissolution. But, according to them, the universals continue to exist in the great Dissolution. It is the objects and beings in which they inhere and which manifest them that disappear in *pralaya*. Objects and beings are required for the manifestation of the universals and not for their very existence. Helārāja humourously remarks that it is not that the universals, being heavy, require substrata as supports to prevent them from falling[65] There is no harm, he says, in accepting that, in *pralaya*, they remain unmanifested and without substrata.

Bhartṛhari, however, looks at it differently. He also believes in *pralaya*. He was a monist and he was of the view that what is called the great Dissolution is nothing more than the cosmos being resolved into their root cause. Nothing is destroyed without a trace. The great Being, the highest universal, is the root cause and all other universals are merged into it. They exist as one with it. It is characteristic of Helārāja that he refers to this root cause as *mūlaprakṛti* or *pradhāna* in the *Sāṅkhya* sense or as *parabraman* in the monistic sense. Here, as elsewhere, the desire to accommodate other systems of thought dominates the approach of the *Vākyapadīya*.[66]

63. See Texts.
64. See Texts.
65. See Texts.
66. See Texts

So far, it has been shown that there do exist unifying, persisting though relative elements called universals and that words are expressive of them. There is an eternal relation between them and the words. This relation can be known only if it is taught by somebody who had been taught by somebody else and so on till we come to certain omniscient Beings who teach this relation to others and who are themselves taught by God. Even God does not create this eternal relation between words and their universals. He only teaches what is already there. To understand this means to connect particular words as expressive of particular universals. Some of them are directly perceptible by the senses, as for example, the universal *gotva* which exists in a particular cow. Even one who does not yet know the relation between this universal and the word *go* can see it if he sees many individual cows. But what he cannot do is to give it a name, to understand that this particular universal is expressed by the word cow. That requires instruction by one who already knows it. There are certain universals which are not perceptible at all, as, for example, the fact of being a *brāhmaṇa.* In such cases, instruction by one who already knows becomes all the more necessary. In other words, every generation depends upon the previous generation for the understanding of the relation between the words and the universals of objects. By going back as far as one can, one comes to the time of creation after the great Dissolution. At that time God teaches this relation between words and the universals to certain beings who have the seeds of omniscience, in them.[67] They pass on that knowledge to others and they to others still. The existence of God and omniscient beings is vouchsafed by Scripture. Reasoning also leads to the same conclusion. We see in this world that knowledge and power admit of degree, because some have more and others less of them. The same person has more of them at one time than at other times. They must reach their climax somewhere. That person in whom they reach their climax is God.[68] Helārāja, following Bhartṛhari, says that, in the case of omniscient beings, the powers of their senses are not restricted.[69] They can not only see with their eyes but also smell with them, hear with their nose, see what is at their back. The tips of their fingers can act for all their senses. Not only do their senses perform the functions of the other senses but they can also see the past and the future, what is atomic, hidden or distant. It is they who directly perceive all universals and their connection with their words and teach both, without confusion, to

67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.
69. See Texts.

others. A universal like *gotva* is visible to ordinary mortals because their manifesting elements like *sāsnā* (dewlap) and so on are visible In the case of universals like *brāhman-hood* also, there must be some such manifesting elements but they are beyond the senses of ordinary mortals like ourselves.[70]

In the previous account relating to the conveying of the universal by words, the stem-part or the root-part of the word was chiefly kept in mind. The conclusion was reached that both of them express the universal. But the word is not complete without the suffix to which also a meaning is assigned when the word is analysed. Number and case are the chief meanings assigned to suffixes. The suffix denotes number in general which inheres in a particular number. Thus the stem or the root denotes the universal of a thing or an action and the suffix denotes the universal of number and the two universals are co-ordinated. Number exists in the very thing in which the universal of the latter inheres. That is how they are co-ordinated. The universal conveyed by the suffix figures as the *viśeṣaṇa,* the qualifier, of the universal conveyed by the stem. In the words *gauḥ, gāvaḥ, pacati, pacataḥ,* a thing or an action having a universal and qualified by a particular number is understood as the main thing.[71] This agrees with the well-known dictum that, in a verb, the action is the main thing. The meaning of a suffix need not always be the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*). In the word *aupagava* = offspring of Upagu, the idea of offspring is the main thing and it is the meaning of Upagu which qualifies it.

That the word denotes primarily the meaning of the *prakṛti* (stem or root) as qualified by that of the suffix is the general position. In some cases, however, the position is different. The meaning of the suffix, whether it be number or case, can play one of two roles in a sentence. Its function may be *lakṣaṇā,* that is, subordination or abandonment of its real meaning or it may actually co-operate in the accomplishment of the action conveyed by the sentence.[72] In the Vedic injunction *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi,* the singular number conveyed by the suffix in *graham* is not significant. It is there only to give a certain completeness or correctness to the word. In the injunction *saktūn juhoti* = 'he throws ground grain into the sacrificial fire', the accusative case in *saktūn* is not significant. All that the sentence means is that the oblation is to be performed with ground grain. In

70. See Texts.
71. See Texts.
72. See Texts.

reality, it is performed in order to attain an invisible fruit, with, of course, ground grain as the material. It is not performed for the sake of the ground grain. Ground grain is made use of in order to attain some other purpose. Sometimes, however, the meaning of the suffix, namely, number or accessory, serves the purpose of accomplishing the action which is the meaning of the sentence and that is done by specifying in some way the things which are accessories. For example, in the Vedic injunction *paśunā yajeta*, the singular number in *paśunā* is significant, because the sacrifice can be fully accomplished with one animal. Similarly, in *vrīhīn avahanti*, the accusative case is significant because the act of threshing is for the sake of unhusking the grain. Grain, when cleaned by threshing, becomes fit for being made into a sacrificial cake (*puroḍāśa*). From the point of view of reality, the grain is more important than the act of threshing it. From a purely verbal point of view, in the sentence *vrīhīn avahanti*, the act of threshing is more important and grain is subordinate to it, because it is conveyed by the verb.

Thus, the number conveyed by the suffix is sometimes significant and sometimes not. Before stating the different arguments on which the position is based, it is necessary to point out that a stem can also convey a number. When a numeral is used, it naturally conveys the number which is its meaning. Such a number cannot but be meant to be taken seriously and it must be looked upon as connected with action.[73] Secondly, while the singular and the plural numbers conveyed by the suffix may just stand for the universal only and not for the number of individuals to be connected with action, the dual number conveyed by the suffix is usually significant. In the injunction *brāhmaṇo na hantavyaḥ* = 'a brahmin must not be killed', *surā na peyā* = 'liquor should not be drunk', *vṛṣalair na praveṣṭavyam* = 'Śūdras should not enter', the singular and plural numbers are not significant. The prohibition relates to brahmin, liquor and *śūdra*, irrespective of number. P.1.2.58 specially provides for the use of the plural number with reference to the universal which is considered to be one and eternal in grammar, though others may hold that the universal has no number at all and that only individuals or particulars have it. Here, as in so many other matters, grammarians have their own tradition. So much for the singular and plural numbers. When some one says, *gāvāv ānaya* = bring two cows, the number two, conveyed by the

73. See Texts.

suffix, does not refer to the universal only, but also to the individuals. Two cows are meant to be brought, neither more nor less. It is not that there are no exceptions even to this. Bhartṛhari points out that in the sentence "*Yady etau vyādhitau syātām deyaṃ syād idam auṣadham*[74] = 'if these two fall ill, this medicine should be given', the dual number conveyed by the suffix is not significant, because even if only one of the two falls ill, the medicine is meant to be given. Notwithstanding such exceptions, it is true to say that, ordinarily, the dual number conveyed by the suffix is significant.

It has been stated so far that the stem conveys the universal of the object and the suffix conveys the universal of number and that the two are correlated. It was also pointed out that the number conveyed by the suffix is sometimes significant and sometimes not. In *paśunā yajeta,* the singular member conveyed by the suffix in *paśunā* is significant, whereas in *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi,* the singular number conveyed by the suffix in *graham* is not. It would be worth while to state briefly the arguments on which these two conclusions are based.

It was said before that the number conveyed by the suffix can play one of two roles, one of them being that it can co-operate in the accomplishment of the action which is the meaning of the sentence. The injunction *paśunā yajeta* is an example of this. Here the act of sacrifice is conveyed by the verb. *Paśu* or the animal, conveyed by the stem part of the word *paśunā,* is connected with the sacrifice as its material. The number one is conveyed by the suffix part of the same word and so it is also connected with the sacrifice. In other words, the sacrifice is performed with one animal. The number one also becomes *sādhana* or accessory of the sacrifice.[75] It is true that it is some material or other which is usually prescribed as an accessory. Number is not a material, but a quality. And yet, it is also understood together with the material by a process of inclusion. There is no material without some quality in it. Moreover, the, two are conveyed by the same word. The two ideas, conveyed by the two parts of the word, appear as one in the mind and cannot be separated. This process of inclusion is called *upādāna* which is over and above the six proofs beginning with *śruti* which are taught in *Mīmāṃsā* in connection with the ritualistic interpretation of the *Brāhmaṇa texts.*[76] The injunction *paśunā yajeta* is an original injunction which teaches

74. Vāk. III. pt. i, p. 61, l. 18-19.
75. See Texts.
76. See Texts.

for the first time (*utpattivākya*) that the sacrifice is to be done with an animal which thus becomes the *aṅga* and whatever number is mentioned there is accepted and not abandoned.[77]

There is also an indication (*liṅga*) in the Scripture that the number conveyed by the suffix in *paśunā* is significant. After having said *āgneyamajam agniṣṭoma ālabheta* = 'one should sacrifice a goat to Agni in Agniṣṭoma', it is said: *aindrāgnaṃ dvitīyam ukthye* = 'in *ukthya*, a second one to Indra and Agni', *aindraṃ pṛśniṃ tṛtīyaṃ ṣoḍaśini* = 'in *ṣoḍaśin*, a third spotted one to Indra'. The very mention of the words second and third is an indication that the singular number expressed by the suffix in *ajam* is significant. It also shows that the universal and number are found in the same object. Unless the universal is found in its complete form in one individual, it would be impossible to sacrifice a second animal. Unless the whole universal is found in one animal, it would not be that animal at all. Moreover, it is simpler to look upon the singular number conveyed by the suffix in *paśunā* as significant. The whole of the universal is found in any single animal. And the sacrifice is also complete when one animal is sacrificed. By sacrificing more than one animal, the sacrificer will not get any extra merit. Thus, it is simpler to say that the singular number is significant.[78] Secondly, even if the number one conveyed by the suffix is not taken seriously and thus it does not become an *aṅga*, that number would naturally come to his mind first, being the first among numbers and if that would serve his purpose (*sāmarthya*) he would have no reason to by-pass it (*vyatikrama*). Thus, because of simplicity (*lāghava*) and because it would serve the purpose (*sāmarthya*), the number one is adopted. The argument based on the fact that the number one would serve the purpose dispenses with the necessity of making it a part of the injunction. But, really speaking, that is not the right way of looking at it. The number one is understood only when the singular suffix is present and not otherwise. If it is understood, there is no reason for abandoning it. It should also become an auxiliary to action. The suffix of the singular is not there merely to give a certain completeness or correctness to the word. The same word expresses two ideas, one through the stem and the other through the suffix and they stand towards each other as *aṅga* and *aṅgin*. To accept one and reject the other is not right.

In considering the question whether the number conveyed by the suffix is significant or not, the question of what is taught as the main

77. See Texts.
78. See Texts.

thing and what is taught as the secondary thing is often raised. A distinction is made between what the main thing is in reality (*vāstavaṃ guṇapradhānabhāvam*) and what is so in verbal presentation (*śābdena vyāpāreṇa*). In the sentence *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi,* the wiping of the vesels is taught. The wiping is done for the sake of cleaning the vessels which are, therefore, the main thing in reality. And yet the purpose of the sentence is to prescribe wiping in regard to the vessels taught elsewhere in fixed numbers. In that sense, the wiping is the main thing. The word *graha* in this sentence only refers to the vessels as taught elsewhere with all their qualifications. As far as the vessels are concerned, this sentence is a restatement (*anuvāda*) and not an initial prescription (*vidhivākya*). The injunction *paśunā yajeta* is in a different position. Here the sacrifice is the main thing. The animal is auxiliary to it. As the sacrifice can be accomplished with one animal, there is no reason for sacrificing a second one. If another animal is sacrificed, it would amount to another sacrifice and that should not be done unless it is specifically enjoined. Number should follow the main prescription and not vice-versa. If one were to sacrifice as many animals as one can, sacrifice would follow number and not vice versa. The number one which is taught together with the material of the sacrifice, which is a *guṇa,* an auxiliary, is significant. The number taught together with what is auxiliary is significant — that is the principle.

Pāṇini, in the formulation of his *sūtras,* has followed this principle. The *sūtra*: *saha supā* (P.2.1.4.) teaches the formation of a compound word which is, therefore, the main thing. It is not the members of a compound word which are specifically taught in this *sūtra.* They are only referred to. They are auxiliary (*guṇa*) to the compound word and the singular number is actually used in connection with them. That is why it is significant and, according to that, in a compound word, a word ordinarily combines with one other word at a time and not with more than one. Similarly, in teaching suffixes also, the singular number in such *sūtras* as *ṅyāp prātipadikāt* (P.4.1.1.) is significant. The suffixes like *su, am,* etc. which are prescribed are the main thing and the stem to which they are added is auxiliary to them. In regard to the stems, the singular number is actually used and so it is significant and that is why a suffix comes after a single stem. It is not that in the Science of Grammar, no exception can be found to the principle : *guṇe saṅkhyā vivakṣyate* = 'the number taught with what is auxiliary is significant'. The *sūtra* which teaches the name *karma,* namely, *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma* (P. 1.4.49). = 'that *kāraka* is called *karma* which the agent wants most to reach', is such an exception. Here the name *karma* which is prescribed is the main

thing and the *kartā* (the agent) in relation to which it is taught is subsidiary to it (*guṇa*) and yet the singular number which is actually used in *kartuḥ* is not significant. That is why even what is actually to be reached by more than one agent is also called *karma.*

In the sentence, *grahaṃ sammārṣṭi,* the number one conveyed by the singular suffix is not significant, it is to be abandoned. The singular suffix only lends a certain completeness or correctness to the word. In this sentence, wiping is taught in regard to the vessels taught elsewhere in fixed numbers. The initial injunction in regard to the vessels is this : *prājāpatyā nava grahā bhavanti; daśaitān adhvaryuḥ prātaḥsavane grahān gṛhṇāti, maitrāvaruṇaṃ grahaṃ gṛhṇāti* and so on. Here fixed numbers such as nine and ten are specifically mentioned. The sentence under discussion does no more than refer to the vessels taught in this initial injunction together with their numbers in order to prescribe the action of wiping in regard to them. As far as number is concerned, what is mentioned in the initial injunction counts more than what is merely conveyed by the suffix in the sentence in question. Here wiping is the main thing and how many vessels are to be wiped must be gathered from the initial injunction. As many as are mentioned there must be wiped because none of them has been singled out anywhere.[79] The principle *guṇe saṅkhyā vivakṣyate* cannot be applied to the vessels, because in this sentence, vessels are not *guṇa* in reality. They are the main thing as far as the wiping is concerned. If the act of wiping were the main thing, the number one expressed by the singular suffix would be significant, because it can be accomplished even by wiping one vessel. But that is not the case.

Thus it has been shown that, in a word, the stem or the root conveys the universal, the suffix also conveys it and that the two are correlated. When the meaning conveyed by the suffix is significant and when it is not has also been discussed. It now remains to distinguish the universal from some other things which look like it but which are really different from it. It is particularly necessary to distinguish it from resemblance and collection (*sādṛśya* and *samūha*).

The existence of the universal is postulated in order to explain the uniformity of cognition which takes place in the presence of many individuals which differ from one another. Being different from one another, they cannot account for the uniformity of cognition. The universal is conceived of as something over and above the individuals;

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79. See Texts.

though it cannot be seen apart from them. It is suggested by some that the individuals themselves, because of their mutual resemblance, are the cause of the uniformity of cognition and not something apart from them. Resemblance is not something apart from the individuals. If it is the cause of the uniformity of cognition, it means that the individuals themselves are the cause of it. Some look upon resemblance as a kind of power which causes uniformity of cognition and consider power to be a separate entity. Really speaking, even power is not a separate entity from what has the power. Some suggest that the particular disposition of parts which individuals must have before they can become substrata of universals according to those who believe in them is the cause of the uniformity of cognition and thus one can dispense with the universals.

The fact is that resemblance, whether conceived of as a power or as a particular disposition of parts cannot account for the uniformity of cognition which takes place in the presence of many individuals belonging to the same class. Particular effects have particular causes. When we get about anybody the cognition that he is a lancer, the cause of it is his connection with the lance. The cause of this connection is his desire to take the lance for some particular purpose. Similarly, uniformity of cognition must have a cause. It cannot be resemblance because that would help in determining the object in some way and cause a cognition of resemblance, but not of uniformity or identity as the universal does. Moreover, there can be resemblance between individuals belonging to different classes. Resemblance is, therefore, something different from the universal.[80] If we try to explain things, not by particular and immediate causes, but by remote ones, it would take us back to the root cause of everything, whether it be *pradhāna* or anything else. It would be something indefinable. It would then become impossible to make statements of cause and effect. In order to explain verbal usage, universals have to be accepted.

The universal, resemblance and collection are allied things, but there is difference between them.[81] Where both diversity and unity figure in the cognition, then the object cognised is a collection (*samūha*).[82] Unity is superimposed on diversity. In the cognition of collection, unity figures, mixed up with diversity. The two appear at the same time. In the cognition of resemblance, first difference

80. See Texts.
81. See Texts.
82. See Texts.

figures and then resemblance.[83] In the cognition of the universal, only identity figures.[84]

According to the Bauddhas, the cognition of the universal is an error. All cognitions are different from one another. There is no such thing as identity of cognition. But, due to an eternal predisposition (*vāsanā*), cognitions appear to be identical and, on the basis, the concept of a universal arises. Things are essentially different from one another. There is nothing in common between them. But we are not able to see this difference. As our words can only express what we see, they also do not express this difference. They express a certain identity which we wrongly see on account of resemblance. Thus both our cognitions (*prakhyā*) and our verbal usage (*upākhyā*) proceed on the basis of identity due to resemblance. Meanings of words are based upon convention and convention cannot rest upon the own nature of things (*svalakṣaṇa*). Cognitions really differ from one another because their objects differ from one another. Words differ from one another. Objects of the same class also differ from one another, but we notice only the points where they differ from things of another class. But, of course, sages can see the difference which exists among cognitions, words and objects.

Those who believe in universals believe that there are universals of cognitions also. It is that which proves the existence of universals in the objects of these cognitions. Others, on the other hand, do not accept this position. An object is given its form by the universal which is different from it, but that does not mean that a cognition is also given a form by a universal which is different from it. To be determined by something else is the characteristic of an object and cognition is not an object[85]. If one seems to perceive a universal in cognitions, it is only because of the universal in the objects. Cognitions have a form, they are self-luminous, but they have no universals in them.[86] A cognition is like light, it is self-luminous and does not require another cognition to illuminate it. Unlike the *Vaiśeṣikas,* the grammarians believe that knowledge is self-luminous. One cognition does not become the object of another. Even the cognition which takes the form : *ghaṭajñānam etad* = 'this is knowledge of the jar, has not got a cognition as its object'. Its object is still the jar which is something external. The external object figures in this knowledge,

83. See Texas.
84. See Texts.
85. See Texts.
86. See Texts.

but not the knowledge itself as the illuminator of the external object and as distinct from it. A cognition having the form of another cognition as its object does not arise. So in what the *Naiyāyikas* call '*anuvyavasāya*', knowledge of a knowledge, it is the external object which is the object and not its cognition.

Thus it has been shown that Bhartṛhari, as explained by Helārāja, makes the following points in regard to the universal : (1) that all words convey the universal, (2) that the stem or the root as well as the suffix convey the universal and that the two are correlated, (3) that the universals are relative entities, unreal manifestations or differentiations of the highest universal, *mahāsattā*, that is, *Brahman*, (4) that the universal conveyed by the suffix is sometimes significant and sometimes not, (5) that the universal must be distinguished from resemblance and collection, (6) that there are no universals in cognitions, because that would make them *jñeya* and, being self-luminous, they are never *jñeya*.

The other view is that all words denote the *dravya*='substance, the individual, the concrete, the particular'. It is not an accident that the *Vākyapadīya*, as it has come down to us, has two sections devoted to a consideration of *dravya*, the fourth section (*samuddeśa*) of the third *kāṇḍa* being called *bhūyodravyasamuddeśa* = 'the supplementary section dealing with *dravya*'. Helārāja openly tells us that *dravya* is of two kinds : the real (*pāramārthika*) and the expressional (*sāṃvyavahārika*).[87] According to him it is the second kind of *dravya* which is dealt with in the supplementary section and was declared to be the meaning of all words by *Vyāḍi*.[88] But, according to Bhartṛhari, the real *dravya* (*pāramārthika*) is also the meaning of all words. The difference between the two seems to be this : whereas the real *dravya* is the meaning of all words, the expressional one can be presented by all words as their meaning. The difference between the two will, I hope, become clear in the course of this exposition. As has already been said, the two views are the result of looking at the same thing in two different ways. According to the second view words express what we cognise. We cognise all kinds of things having all kinds of forms. Through these forms, it is the ultimate Reality, *Brahman* which we cognise, though indirectly. Words express these forms, but do not stop there. Through them, they express the ultimate Reality also.[89] The latter is really their expressed meaning. These

87. See Texts.
88. See Texts.
89. See Texts.

forms which we cognise and which words express are unreal. But the real runs through all of them and that is the expressed meaning (*vācya*) of all words. The unreal and transitory forms which words express point to the eternal Reality which is behind them. The crow which sits on the top of a house is not a permanent feature of it and yet it helps in distinguishing the house from other houses. The different ornaments made of gold stand for different shapes which come and go, but behind them all, there is gold which is permanent. Similarly, all words denote particular forms, but they also denote the ultimate Reality through these forms. Nor would there be any confusion if all words expressed the same ultimate Reality, because each word would convey it as coloured by a particular form which only that word can bring to the mind. It is like looking at a landscape through a tube. One would see only as much of it as is visible through the tube. All this has already been said in the context of the reality or unreality of the phenomenal world, in the section dealing with the Metaphysical Background of the *Vākyapadīya*. It has been briefly repeated here in the context of the nature of the meaning of the individual words, obtained by analysis.

There is no harm in saying that words are expressive of the different forms. All that is emphasized is that they do not stop there, but go further. They express them as attributes of something else. They do not rest there. It is just because the forms figure as attributes in our cognition that the meanings of words differ from one another. These different forms which appear are not different from the Ultimate Reality, which is One and undifferentiated. The many which emanate from the One appear to have spatial sequence due to its *Dikśakti* and temporal sequence and the six transformations of Being already mentioned by Yāska, due to its *Svātantryaśakti* or *Kālaśakti*. But all this is unreal. Other systems also postulate the appearance of the unreal in the real. According to the *Vijñānavādins*, the external world does not exist and yet objects appear in our cognitions as being external. Consciousness appears to have various forms which appear as external. In other words, the unreal appears in the real. Similarly, according to the *Sāṅkhyas*, primordial matter (*pradhāna*) contains within itself the germs of all the later transformations and yet, it is free, in its own nature, of all these transformations. It consists of an equilibrium of the *guṇas* and is, therefore, quite different from that state in which there is disturbance of equilibrium. But, in actual life, it can be cognised only through its transformations which have not the same reality. Thus, in all systems, there is a place for some sort of *avidyā* and the Reality can be apprehended only through the limiting factor of relatively unreal forms.

What remains when all the forms disappear is real.[90] When the shapes of the different ornaments are suppressed, what remains is gold and that is, therefore, the real. Similarly, when all the multiplicity which appears before us disappears, only Brahman remains and that is real and eternal. The eternality of everything else like the universal, earth, water and so on is only relative. Everyone of these things is resolved into something which is wider than itself. All the universals like *gotva, aśvatva* are resolved into earth (*pṛthivī*). Substances like earth, water and so on are resolved into something very general which can be called a thing (*vastu*). All this appears as the object of consciousness and, when it does so, consciousness is also there. That is what is presented in all cognitions in an invariable manner while the objects are constantly changing. When it is viewed apart from the forms of the objects, it is the truth. That is, therefore, the ultimately Real. That is the Supreme Word, called *Paśyantī* or *Parā Vāk* or *Śabdabrahman*. The expressive word and the expressed meanings, both are derived from it. They are, therefore, not different from each other.

It is not possible to make any positive assertion about this ultimate Reality because it is totally different from all manifestation in relation to which assertions can be made. One cannot predicate about it that it is One, because the Reality which is free from all limiting factors is without any inner differentiation and, therefore, it does not appear as One. Nor does difference add any peculiarity to it because there is nothing different from it and if there were, it would have no reality. Nor can one speak about it as connected or separated, because there is nothing else apart from it.[91] With what would it be connected or separated? As only unreal manifestation and not transformation is accepted, one cannot speak about it as transformed. And yet the whole wonderful cosmos is before us and so some kind of transformation has taken place. Thus, it is not possible to make any positive assertion about the ultimate Reality.

And yet, it is that which appears as everything else. It appears as positive entities and as negative entities. It appears as one and as many, one in the case of universals and many in the case of individuals. It appears as associated with other things and as separated from other things. It appears as transformed and as not transformed.

90. See Texts.
91. See Texts.

Thus everything being Brahman, even apparently contradictory attributes are merged in it. It is the ultimate Reality which appears as the seer, the seeing, the seen and the purpose of seeing.[92] The power of being the symbol and that of being the thing symbolised are merged in it. All the objects and the processes which make up the cosmos and all the words which express them emanate from it. It is something positive and as it runs through all its manifestations as cognition or consciousness, it is of the nature of Consciousness. It is called *dravya* in this context and it is this which is expressed by all the words.

What is worthy of emphasis is that, whether the universal is looked upon as the meaning of all words or whether substance is so looked upon, it is ultimately Brahman which turns out to be the meaning of all words. It is really a difference in the way of looking at the same thing. Or rather within these two apparently divergent views, there is one common view.[93] When we look upon words as expressive of the common feature in many individual objects or processes that causes uniformity of cognition and the application of the same word to all of them, then they express the universal. As the highest universal, the common feature which runs through everything is Being (*Sattā*) which is identical with Brahman, all words express this highest universal. But it is also true that objects of the world produce a diversity of cognition is us and we, therefore, apply different words to them. Words express different things. But these different things are limiting factors of one ultimate Reality which, in this view, is not looked upon as a common feature running through everything but as something which remains unchanged and cannot be directly perceived in everyday life. We can only perceive its limiting factors and we apply words to what we perceive. But then, though words denote these limiting factors in the first instance, ultimately, they denote the unchanging concrete substance behind them. And that is Brahman. According to both views, therefore, words denote Brahman, thought of as the highest universal running through everything or as the one unchanging substance behind all the phenomena which we can perceive. The latter is what Helārāja calls *pāramārthika dravya* and is the subject matter of the second section of the third *kāṇḍa*.

But the fourth section also deals with *dravya* and *Helārāja* draws our attention to its different character by calling it *sāṃvyavahārika* =

92. See Texts.
93. See Texts.

expressional. A distinction is made between the normal meaning of words and their meaning as presented by words according to the will of the speaker. The *dravya* as presented by words is defined as something which is to be qualified, to be distinguished from other things and which can be referred to by a pronoun as this or that.[94] Whatever a phenomenon may be in reality, words can present it as a thing, as something to be distinguished or qualified and then it becomes *dravya*. In 'blue sky', the colour blue qualifies 'sky' but when we say: 'sky blue is different from sea-blue', the blue is presented by words as something to be qualified. The words 'sky' and 'sea' qualify it. In other words, in this sentence, blue is not a quality, but a *dravya* = substance. Similarly, in the sentence *yad devadatto durbalaṃ bālakaṃ tāḍayati, tan na me rocate* = 'Devadatta is beating a weak child, that does not please me', the action of Devadatta beating a weak child is referred to by the relative pronoun *yad* and its correlative *tad*. What these two pronouns refer to has become a thing (*dravya*) even though it is an action. But in the sentence : *Devadatto durbalaṃ bālakaṃ tāḍayati* = 'Devadatta is beating the weak child', these two pronouns are absent and the action of beating is conveyed by the verb *tāḍayati*. It, therefore, remains an action. The words have not presented the action as a thing. The characteristic of a *dravya* as presented by words is that it can be referred to by a pronoun as a thing. Something so presented has a certain concreteness about it, a certain finished chaarcter. It does not appear as something which is in the process of being accomplished, but rather as something already accomplished. The word which expresses such a thing is capable of having a gender and a number. This presentation by words depends upon the will of the speaker, his *vivakṣā*. That is why it is described as: *bhedyatvena vivakṣitaḥ* = meant to be conveyed as something to be qualified. The speaker can wish to present anything as something to be differentiated. The universal for instance, usually comes as a common distinguishing property. *Gotva* distinguishes a cow from what is not a cow and is common to all the cows. But if it is presented by words as something to be qualified, it becomes a *dravya*. We have already seen how words can present an action as a thing. Anything can be so presented.

94. See Texts.

3. ON QUALITY (*GUṆA*)

The notion of *guṇa* (quality) is a corollary to that of the second kind of *dravya* dealt with towards the end of the last section and this is, therefore, the appropriate place to say a few words about it, especially as Bhartṛhari has devoted a small *samuddeśa* to it. A reference has already been made to it in the section dealing with Grammatical analysis, in the context of the practice of grammarians to evolve their own notions if those prevalent in the systems of Philosophy or in the world are not adequate for explaining the forms of the language. But it requires to be considered in somewhat greater detail here in the context of the notions which we arrive at when we analyse the unified and particularised meaning of a sentence for practical purposes. In the last section, the notions of the Universal and the real (*pāramārthika*) Substance were considered because they are of a very comprehensive nature and are expressed by all kinds of words and even parts of words. Something was also said about the second kind of *dravya*, the expressional one (*sāmvyavahārika*), because, though not so general and comprehensive as the first kind, it is helpful in explaining the formation of some words.

Many are the *sūtras* of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* in which the word *guṇa* occurs, showing that the notion or notions for which the word stands have been made use of by Pāṇini for explaining some forms. Needless to say that the word does not mean the same thing in all its occurrences. It can denote one of three things : (1) it can mean one of the several things which it means in the language of the average man, (2) it can stand for a notion accepted in some system of Philosophy, (3) it can express the particular notion evolved and accepted by the grammarians themselves.

In his *Mahābhāṣya,* on P. 5.1.119, Patañjali points out that the word has many meanings in the language. In expressions like *dviguṇā rajjuḥ* 'a rope with two strands', *triguṇā rajjuḥ* = 'a rope with three strands, the word means an equal part (*sameṣvavayaeveṣu*). In *guṇavān ayaṃ deśaḥ* = 'this country has good qualities', it denotes such desirable things in a country as abundance of cattle and luxuriant vegetation. In *guṇavān ayaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ* = this brahmin has good qualities', it stands for good conduct and good habits. In *guṇabhūtā vayam atra* = "I am unimportant here" it has the meaning of what

is only secondary, not primary. When one speaks of cooked rice as having quality (*guṇavad*), the word stands for the curry which is to be eaten with it.[1] These are popular meanings of the word and it is characteristic of the Science of Grammar that it does not despise popular notions, but makes use of them, whenever possible, for the explanation of forms. Thus, the meaning of *guṇa* as an equal part is made use of for explaining formations like *dvimayam udaśvit* = 'whey at two (to one)'. The expression is used in cases of barter when two or more parts of something are given as the price for one part of something else. This formation is taught in P.5.2.47 : *saṅkhyāyā guṇasya nimāne mayaṭ* = "the suffix *maya* is added to a numeral which stands for the number of parts to be given as the price (*nimāna*) for one part of what is sold." Here one part of whey (or butter-milk) is sold for two parts of something else, like barley, as given in the example. So the whey is described as *dvimayam udaśvit* = 'whey at two (to one)'. In the *sūtra* the word *guṇa* stands for the part of the thing to be sold by barter. The parts of what is given in exchange and what is received in exchange are supposed to be equal (*sameṣvavayaveṣu*). Thus the idea of equal parts, the meaning of the word *guṇa*, has been made use of by Pāṇini to explain the form *dvimayam*. This meaning, however, has not got a wide application. A more technical meaning of the word has been found useful by Pāṇini to explain some forms. He gives such a meaning to the word *guṇa* occurring in P.4.1.44: *voto guṇavacanāt* = 'the feminine suffix *ī* (*ṅīṣ*) is to be added to a stem ending in '*u*' and expressive of a quality (*guṇa*)'. The question as to what is meant by *guṇa* naturally arises here and Patañjali, while explaining this *sūtra*, gives a definition of *guṇa* in verse and later a second definition, also in verse as belonging to somebody else. The first verse is usually understood as follows, as explained by Kaiyyata.[2] A *guṇa* (quality) is something which is found in substances (*sattve niviśate*), it can disappear from them (*apaiti*) and it is found in different kinds of substances (*pṛthag jātiṣu dṛśyate*). This excludes universals from the province of *guṇa*. The universal never disappears from a thing. Nor does it exist in things belonging to other classes. *Guṇa* is sometimes an effect as the colour of a jar and sometimes not so, as the magnitude of *ākāśa*. An action is always an effect and so it would not come under *guṇa*. The above definition of *guṇa*, if not further restricted, would become applicable to substance also. For example, a whole which is a substance exists in its parts which are also substances. When the conjunction of the parts is destroyed, the whole disappears. It exists in different

1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.

kinds of things. Thus, the definition given above seems to apply to a whole. But the whole is not a *guṇa*, because the definition excludes all substance from its scope (*asattvaprakṛtiḥ*).[3] Thus, the first verse, as explained by Kaiyyaṭa, makes *guṇa* something which is not substance, nor universal, nor movement, but which exists in substances or things and may disappear from htem. Now this is really nothing more than the *Vaiśeṣika* definition of *guṇa*. Helārāja openly says that this verse contains the Vaiśeṣika definition.[4] The other verse given in the M. Bhā on P.4.1.44 also mentions the same characteristics of a *guṇa*.[5]

There is a tradition which interprets these two verses as an explanation, not of the notion of *guṇa* but of what is meant by the word *guṇavacana*. Not only in P. 4. 1. 44, but also in P. 2. 1. 30, P. 5. 1.124, P 5.3.58 and in a *vārttika* on P.2.2.7 and P.5.2.94, the word *guṇavacana* occurs, because some grammatical operation is taught after such a word. So it is necessary to know which word is a *guṇavacana* and which word is not. Patañjali has said in his Mahābhāṣya on P.1.4.1. that compounds (*samāsa*), primary derivatives (*Kṛdanta*), secondary derivatives, (*taddhitanta*) pronouns, class-words, numerals. indeclinables and proper names are not *guṇavacana* words. This was said chiefly to exclude them from the scope of P.5.1.124 which teaches the suffix *ya*(*ṣyañ*) after *guṇavacana* words. Thus we cannot have *syañ* instead of *ava* in the following words : *citragutva, kārakatva, aupagavatva, uccaistva, sarvatva, gotva, bahutva, pañcatva* and *Ḍitthatva,* because these words come under one of the categories mentioned above. The two verses given by Patañjali under P. 4.1.44. are interpreted in such a manner as to exclude these categories of words from the scope of the term *guṇavaccana*. Class words and proper names are applied to things as long as the latter remain as such. According to these verses, it is pointed out, a word is a *guṇavacana,* if it can be sometimes applied to a thing and sometimes not, even though the thing is still there and is the same. But the word *rakta* (red) is sometimes applied to a thing and sometimes not, though the thing may be the same. A fruit may be the same thing, but the word red is sometimes applied to it and sometimes not. So the word *rakta* (red) is a *guṇavacana*. The word *āmra* (mango) can not thus be applied or not applied to an object according to circumstances. Either it is always applied or not applied at all. So it is not a *guṇavacana* word. All this is conveyed by *sattve niviśate' paitī'*

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3. Kaiyyaṭa—*Pradīpa* on M. Bhā. II. p. 217, l. 1-2.
4. Vāk. III', pt. i, p. 197, l. 19.
5. See Texts.

of the first verse. Following *pṛthag jātiṣu vartate* in the same verse, a *guṇavacana* word may have only a restricted application. Though the colour white is the same, it is called *śveta* when found in a cow and *karka* when found in a horse[6]. These two words have a restricted application and so they are *guṇavacana* words. For a word to be *guṇavacana*, it must express something brought about by effort. The red colour of a thing may have been brought about by special effort and that is why the word *rakta* is a *guṇavacana* word. As the number of an object is not due to a special effort, a numeral which expresses number is not a *guṇavacana* word. All this comes out of the word *ādheya* in the verse which gives the definition. The expression *akriyāja* is interpreted to mean that such a word should not be formed out of a root. In this way, primary derivatives are denied the name *guṇavacana*.

In spite of this tradition of interpreting these two verses as explanations of what is meant by the word *guṇavacana*, we have to remember that they are given in the *Mahābhāṣya* in answer to the question : *ko guṇo nāma ?* = 'what is meant by *guṇa ?* One is, therefore, quite justified in taking them as definitions of the notion of *guṇa*= 'quality'. We saw that the definition ultimately was more or less the same as that of the *Vaiśesikas*. This notion has been used by Pāṇini in explaining some formations. A distinction is made in the way in which this *guṇa* is presented by words. A word can present it as independent of the thing in which it is found or as existing in it, as qualifying it. The words *rūpa*='colour' and *gandha* 'smell' are of a very general nature and present the qualities as independent of the thing in which they may be found. When we hear these words, we only think of the qualities and not of the things in which they are found. But in the expression, *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*, the word *śuklaḥ* presents the colour white as existing in the cloth. The word does not mean whiteness but that 'which is white'. In understanding some expressions like *candanagandhaḥ* = 'the fragrance of sandal', and in undersanding why we cannot make a compound of the words *brāhmaṇasya śuklaḥ*, we have to remember not only the *Vaiśesika* definition of *guṇa* but also this difference in its presentation by words. In *candanagandhaḥ*, the compound is possible because the word *gandha* always presents that quality (fragrance) as independent of the thing in which it exists. That is what Kātyayana means by *tatsthaguṇa*[7]. We can never say *candanam gandhaḥ*, because the word *gandha* always stands for the

6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.

quality only, never for the quality as existing in a thing. The word *śukla* is not in that position. It presents whiteness as existing in a thing. Such words are called *guṇavacana* and it is after such words that the suffix *ī* (*ṅīṣ*) is prescribed in P.4.1.44. or the elision of the suffix *malup*[8] or the suffix *ya*[9] (*ṣyañ*) in P.5.1.124. or reduplication[10] in P.8.1.12. In explaining all these formations, the *Vaiśeṣika* conception of *guṇa* has been used, in accordance with Bhartṛhari's principle, based on the *Mahābhāṣya*, that the Science of Grammar accommodates itself to the different systems of Philosophy.

This does not mean that Grammar does not evolve its own notions from its own point of view. That it has its own point of view is insisted upon by many writers from Patañjali downwards. It does not analyse Reality and try to arrive at scientific notions concerning it. Its main task is to explain linguistic forms and the notions which may be necessary to explain them must be derived from these forms themselves. Even when they are borrowed from the world or from other other systems of thought, they must be justified by the forms themselves. Pure logical notions and categories may not bear any relation to the forms actually found in a language. That is why Patañjali has declared that the worldly conception of *liṅga* would not explain what is called gender (*linga*) in the Sanskrit language and that grammarians have to evolve their own conception of it.[11] And then he proceeds to do so. How Bhartṛhari has interpreted Patañjali's ideas on *linga* will be dealt with in a later section. There are similar *Vaiyākaraṇa* definitions of other notions like *jāti, svāṅga, saṅkhyā* and so on, all arising out of the forms existing in the language and meant to explain them. In the same way, they have their own conception of *guṇa* which, as I have already pointed out, is a corollory of that of the second *dravya*.

One gets an idea of the grammarian's conception of *guṇa* from the *Mahābhāṣya* on Vā. 5 of P.5.1.119. This *sūtra* prescribes the suffixes *tva* and *tal* after nominal stems in the sense of the essence of a thing (*bhāva*). This essence is explained by Kātyāyana as that quality or characteristic due to the presence of which a word is applied to an object.[12] It is something which exists in that object.

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8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.

What this characteristic is would depend upon the word to which these suffixes are added. It would always be something which determines or qualifies something else. The meaning expressed by the stem is what has to be determined, or qualified or differentiated. The meaning expressed by the suffix *tva* or *tal* is what does the differentiation. This can be seen if we take as examples different kinds of words ending in these suffixes. In the word *rūpatva,* the stem *rūpa* denotes colour in general which is a quality and not something which has colour. That being so, the suffix *tva* denotes the universal which exists in colour in general. It is this universal which distinguishes colour in general from other things and enables us to call it *rūpa.* A word like *śukla* may stand for the colour white or for the object which is white. In the former case, the suffix *tva* added to it would denote the universal of the colour white existing in all its variations. It is this universal which would distinguish this colour from other colours and which enables us to apply the word *śukla* to this colour. In the latter case, that is, if the word *śukla* stands for the object which is white, then the suffix would stand for its whiteness, the quality which distinguishes that object from others. Words like *aṇu*= 'atomic', *mahat*='big' *hrasva*='short', *dīrgha*='long', always stand for the objects which have these qualities and the suffixes *tva* and *tal,* when added to them, mean these sizes or lengths, which distinguish these objects from others. If a word like '*go*' = 'cow' stands for the universal cow-ness, then the suffix would denote the form of the word itself, because of the identification of the two from time immemorial. It is the form of the word which becomes a *guṇa* and distinguishes this universal from other universals, being identified with it. When a word conveys a meaning by superimposing its own form on it, the form colours it and distinguishes it from other things and thus becomes a *guṇa.*[13] If the word '*go*' stands for an individual cow, then the suffix would denote the universal. That is what distinguishes the individual cows from animals belonging to another class. Coming to compound words, primary derivatives and secondary derivatives, though they involve some relation or other, they never denote the bare relation. They denote the object related. So the suffixes *tva* and *tal,* when added to them, denote the relation which is involved and which distinguishes the related from other things. In the word *rājapuruṣatva,* the suffix *tva* denotes the relation of master and servant involved in the compound *rājapuruṣa.* In the word *pācaka-tva,* the suffix denotes the relation of agent and action (cooking) which is involved in the primary deri-

13. See Texts.

vative *pācaka*. Similarly, *aupagava* is so called because of the relation of father and offspring which exists between Upagu and his son and the suffix *tva in aupagavatva* expresses this relation. In all these cases, some relation or other becomes the *guṇa* because relation can also determine or qualify things.[14] Words like *gaurakhara, saptaparṇa* and so on stand for individual objects in which a particular universal inheres. Therefore, the suffixes *tva* and *tal,* added to them, would denote the universal. Thus, the *guṇa* expressed by the abstract suffixes *tva* and *tal* is sometimes the universal, sometimes a quality, sometimes the form of the word itself and sometimes a relation. It is due to the presence of one of these that a certain word becomes applicable to a certain object. Therefore, the abstract suffix denotes that *guṇa*. This *guṇa* is the cause, not only of the application of a particular word to an object, it also distinguishes it from other objects. It can be seen that this conception of *guṇa* is quite different from the *Vaiśeṣika* conception, because it is derived from such different words as a simple noun, a word ending in a secondary suffix and a compound and is meant to be the common notion which underlies and explains their formation. It is a conception derived from the *Vaiyākarṇa* point of view which looks at forms and not at reality. It is based on the principle. *Vaiyākaraṇānāṃ śabdārtho' rthaḥ na vastvartho' rthaḥ.*

The *Vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 5.1.119 seem to be the main basis of Bhartṛhari's definition of *guṇa*. He also emphasises the following characteristics of *guṇa* : (1) It rests on or inheres in something else (*saṃsargi*). Quality is said to rest on its substratum because the forms of the two are mixed up as it were. (2) That is why it distinguishes its substratum from other things (*bhedaka*). (3) It helps to express degree in the object where it is found (*savyāpāra*). (4) It is called *guṇa,* because it is dependent on something else (*paratantra*).[15]

A thing cannot be determined except with the help of its quality. Not only does a quality serve to give a name to it but it is also through it that it is distinguished from other things. Not through any quality that may be present in a thing, but only through that which is actually expressed by words. No single word can express all the attributes which may be present in a thing. In addition to what is actually expressed, others may be just understood. There may be too many of the latter and there would be nothing to coordinate this function of theirs. What

14. See Texts.
15. See Texts.

is actually expressed by words is in a different position. It comes to the mind more readily and then serves more effectively to distinguish a thing from others of the same class. This is the force of the word *bhedaka* used by Bhartṛhari in the definition. The word is intended to be taken in a very wide sense. Helārāja points out that it is not only qualities like colour and an attribute like the universal which can distinguish the object in which they inhere. Even such a casual thing as a stick which one may hold in one's hand can distinguish one from others.[16]

Another characteristic of *guṇa* is that it is through it that degree in a thing can be expressed. That quality through which an object comes within the range of words and becomes fit to be talked about, is the very one through which difference of degree is also expressed. The universal becomes the cause of something being expressed by a word and in that sense, it becomes a *guṇa,* quality. But it differs from other qualities because it cannot be the cause of difference of degree in an object. It exists everywhere in the same degree. It exists in a thing from the very time when the latter comes into existence and exists in it completely. So some other quality which exists in the thing with the universal becomes the cause of difference of degree in it. Some expressions give the wrong impression that they express degree in the universal, as for example, *gotarā* = 'a better cow'. Here the suffix *tara* expressive of degree, is added to the word *go* which denotes the universal *gotva* and so it looks as if the word expresses degree in the universal. But this is a wrong impression. Patañjali definitely says that the universal has no degree and that in the expression in question, degree is conveyed by the qualities which coexist in the cow together with the universal. If the animal gives birth to a calf every year, it is just called a cow (*gauḥ*) but if it gives birth to a female calf every year, it is called a better cow (*gotrā*).[17]

When a word presents a quality as a thing, as something independent and not as something existing in something else, difference of degree in it can be expressed only through another quality. In *śuklataraṃ rūpam,* the word *rūpa* presents its meaning 'colour in general' as an independent thing to be qualified and differentiated. It is qualified by the word *śukla* = 'white'. Not only that. This word also expresses degree in it. It is not only white, but whiter. Some such quality as brightness (*bhāsuratva*) or clarity (*vaimalya*),

16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.

or purity (*rāgāntarāvyatibhinnatā*) is the basis of this higher degree.[18] It cannot be said that this other quality is not directly conveyed by the word *śukla*. The fact is that it is actually conveyed. The word cannot be applied to anything which is not bright. If we say *śuklatara*, it is because we see a greater degree of brightness. Therefore, we must assume that brightness is also included in the expressed meaning of the word *śukla*.[19]

One cannot argue that even though a thing may come within the range of words through some quality, the latter cannot serve to express degree also. If it serves only to bring the object within the range of words, then we would see difference of degree being expressed through some other quality coexisting in the same thing. But that does not happen. We understand differenre of degree through the first attribute itself as in *śuklatara*. Therefore, we must conclude that the very attribute which gives something a name serves also to express degree in it.[20] Of course, a higher degree of the same attribute is responsible for the expression of degree, even if a different word is used to express it. The fact that a different word may be used for it is the reason why it is sometimes spoken of as a different attribute as in Vāk. I. 64, but it is really another degree or another aspect of the same attribute.[21] Everything can differ from everything else of the same kind, either on the basis of an attribute of inferiority or of superiority. Degree can be that of superiority or of inferiority. Of whatever kind it may be, it can be expressed only through a quality. That is why Bhartṛhari has included this characteristic among the four aspects of a quality.

The object, in itself, is devoid of any degree. It can be given a name and spoken about on the basis of some attribute in it. If there is any peculiarity in the quality, on that basis, it can be distinguished from other objects of the same kind. It is quality which, performing its own function and on the basis of its own difference in degree, involves the object also in such difference and distinguishes it from others.[22] An object, in isolation from its attributes, cannot come within the range of speech. When qualified by an attribute, it can be expressed in words. As it is difficult to distinguish a thing from its attributes, to

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18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Vāk. I. 65 (English Translation) p. 67-68. (Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series 26).
22. See Texts.

cognise them apart, excellence in the attribute results in the excellence of the object. It is not confined to its own excellence, isolated from that of the object, nor to that of the object, isolated from its own.[23]

23. See Texts.

4. ON DIRECTION (*DIK*)

The words *ākāśa, dik* and *deśa* occur frequently in the *Vākyapadīya*. Their meanings may sometimes seem to overlap and yet each has its own distinct meaning. In the *Vaiśeṣika* system, *ākāśa* and *dik* come under the category of substance (*dravya*). The former is defined as that substance which is the substratum of the quality called sound (*śabda*). It is an all pervading substance and is the medium for the propagation of sound. It is usually translated as 'ether'. It fills the whole of space and is, therefore, different from it. In the *Upaniṣads,* however, *ākāśa* often means space itself and not a substance which fills space. In the *Vākyapadīya, ākāśa* seems to have a similar meaning. It is looked upon as One, without any real division of its own. In this sense, it is equal to space. That is why it is said to be in contact with all the objects of the world to which it provides room or accommodation. Helārāja actually says that *ākāśa* is so called because it provides room (*avakāśa*) for everything.[1] Even though One, it can be artificially divided. It can be looked upon as many in terms of the various objects of the world which occupy space. The space occupied by each object would be a portion of the One space. Each of these parts is a region (*deśa*) within space. Moreover, these regions have a position in the scheme of things. We can say of a particular region that it is to the north of an object or to the south of it. There is something which is the cause of such expressions, of notions such as north and south and that is called *Dik* (Direction). Though, in the usage of the average man, there may sometimes be overlapping, the notions of space, region and direction are quite distinct from one another.

When the unified and particularised sentence-meaning is analysed into smaller units, assigned to individual words or to parts of words, we get certain notions which play a part in giving words their particular forms. These smaller units of meaning obtained by analysis are peculiar to a language and help to give it its particular aspect or structure. Some of these notions are of a very general nature and are considered to be expressed, not only by all the words obtained by analysing the sentence, but also by the elements such as root and suffix obtained by analysing the individual word into parts. The notions of Universal and Substance are such comprehensive ones and

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1. See Texts.

they have already been dealt with in a previous section. There are some others which are less comprehensive in the sense that they are not expressed by all the words or parts of words obtained by analysis. They are expressed only by some of them. Four such notions are grouped together and given the designation of *śakti* = 'power'. They are *Dik* (Direction), *Sādhana* (Means), *Kriyā* (Action) and *Kāla* (Time).[2] These are not only notions expressed by words, but as we have already seen in the case of Time, they also play a part in Bhartṛhari's metaphysics.

Dik then is a *śakti*. It is usual to use the word space for *dik*, but as Bhartṛhari describes it, 'Direction' would be a more suitable word. I am, therefore, using this word for this power. Bhartṛhari makes use of the notion of power very frequently. He uses the word in a very wide sense. Anything which can produce an effect is called *śakti*. All the seven categories, recognised by the *Vaiśeṣikas*, have been declared to be nothing more than powers of the Ultimate Reality and not separate entities. Anything which exists at first as a potentiality and becomes actual later is a *śakti*. We have already seen what place Time, the most important *śakti* of *Brahman*, has in Bhartṛhari's metaphysics. But he credits Time itself with powers. The past, the present and the future which others call divisions of Time, are called powers of Time by him. It seems to be possible to call every cause a power because it produces its effect.

If *Dik* is a power, it must naturally be the power of *Brahman-Śabdatattva* just like *kāla* is. That such a power exists is inferred from its effects. The effects of which *Dik* is the cause are stated as follows by our philosopher:—

"Direction is that power which is the cause of the opposition between the limit (*avadhi*) and the limited (*pratipādya*), of the cognition of straightness without the help of anything else, of the manifestation of the minor universals of movement and which (though One) is divided into many through its associates.[3]

We make statements like : 'this is to the right of that' and 'that is to the west of this' and so on. In these statements, one of the two is the limit or the starting point (*avadhi*) in relation to which the other is the object determined (*pratipādya*). There is the relation

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.

of the limit and the limited (*avadhyavadhimadbhāva*) between the two. One has to explain such expressions. It is the notion of *Dik* (Direction) which explains them. It cannot be explained by merely looking at the nature of the objects concerned. None of their essential properties such as their universals (*jāti*) can explain them. The *Vaiśeṣikas* also declare that the relative position of objects in the world is due to '*dik*', though they do not look upon it as a power, but as an independent substance.[4] As its existence is inferred from its effects, it is always cognised as something which colours other objects and not as an independent entity. It is not directly perceived, as the substances like earth are.[5] That is why it is looked upon as a power. Another effect of *dik* is that we cognise certain objects as straight and others as crooked without any reference to other objects. An object can be to the east or to the west only in relation to some other object. But an object can be cognised as 'straight' without reference to any other object. To be 'straight' means to extend only in one direction. No relation of the limit and the limited is involved in it. Similarly, when we cognise something as crooked we mean that it extends in different directions. In other words, this cognition is also based on the power called Direction. Here also no relation of the limit and the limited (*avadhyavadhimadbhāva*) between the object which is crooked and some other object is involved. When we make distinctions between different kinds of movements like lifting and turning, it is the notion of Direction which is the cause of it. All movements consist of a series of moments and the initial moments of two different movements may be the same. It is the subsequent moments which take a particular direction that determine whether a movement is say, lifting or turning. When that is determined, the moments manifest the universal of that particular movement. Direction thus becomes the cause of the manifestation of the minor universals of movement such as *utkṣepaṇatva*, *bhramaṇatva* and so on, which come under the wider universal called *karmatva*.[6] Direction is a power and it is One, but due to association with particular objects, it is looked upon as ten in number. That particular Direction which is in contact with the Sun daily at the beginning of the day is called the East (*Pūrvā dik*).[7] The West, the North and the South are similarly named. The intermediate Directions are called by their respective names because of the association of the Sun with the regions guarded by the Guardians (*Dikpāla*) who are

4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.

watching and protecting them. [8] A particular association with the Sun is the auxiliary cause which brings about the apparent division of what is One. The association does not create anything which was not already there. It only makes known what was already there.[9]

The notions of prior and posterior are connected, not only with concrete limited objects but also with the different moments of a process or action. But the cause is not the same in the two cases. Concrete limited objects are said to be prior or posterior if they are associated with prior or posterior regions. Regions are said to be eastern or western if they are situated in the direction called East or West. Regional differences are based on Direction (*Dik*). But when we use the expression prior or posterior in regard to the moments of a process or action, we are speaking about temporal sequence which is due to the power called Time and to its two functions of prevention and permission.[10]

Even though the distinction of priority and posteriority ordinarily relates to limited concrete objects, we sometimes use such expressions in regard to immaterial entities also. An example of such an immaterial and incorporeal entity is *ākāśa* = 'space'. It is conceived of as being One. But we have already seen that it can be artificially divided on the basis of the objects which are in contact with it. This contact takes place in a particular region (*deśa*). That region is an artificial division of space. There is contact between such regions and parts of the objects which are on them. These objects are also described as first or next and farther and nearer on the basis of such a description of the divisions of space.

From what has been said above, it follows that distinctions between regions depend upon the particular Direction with which they are in contact. A region is essentially so much space capable of accommodating objects. In itself, it is neither eastern nor western nor anything else. And yet we speak about them as being eastern or western or something else. The fact is that a region (*deśa*) situated in the Direction called East (*Pūrvā*) would be called eastern (*pūrva*), another situated in the Direction called West (*Pratīcī*) would be called western (*pratīcya*) and so on. The question now arises : why is a particular Direction so called? Why is *Prācī* so called? Is it

8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.

due to the presence of any particular circumstance or cause? Here Bhartṛhari definitely says that it is not.[11] We postulate the existence of *Dik* because of the service which it renders to the regions and to the objects situated in these regions. Being a power, it rests on something else, it appears as an attribute of something else. That being so, there cannot be another power to regulate it. If another power is postulated, *Dik* would cease to be a power, because it would become that which has power (*śaktimat*). The quality of being East, West, North or South is inherent in it. It is not the result of its contact with the Sun in the different stages of its course. That contact only makes manifest what is already inherent in it. *Dik* is One. This one *Dik* is, in its own nature, East, West, North and South which are not its real divisions, but different aspects of one and the same thing.

That what is called *Dik* is only a power and not an independent entity is emphasized. The characteristic of a power is that it rests on something else. We come to know *Dik* when we see it as an attribute of something. Regions or objects are called eastern or western or something else. Enquiring into the basis of such expressions, we find that it is the notion of *Dik* which is the basis. But the thing to note is that it always appears as resting on or qualifying something (*paropādhirūpā*). If it is not so looked upon, the result would be that we would not come across any tangible entity and the word *Dik* would end up by being a mere name.[12] So it should be looked upon as a power, postulated on the basis of its appearing as the attribute of other things and causing certain turns of expression.

Some tried to explain expressions like *purrastāt* (in front), *paścāt* (behind) without reference to the power called *Dik*. They argued that such expressions were based on one's own body. 'In front', for instance, refers to the direction which one is facing and 'behind', refers to the opposite direction.[13] They also pointed out that certain names of countries or regions, though formed from the very words which denoted the Directions, did not have any relation with them but were mere conventional names of these countries or regions. There is the name *uttarāḥ Kuravaḥ* = the country of the northern *Kurus*. This name has nothing to do with the Direction called *Uttarā* (North). It seems to be a mere conventional name. Even those who live to the north of the *Uttara Kurus* call them by the same name though, strictly speaking, if they went on the basis of Direction, they should call them

11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.

the Southern Kurus. Similarly, names of countries like *Pūrvadeśa*, *Dakṣiṇāpatha* also seem to be mere conventional names (*rūḍhi*), without reference to *Dik*.[14] Sometimes we apply the term *pūrva* to what, from the point of view of Direction, is in the West. When we face the West, the region in front of us is in the West but we use the expression *pūrva* for it. When one goes from the South (*Dakṣiṇāpatha*) to the Eastern country (*Pūrvadeśa*) one is said to go to the east (*pūrva*) but one actually goes north. Thus, it is clear that we sometimes use the expressions *pūrva, para,* etc. without meaning Direction by them. In other words, the notion of *pūrva* (in front) and *paścāt* (behind) are not based on *Dik*. The remarks of the *Mahābhāṣya* on *pūrvasmin deśe vasati* = 'he lives in the eastern region', confirms this.[15] The *M. Bhā.* is trying to explain why the suffix *astāti* cannot come after the word *pūrva* in the above sentence. The reason is that the suffix in question is taught after words like *pūrva* when they directly express Direction, Region or division of Time, whereas in this sentence the word *pūrva* only qualifies the word *deśa* which is the word directly expressive of region. The word *pūrva* here is not a *dikśabda* expressive of *deśa* as required by P. 5.3.27.

These attempts to dispense with the notion of *Dik* cannot be successful. It does not require much imagination to see that one's own body cannot be the basis of such expressions because there cannot be any fixity about the direction which one faces and the meaning of such expressions as *puraḥ* and *paścāt* would depend entirely on the direction which one faces.[16]

In this uncertainty and lack of fixity one would find it difficult to carry out Vedic injunctions which often have reference to a particular Direction, as in "One should eat, facing the East or the North."[17] The fact is that words like *Pūrvā* (East) etc. are applied to the Directions (*Dik*) irrespective of any other implication. But when they are applied to the Regions or to the divisions of Time, they are based on *vyavasthā* (mutual requirement, the relation of the limit and the limited).[18] When applied to the Directions, these words are no more than proper names. If the relation of the limit and the limited or the idea of mutual requirement is there at all, it must be so in a hidden

14. See Texts.
15. M. Bhā. II. p. 408, l. 5.
16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.

form. In the expression *pūrvo ghaṭaḥ* = 'the jar on the east, the prior jar', the word *ghaṭaḥ* conveys its own meaning and the word *pūrva* provokes the question : in relation to what ?[19] Thus there is a clear difference between the words *pūrva* etc. as applied to Directions and as applied to the Regions and the divisions of Time. Because of resemblance, they appear to be the same. What is based on mere immemorial usage cannot be the same as something based on a cause.[20] In the case of the regions and the divisions of Time, the words only look like *dikśabda* but are really not so. Such words are used in a fixed meaning. It is like the word *ṣaṣṭi* = 'sixty' in the expression *ṣāṣṭika* = 'one who is sixty years old'. Though a numeral, it denotes years here without the help of any other word, by mere usage.[21]

Another aspect of *Dik* is that it is due to it that all divisions in objects are brought about. Objects like mountains seem to be illuminated by the light of the Sun on one side and to be covered with darkness on another. Without *Dik,* this division of parts would not be possible. It serves as an indication for the inference of *Dik.*[22] Division into parts of limited material objects is due to *Dik.* Even in atoms which are indivisible, one can imagine four sides, a top and a bottom on the basis of *Dik.*[23] Other atoms can come into contact with these six parts and produce such things as binaries etc. (*dyaṇuka*). It is because of this division into parts from the very beginning that it continues in all the later products. So the division of all material objects into parts is the first service which *Dik* renders. Some explain the whole thing differently. They say that in all divisible objects, division into parts is due to light and shade and that in all indivisible objects like the atom, division is imaginary and brought about by *Dik.* What they mean is that when there is some basis for the division of parts such as light and shade as in the case of divisible objects, the division is due to that. When there is none as in the case of indivisible objects like the atom, it is *Dik* which is the cause of such a division. But the right way of looking at the matter is that it is due to *Dik* that division in any object is possible, not merely in the indivisible atom.[24]

The effects of *Dik,* so far explained, are found everywhere. That is why it is said to be all-pervasive (*vibhu*). The all-pervasiveness

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19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.

of incorporeal entities consists just in this, namely, that their effects can be seen everywhere. The all-pervasiveness of corporeal things, on the other hand, consists in their occupying all space with their parts.[25]

The postulation of the existence of Direction and Time is as established as that of Consciousness. It is the very nature of living beings.[26] Even a thing which exists is as good as non-existent if it is not cognised, if it does not come within the range of our consciousness, because then it cannot fulfil any worldly purpose. That is why consciousness is accepted by everybody.[27] Similarly, Direction and Time are based on our cognitions. Otherwise they would not lead to any purposeful activity.[28] If this postulation of *Dik* and *Kāla* which has become our nature is not accepted, there would be confusion in all our worldly transactions. Even though the universe is without spatial or temporal sequence, still even one who knows the truth must act on the basis of the postulation of *Dik* and *Kāla*. Even he can cognise things only as having spatial and temporal sequence. Just as Time, a power of *Brahman,* by exercising its functions of permission and prevention, brings about temporal sequence, in the same way. Direction is the cause of spatial or rather directional sequence among objects. It brings about cognition of objects as qualified by itself. It is then that, though One, it appears to be many.[29]

As words expressive of Direction, when applied to regions and divisions of Time, involve the relation of the limit and the limited, the fifth case affix (*pañcamī vibhakti*) is used in the Sanskrit language to express it. Of course, it is used only when this particular relation is actually meant to be conveyed. But it may not be meant to be conveyed even when it is there. In such a case, some other case affix like the sixth one would be used.[30]

Helārāja here points out that all that has been said so far is from the point of view of those who hold that there is an external reality also (*bāhyārthanaya*). But there is the point of view of those who believe that the whole of manifestation takes place within the Supreme Consciousness itself (*antarjñeyanaya*). They hold that, because of an eternal metaphysical limitation, the manifestation seems to be ex-

25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.

ternal, but it is really not so. It is not only *Dik* which appears to be external, but the heavens, the earth, the air, the oceans, the rivers, in fact, everything is an inner manifestation. In fact, to speak about inner and outer is itself a mistake. There is only the *Brahman-Śabda-tattva* which manifests itself, now as this and now as that.[31] When there is nothing else besides that, there cannot be any disinction between inner and outer. These are relative terms. Something can be inner only in relation to something else which is outer. There is just one Reality which is neither inner nor outer but which is everything. The whole cosmos is manifested within it.[32] *Dik,* as an external entity, does not exist.[33] That being so, to postulate that its powers are one or that they are many is futile. Such a postulation would not relate to a positive entity.[34] In practical life, we have to follow our understanding and act. Things in the world are quite different from what the different thinkers (*tīrthika*) speculate them to be. They obviously cannot have the contradictory characteristics which the thinkers attribute to them. Therefore, in practical life, one has to follow the usages based on convention. Even thinkers have to do it. One has to accept the ten Directions current in the world.[35]

One can establish neither unity nor multiplicity on the basis of mere logic. Where two things are mutually dependent, the disproving of one would disprove the other. Thus neither the multiplicity nor the unity of *Dik* would stand examination. Worldly usage is based on what the mind grasps. In reality, both multiplicity and unity are unreal. The accepted doctrine is that what is called *Dik* is a power[36] and it is futile to discuss whether power is one or many or whether it is different or not from that which wields the power. That which wields the power, being a positive entity, can be separately cognised and therefore, its difference can be established.[37] Power being something which depends and rests on something else, its difference or otherwise cannot be so clearly established. Therefore, in practical life, one has to be content with accepting *Dik* as understood in the world.

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31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.

5. ON THE MEANS (*SĀDHANA*)

Of the four powers grouped together by Bhartṛhari, *Sādhana,* the Means, is the second one, the first being Direction (*Dik*) which has been explained in the last section. As already pointed out, the notion of power (*śakti*) plays an important part in Bhartṛhari's thought. We know that in his metaphysics, the ultimate Reality is endowed with infinite powers, all postulated to explain the infinite variety of the cosmic phenomena. The cosmos is thought of as consisting of an infinite number of concrete objects situated in space. These are not static objects. They are all the time reacting on one another and, by their mutual co-operation, bringing about an infinite number of actions and processes. These actions and processes produce concrete objects which, in their turn, enter into the stream of the life of the cosmos and act in a similar manner. They are able to accomplish actions and initiate processes because they are endowed with the requisite powers to do so. In fact, what is called a concrete object is essentially a bundle of powers.[1] Any object in the world is defined in terms of its capacity to participate in the accomplishment of various actions. While everything in the universe, all living beings, all objects and all actions and processes are the products of the working of the infinite powers of the ultimate Reality, these products, in their turn, are endowed with powers to produce various kinds of effects. In fact these powers constitute their essential nature. The very causes which produce the objects endow them with their powers also. When the objects in which the powers inhere perish, the powers also perish. The power of the lamp to illuminate comes into existence with the lamp itself and perishes with it.[2] Not all powers, however, are like that. Some which are due to special human effort may decline even when their substratum is still present. Physical strength acquired through vigorous physical exercise and good food may decrease while the body is still alive.[3] Some powers are interfered with by exceptional personalities. It is believed that Yogins can, at their will, change the form of all objects. Some powers are made manifest by lapse of time. The moral forces called *dharma* and *adharma* (merit and demerit) take time to mature and produce their fruit in the form of reward or punishment. Some are held in abeyance by human effort. For

1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.

example, the power of poison to kill or of the seed to produce the sprout can be held in check by powerful personalities.

The observer watches the play of forces in the universe, understands them and gives expression to them in words. As a speaker, he has a certain amount of liberty in describing what he understands. He uses sentences to describe it. The normal sentence expresses a complex meaning in which some action or process is the central element and the concrete objects which co-operate in accomplishing the process are the other elements associated with it. Normally, it is the verb which expresses the central element and the nouns express the other elements. The other kinds of words like adverbs and adjectives denote some peculiarity in the elements expressed by the verbs and the nouns.

Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali,[4] gives the name *sādhana* to the concrete objects which help in the accomplishment of the action. They are so called because they are the means (*sādhana*). When it is said that the concrete object is the means, what is meant is that one of the many powers or capacities which it has is the means in the accomplishment of some action or other.[5] When the *Mahābhāṣya* says that *guṇa* is the means, it is power which it so calls. Power is called *guṇa* because it helps to distinguish a thing from other things. In other words, it is *bhedaka,* a distinguishing property, an important characteristic of *guṇa,* according to Bhartṛhari, as we have already seen in a previous section. A power is dependent upon what has power and it also helps to distinguish it from other things. Even when the *Mahābhāṣya* says that substance is the means in the accomplishment of an action, we must understand that it is because it is the subsratum of power.[6] What is meant is that a substance, that is, a concrete thing having power is the means. A power must always have a substratum. Patañjali seems to identify power with what has power when he sometimes declares the substance to be the means.

There is no difference of opinion between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, but the latter emphasises that it is not a thing which is the means so much as its power. In discussing whether it is the concrete thing or its power which is the means, Bhartṛhari is not thinking so much of outside reality as of the way in which we describe it in communication. Words move about in their own realm and though this realm is not without any relation with outside reality, we have already seen

4. M.Bhā.II, p. 12, l. 11 ff.
5. See Texts.
6. M.Bhā.II, p. 57, l. 9.

that Bhartṛhari makes a distinction between *śabdārtha* and *vastvartha*, between objects and processes as conveyed by words and as they exist in the outside world. When he says that what is called means is the power of a thing rather than the thing itself, he is thinking of the realm in which words move. The realm in which words move is conditioned by the way in which the speaker cognises things and by his desire to present what he cognises in a particular way. The speaker's mode of cognition and his intention determine to a great extent the nature of the realm in which the words move.

The reason why the power of a thing rather than the thing itself is declared to be the means is that the object in the outside world has a certain fixed character and cannot explain the great variety of ways in which it figures in our speech. That it is power or capacity which is the real means or accessory to action and not substance can be gathered from the fact that an accessory sometimes becomes *śeṣa* and from the fact that the object (*karma*) can sometimes become the agent (*kartā*). These are changes which a substance or a concrete thing, being of a fixed chaarcter, cannot undergo.[7] If the thing, apart from its powers, were the means, it could not become, now the agent, now the instrument, now the location and so on, because it is, in its own nature, of a fixed character. But the fact is that a thing is a bundle of powers and, though it may always remain so, it is open to the speaker to emphasize some power or other in a particular context.[8] That is how one and the same object figures in different capacities in different sentences as when we say : *ghaṭaṃ paśya* = 'see the jar', *ghaṭenodakam ānaya* = 'bring water in a jar', *ghaṭe udakaṃ nidhehi* 'pour water in the jar', and so on.[9]

The principle that in the use of words, everything is a matter of the speaker's intention and cognition is invoked to explain some expressions like the following : *śaktiṁ ādadhāti* = 'he imparts power', *śaktyā sādhayati* = 'he accomplishes through power' and so on. Here the word *śakti* is put in the accusative case in the first sentence and in the instrumental case in the second sentence, showing that what it stands for, namely, power, is presented as the *sādhana* called *karma* = 'object' in the first sentence and as the *sādhana* called *karaṇa* = instrument' in the second case. But how is this possible ? How can power become *sādhana* unless it has itself powers ? And how can a power have power ? To postulate a power in a power would result in *re-*

7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.
9. Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 232, l. 19-20.

gressus ad infinitum. Similarly, in the expression : *dhanavināśaṁ karoti* = 'he brings about destruction of wealth', destruction, a kind of non-existence, is presented as a *sādhana* of the action of bringing about. But how can non-existence have power ? This difficulty is surmounted by invoking the principle mentioned above. The use of words depends more on the speaker's intention than on outside reality.[10] Words follow cognition.[11] A thing may actually exist, but if it is not cognised, it cannot become the object of verbal usage. Similarly, even what does not exist may become the object of verbal usage provided it has become the object of cognition and the speaker's intention. When power, which is ordinarily a property of things, is itself thought of as a thing (*dravya*), there is no contradiction in thinking of it as having power.[12] Similarly, we can think of non-existence as a thing, in which case, it can also have power.[13] Everything is a matter of the speaker's intention and cognition. That is how expressions like *hanty ātmānam ātmanā* = 'he kills himself', in which one and the same thing is agent and instrument of an action — two different kinds of *sādhana*—are possible. Ordinarily one thinks of a cooking pot (*sthālī*) as a vessel in which to cook, as a receptacle (*adhikaraṇa*). But when it is made of thin material and so what is put in it cooks quickly, one may want to emphasize that point and speak of the pot itself as the agent of cooking by saying : *sthālī pacati*. Here, through the speaker's intention, what is ordinarily a receptacle has become an agent. Similarly, if we want to emphasize that it is more through the quality of the pot than through the fuel that the cooking has been done quickly, we would say : *sthālyā pacati* = 'one cooks with the pot', in which case the pot has become an instrument,[14] another kind of *sādhana*.

It is because nothing is predetermined to be a particular *sādhana* but becomes this or that according to the speaker's cognition and intention and because *sādhana* is something essentially mental that Patañjali has declared certain *sūtras* of Pāṇini to be unnecessary. *Apādāna* has been defined as that which remain firm and stable when separation between two things takes place[15] and the fifth case affix (*pañcamī*) has been taught after a word expressive of *apādāna*.[16] It is again

10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See Texts.
15. P.1.4.24.
16. P.2.3.28.

taught in P.2.3.42 to cover cases like: *Kurubhyaḥ pāñcālā abhirūpa-tarāḥ* = 'the Pāñcālas are more good-looking than the Kurus', in which a comparison between two things is involved and one of them is declared to be superior to the other in some respect. It is pointed out that such expressions are also covered by P. 2.3.28 and that there was no need for P. 2.3.42. The argument is based on the idea that what is called *sādhana* is something essentially mental. The fifth ease affix is taught where separation is to be expressed. Separation, however, need not be always physical. In comparison, for instance, there is separation, not physical of course, but mental. What is called separation is taking two things apart, preceded by their union. In the comparison given above, there is, first of all, a bringing together (*saṃśleṣa*) of Kurus and Pāñcālas mentally on the basis of their resemblance in good looks and then their separation (*vèśleṣa*) on account of the superiority of one over the other.[17] The whole thing is mental. Even what is purely mental is quite enough to explain verbal usage. It is well known that in the application of the name of a particular *sādhana* to a particular object, maximum degree is not ordinarily important. Where it is important, Pāṇini tells us so in some way, as by the use of the suffix '*tamap*' in P. 1.4.42. Just because he insists on maximum degree in particular cases, we conclude that it is not ordinarily required.[18] Physical separation represents maximum degree, but mental separation is also separation and can become the basis of the use of the fifth case affix according to P. 2.3.28 and there was, therefore, no need for P. 2.3.42.

Another indication that *sādhana* can be purely mental is that when story-tellers tell an old story, they sometimes use the present tense as in the expression : *Kaṃsaṃ ghātayati* = 'he gets Kaṃsa killed' (that is, he tells the story of the killing of Kaṃsa). The historical present is well known in many languages. That is because the whole story is present in the mind of the tellers at the time of the telling and it is evoked in the mind of the hearers also.[19] What figures in the mind is the meaning of words and not outside reality.[20] Thus, the story-teller causes the mental Vāsudeva to kill the mental Kaṃsa.[21] As maximum degree is not important, mental Vāsudeva and Kaṃsa can also be *sādhana* in regard to an action. Secondly, the story-teller has become the prompting agent (*prayojaka*), of course, in a secondary manner.

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17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.

The foregoing statements on *sādhana* have been made on the assumption that, as a power, it is distinct from what has power. But there are some, like the *Vaiśeṣikas* who do not believe that there is any power distinct from the objects whose power it is supposed to be. In fact, they believe that, due to the relation called *samavāya* (inherence) even things which are different from each other appear to be the same. For example, the whole and its parts. They believe that many properties and qualities inhere in the same substance. That is why they are called *saṃsargavādinaḥ* = 'believers in *saṃsarga*' (the relation called inherence). They believe that things produce their effects through their own nature, helped by auxiliary factors (*sahakāriṇaḥ*). The thing itself would be the cause and the auxiliary factors their power in producing the effects. Or the thing itself may be looked upon as the power of the auxiliary factors in producing the effect. What it amounts to is that everything in the world is both power and that which has power.[22] Things are powers to one another and there is no such thing as an invisible power apart from the objects coming under the six categories accepted by the *Vaiśeṣikas*. This character of things, namely, that they are powers of one another is conveyed by the case affixes.[23] In the sentence *ghaṭaṃ paśyati* = 'he sees the jar', the second case affix (*dvitīyā*) conveys the power of the jar, its bigness (*mahattva*) which makes it visible. It is then that the jar becomes the *sādhana* = 'means', in the act of seeing. When a thing is conceived as helping something else, it is a power. When it is conceived as helped by something else it is *śaktimat* (that which has power).

It is the *Vaiśeṣikas* who look upon objects as powers of one another. They do so on the basis of an analysis of outside reality and not after an analysis of the words which we use to describe reality. For them, the word *sādhana* stands for the cause which actually produces the effect and not for what is presented by the words as the means. What is the *sādhana* of what is stated by them as follows.[24] When the jar becomes the object of the action of seeing, it is because of its magnitude (*mahattva*) and of its being made up of compound things which, having magnitudte, are preceived because they are made up of compound things and have colour.[25] A binary (*dvyaṇuka*) is called a compound because it is made up of more than one thing and a tertiary (*tryaṇuka*) and other things are said to be made up of compounds.

22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. Vai, sū. 4.1.6.

The atom (*paramāṇv*) has colour but it cannot be perceived because it is not made up of more than one thing. A binary is not perceptible because it is not made up of compounds. What is said of the atom is applicable to other imperceptible things also. The fact of having colour is a second cause. Air has magnitude, is made up of compounds but is not perceptible because it has no colour. Though magnitude is not a cause of perceptibility, it is connected with it because what is perceptible has magnitude. A universal is a cause of perceptibility because, due to it, one perceives a thing as different from other things. That the fact of being made up of compound things is a cause of perceptibility implies that a thing must be a whole having parts before it can be perceived. The quality of being colour (*rūpatva*) is a means of perceiving colour. Colour is perceptible because it inheres in an object which is a whole having parts and also because it is in a manifested state. The colour of the ocular ray is not perceptible because it is not in a manifested state. The colour of the atom is not perceptible because it does not inhere in a whole having parts. It is not only in the case of colour that its universal (*rūpatva*) is a cause of perception. That is true of other qualities also. In the cognition of taste, the quality of being taste is a means. So is the case with smell.[26] In fact, they can be cognised only in that way. Substance, on the other hand, can be cognised in several ways. It can be cognised through its universal, its quality or its action.[27] Universals, on the other hand depend upon their substrata for their cognition. When the universal *rasatva* is cognised, the *rasa* in which it inheres is the means or the power by which it is cognised. So is the substance in which the *rasa* is found one of the factors or the means by which *rasatva* is cognised. What it all amounts to is that things are powers to one another, powers which help the thing having power to produce its effects and to be perceived. So what is called power is not anything fixed. Things related to one another can be powers to one another. Such factors as favourable place and time can also be powers.[28]

From what has been said so far, it is clear that the *Vaiśeṣikas* take the concept of *sādhana* = 'means' in a very comprehensive way. Whatever helps another at any time is its means or power for that time.[29] By the contact between the soul, the senses, the mind and the object, knowledge of such things as colour takes place. Here contact is the means or power which produces the effect, namely know-

26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.

ledge. Number, dimension, separateness, contact, separation, action are all perceived by the eye, because they all inhere in a substance having colour. Contact is a power of the parts in the production of the whole.[30] The relation called inherence is a power in the production of qualities in the whole.[31] The conclusion is that whatever helps another and is dependent on it is power[32] All objects can be power to one another in this sense.

From the above brief account of the way in which the *Vaiśeṣikas* look upon power or *sādhana,* it is clear that for them it is whatever helps another to produce its effect or to be cognised. Bhartṛhari speaks about *sādhana* chiefly in the context of giving expression to our experience through words. We do so by means of sentences which have a complex particularised meaning, in which some action or process is the central element and the other elements are things or powers or things having powers which help in the accomplishment of that action, the central element. He has emphasized that they are powers rather than things. The question now arises : what verbal element in the sentence expresses these powers ? The power exists in order that the action may be accomplished. In that sense, it is subordinate to it. There are general words like *sādhana, kāraka* and special words like *apādāna, sampradāna* and so on which denote either power in general or a special kind of power. But in the actual sentence, these words may not occur at all. In any case, they only denote, in a very general way, the things which help in the accomplishment of the action, but not their particular powers which actually do so. It is the case affixes, the secondary suffixes and other verbal elements which express the power.[33] In the sentence : *devadattaḥ kāṣṭhair odanaṃ pacati,* it is the third case affix in *kāṣṭhaiḥ* which expresses the power of being an instrument which *kāṣṭha,* that is, fuel has in the act of cooking. The word only means fuel. That fuel is the instrument in the act of cooking is expressed by the third case affix. Similarly, in *śatikam* and *śatyam,* it is the secondary suffixes *ṭhan* and *yat* which express the idea that hundred is the instrument — a kind of *sādhana* or power — with which the purchase was made.[34]

It is because of their rendering help to action that finished objects (*siddha*) are looked upon as cause (*nimitta*). They are characterised

30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.

by an inclination to render service (*nati*), by a self-surrender and a dedication, as it were, to the accomplishment of the action.[35] It is what is already there which has the power to be the means in the accomplishment of what is yet to be.

The existence of two views in regard to power has already been indicated. One view is that power is different from what has power and that it is beyond the range of the senses. This is the *Mīmāṃsaka* view. The other view, that of the *Vaiśeṣikas,* is that an object, produces its effect as a function of its own nature. Its own essence, its own nature, is its power. There is no need to postulate a power apart from the object. Grammarians are really not concerned with this controversy at all. They have no predeliction in this matter.[36] As already stated several times, they go by what the word conveys. Words do convey things and their powers as distinct from one another. In other words, they are not expressed by the same element in the word or the sentence. The stem expresses the thing and the case affix expresses its power.[37]

It has so far been said that whatever helps anything at any time is its means or power for that time. Ordinarily, in our expressions it is some action or process which is presented as having to be accomplished and things are presented as the means for accomplishing it. Bhartṛhari, however, points out, again on the authority of Patañjali, that action itself can become the means in the accomplishment of other actions. It has been said in the *Mahābhāṣya* that not only that for which the object (*karma*) is destined is the recipient (*saṃpradāna*) but also that for which action is destined.[38] Somebody sees a thing, then desires it, decides on a course of action, then acts, completes his action and attains the object. Each previous act becomes the means for the accomplishment of the succeeding one.[39] The agent accomplishes each succeeding act by his previous act. By seeing (*saṃdarśana*), he attains desiring, by desiring (*prārthanā*) he attains (*vyavasāya*) and decision leads to the making of an effort (*ārambha*). Thus each later stage comes under the definition of *karma* (object). That is what the *Mahābhāṣya* means by saying : *kriyāpi kṛtrimaṃ karma* = 'an action can also be an object in the technical sense.' Seeing well or seeing all round is what is meant by *saṃdarśanam*.

35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. M. Bhā. I. p. 330, l. 18 ff.
39. See Texts.

It is a kind of contemplation of the ultimate fruit. It becomes the means for the accomplishment of *prarthanā* = 'the desire relating to the means of obtaining the fruit'. Desire does arise when the object is seen. The next stage is the decision that a particular action will lead to the attainment of the fruit. It is the previous act of desiring which leads to this. Desire leads to decision and the latter to activity, because it is due to decision that one begins purposeful activity. That which was action in the previous stage becomes the means (*sādhana*) in the next stage. As far as the action of seeing itself is concerned, the self who experiences the objects is the *sādhana,* the self that is capable of desiring the fruit. Even though action is a process and not an accomplished thing yet it becomes a thing, as soon as it is completed and so it can be a *sādhana.*

The processes or actions expressed by the verbs in the sentence are brought about by a set of accessories. They are all called *sādhana* because they are means in the accomplishment of the action. It has been shown in the previous pages that they are all in the nature of a power. But they can all be called do-ers (*kāraka*), because they all play some part in doing the main action conveyed by the sentence. In that sense, all of them become agents. Each of them performs a particular function in regard to the main action and thus acquires a special name such as instrument (*karaṇa*).[40] That which sets the other accessories in motion is the real Agent (*kartā*). That which the agent seeks most to reach by his action, to make, to mar or to modify is called the object (*karma*) and so on. Six such do-ers (*kāraka*) have been recognised in *Vyākaraṇa.* All these functions having a special name come under the general heading of 'do-er'. The word *kāraka* (do-er) and the special names can be used in apposition to each other for this reason.[41] Nothing which is not a *kāraka* can get one of the special names. In regard to the main action, one and the same thing can be *kāraka* in a general sense and *karma, karaṇa* etc. in a special sense. Each *kāraka* performs some minor action in order to serve the main action conveyed by the sentence. These minor actions are not ordinarily openly mentioned but understood. Each *kāraka* may be dependent on the main agent (*kartā*) in regard to the main action but it is independent in regard to its own minor action. There is no contradiction between the two. In regard to the main action it is under the main agent who employs it. That is why Bhartṛhari says that the agents of the minor actions subordinate their function

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40. See Texts.
41. See Texts.

to the main Agent (*kartā*).[42] But they do not lose their independence as far as their own minor action is concerned. Nor can anything be considered to be the do-er (*kāraka*) of an action if it does nothing, that is, if it has not some kind of independence. So, by each one doing its own minor action, all become accessories of the main action. Even though they are under the main Agent, they are independent as far as their own minor action is concerned. So they acquire special names such as *karaṇa* according to the nature of their own minor action. While retaining this character or rather because of that, they participate in the accomplishment of the main action, that is, they are *kāraka* in addition to being *karaṇa* etc. Under the direction of the main agent (*kartā*) they perform their own minor actions and thus become *karaṇa* etc. as well as *kāraka*. It is only when the other accessories become *karaṇa* and so on that the main agent attains his status, that is, *kartṛtva*. Thus, there is no contradiction between their independence in regard to their own minor action and dependence in regard to the main action. In fact what is independence in regard to one's own minor action is the same thing as dependence in regard to the main action.[43] In fact, the former materialises only after the accessories have been employed by the agent. Till then, it was only in a potential state. Thus every acessory is a do-er (*kāraka, kartā*). That is why we can sometimes say, when we want to emphasize the importance of the other accessories : *sthālī pacati, edhāṃsi pacanti, odanaḥ pacyate.* It means that the roof in the verb *pacati,* though it usually expresses the activity of the main agent, can, on occasions express the activity of some of the other accessories also. It can express the activity of three of them, *karma, karaṇa* and *adhikaraṇa.* But it cannot express the activity of the *saṃpradāna* and *apādāna,* or rather, these two accessories cannot be presented by the speaker as the main agent of the action denoted by the verb.[44] One cannot say *rāmo dadāti* for *rāmāya dadāti* nor *vṛkṣaḥ patati* instead of *vṛkṣāt patti.* Thus *karaṇa, adhikaraṇa* and *karma* can also be called *kartā.* And yet they are not so called because their independence is only relative. It is mixed up with dependence. Only the main agent has independence unmixed with dependence. So the name has been reserved for that.[45]

While on the subject of *sādhana* and *kāraka,* Bhartṛhari says a few words about some allied notions which have been used by Pāṇini to explain some forms. He takes up the notion of *hetu* = 'cause' first.

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42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.
45. See Texts.

Sādhana or *Kāraka* is that which brings about action and so it is a cause of action. A variety of it is *karaṇa* = 'instrument'. The third case-affix has been taught after a word expressive of an instrument.[46] What is called *hetu* can also bring about an action and the third case affix has been taught after a word expressive of *hetu* also.[47] This looks like a repetition, unless one can point out some difference between the *sādhana* called *karaṇa* and *hetu*. A difference is pointed out. That which can bring about a substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) or action (*kriyā*) is *hetu*. The following sentences are illustrations : *bījenāṅkuraḥ* = 'through the seed, the sprout, *dhanena kulam* = 'through wealth, the family', *vidyayā yaśaḥ* = 'through learning, fame', *śilpābhyāsena naipuṇyam* = 'through practice of a craft, skill', *agninā pākaḥ* = 'through fire, cooking'. A *kāraka* or *sādhana* brings about an action only.[48] By '*hetu*' is meant anything which is looked upon as a cause, irrespective of whether it performs a function or operation or not.[49] That is why, in the above examples, fire is the *hetu* of cooking and takes the third case affix by P. 2.3.23. There is only one thing which performs some operation and is yet called *hetu*, namely, that which prompts another to do something.[50] There is another notion which is allied to that of *hetu*, namely, *lakṣaṇa*. There is, however, a difference between the two. *Hetu* is that which produces an effect whereas *lakṣaṇa* is that which makes something known, such is the view of some. But this is not right, because *hetu* also can make something known. When a person lives on his knowledge, the latter produces the knowledge as to how he lives.[51] In *vṛkṣam anu vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes off the tree', the tree is the *lakṣaṇa*.[52] Irrespective of the consideration whether it produces the lightning or not, it is taken as the point of indication of the lightning. Lightning flashes off the tree, after reaching the tree. The word *lakṣaṇa* comes in P. 1.4.84, also where *anu* is given the name of *karma-pravacanīya* (postposition) when it is used for expressing *lakṣaṇa*. The example usually given is : *Śākalyasya saṃhitām anu prāvarṣat* = 'it rained after the reaction of the *saṃhitā* by *śākalya*.' Here the *saṃhitā* is not only the point of indication (*lakṣaṇa*), but also the cause (*hetu*). It is called *lakṣaṇa* because this *hetu* is also something which makes something known (*jñāpaka*).[53] Similarly, smoke is the sign (*lakṣaṇa*)

46. P. 2.3.18.
47. P. 2.3.23.
48. See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. P. 1.4.55.
51. See Texts.
52. P. 1.4.90.
53. See Texts.

of fire because the sight of it leads to the inference of fire. One has seen the two together so many times that when one sees it alone, one infers the existence of the other. It is true that one does not see rain following *saṃhitā* so often in real life. But if one has understood that a certain thing has the power to produce a certain effect, it can become its sign (*lakṣaṇa*) also. The rising of clouds becomes the cause of our understanding that it will rain. One might argue that invariable concomittance is understood only after seeing two things together many times and not just once. One has not seen *saṃhitā* followed by rain many times. It may be the cause but seeing them together just once does not enable us to decide. So it cannot be a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) of rain, just as the rising of clouds can be. To this, the answer is that sometimes we decide that there is a relation of cause and effect between two things even after seeing their sequence just once.[54] The reason is that, if a thing is not the cause, the effect will not follow it even once. To think of something else as the cause would upset the whole scheme of causality. Nor can it be an accident because what is not the cause cannot produce the effect even once. If we can see the *saṃhitā* produce rain definitely even once, we conclude that it is the cause. As the cause is also something which makes something else known, it has been called *lakṣaṇa* in P. 1.4.84. The *Mahābhāṣya* says that *lakṣaṇa* includes *hetu*.[55] The rising of clouds is not only the cause of rain, it is also an indication of it, a sign of it. Even that which is a limit (*avadhi*) becomes a sign only if it causes the knowledge of something. The fact is that a sign (*lakṣaṇa*) is of many kinds. Sometimes, it makes the cause to be known, as in the case of smoke. Sometimes, it makes the effect to be known as in the case of clouds. *Saṃhitā* is both the cause and the sign of rain. P. 1.4.90 makes *anu* a postposition in the sense of sign which includes cause also. P. 1.4.84 has been given in order to exclude the third case affix expressive of cause taught in P.2.3.23. *Anu* has been given the name of *karmapravacanīya* twice, once in P. 1.4.84, to exclude the third case-affix and again in P. 1.4.90 to bring in the second case-affix.

The conclusion which emerges after all these considerations is this : a do-er (*kāraka*) is that which helps in the accomplishment of an action by assuming different forms; that which helps in a general way is a cause (*hetu*) and that which makes something else known is a sign (*lakṣaṇa*).

54. See Texts.
55. M. Bhā. I, p. 347, l. 10 ff.

After having pointed out the difference between *hetu* and *sādhana* or *kāraka* in general, it remains to distinguish it from a particular *kāraka*, namely, *karaṇa* = 'the instrument'. That which helps *most* in the accomplishment of the action is called instrument.[56] It is subordinate to action which is the more important of the two. That is why, if the prescribed instrument is not available, a substitute can be used. The action being the chief thing, it would demand some instrument or other. It the prescribed one is not available, a substitute can be used without violating the injunction.[57] According to some, this applies to all the accessories. In the sentence *adhyayanena vasati* = 'he resides for study', the third case affix has been used, not because study is an instrument (*karaṇa*) but because it is a cause (*hetu*). The action understood from the verb *vasati* is subordinate to study.[58] Residing somewhere is for the purpose of study and, therefore, subordinate to it and not vice versa. There cannot be a substitute for the main purpose. Thus *hetu* (cause, purpose) is more important than action, whereas instrument is always subordinate to action.

As *hetu* includes purpose also as we found in the illustration : *adhyayanena vasati*, it has become necessary to distinguish it from *tādarthya* = 'the fact of being meant for something else'. In it, something is for the purpose of something else, it brings about that something else. It, therefore, looks like the cause. A cause brings about its effect in two ways : either in unfavourable circumstances or in favourable circumstances. If it is in a declining condition, it produces an effect which is also in a declining condition. When water comes into contact with the heat of the sun, it decreases and continues to decrease. When, on the other hand, a cause gets the help of other factors, its strength increases and the effect also correspondingly benefits. For example, when the seed is strengthened by water and sunshine, it is capable of producing a stronger seedling. What is called *tādarthya* is a cause of the latter type.[59] It is a fully manifested state of causality. The fourth case affix is used to express it as in *kuṇḍalāya hiraṇyam* = 'gold for ear-rings'. The word *tādarthya* is formed by combining *tadartha* and *ya*. *Tadartha* means '*tasmai idam* = 'something meant for something else'. *Idam* stands for that something and *tasmai* for the something else. The suffix *ya* which

56. P. 1.4.42.
57. See Texts.
58. See Texts.
59. See Texts.

comes at the end of *tadartha* expresses the manifested state of the relation of causality existing between what *tasmai* and *idam* stand for.[60] When the compound *kuṇḍalahiraṇyam* is made of the two words, the main purpose would be to convey the idea that *hiraṇya* (gold) is the material cause of *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) and so the meaning of the second part of the compound is more important than that of the first part.

All this discussion about the difference between *sādhana* (*kāraka*), *hetu, lakṣaṇa* and *tādarthya* was a kind of digression, the real subject of this section being *sādhana*. It has already been stated clearly that *sādhana* is in the nature of a power. It is inborn in an object and lasts as long as the object itself. It is manifested when the object is called upon to help in the accomplishment of the action.[61] It is not that power is added on to an object after it has already come into existence. As for eternal things, their power is also eternal and natural to them. Though objects have their power at all times, it becomes manifest only at the time of action. It is then that the object is called *sādhana,* not at all times. The power of a wall to screen and of a sword to cut is seen when the thing to be screened and the thing to be cut are present. Another illustration would be the *vāruṇa* nooses of *Daityas*. The tradition is that they are always attached to their hands as a kind of power. They are, however, manifested only when the *Daityas* have to fight their enemies. When a sword, possessing sharpness, heaviness, hardness and a particular shape, is directed towards the thing to be cut, it is seen to be a thing having power, not till then. What is true of the *vāruṇa* nooses of the *Daityas* and the sword is true of all objects in the world.

The main view of Bhartṛhari on *sādhana* has already been expounded. According to his practice, he refers to some other views on *sādhana,* which were current, in his day. One view was that, as the existence of power cannot be known before the action which is its effect, we conclude that, it is produced before action by the forces, which are favourable to action. Others believed that the power of a thing was not different from it. It was the nature of a thing to have a certain power or not to have it. Others thought that the power of a thing was born with it.[62] Others still thought that the cause of action was not the same as that of he power of a thing to act. The different

60. See Texts.
61. See Texts.
62. See Texts.

things which cooperate to produce an action lend their powers to one another. Therefore, the powers and action are produced at the same time. In that sense, the powers are *sahaja*. As the powers produce action in the next moment after their own production, the relation of *sādhya* and *sādhana* between the two is not impaired. According to some, there exists, before everything, what is called *pravṛtti*, an eternal force leading to action. In that condition, it exists in nothing in particular. It is *anapāśritā*, without a support.[63] It is this force which gives to different things in the world their power to do particular actions. In this sense, *pravṛtti* or activity in a very general form is there before particular actions. This is said to be the view of the old *Mīmāṃsakas*. The *Sāṅkhyas* think that what is called *pravṛtti* is *rajoguṇa* = 'the quality called *rajas*', existing in everything in an eternal form and it is this which enables a thing to do particular actions. Some interpret the *pravṛtti*, the creative force that leads to action, as a moral force in the form of *dharma* (merit) or *adharma* (demerit). It is due to this moral force that things happen or do not happen. All actions of human beings are ultimately the result of this force. Others look upon the power called Time of the ultimate Reality as the *means* leading to all action. Though this view is presented by Bhartṛhari in this context as that of some, we have already seen what part *kālaśakti* plays in his metaphysics and in the creation of the cosmos. Nothing moves except when prompted by this power. Others do not make any distinction between the means and action, its result. For them action itself is the means. Even those who look upon Time as an independent substance attribute all activity in the universe to its influence.[64]

Though Bhartṛhari has given the views of others on *sādhana*, his own view does not admit of any doubt. It is essentially a power which exists in the objects and which enables them to act in different ways on different occasions. A general question in regard to this power is : is it one or many? In reality it is one but it can be looked upon as infinite in number in view of the infinite variety in its effects. As a kind of compromise and from the point of view of the expression of these powers in the language, six of these have been recognised.[65] They inhere in all objects like the universals. In the object called 'cow' for instance, inhere the universals : *sattva* = 'Being', *dravyatva* = 'the fact of being substance', *gotva* = 'the quality of being a cow' and so on.

63. See Texts.
64. See Texts.
65. See Texts.

Similarly the six powers also inhere in all objects, without our being able to say definitely whether they are identical with these or different from them. If they were entirely different from the objects, the latter would become powerless and, therefore, formless. If they were absolutely identical, one could not explain the multiplicity of the effects.[66] It is difficult to say whether they are different or identical. They are different and yet not so. Whatever they may be, grammarians look upon them as different. That is because, the world takes the word as authority and the Science of Grammar also follow it.[67] If one wants to go to the bottom of this matter, the position is that there is no identity apart from difference. Truth shines now as identity and now as difference.[68] Difference, clearly conceived, is not apart from unity and unity, clearly conceived is not different from difference. When unity or identity reaches its climax, one comes to the ultimate which it is that manifests itself as the different objects and processes of the cosmos. As already stated in the last section, Bhartṛhari considers the whole cosmos to be an external manifestation of an inner Reality. Really speaking, even the distinction between internal and external does not exist. An inner Reality, of the nature of Consciousness, called *Brahman-Śabdatattva*, shines, now as this and now as that. It is without any differentiation but it shines as having sequence.

In the course of the consideration of the nature of *sādhana* or means, it has been stated that, according to grammarians, it is a power which inheres in objects. It has also been stated that, according to the *saṃsargavādins,* objects are powers to one another, that it is a moral force called *adṛṣṭa* or *apūrva* for the *Mīmāṃsakas* that it is the power called Time for the Monists, that it is *rajas* for the *Sāṅkhyas* and that is an eternal substance called Time for those who look upon Time as a substance. While on the subject of *sādhana* the distinction between that and allied things like *hetu, lakṣaṇa* and *tādarthya* has also been considered. Whether power comes into being before, after or together with the object was also discussed. Whether it is one or many is also one of the topics which has been expounded. While considering the question whether it is identical with or different from the object, Bhartṛhari concluded by saying that everything is a manifestation of an Internal Reality.

66. See Texts.
67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.

a. The object (*karma*)

After this brief exposition of Bhartṛhari's ideas on *sādhana* or *kāraka* in general it remains to see what he has to say on its six varieties which have been recognised in *vyākaraṇa*. Though the *Vākyapadīya* is the result of Bhartṛhari's study of the Sanskrit language and of the *Vyākaraṇaśāstra* in particular, we have found that some of the ideas found in it have a wider application. Such, for instance, are his ideas on the *sphoṭa*, the *vākya*, the *jāti*, the *guṇa*, the *dik*, the *sādhana* and *kriyā*. That is why I have said that these ideas may be looked upon as the contribution of Ancient India to General Linguistics which was mixed up with Philosophy. When we come to his treatment of the six varieties of *sādhana* we find that it is based chiefly on the nature and structure of the Sanskrit language and has, therefore, not got the same wide application.

It has been stated that grammarians look upon the power of an object as different from it because the word presents them as different. What they mean is that the verbal element which expresses the power is not the same as that which denotes the object which has power. When the element which expresses the object remains the same, that which expresses the power may vary. In *vṛkṣam*, *vṛkṣeṇa* and *vṛkṣāya*, the stem expresses the object which has the power and it is the same in all the three forms. The case-affix varies with the power which it denotes. What the case affix denotes is, thererfore, different from what the stem denotes, it is a power or capacity of the object and it is called *sādhana* in all its variations.[69] Speaking generally, it helps in the accomplishment of the action and so it is a 'do-er' (*kāraka*). It is of six kinds beginning with *karma* and there is also a seventh one called *śeṣa*.[70] What is called *śeṣa* is treated here as the seventh *kāraka* but it is a *kāraka* only in a secondary sense. Pāṇini himself has not mentioned it in the context of the *kārakas*. Why Bhartṛhari looks upon it as a seventh *Kāraka* will be stated later.

We have already seen that the *kārakas* are all do-ers or agents because they all help in the accomplishment of the action. They are, in a way, causes of the action. It is necessary to remember that whatever Bhartṛhari says about them is said from the point of view of their presentation by words. Here again, it is the words of the Sanskrit language as explained in the grammar of Pāṇini that he has

69. See Texts.
70. See Texts.

in mind. Though the *Vākyapadīya* is not written in the form of a commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* or the *Mahābhāṣya,* these ancient works are the source of what he says and consciously or unconsciously, he is explaining particular passages from them especially from the latter in the course of his treatment of the topics dealt with in the third *kāṇḍa*. The result is that his treatment sometimes gets mixed up with the technique (*prakriyā*) of Pāṇini. One has often to sift his ideas from the technical material in which they are embedded. It is proposed to give a brief exposition of what he says about each one of the *kārYkas.*

The object (*karma*) is what the main agent (*kartā*) seeks most to attain by his action. It is of three main kinds and four minor kinds. The three main kinds are product (*nirvartya*), modification (*vikārya*) and destination (*prāpya*). In addition, (1) that which the agent attains though he may be indifferent to it, (2) that which he positively dislikes, (3) that which does not come under the definition of any other *kāraka* and (4) that which was some other *kāraka* before but has now become *karma,* make up the four minor kinds.[71] It is called product (*nirvartya*) when it has no material cause and even if it has it, it is not meant to be conveyed as in *saṃyogaṃ karoti* or *ghaṭaṃ karoti.*[72] When the material cause is presented as becoming its effect and identical with it, it is modification (*vikārya*). In the sentence *mṛdā ghaṭaṃ karoti* = 'he makes a jar with clay', the jar is presented as made out of clay and different from it. In *mṛdaṃ ghaṭaṃ karoti*='he makes the clay into jar', the material is presented as identical with the product. In the latter sentence, the object is said to be modification (*vikārya*). The modificaion is of two kinds : one which is the result of the total destruction of the original material, as when wood is reduced to ashes and the other when a new property is produced in the original material as when gold assumes the shape of earrings.[73] The third main kind of object is that in which the effect of the action cannot be seen or inferred.[74] As far as the first kind is concerned, the very coming into being of the product is the result of the action and it can be directly perceived. Similarly, in the second kind (*vikārya*) also, the effect of the action, namely, the appearance of the new property can be seen. Sometimes, the effect of the action cannot be perceived but can he inferred as when we infer other people's happiness by observing their facial expression or when we conclude

71. See Texts.
72 See Texts.
73 See Texts.
74 See Texts.

that the growth of the tree is due to previous watering and other care. This is not the case in such sentences as *ādityaṃ paśyati*='he sees the Sun', *nagaram upasarpati*='he goes to the city', *vedam adhīte*= 'he studies the Veda. Here one neither sees nor infers any effect on the objecct by the action mentioned in each sentence. Such an object is called destination (*prāpya*). Some do not accept destination as a separate kind of object, because they are of the opinion that all actions have some effect or other on their objects, whether it can be seen or not.[75] They maintain that in some cases the effect of the action of seeing can be actually seen. For example, we do see things being burnt up when looked at by snakes having poison in their vision (*dṛṣṭiviṣa*). On that analogy, we can conclude that other actions also have their effects. But this view is not accepted by Bhartṛhari. According to him, some actions do not have any visible or inferrable effect on their objects and it is such objects which are called 'destination' (*prāpya*).

The question arises : if the action has no effect upon the object at all, in what sense is the latter a means (*sādhana*) in regard to the former ? The answer is that it becomes the means in three ways. Taking an action like seeing, an object can be helpful (1) by being in the right place, (2) by being illuminated by light when vision is obstructed in some way, (3) by having natural fitness to be seen.[76] Unless a thing is in the right place, it cannot be seen. Light is a well-known condition for seeing something. Lastly, only visible things can be seen and not invisible things like ghosts. These are causal factors of the action of seeing and such factors exist for other actions also and through them a *prāpya* type of object becomes the 'means' of an action.

It has already been stated that all the powers exist in an object at the same time and that any one of them becomes active at the time when it is to help in the accomplishment of the action. It has also been stated that every object mentioned in a sentence is the agent (*kartā*) as far as its own minor action is concerned. How then can it be one of the other *kārakas*, say, *karma*, in the same sentence? It can be when its own minor action is not emphasised but that of the main agent is emphasised. The main agent wants to reach it by his action and then it becomes the *karma* in regard to that. So what is an agent in regard to its own minor action is *karma* in

75 See Texts.
76 See Texts.

regard to the action of the main agent.[77] What particular means (*sādhana*), an object, or particular power is emphasised depends upon the intention of the speaker and on the structure of the words or sentences which he uses.

The accessories (*kāraka*) which co-operate in the accomplishment of the main action, say, cooking expressed by a sentence are all agents (*kartā*) in regard to their own minor actions but become some other *kāraka* in regard to the main action. Fuel is agent in regard to the action of burning, but instrument (*karaṇa*) in regard to the main action of cooking. This is the normal state of things. Sometimes, due to the speaker's intention, what is normally the object (*karma*) in regard to the main action is presented as the agent in regard to it. In other words, it becomes *karmakartā*. This happens only in the case of roots, the action (*kriyā*) or the result of action (*bhāva*) conveyed by which resides in the object and not in the agent, that is, roots which are *karmasthakriya* or *karmasthabhāvaka*. In *kāṣṭham bhinatti* = 'he splits the wood, the action of splitting, becoming many bits, the meaning of the root *bhid* resides in the wood'. So it is *karmasthakriya*. Similarly, in *adanaṃ pacati*='he cooks rice', the result of the action of cooking, namely, becoming soft, resides in the rice. So the root *pac* is *karmasthadhāvaka*. In the two sentences given above, wood and rice are presented as object (*karma*), because, in them, the activity of the main agent, causing the wood to split or making the rice soft, is emphasised. When it is not emphasised due to the speakers' intention, we can have a sentence like this : *bhidyate kusūlaḥ svayam eva*='the granary breaks by itself'. Such an expression is sometimes resorted to by the speaker in order to emphasise the rickety nature of the granary. In this sentence *kusūlaḥ* is *karmakariā*, a case of a former *karma* becoming *kartā*. Similarly, one can say *pacyate odanaḥ svayam eva*='the rice cooks by itself', in order to exaggerate or to emphasise the extreme facility with which a particular kind of rice cooks. Here also, *odanaḥ* has become *karmakartā*. What is to be noted is that when an object becomes *karmakartā*, the activity of the main agent is not conveyed and the object is presented as independent and, therefore, agent in regard to its own action.[78] Even when an object is the *karma* in regard to the action of the main agent, it is *kartā* in regard to its own minor action but the latter is not emphasised because the action of the main agent is emphasized. When it becomes *karmakartā*, the action of the main

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77 See Texts.
78 See Texts.

agent is not conveyed at all, the minor action becomes the main action of which the object is presented as the agent.

As said before, there can be *karmakartā* only in the case of roots which are *karmasthakriya* (of which the action resides in the *karma*) or *karmasthabhāvaka* (of which the result of the action resides in the *karma*). Where the action resides in the agent (*kartṛsthakriya*) or the result of the action does so (*kartṛsthabhāvaka*), the *karma* cannot become the agent in the sentence. The root *gam* = 'to go' is an example of the former kind and the root *ās* = 'to stay' is of the latter kind.[79] This four-fold division of roots is based on a distinction between *kriyā* and *bhāva*. Some define the former as something brought about by an accessory having movement (*saparispandasādhanasādhyā*) and the latter as something brought about by an accessory having no movement (*apariśpandasādhanasādhyaḥ*). But this distinction between *kriya* and *bhāva* and the fourfold division of roots based on it are unsound. The fact is that the distinction between *kartṛsthabhāvaka* and *karmasthabhāvaka* is a matter of presentation by words. There is the sentence *ghaṭaṃ paśyati*=he sees the jar'. Here the real question is not whether, when one sees a jar, the action of seeing makes any difference to the jar or not. Such a consideration would be a consideration of outside reality which is not the grammarian's business. The question is : does the sentence present the jar as having been affected in any way by the seeing? The answer is that it does not. So one concludes that the root *dṛś* is not *karmasthabhāvaka*. The sentence *kāṣṭhaṁ bhinatti*='he splits the wood', presents the wood as being changed by the action denoted by the root '*bhid*'which is, therefore, *karmasthabhāvaka*. Going according to this principle, one cannot have *karmakartā* in the case of root *dṛś*, that is one cannot say *dṛśyate ghaṭaḥ svayam eva*.

In addition to the three main kinds and four minor kinds of *karma* already described, there is discussion in the texts about a secondary kind of *karma* in connection with intransitive roots (*akarmaka*). A root which is *akarmaka*, should, from its very name, have no *karma* at all. And yet, Katyāyana has declared that time, action (*bhāva*) distance to be covered and country are objects of intransitive roots.[80] Examples are : *māsam āste* = 'he stays for a month', *godoham āste* = 'he stays for the time it takes to milk the cow', *krośam svapiti*='he sleeps through one *krośā* and *kurūn svapiti*='he sleeps in the *kuru* country.

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79 See Texts.
80 See Texts.

Bhartṛhari is of the opinion that, even without this *vārttika*, these things would become *karma* according to the main *sūtra* itself because the intransitive roots imply another action than the one which they openly express,[81] and the words expressive of time etc.. like *māsam* in the above examples become the *karma* of that action. *Māsam āste* means *māsaṁ vyāpya āste*=he stays *covering* a period of one month. The period of one month has become the object of covering by P. 1. 4. 49 itself. Even though time etc thus become the *karma* of *akarmaka* roots, these latter do not cease to be so, because it is only when a root has an *antaraṅgakarma*, an inner object, an object in the form of a thing (*dravya*) that it is called a transtitive root (*sakarmaka*)[82]. As time etc. are not *dravya*, these roots remain *akarmaka* and imply some other action of which time etc become the object directly. Time etc. become secondary objects, having a different status (*bhinnkakṣya*)[83]. They become a kind of substratum (*ādhāra*) in which the main object or the agent resides. In *kurūn svapiti* = 'he sleeps in the *kuru* country', it is clear that the country is the place where he sleeps. In other words, it is a kind of *ādhāra*. In *māsam odanam pacati* = 'he cooks rice for a month' where the main object also is mentioned in the sentence, it is clear that 'a month' is a kind of *ādhāra* for the main object also. Bhartṛhari says that they become like *ādhāra*. The point of the comparison may be that just as a place becomes connected with action *through* the agent or the object, in the same way, time etc become objects *through* the main object. Action becomes connected with the main object first and then only with the secondary object. Therefore, the latter becomes an object only in the secondary stage. In cooking, for example, the time taken depends upon the nature of the main thing which is cooked. Thus time and others become connected with action through the main object. When both the objects are mentioned in the same sentence, the suffixes *la, kṛtya, khal* and *kta* express the main object and not the secondary ones like time etc. They are expressed by the second case-affix found in a separate word. Bhartṛhari also points out that time etc can become the *karma*, not only of intransitive roots, but of all roots.[84]

It has been shown so far that time etc can become the object of all roots, intransitive and transitive and that they are objects having a different status. It is not only they which have a different status. All those things which becomes a second *karma* of the action

81 See Texts.
82 See Texts.
83 See Texts.
84 See Texts.

denoted by some specifically mentioned roots according to P. 1.4.51 are also in the same position. They are also secondary objects, having a different status. In *gāṁ dogdhi payaḥ* = 'he milks milk off the cow' the cow is *karma* of a second order compared to the milk. The cow is only a means to an end. What the person who milks is most keen on, wants to reach most (*īpsitatama*) is milk. The cow comes within the scope of the meaning of the root in the second stage and milk in the first stage. There is not only difference of time, but also of status. As far as the meaning of the root is concerned ,the milk is what is meant to be reached directly by it whereas the cow is sought to be reached only as a means. This is what Bhartṛhari means by *dhāvarthoddeśa-bredena:* because of the difference in the position of the two (the milk and the cow) in regard to the meaning of the root. If the milking is not done for the sake of the milk but for some other purpose, for preventing the cow from drying up, as suggested by Helārāja,[86] then one would only say *gāṃ dogdhi* and *gāṃ* would then become the main *karma* according to P. 1.4.49.

While Bhartṛhari has, following the ancient texts, spoken about the major and minor kinds of *karma* and about the *karma* having a secondary status, he holds that it is One, but presented as many. In this respect, it is like the means called *apādāna*=point of departure,' That is also One and defined by P. 1.4.24. The other *sūtras* devoted to that topic by Pāṇini are only elaborations of that sūtra.[87] Similarly, *karma* is also One, that is, a common characteristic runs through all the so called divisions of it. That common characteristic is the fact of being something which the main agent wants to reach or attain by his action.[88] It is mentioned in the very first *sūtra* (P. 1.4.49) and the following ones are only elaborations of it, to help those who cannot think of all the details themselves. It is, true that divisions of the *karma,* such as product, modification and destination are mentioned but that does not take away its one-ness. They are names given to the objects on the basis of the particular kinds of actions with which they become connected. In all these connections, the common point remains : it is something which the word presents as an accomplished thing (*siddha*) as against the action which the verb presents as something to be accomplished (*sādhya*).[89] In the sentences : *kaṭaṃ karoti*='he makes a mat', *taṇḍulān odanam pacati*='he cooks

85 See Texts.
86 See Texts.
87 See Texts.
88 See Texts.
89 See Texts.

the unhusked rice into cooked rice', *sūryaṁ paśyati*='he sees the Sun', nouns present some object or other as an accomplished thing and as endowed with some capacity in regard to the action mentioned in the sentence. Though the *karma* in these three sentences is supposed to be different, it is essentially of the same nature. It is called by a different name in each case because of the particular way in which it becomes connected with the action. But its one-ness is not affected by all this : in all of them there is this common characteristic, namely, the fact of being something which the main agent wants to reach by his action. This is true even of the objects mentioned in sentences like *viṣaṃ bhakṣayati* = 'he eats poison', *coraṃ paśyati* = 'he sees the thief'. Poison and thief can be brought under *īpsita* = 'what is desired to be reached. In certain circumstances, one may wish to take poison.[90] All one's actions are not the result of careful consideration. A sick man may want to eat what is not good for him through greed. In such cases, *īpsita* would only mean becoming the object of the action of eating. Similarly, a thief would also become *īpsita* in the same sense. The grass which one treads on without noticing it while going somewhere would also be in the same position. All would share in the common characteristic mentioned above.

Even though *karma* is one and its so called divisions not important still it should be possible to bring the object of any verb under one of its major or minor divisions recognised in the *śāstra*. That is why a doubt arises in the case of objects like *guḍa*='unrefined sugar' in sentences like : *guḍam bhakṣayati* = 'he eats *guḍa*. And it is already there, it cannot come under the division called product, because the sentence does not say anything about its production. Nor does the sentence present it as something to be modified. So it cannot come under the division called modification (*vikārya*). Can it come under the *prāpya* kind? An attempt is made to show how it can. It is pointed out that it becomes *īpsita* because it attains differentiation according as it becomes the object of the action denoted by this root or that.[91] In the sentence under discussion, *guda* is presented as becoming the object of the action of eating and not of any other. That is the special feature which it acquires here and that is why it is considered to be *prāpya*. Nothing more than this is required for making something this kind of object. In fact that is what makes this kind of object different from *nirvartya* and *vikārya*.

90. See Texts. Also M. Bh. I, p. 333, l. 15-16.
91. See Texts.

If the mere fact of becoming the object of an action, without in any way, being effected by it can make a thing technically a *karma*, there would be no action left without such a *karma* and the distinction between roots with *karma* (*sakarmaka*) and roots without *karma* would disappear. A root expressive of any action would become *sakarmaka*. The meaning of every root can be so analysed as to imply an object though it is not openly expressed. The verb *śete* = 'he lies down' can be explained as *śayanam karoti* = 'he performs lying down'. In this explanation, the meaning of the root itself has become a kind of technical *karma*. But this is not right. The distinction between *sakarmaka* and *akarmaka* roots does remain. Only that root is transitive the object of which lies outside its own meaning and is not merely something implied in its own meaning. *śete* has no such object nor *āste*='he sits. These two roots are, therefore, intransitive. The presence or absence of an outside object alone can serve as a criterion to decide whether the root is transitive or not. Every root denotes a meaning in the nature of bringing about something. If what is brought about does not lie outside the meaning of the root itself, then the root is *akarmaka*. In fact there are four ways in which a root may become *akarmaka* : (1) when the root is used in a meaning other than its usual one, (2) when the object is included in the meaning of the root (3) when the object is well-known, (4) when it is not meant to be conveyed.[92] Some actions denoted by roots imply an object as part of the meaning of the root. Other roots denote actions which have an object outside their meaning. The former are intransitive and the latter transitive. *Āste* which can be analysed as *āsanam karoti* = 'he does sitting', has an object which is part of the meaning of the root. But *pacati* in *odanaṃ pacati* denotes an action having an object outside the meaning of the root. That is why the root *pac* is said to be transitive (*sakarmaka*). A root which is ordinarily transitive becomes intransitive when it is used in a meaning often than it usual one. For example, in *bhāraṃ vahati*= 'he carries a load' the verb *vahati* is *transitive*. But when we say *nadī vahati* = 'the river flows', that meaning is absent and the root *vah* is now intransitive. 'To flow' means an action which is not presented by the word as affecting something else than the agent. There are some verbs which invariably bring an object and an agent to the mind though neither is mentioned. *Varṣati* = 'it rains' is an example. Here one understands *'deva'* as the agent and water as the object. Such verbs are also intransitive. Sometimes, the speaker does not want to say anything about the object. Then the verb, though

92. See Texts.

ordinarily transitive, becomes intransitive. We can just say *pacati* in answer to the question : *kiṃ karoti* = 'what is he doing' ? It is then intransitive, we are deliberately silent about the object. Similarly, when one says *neha pacyate* = 'no cooking is done here', the root is intransitive, because all that the speaker wants to do is to emphasize the absence of any cooking and not to draw the listener's attention to any substance that is not cooked.

What one has to note is that even actions which are ordinarily presented by verbs as having objects outside their own meaning are sometimes presented as devoid of any *karma*.

b. *The karaṇa (Instrument)*

An action is accomplished with the co-operation of many things. As already stated, they are all 'do-ers' (*kāraka*). Though this is so, the speaker usually wants to convey that the action is accomplished immediately after the activity of one of them. It is then called the instrument (*karaṇa*).[93] Bhartṛhari has stated at the very beginning that the application of the name of a particular *sādhana* to an object is a matter of the speaker's intention.[94] It is from this point of view that he deals with *karaṇa*, as he did with *karma* and as he will be doing with the other means. Ordinarily, the speaker might say *dātreṇa lunāti* = 'he cuts with a sickle'. Here the sickle is the instrument. But he might also say : *balena lunāti* = 'he cuts with strength', making *bala* the instrument. Ordinarily, the cooking pot is presented as a receptacle for cooking, as in *sthālyāṃ pacati* = 'he cooks in the pot'. But sometimes the speaker might present it as the instrument, as in *sthālyā pacati* = 'he cooks with the pot', if he wants to emphasize the excellence of the pot and the help which it gives in the process of cooking. Ordinarily, the eye is presented as the instrument of seeing as in *cakṣuṣā paśyati* = 'he sees with the eye', but when the speaker says : *ālokena paśyati* = 'he sees with light', *āloka* becomes the instrument. The fact is that nothing is predetermined to be a *karaṇa* or any other *kāraka*.[95]

The instrument has been defined by Pāṇini as the most efficient accessory.[96] This definition involves degree. The comparison is between

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93. See Texts.
94. See Texts under note 10, p. 286.
95. See Texts.
96. See Texts.

the instrument and the other five accessories. There is no question of degree as between the different instruments of the same action.[97] So the instrument is that which is an accessory in the highest degree in comparison with other accessories and not in regard to other instruments. That is why we can have a sentence like : *aśvena pathā dīpikayā yāti* = 'he goes on horseback by the path with a light'. In this sentence, several things are presented as rendering maximum service to the action of going.

As all the accessories are employed only after the agent comes on the scene, it might be said that the agent himself should be looked upon as the accessory (*sādhaka*) in the highest degree. But this is not the right way of looking at it. The action is accomplished immediately after the activity of the instrument is over and not after that of the agent whose work consists in setting the other accessories in motion. So there is a big interval between the activity of the agent and the accomplishment of the action. In regard to the accomplishment of the action, the instrument has a certain superiority. The question whether it is the agent or the instrument which is the accessory in the highest degree should not arise at all. Nothing is an accessory until the agent employs it in order to accomplish the action. In that stage the question of degree can arise only among the accessories set in motion by the agent and not between them and the agent who is in a different category altogether. The agent is independent (*svatantra*) and the others are a combination of independence and dependence.[98]

The main point which Bhartṛhari emphasizes is that everything is a matter of the speaker's intention. Ordinarily, the sword is presented as the instrument of cutting. If the speaker wants to convey its extreme sharpness, he can underplay the activity of the agent and make the sword itself the agent by saying *asiś chinatti* = 'the sword cuts'.[99] In this case, the listener may, on his own, understand its extreme sharpness, weight, hardness and shape as the instrument. The speaker can go further and say : *taikṣṇyaṃ chinatti* = 'the sharpness cuts', making sharpness the agent. One would then have to postulate something else as its instrument. The new instrument may not be different from the agent, but the words would present it as different. Our cognition and, following them, our words can present

97. See Texts.
98. See Texts.
99. See Texts.

what is united as differentiated.[100] The speaker can look upon a thing and its properties as identical with one another or as different from one another. The instrument would vary accordingly.[101] When one says : *devadattaḥ kāṣṭhair odanaṃ pacati* = 'Devadatta cooks rice with wood-fuel', *kāṣṭha* is presented as the instrument though it is the fire in it which does the cooking. Here the wood-fuel and the fire have been identified by the speaker. But if he says : *kāṣṭhāni pacanti tejasā* = 'the wood-fuel cooks with its fire', fire is the instrument because it is now presented by the words as something different from the fuel. When the speaker goes further and says : *tejaḥ pacaty auṣṇyena* = fire cooks with its heat', fire and heat, previously identified, are now looked upon as different. By looking upon things and their properties, now as identical and now as different, shades of difference are introduced in the action itself, because an action is determined by its accessories. If these differ because of a different way of looking at things, actions themselves become different.

c. *The Agent and the Prompter* (*kartā and hetu*).

We saw that all the accessories are agents as far as their own minor actions are concerned. To that extent, they are all independent, though they may be dependent on the main agent. It is the latter who is really independent, because the independence of the others is mixed up with their dependence. The main agent is independent (1) because he acquires his independence before (the operations of the other accessories) and from some other source (2) because he keeps the others sub-ordinate (to himself) (3) because the others act according to his direction (4) because the agent can hold back the others already engaged (5) no substitute for him is seen (6) because he is present even when the others are not, even though he helps in the accomplishment of the action from a distance.[102] The agent desires the fruit of the action and sets about collecting the accessories. So he is free or independent from the very beginning. The other accessories are also relatively free in regard to their role but only after the main agent enters the scene. In any case, they are under his control. He can restrain any of them at any time. There is always an agent whether the other accessories are there or not. In a sentence consisting of one finite verb only, there is only the agent. If there is no agent there can be no substitute for him or rather if anybody else does the

100. See Texts.
101. See Texts.
102. See Texts.

action, he would not be called a substitute as he can do the action on his own, being independent. But if any of the other accessories is not available, it can be replaced. For the reasons given above, even though the main agent helps in the accomplishment of the action from a distance, he is considered to be independent. This idea has already been expressed by the author of the *Mahābhāṣya.*[103]

The characteristics of the main agent, mentioned above, have all been given keeping in mind what is presented by words and not outside reality. If what has been mentioned above is taken literally, only a sentient being can ever become the main agent. It does not require much imagination to see that there is nothing which cannot become an agent in language. Any inanimate object can become so. In other words, that thing becomes the agent which the speaker presents through his words as having these properties.[104] Therefore, whether a thing is sentient or not, it can become the agent. It becomes the agent really, not figuratively, if the words present it as having these properties.[105] Thus, as in the case of *karma* and *karaṇa* already dealt with, Bhartṛhari expounds his conception of *kartā* according to the principle that for grammarians, the object means what the word presents and not outside reality.

If, whether a thing is independent or not is a matter of how the speaker presents it, one can easily understand how one and the same thing can be the agent, the object and the instrument in the same sentence, as in *hanty ātmānam ātmanā* = 'he kills himself'.[106] It is only because of the speaker's intention that *ātmā* can become the object (*karma*) as well as the instrument (*karaṇa*), not in reality. Fictitious difference, based entirely on the speaker's fancy, is the basis of such expressions. Once it is grasped that what is called 'agent' is a matter of presentation by words, other things can also be understood. In the sentence *aṅkuro jāyate* = 'the sprout is born', the sprout which is born either exists or does not exist. If it already exists, why should it be born ? If it does not exist, how can it be the agent of the act of being born ? Such doubts arise if the idea of agent is not a matter of presentation by words, but something having outside reality. An answer to such doubts was given in a previous section on the basis of *upacārasattā* = 'secondary Being'.[106] But to say that things denoted

103. M. Bhā. I. p. 26, l. 10.
104. See Texts.
105. See Texts.
106. See p. 210-212.

by words have *upacārasattā* does not mean that they are figurative meanings of words. That is a different conception altogether based on the incompatibility of the primary meaning (*mukhyārtha*). In the expression under discussion, due to the speaker's intention, the idea of sprout comes to the mind. By coming to the mind, it acquires a kind of *sattā* (Being). The sprout is now *sat*. So the word *aṅkura* is used. When the word *jāyate* is added, the sentence so formed says : the sprout which has already acquired *sattā* and thereby the capacity of being the agent of the act of being born is actually born, that is, it is actually born in the external sense also. Thus there is a difference between the being of the sprout and the fact of its being the agent. But this is a difference which exists only in the realm of words (*śābdī*) but as it does exist there, there is no *upacāra here*,[107] even though there is *upacārasattā*. When the cause and the effect are looked upon as totally different things, expressions like *aṅkuro jāyate* become difficult to explain and to explain them, the concept of *upacārasattā* or that of presentation by words is resorted to. But if they are looked upon as one and birth is explained as the cause transforming itself into the effect, then without resorting to the concept mentioned above, one can understand how *aṅkura* becomes the agent of the act of being born.[108] It would mean that the seed, being existent, is the agent of the act of being born, that is, of attaining the next transformation. In the view that the effect is different from the cause, even though it does not exist as such before production, it exists as the universal. It is this universal, which, for its own manifestation, sets in motion the accessories. So it is the universal which already exists that is the agent of the act of being born as the particular. As the universal, it is the agent and as the particular, it is the thing born.[109]

What Bhartṛhari emphasizes is that the object is what the word conveys. Both cognition and the word are based on whatever form is understood. In the expression *nāsti* = 'it does not exist' both the cognition and the word are based on some form or other. Thus they are not different from the cognition and the word based on what exists. There is really speaking no difference between *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Whether the thing in question exists outside or not is irrelevant. Thus whether the sprout has an external existence or not, the expression *aṅkuro jāyate* is alright because there is some form which figures in the mind. In worldly usage, apart from coming within the range of cognition and the word, objects have no external existence. What is

107. See Texts.
108. See Texts.
109. See Texts.

called usage consists of cognition and expression. No cognition exists in which an object does not figure and what figures in it acquires existence and can become the agent of action. In the expression *nāsti*, the external existence of a thing at a particular time and place is denied but it still figures in the mind in a certain form and that is the agent conveyed by the suffix. Similarly, in the expression *aṅkaro jāyate*, even though the sprout has no external existence, it figures in the mind and as such, it becomes the agent of the action of being born.[110]

Thus, the concept of agent has been defined, discussed and illustrated. It was stated that it was characterised by unmixed independence whereas the independence of the other accessories in regard to their minor actions was mixed up with dependence on the main agent. Here a doubt arises. It is not only the main agent who has been called *kartā*, but also the one who prompts him (*prayojaka*Q.[111] But how can one who is prompted by another be said to be independent ? It is said in answer that the one who is prompted does not lose his independence merely because somebody else makes him do something. He is prompted just because he is known to have the requisite capacity. This capacity makes him retain his independence. It is just because of his capacity-cum-independence that he comes under somebody's orders. Thus there is no contradiction between his independence and his dependence. The one who is ordered by another retains his independence in the matter of engaging the other accessories in a suitable manner. There he is not under anybody else's order. In this way, he is not different from one who is not prompted but acts spontaneously.[112] It is also possible to hold that nobody loses his independence merely because of his being prompted by another. Ultimately, everybody acts knowing well his own interests and for his own benefit.[113] The servant who works for his master and the sage who is free from all desires and works for others ultimately act to fulfil their own purposes. Even insentient things can be presented by words as prompters as in the expression : *bhikṣā vāsayati* = 'alms make one stay (in a particular place'). Here alms are treated as sentient and an intention attributed to them.[114]

The one who prompts is not called agent but also *hetu*. It is the agent who, by ordering or requesting and doing other things favour-

110. See Texts.
111. P. 1.4.55.
112. See Texts.
113. See Texts.
114. See Texts.

able to an action, acquires the name of Prompter.[115] Prompting an inferior to act by giving an order is what is called *preṣaṇa*. Prompting a superior is request (*adhyeṣaṇa*). Prompting can be attributed even to insentient things like alms as we have already seen. *Hetu,* the prompter, must be distinguished from what is called *hetu* in the world. In the world, whatever brings about a substance or a thing or a quality or an action is called *hetu* as in the expressions : *dhanena yaśaḥ* = 'glory through wealth', *pākena raktaḥ* = 'red through heat', *agninā pākaḥ* = 'through fire cooking'. The word *hetu* is used, now in the technical sense of prompter and now in the worldly sense of cause. In connection with the act of prompting, the question arises as to why the one who is prompted continues to be called agent, considering that he does become the object (*karma*) of the prompter's act of prompting. The answer is that he retains his name of agent besause he does not lose his independence as has already been pointed out.[116] The *śāstra,* however, is not logical and consistent in this respect. Or rather, language is not a matter of logic and consistency. The one who is prompted does become the object (*karma*) in the case of some specified roots : (1) those that denote movement, (2) those that denote understanding, (3) those that denote eating, (4) those whose action has the word as its object and (4) those that are intransitive. This happens naturally only when the verb expresses the activities of both the prompter and the one who is prompted. That is why one would say : *gamayati māṇavakaṃ grāmaṃ* = 'he makes the boy go to the village'. Here the boy who is prompted has become the object of the action of the prompter, the root *gam* = 'to go' being expressive of movement. In *bodhayati māṇavakaṃ dharmam* = 'he causes the boy to understand *dharma*' where the verb denotes understanding, the same thing has taken place, namely, the one who is prompted has become the *karma*. In *bhojayati māṇavakam adanam* = 'he makes the boy eat rice', the root being expressive of the action of eating, the *māṇavaka* has become the object of prompting. In *adhyāpayati māṇavakam vedam* = 'he makes the boy study the Veda', as the action denoted by the root has the word (the Veda) as its object, the same thing has taken place. Lastly, in *āsayati devadattaṃ* = 'he makes Devadatta sit', Devadatta has become the object of sitting, because the root is intransitive. The very fact that this happens only in the case of some roots shows that, ordinarily, the one who is prompted continues to be the agent. For example, in *pācayaty odanaṃ devadattena* = 'he makes Devadatta cook rice', the root '*pac*' being

115. See Texts.
116. See Texts.

outside the four categories mentioned above, the one who is prompted continues to be the agent, as indicated by the third case affix coming after Devadatta.

Lastly Bhartṛhari points out that only that which prompts the agent can be called '*hetu*' and not that which prompts anything else. In a way, one can say that the object prompts the action because it is in order to attain the object that the action is done. In that sense, the object is a prompter (*prayojaka*). But the name '*hetu*' is reserved in the *śāstra* for that which prompts the main agent. The action, which may consist of production, modification or reaching, is for the sake of the object which, therefore, prompts it directly. If it prompts any of the other accessories at all, it can only be very indirectly. It prompts the action directly.[117]

d. The Recipient (Saṃpradāna)

In any act of giving, three factors are involved : the giver, the thing given and the person to whom it is given. The last one is called the recipient (*saṃpradāna*). Bhartṛhari says that one becomes *saṃpradāna* by not declining the offer, by making a request and by giving one's consent.[118] Giving means relinquishing one's own ownership over something and creating somebody else's ownership without taking anything in return. The giver intends to reach somebody with his gift and that person is called *saṃpradāna*. The one who receives does not decline nor does he prohibit the giver from giving. Sometimes, he himself makes a previous request for the gift. From the point of view of outside reality, the gift as well as the act of giving may be meant for the sake of the receiver. From the point of view of presentation by words, however, all accessories are meant for the accomplishment of the action. The recipient being one of the accessories, he is also meant for the accomplishment of the act of giving and not vice-versa. If the giving were for the sake of the recipient, the idea of *tādarthya* = 'the fact of being meant for something else', would come in and the word expressive of the recipient would take the fourth case affix according to Kātyāyana's *vārttika*.[119] As there is no *tādarthya* in a sentence describing an act of giving,[120] the fourth

117. See Texts.
118. See Texts.
119. Vā. 1 on P. 2.3.13.
120. See Texts.

case affix is added to the word because the recipient is given the technical name *saṃpradāna* which results in the fourth case affix.

The *kāraka* called *saṃpradāna*, so defined, has necessarily a much more restricted application than the three *kārakas* already described, because it is connected with one action only, that of giving. Even after making allowance for all figurative uses of the roots expressive of the act of giving so as to include cases like the following : *khaṇḍikopādhyayas ṭasmai capeṭāṃ dadāti*='the teacher gives him a slap on the face', the name *saṃpradāna* would still have only a very restricted application, especially if one remembers that in some sentences containing the verb *dadāti*, the recipient would not get the name *saṃpradāna*, as, for example : in *rajakasya vastraṃ dadāti* = 'he gives the cloth to the dyer'. Though the root *dā* = 'to give' is here, it does not express the idea of giving. As though to compensate for this restricted application, the name *saṃpradāna* has been extended to what would otherwise have been *hetu, karma* or *śeṣa*.[121] It has been extended, for instance, to cases where the root *ruc* = 'to be liked', 'to cause desire' or its synonym is used. The sentence *Devadattāya rocate modakaḥ* = 'the cake is appetising to Devadatta' is an example. The cake awakens in Devadatta a desire for it. The implied meaning here is that the cake is becoming the object of desire and Devadatta prompts it to do so.[122] In other words, Devadatta is the prompter (*hetu*) and should normally follow the rules prescribed for it. But in association with the root *ruc*, the name *saṃpradāna* has been extended to it. If the root '*ruc*' means 'to please', the sentence would mean 'the cake pleases Devadatta.' In that case, the name *karma* would become applicable to Devadatta with the consequential use of the second case affix.[123] But as the name *saṃpradāna* has been given to it it takes the fourth case affix. In association with the root *dhāri* = 'to owe', what would normally be *śeṣa* has been declared to be *saṃpradāna*, as in *devadattāya śataṃ dhārayati* = 'he owes a hundred to Devadatta'. A hundred is owed to Devadatta because he had lent it before. But as the act of lending is not mentioned but only understood, Devadatta would become *śeṣa* in regard to it and invite the sixth case affix according to P. 2.3.50. But as P. 1.4.35 specially gives it the name of *saṃpradāna*, it takes the fourth case affix.[124]

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121. See Texts.
122. See Texts.
123. See Texts.
124. See Texts.

What we have to note in all this is that when the name *sampradāna* is given to the recipient, it is not a pure technical name because it corresponds to fact. The word *sampradāna,* formed from the root *dā* = 'to give' means one to whom something is given, in other words, the recipient. But when the name is given in connection with roots which have not the meaning of giving, it is a pure technical name, that is, not based on fact at all. The name is given merely for explaining the addition of the fourth case affix to words expressive of such a *sampradāna.* Thus the name can be in accordance with fact or purely technical.[125]

The question now arises : Can there be a *sampradāna* in connection with the action denoted by intransitive roots ? If what is meant to be reached with the object is the recipient, how can there be a *sampradāna* in connection with roots which have no object at all ? And yet we have expressions like *Yuddhāya sannahyate* = 'he gets ready for battle'. Here the root *saṃnah* is *akarmaka.* Such expressions are sought to be explained on the basis of a statement found in the *Mahābhāṣya* that even action can be looked upon as *karma* in the technical sense. Patañjali has spoken about all actions being preceded by four purely mental stages. First of all, one sees mentally something worthy of attainment, then desires it, next decides on a course of action to attain it and fourthly resolves to do it. This is followed by the visible act itself. One can put the whole thing in greater conformity with the texts by saying that by seeing something worthy of attainment, one reaches the act of desiring it. The act of desiring has become the technical *karma* of the previous act of seeing something worthy of attainment. Through the act of desiring, one reaches the act of deciding on a course of action which, therefore, becomes the technical *karma* of the act of desiring. The act of deciding on a course of action leads to the resolve to do it, which, in its turn. becomes the technical *karma* of the act of deciding on a course of action. So far, everything has been mental. The resolve to do it results in the visible act itself which, following the same reasoning, becomes the technical *karma* of the resolve to do it. Going back to the sentence under discussion : *yuddhāya sannahyate* = 'he gets ready for battle', the visible act of getting ready which, as we saw, is the technical *karma,* is intended for (*abhipreta*) the battle, which therefore, becomes the *sampradāna* according to the original definition itself.[126] This way of interpreting the expression has answered the question

125. See Texts.
126. See Texts.

whether there can be *saṃpradāna* in connection with the action denoted by intransitive roots. The answer is that there can be. As all actions involve the mental stages described above, their visible stage can become technical *karma* and whatever that visible stage is meant for would become *saṃpradāna*. Though this *kāraka* was defined chiefly in connection with the act of giving, that fact loses its importance if it is maintained that all actions are preceeded by these mental stages and can become *karma* in the technical sense. Though all actions can theoretically become *karma*, in practice, they are deemed to become so only, *if necessary*, that is, if by becoming so, some linguistic form can be explained, as the fourth case affix in *yuddhāya sannahyate*. The principle cannot be extended to a case like *odanaṃ pacati*. Here one cannot argue that the act of cooking is a technical *karma* in the manner described above and as this act which has become *karma* is meant for (*abhipreta*) rice, the latter has become *saṃpradāna* and, therefore, one should have *odanāya pacati*. Because here the position is as follows : The act of cooking would become a *karma* technically only if the previous mental stages are thought of as different from one another, each following stage being the *karma* of the previous one. But here they are not thought of in that manner. They are thought of as a whole and identified with the visible act of cooking because they have the same ultimate result. If the previous stages are not thought of as different from one another, they cannot stand in the relation of *kriyā* and *kāraka* which is based on difference. The visible act of cooking does not, therefore, become *karma* technically and the rice becomes connected with such an act of cooking as its technical *karma*. It does not, for that reason get the name of *saṃpradāna*.[127] The visible act, the meaning of the root, can become a technical *karma* only when the previous four mental stages are thought of as different from one another and different from the visible act. It is only then that each later stage can become the technical *karma* of the previous stage. When the previous stages are to be thought of as different from the visible act and when not depends entirely upon worldly usage. After all, the main purpose of *vyākaraṇa* is to explain forms which actually occur. To explain forms like *yuddhāya sannahyate*, one has to assume that they are thought of as different. To explain forms like *odanaṃ pacati*, one has to postulate that they are thought of as identical with the visible act. With roots denoting actions involving movement, both the second and the fourth case affixes are found in usage. One can say *grāmaṃ gacchati* or *grāmāya gacchati*. To explain such forms, one must assume that the previous stages *may*

127. See Texts.

be thought of or *may not* be thought of as identical with the visible act. In other words, the whole thing depends upon the speaker's or rather the speech community's intention.[128]

e. The Starting-point (*apādāna*).

A starting point is of three kinds : (1) that in relation to which a movement is mentioned, (2) that in relation to which the verb expresses the movement only partly and (3) that in relation to which some movement is required.[129] That which is stable or firm in a case of separation or departure is called *apādāna* = 'starting point'. When something goes off from a starting point, the latter is stable and that which goes off has movement. In *grāmād āgacchati* = 'he comes from the village' the movement from the starting-point is expressed directly by its own word. Where the movement mentioned is incomplete and stands in the relation of being primary or secondary to something else, the starting-point is of the second kind. In *valāhakād vidyotate vidyut* = 'the lightning flashes from the cloud', the verb flashes means more than what it says. It means 'comes out and shines'. These is a relation of primary and secondary between what is mentioned and what is understood. In *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhya āḍhyatarāḥ* = 'the inhabitants of Mathurā are richer than those of *Pāṭaliputra*', no action or movement is mentioned. But the fifth case affix is there in the sentence which shows that the word at the end of which it comes denotes the starting-point. Nothing can be a starting-point except in relation to some separation or departure. As none is mentioned, it has to be supplied mentally.

This separation or departure is not mere movement. As other particular movements like turning and revolving, the movvement called *apāya* can also be defined. It is something brought about by two things, of which one is stable, firm and inactive, while the other is active.[130] It inheres in that which moves and has something which does not move as the starting-point.[131] It is called *āpāya* in relation to the starting-point. The starting-point though inactive, helps in the bringing about of this kind of movement and thus becomes a do-er (*kāraka*) called *apādāna*.

128. See Texts.
129. See Texts.
130. See Texts.
131. See Texts.

When it is said that the starting-point is stable, firm and inactive, these adectives should not be understood in absolute terms. All that is meant is that it is not affected by the separation of which it is the starting-point. That is why in the sentence : *dhāvato'śvāt patitaḥ* = 'he fell from a running horse', even though the running horse is not stable and inactive, it is the starting-point (*apādāna*) because it is not in any way affected by the movement of falling. In relation to the movement of falling, the horse is inactive (*udāsīna*) though it is otherwise running. Whatever is merely inactive cannot become *apādāna*. In the sentence : *grāmād āgacchati pathā parvatam* = 'From the village, he comes along the road to the mountain', though the road and the mountain are inactive, their inactivity is not in relation to the action of coming and so they are not starting-points. The village is stationary in regard to the action of coming and so it is *apādāna*. This point becomes clear if we take a case where both the things involved in the separation happen to be active. In the sentence : *apasarpato meṣān meṣo'pasarpati* = 'the ram moves away from the other ram which is also moving away', both the rams are active in regard to the separation which takes place. But there are two acts of separation and in regard to each, the other ram is inactive and so becomes *apādāna*. In regard to the other ram, it is the starting-point and in regard to its own moving away, it is the agent.[132] No movement or separation can be called *apāya* except in relation to a starting-point. The mere falling of the leaf off a tree as described in the sentence *vṛkṣasya parṇam patati* is not *apāya*, because in this sentence the tree is not presented as the starting-point of the movement of falling.[133]

It has also to be pointed out that the separation from a starting-point has to be taken in a comprehensive way so as to include not only physical separation but also mental separation. It has already been pointed out that the application of the name of a particular *kāraka* to an object does not depend upon maximum degree. Though the definitions of the *kārakas* are given in physical terms, they become applicable even if the required attributes are present in the mental sense. In the definition of *apādāna*, the two chief relevant notions are those of starting point and separation. Even if both are only mentally present, the name can be applied. Bhartṛhari has declared rightly at the beginning that the application of the name of a particular *kāraka* to something is a matter of the speaker's intention. It is because Patañjali has taken the ideas of separation and starting-point in a

132. See Texts.
133. See Texts.

very comprehensive way that he has declared some *sūtras* which teach the name *apādāna,* and others which teach the fifth case affix to be unnecessary, as the cases meant to be covered by them are covered by the original *sūtra* itself (P. 1.4.24). *Apāya* means separation preceded by union. This can take place not only physically, but also mentally. In fear and danger, for instance, when one mentally visualises the cause of it, there is a kind of union with it and then one mentally keeps away from it, which is a kind of separation. In other words, one is afraid of it. As there is separation from the cause of fear and danger, the latter gets the name of *apādāna* and the word expressive of it ends in the fifth case affix. Similarly, when one mentally realises robbers to be dangerous, it is a kind of union and when one protects one's folk from them, it is a kind of separation. That from which something is protected thus gets the name of *apādāna* and the fifth case affix is added to words expressive of it. Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali, points out that there is this kind of mental starting-point and separation in expressions of comparison. In *māthurāḥ pāṭaliputrakebhya āḍhyatarāḥ* = 'the citizens of Mathurā are richer than those of Pāṭaliputra', it is pointed out that the citizens of the two cities are first thought of as resembling one another in the matter of being rich. That is, there is first a kind of union of the two. Those of Mathurā are then stated to be richer than those of Pāṭaliputra and that amounts to a kind of separation. Because of this, the citizens of Pāṭaliputra, in relation to whom there is superiority, become the starting-point and the word expressive of them takes the fifth case affix. Here no action is mentioned in the sentence and so the hearer supplies one mentally. This kind of *apādāna* is called *apekṣitakriya* = 'that which requires an action'. The mention by Pāṇini in some *sūtras* of cases involving mental starting-point and separation when there was no need to do so is for the sake of the less bright students who cannot think of all the details themselves and not because these cannot come under the original *sūtra itself.*[134]

f. The Abode (*adhikaraṇa*)

The real abode of action is the agent who does it or the object on which it is done. But the agent and the object must exist on something before the action can be done. That something is called the abode (*adhikaraṇa*). It helps in the accomplishment of the action indirectly, through the agent and the object. *Kaṭe āste* = 'he

134. See Texts.

sits on the mat' and *sthālyāṃ pacati* = 'he cooks in the pot'. Here the mat and the pot render service to the action concerned by holding its agent and object. They do not hold the action itself, but hold the agent and the object which are the substrata of the action.[135] As far as the application of the name of a particular *kāraka* is concerned, maximum degree is not required and so what is an abode of action only indirectly and remotely is called abode (*adhikaraṇa*).

The connection between the abode and what is on it is the same in all cases but because of the difference in the things connected, the connection is called by different names.[136] From the expression *kaṭe āste* = 'he sits on the mat', one understands that the sitter is not in contact with the mat at all points. Here the relation between the two is called *saṃyoga*. Where the relation is *samavāya* = 'inherence, the contact is at all points as in the expression' *'tileṣu tailam'* = 'oil in the sesame seeds'. In *khe śakunayaḥ* = 'birds in the sky' and in *gurau vasati* = 'he lives with the teacher', the abode is said to be *vaiṣayika*.[137] In the former expression, the birds are not thought of as occupying particular parts of the sky which has really no parts. All that is intended to be conveyed is that the sky is their sphere, that they are not found elsewhere. The latter expression conveys the idea that the disciple depends upon the Guru. Because of the disciple's dependence on the Guru, the latter becomes a kind of abode. Similarly, when one gets ready for battle, the latter, which represents the purpose, is looked upon as a kind of abode and the expression *yuddhe sannahyati* = 'he prepares for battle' results.[138] The sky, the Guru and battle are not abode in the physical sense. To apply the word *adhikaraṇa* to them would be a figurative use of the word. That is why they are called the *viṣaya*.

The different kinds of abodes render different kinds of services. The sesame seed renders service to the oil by not itself perishing, because if it perished, the oil in it would be scattered and destroyed. The couch renders service by resisting the weight of the person who lies on it. The sky prevents the birds from falling, that is, from coming into contact with the lower region. To say that the Sun rises in the east and sets in the west only means that these two Directions are connected with the Sun and thus become the abode.[139] If all material

135. See Texts.
136. See Texts.
137. See Texts.
138. See Texts.
139. See Texts.

things have an abode or support, the latter, being itself material, must have a support. That support is *ākāśa*. The earth, the stars and planets have *ākāśa* as their support. Parts are the support of the whole. In the last resort, atoms are the support of divisible things, but *ākāśa* is the support of atoms. Some question the very existence of *ākāśa* but, for grammarians, its existence is based on the principle that the object is what the word conveys. There are expressions like : *idaṃ nakṣatram atra tiṣṭhati* = 'this star is here'. The word '*atra*' must point to something and not to nothing. Whatever it points to is *ākāśa*.[140] We use words after cognising something. Whatever has been cognised and expressed in words exists. That is how even non-existence becomes an abode in expressions like : *śatror abhāve sukham* = 'in the absence of the enemy, there is happiness'.[141] While *ākāśa* is the abode of all finished (*siddha*) objects, Time is the abode of all actions and processes. It is responsible for the birth, existence and decay of things. It is the support of all the three processes. Space distinguishes objects from one another by allotting to them particular regions. The universe consists of differentiated objects and actions, though this differentiation is based on an initial unity of Time and Space. These two, being powers of *Brahman*, are based on its absolute unity.[142]

g. *Śeṣa* and *Sambodhana*.

It remains to explain two notions which one obtains on analysing the sentence meaning, though their connection with action, the main meaning of the sentences, is rather remote. The main points relating to the six accessories (*sādhana, kāraka*) have been expounded. But Bhartṛhari has given a hint about a seventh one called *śeṣa* which, however, has not been mentioned among the accessories by Pāṇini. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the word comes in the context of the allotment of the case affixes for the expression of the six *kārakas*. After having done that, Pāṇini says that the sixth case affix denotes *śeṣa*. It also stands for relation, but not for a relation in regard to the action denoted by the verb. The word means the 'rest', that is, what remains after the six *kāraka* relations have been isolated. The Bhāṣyakāra has said that when any one of the six *kāraka* relations is not meant as such, it becomes *śeṣa*.[143] Though it is not a *kāraka* relation, it is preceded

140. See Texts.
141. See Texts.
142. See Texts.
143. M. Bhā. I. p. 463, l. 13.

by or rather it involves a *kāraka* relation. That is why it has been counted as a kind of seventh *kāraka*.[144] The relation of master and servant in the expression *rajñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the king's man', implies a previous relation of action and accessory or rather of donor and recipient between the two and that is how the relation of master and servant also becomes a kind of *kāraka* indirectly. The previous relation of master and servant is the cause and the later relation of master and recipient is the resnlt. When the previons special relation is not meant to be conveyed as shown by the fact that the action on which it was based is not mentioned at all, a very general relation is all that remains and that is what is meant by *śeṣa*. In the sentences : *vṛkṣasya śākhā* 'a branch of the tree', *paśoḥ pādaḥ* = 'the foot of the animal, *pituḥ putraḥ* = 'father's son', the relations expressed by the sixth case affix are those of part and whole and procreater and offspring and are the results of previous actions not mentioned in the sentences, actions in which these objects were accessories. That previous status lingers somewhat in the present status and that is why the present status which is *śeṣa* is looked upon as a kind of *kāraka*,[145] though its relation with the action expressed in the sentence is rather remote.

Another thing which we obtain when we analyse a sentence meaning and which is also not directly connected with the action expressed by the sentence is what is called *saṃbodhana*. Turning the attention of one who is already there (*siddha*) in order to prompt him to do something is *saṃbodhana*.[146] It is a meaning over and above that of the bare stem (*prātipadikārtha*). It is quite different from the relations with action such as *karma* etc. As it is one whose attention has been invited that is employed to do an action, this inviting of attention helps *indirectly* in the accomplishment of the action. The meaning of the word in the vocative case can be understood without reference to the meanings of the other words in the sentence. So even if it is indirectly connected with the action of the sentence it is the meaning of the individual word and not that of the sentence.[147]

144. See Texts.
145. See Texts.
146. See Texts.
147. See Texts.

6. ON ACTION (*KRIYĀ*)

Of the four powers of *Brahman* grouped together by Bhartṛhari, three have already been dealt with. The fourth is called *Kriyā* = 'action'. We have seen that the function of the *sādhanas* is to cooperate in the accomplishment of the action which is the main meaning of the sentence. Within the sentence, it is the verb which chiefly expresses this main meaning. Similarly, when a word is analysed into root and suffix, the question arises as to what the meaning of each is. Or the question might arise in another way. One might want to know how to tell a root from what is not a root and if the answer is that the root is that which expresses *kriyā*, it becomes necessary to get a clear idea of action as expressed by a root. In dealing with the subject, Bhartṛhari has made full use of certain ideas found in the *Nirukta* of Yāska, in the *vārttikas* of Kātyāyana and in the *Mahabhāṣya* of Patañjali.

To begin with Yāska, of the two words *bhāva* and *kriyā* which occur so frequently in this context, it is the former which is found in the *Nirukta*. He says that the verb primarily denotes *bhāva* which is thus distinguished from *sattva*, the meaning of a noun.[1] He also quotes the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi that *bhāva* undergoes six modifications : genesis, existence, alteration, growth, decay and destruction.[2] Several ideas on *bhāva* were current among students of the *Nirukta* in the old days. Some looked upon it as different from *kriyā*. It is manifested by the latter. *Kriyā* comes into being for the sake of *bhāva*. If *kriyā* means action, *bhāva* is a condition brought about by that action. Action is invisible, but we infer its existence from the *bhāva* or the particular condition or state brought about by it. That is why action is the secondary meaning of a verb as compared with *bhāva* which is its primary meaning (*bhāvapradhāna*). A thing is subordinate to that for the sake of which it comes into being. *Kriyā* comes into being for the sake of *bhāva* and so it is subordinate to it. To say that the root *pac* means *bhāva* is equal to saying that it stands for that particular state or condition of a substance like rice which is brought about by the action called cooking. This action has various aspects, each of which is associated with one of the accessories of the action (*kāraka*) and which are expressed by the different nouns which

1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.

are present, together with the verb, in the same sentence. *Kriyā* is a process and *bhāva* is the result of that process and though both are expressed by the verb, it is the latter which is the main meaning.[3] This is one view of *bhāva*. The other view is that it is the process itself. No distinction is made in this view between the process and its result. The verb expresses this process as its main meaning. It is, in reality, the meaning of the root part of the verb. The suffix part expresses the accessories such as the agent and the object which are subordinate to the process expressed by the root.[4] It is called a process because it has parts arranged in a temporal sequence.[5] Whether *bhāva* is the result of a process or the process itself, it is an effect.[6] In addition to this *bhāva*, there is an eternal *bhāva* of which all processes are transformations. Not only all processes, but everything in the universe which can be expressed by the four kinds of words referred to by Yāska.[7] It is to this *bhāva* that Vārṣyāyaṇi refers in the text referred to under note 2 above.

To Patañjali, the problem presented itself in the following way. How to tell a root from what is not a root? It was necessary to adopt a criterion which would exclude (1) Sanskrit words which had the same sounds as roots but which were not roots,[8] (2) prefixes and suffixes which had meanings very allied to those of roots, (3) *Prākṛt* roots which had the same meaning as the corresponding Sanskrit roots. Patañjali realised the need to adopt a double test : (1) that of inclusion or mention in certain approved lists or texts such as the *Dhātupāṭha*, the *Sūtras*, the *Vārttikas* and the *Gaṇapāṭha* and (2) that of meaning. We are interested in this second test. He presents this test in two forms. At first, he says that the root is that which expresses a *kriyā*, an action. All roots express it. That is why a verb formed from any root can be used in answer to the question : *kiṃ karoti* = 'what does he do ?' The meanings of all roots are mere variations of the meaning of the root *kṛ*, that is, action in general.[9] Actions and movements inhere in something or other and it may be held that there is no such thing as action or movement apart from the thing in which it inheres. When we say, for instance, that Devadatta goes, is there such a thing as his going apart from his presence at different points ?

3. See Durgācārya's commentary on *Nirukta* 1.1.9.
4. Ibid, on *Nirukta* 1.2.7.
5. See Texts.
6. Durga on *Nirukta* 1.2.7.
7. Ibid on *Nirukta* 1.2.7.
8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.

Patañjali holds that there is. Devadatta, his starting-point and the place of destination, all these may be present at a certain moment and yet we may not be able to use the expression : Devadatta goes. At another moment, we may actually use the above expression. Obviously some new factor must have come in, justifying our use of the expression. That new factor is action. To put it in another way : we have to explain the fact that Devadatta is now here and is at another place sometime later. To explain this, we postulate the action of going which Devadatta performed. We infer that he performed the action of going from the effect of that action, namely, the fact of his being found at another place. That means that action is not directly perceptible. It is something which has to be inferred from its effects.[10] It is the root which expresses this action, and not prefixes and suffixes which are added to it to form the verb and which express other ideas that qualify or modify the action expressed by the root. Sometimes a root, in association with a particular prefix, seems to express an action which is the very opposite of what it usually expresses. But, even there, it is simple to assume that the root itself expresses the new meaning. Roots are polysemic and there is no bar to a root expressing several widely different notions.

The idea that action of some kind or other is the meaning of a root seems to encounter a difficulty in the case of some roots. It was given as a proof of this notion that a verb formed from any root can be used in answer to the question *kiṃ karoti.* But the roots *'as'*, *bhū,* and *'vid'* do not seem to follow this principle. Nobody ever seems to say *asti* or *bhavati* or *vidyate* in answer to the question *kiṃ karoti.* The meanings of these roots do not seem to be variations of action in general which is the meaning of the root *kṛ.* And yet it would go against the facts of the Sanskrit language to deny the name of root to *'as'*, *bhū* and *vid.*[11] Secondly, it was said about *kriyā* that the notion of it sometimes arises and sometimes does not even though its accessories may have always been present. But the notion of 'being', 'existence', the meaning of the root *'as'* always arises when the accessories are present. Can that notion be then called action ? Thirdly, the notion that we have of any particular action seems to admit of degree. We can think of actions being performed at different levels of excellence, or otherwise. But the notion of 'being' does not seem to admit of any degree. We can say *pacatitarām* = 'he cooks all the better', but not *astitarām.*

10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.

Faced with this difficulty, it is proposed that the root should be defined as something which expresses *bhāva*. The difference between *kriyā* and *bhāva* here does not seem to be the same as in Yāska where the former means a process and the latter the result of that process. Here Kaiyyaṭa equates *bhāva* with *kriyāmātra* = 'action in general'[12] But this action in general must be distinguished from the meaning of the root *kṛ* which was also said to be action in general as distinguished from the particular actions which are the meanings of the other roots like *pac*. Otherwise there would be no difference between the two views. To make the idea of *bhāva* clearer, Kaiyyaṭa refers to the *sūtra : Bhāve* (P. 3.3.18) which tells us that suffixes like *ghañ* are added to roots like *pac* in the sense of *bhāva* in order to form words like *pāka*. There are two elements in the word *pāka*, the root and the suffix. The former expresses a particular action, the action of cooking and the latter 'action in general' and the two can coexist in the same thing. There is, however, one point to remember. The suffix expresses, no doubt, action in general, but it expresses it as a thing and not as a process. This very action in general is expressed by the three roots '*as*', *bhū* and *vid*, not as a thing, but as a process. Verbs like *pacati* express particular actions as processes and in them, action in general, conceived as a process, also exists. The two can co-exist in the same thing. That all roots express *bhāva* or action in general can be seen in such expressions as *bhavati pacati, bhavatyapākṣīt, bhavati pakṣyati*.[13] These expressions sound strange to our ears today because we are not accustomed to have a Sanskrit sentence consisting exclusively of two finite verbs connected with each other in meaning. In this combination, *bhavati* stands for action in general and *pacati* for a particular action. But this action in general is nothing more than existence or being, (*sattā, ātmabharaṇa*) which is found in everything, be it a thing or a process and it can coexist with other specific properties. The expression *bhavati pacati* would ultimately mean : 'Being, the agent of which is the same as that of cooking.'[14] This Being is the meaning of the root *bhū* and it is present or rather inherent in the meaning expressed by every other root. The meaning of every other root is only a variation of the meaning of the root *bhū* and that is why *bhāva* has been said to be the meaning of every root. If the root is so defined, *as, bhū* and *vid*, can also be called roots because they all express just this 'being'.

12. See Texts.

13. M. Bhā. 1, p. 256, l. 18-20.

14. Nāgeśa—Udyota on M. Bhā. I. p. 256, l. 18-20.

But these three will come under the designation 'root' even if the root is defined as something which expresses *kriyā*. It was said before that the root is that which expresses a process and that all the processes expressed by the different roots are variations of action in general, expressed by the root *kṛ*. If, at this stage, we add that what is called *kriyā* is not merely a process, particular or general, but a particular mode of behaviour on the part of the accessories,[15] this addition would have the effect of bringing '*as*', *bhū* and *vid* under the designation 'root'. To say that *kriyā* is a process only amounts to saying that its parts are arranged in a temporal sequence. It is also necessary to remember that no process is like any other. There is a pecularity in each one of them, a distinctive feature which makes it a *kriyā*. This distinctive feature is seen in the behaviour of the accessories of the process. As Patañjali puts it : One's behaviour towards plain rice is quite different from one's behaviour towards rice with meat in it, though the verb 'to eat' can be used in regard to both of them. Similarly, we see that on those occasions when we use the word '*asti*', the person or persons concerned behave differently from what they do on those occasions when we use the word *mriyate* (he dies), showing that the meaning of the root is a process, a *kriyā*.[16] In other words, even if we adopt the definition *kriyāvacano dhātuḥ* = 'the root is that which denotes an action', *as, bhū* and *vid* would be called roots. That is why, concludes Patañjali, Vārṣyāyaṇi has included *asti* among the six transformations of *bhāva* which we may take as meaning *kriyā* or *sattā*.

Thus the main ideas which emerge out of the *Mahābhāṣya* discussion on the subject are : (1) the root can be defined as something which expresses *kriyā,* (2) it is necessary to understand *kriyā* as *kārakāṇāṃ pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* = 'a particular mode of behaviour on the part of the accessories,' (3) *kriyā* is different from all the accessories which play a part, direct or indirect, in its accomplishment, (4) it is not *pratyakṣa,* it can only be inferred, (5) the *Mahābhāṣya* approves of the view of *Vārṣyāyaṇi* that existence, the meaning of the root '*as*' is one of the transformations of *bhāva* or *sattā* and, therefore, action.

Bhartṛhari, as interpreted by Helārāja, adopts the points mentioned above and in doing so, brings out clearly the point of view of the Grammarians. Helārāja is very anxious here, as on so many other points, to make it quite clear that what is being discussed is not what

15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.

action really is, but what action as presened by words is. It is from this point of view that the definition of *kriyā*, given in the *Mahābhāṣya*, should be understood. The definition was obviously not clear even to Grammarians of old because Helārāja records their conflicting ways of understanding it. Is the statement meant to be a definition of action or it is meant to tell us the nature of the meaning conveyed by the root? Does the word *kārakāṇām* in the definition stand for the agent only or for the agent and the object or for all the other accessories which can play a part in the accomplishment of an action? The activities of all the *kārakas* (accessories) may be entitled to be called by the name action but it was felt that the root was not capable of conveying all of them. If, in the sentence: *devadattaḥ kāṣṭhaiḥ sthālyām odanaṃ pacaii*, the root primarily expresses the activity of Devadatta, in some other rather unusual but possible sentences like *kāṣṭhāni pacanti, sthālī pacati*, the same root expresses the activity of some other *kāraka*. It does so only after the other *kāraka* becomes the agent in the sentence. But even this free and figurative use of words cannot be so extended as to enable us to say *vṛkṣaḥ patati* when we mean that the leaf falls off the tree. In other words, the root *pat* seems never to be able to express the activity of the accessory called *apādāna* = 'starting-point'. The same thing may be said about *saṃpradāna*. We can never say *rāmo dadāti* to express the idea that something is given to Rāma. The fact that the other accessories have to become the agent before the root can express their activity led some to interpret the word *kārakāṇām* as referring to the agent only, so that what is called action as conveyed by words is nothing more than a peculiar and distinctive mode of behaviour on the part of the agent. It is only in passive constructions, it was contended, that the root can convey the activity of the object without the latter becoming the agent.

Some held that by the word *pravṛttiviśeṣa* in the definition, it is the result of an action and not the action itself which is meant.[17] They mean that action is a *viśeṣa*, a peculiarity or rather a distinct result of the activities of the accessories. The softness of the rice after cooking, for instance, is the result achieved by the activities of all the accessories and that is action. Similarly, the root *gam* = 'to go' also means the result, the fact of reaching the destination. For others still, *kriyā* means activity in general and not any particular activity. Thus it would be found in every accessory. The bringing about of the ultimate result is the common feature found in the activity of every

17. See Texts.

accessory. Each does it in its own way and thus gets a special name.[18] It is, of course, very unusual to use the word *viśeṣa* to denote a common feature but those who upheld this interpretation apparently did so deliberately. The common feature found in all actions is that each one has a distinctive feature which distinguishes it from other actions of a similar kind or of a different kind. Thus *pravṛttiviśeṣa* ultimately turns out to be a distinctive feature. When we hear a verb and understand an action from it, it necessarily excludes other actions because it has its own distinctive feature.[19] This is said to be the reason why *sthā* should be included among the roots. The meaning which it conveys shares the characteristics of *kriyā* as defined here. It is a peculiar mode of behaviour which is quite different from other modes of behaviour and excludes them. When an enquiry is made about somebody's illness, the answer that it is increasing (*vardhate*) or that it is decreasing (*apakṣīyate*) is quite different from the answer that it is stationary (stihitaḥ). The last answer would exclude the other two. In other words, it is a *pravṛttiviśeṣa* and, therefore, *kriyā*.[20]

The idea that action is a process is already found in Yāska. Patañjali adds that it is not perceptible and can only be inferred.[21] Bhartṛhari and Helārāja bring out the implication of this idea. A process means something which has parts arranged in a temporal sequence and, therefore, not contemporaneous. How can the idea of a single action arise from parts or moments which do not co-exist? The answer is that the moments or parts come into existence to serve one single purpose and they are unified in one act of cognition. And that is called action. The parts exist for the whole. Action is one, a whole and it is conveyed by the root. On the basis of its parts, one speaks of its sequence. Oneness is attributed to it. Verbs like *pacati* stand for that collection of parts which is conceived by the mind as a unity. It is true that some of the parts are more removed from the ultimate result than others and yet each one is as essential as the others for the production of the ultimate result. That is why they are unified into a whole mentally and this unity is called action.[22]

At the very first moment of the act of cooking, the cook has the ultimate result in view. Therefore, the name 'cooking' is applied to the very first moment. That is why the present tense is used. When that

18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.

moment is over, we can say : 'he cooked', using the past tense, even though many moments of that action are yet to come. The whole is superimposed on each part. We know this because the idea of cooking arises in the presence of each part. With the very first little act which the cook performs, he has already the ultimate result in view. The whole, consisting of parts arranged in a sequence, is superimposed on each part.[23] On the part which is present at a particular moment before the eyes, the whole is superimposed and yet action is not perceptible. It is only inferrable. What is superimposed is action and that is not in contact with the senses. Only a moment is. Because the moment is perceptible, one has the illusion that the whole which is superimposed on it is also perceptible.[24]

The cognition of action is compared to the cognition of the word. In the section on the Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*, it was pointed out that the manifestation of *sphoṭa* was compared to that of the universals of action or movement.[25] Here the cognition of action is compared to that of the word conceived of as a collection of phonemes and not as *sphoṭa*. Words like *gauḥ* consist of a series of phonemes and yet it is more than that. It is a unity. Each phoneme is directly perceived by the ear and the word, as a whole, is cognised after the last phoneme is perceived. But this process of cognising the word as a whole is not perception. The impressions left by the perceptions of the previous phonemes play an important part in it. It is a kind of unification by the mind. Similarly, a revolving series of torches is wrongly perceived as a unity, as a wheel, and the perception appears to be direct. But it is the mind which, after each torch has been perceived separately, unifies them in one act of cognition and the wheel figures in it. Similarly, the different moments of action are directly perceived and they are unified by one act of cognition. This act of unification by the mind is more than *pratyakṣa*. That is why the cognition of action is not compared in this context to that of the word looked upon as *sphoṭa*. For Bhartṛhari, the cognition of *sphoṭa* is a case of pure perception. In the present context, it is to the cognition of the fire wheel that the cognition of action is compared, because, in both, an act of unification by the mind takes place.[26]

It is not merely main actions which are thus inferrable and not directly perceptible. Each moment or part may be looked upon as

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23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.
25. See p. 168.
26. See Texts.

action, in which case it will also be inferrable and not directly perceptible. These parts may be further subdivided and the smaller parts will also be actions. A stage will be reached when the part cannot be further subdivided. It will be atomic in character. It cannot then be called action at all. Such an atomic point may be *pratyakṣa*, but that will not make action *pratyakṣa* because that is not action at all.[27] Action is the name of something which has parts arranged in a sequence. The root cannot express something which has no parts. It can only express a process, that is, something having parts arranged in a sequence. One has to remember here that the real question is not whether action has parts or not. That would be a question pertaining to outside reality. The question is whether the verb presents action as something having parts and the answer is that the root or the verb presents action, however momentary in nature as something having parts which cannot co-exist and which is, therefore, not perceptible.[28]

If action is as defined above and if it is the root which conveys it, how can the root *'as'* be deemed to denote an action ? It is supposed to express Being (*sattā*). Now Being is eternal, sequenceless and not something to be brought about (*asādhyā*). How can it be the meaning of a root or of a verb ? The answer is that even Being is presented as a process by a verb. When presented by a verb, it has distinctions of time and that is why one says *abhūt, asti, bhaviṣyati etc.* A thing as presented by nouns, has no association with time. When we hear the word *ghaṭa* we understand something which is not connected with time. Moreover, when there is a possibility of somebody dying and someone asks *kiṃ karoti* = 'what is he doing', it is quite possible to give the answer *asti* in the sense that he is still alive. Action has already been stated to be *kārakāṇām pravṛttiviśeṣaḥ* = 'a particular mode of behaviour of the accessories'. This conception holds good everywhere. Even in the sentence *parvatas tiṣṭhati,* one understands a process from *tiṣṭhati.* Not all agents behave in the same way. The mountain, in the above sentence, is understood as behaving in a particular way, that of not giving up its locality. Therefore, from a verb, we do understand Being (*sattā*) as associated with time. This very *sattā* is understood as a thing from a noun. In a verb and a noun, the root can be the same and if the meaning of a root is action or a process, how to explain the difference between a verb and a noun formed from the same root ? The difference is this : in a verb, the meaning of the root, the process, is the chief thing whereas in a noun it is subordinate

27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.

to that of the suffix. The sequence of the different moments of the process is superimposed on the process as understood from a verb. This is what happens when Being is conveyed by the root *as*.[29]

If action is something on which the sequence of the moments is superimposed, it seems to be a secondary conception because of the superimposition. The word cow primarily denotes a particular kind of animal. When it is applied to a person having the qualities of a cow, it is said to be used secondarily. As far as action is concerned, there is no primary conception of it, distinct from its secondary conception. There is no conception of action in which the parts are contemporaneous without any sequence between them. Everywhere action is the result of the superimposition of the sequence of parts on the whole. There is no other conception of action. Nothing is secondary unless something else is primary in regard to it.[30] That is why in this case, even a single moment or part, with the sequence superimposed on it, becomes action. Some looked upon the last moment after which the result comes into being as the action. The preceding moments are socalled only because they lead to it. The last moment is superimposed on them because they are the means thereof.

Thus action has been shown to be in the nature of a process. It is really one and, therefore, without any sequence. But the sequence belonging to the moments which are different from it and which exist for it, is attributed to it.

What has been said so far applies to action considered as a particular (*vyakti*). It can be explained from the point of view of the *jātivādin* also. He believes that all words denote the universal. A universal is something the existence of which is proved by the uniformity in our cognition. The idea of cooking persists even when the person who cooks and the thing cooked vary. We must, therefore, admit that the universal called action inheres in the different kinds of action. It is this universal which the root expresses. It is manifested by the different moments which do not co-exist. In this respect, it is like *Sphoṭa* which is manifested by the different sounds of a word. The different moments of an action must be looked upon as the particulars (*vyakti*). Similarly, each different act of cooking different things by different persons must also be looked upon as *vyakti*. The universal called action is really eternal but it appears to be a process.

29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.

that is, something to be brought about, and to have sequence through its substrata, namely, individual actions or the different moments of an action.[31] If an action requires accessories (*sādhana*) for its accomplishment it is the *vyati* aspect of it which requires it. The view that action is a universal is presented in another way also : The universal inhering in the last moment of action after which the fruit results is action. The preceding ones are called action because they exist for the last one.

The universal that has been spoken about so far is the lower universal of action which inheres in the different kinds of actions and in the different moments of the same action. This lower universal, however, is a manifestation of the Grand Universal, *mahāsāmānya,* namely Being, *sattā.* What is called action may be looked upon as this Being, conditioned or determined by the activities of the agent and the object. It is not only action which is a manifestation of this Grand Universal or Being, but everything that would come under what is called *siddha.* It has already been stated in the section dealing with the Universal and the Substance that all words denote ultimately this Grand Universal. Therefore, verbs also do the same. They denote Being as existing in the different individual actions which depend upon the accessories for coming into existence. Being, associated with the activity of a thing, is called action. That is why verbs present it as something to be brought about, that is, a process, *sādhya.* Nouns present this very thing as an accomplished thing, (*sattva* or *siddha*). That Being is the meaning of the root is the uninterrupted tradition, says Bhartṛhari.[32] This was the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi, quoted by Yāska and Patañjali. This Being is the meaning of the noun as well as of the verb. It is sometimes called *sattā* and sometimes *bhāva.* It is One but becomes differentiated on account of association with different limiting conditions. But these limiting conditions are also nothing more than manifestations of *sattā.* Thus there is nothing except *sattā.* This is what is called *sattādvaita,* the view that everything is a manifestation of the Ultimate Being and that all words denote it.

As stated before, Yāska quotes with approval the view of Vārṣyāyaṇi that *bhāva* or *sattā* goes through six transformations, expressed by the words *jāyate, asti, vipariṇamate, vardhate, apakṣīyate, vinaśyati.* A thing is first born, then it is said to exist, what exists necessarily undergoes change, change means growth and then decay and finally

31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.

destruction. These socalled transformations of *bhāva* or *sattā* are not really six in number, because they can be reduced to two : *janma* and *vināśa*. The latter seems to be the very opposite of *sattā* and is yet a transformation of it. The six processes which are said to be transformations of Being can be reduced to these two. Everything is characterised by its own form, its own *dharma*. For it to exist means to exist in that form, with that *dharma*. Before it comes into being, it exists only potentially in its cause. When it abandons this condition of merely existing potentially in its cause, becomes active but has not yet fully attained its form, it is said to be born. When it has attained its full form, it is said to exist. Thus existence is only the later stage of the process of being born, otherwise called *āvirbhāva*, coming into the light. When, without losing its identity, it alters, we say that it changes. This changing can be either increase or decrease. Decrease ultimately leads to destruction which is also called *tirobhāva*, going into cover, being hidden. That marks the end of the process of assuming one's own form. Thus there are six processes to which everything in the world is subject before it totally disappears. But these six can be reduced to two because they are either in the nature of something becoming manifest or going into hiding : *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*.[33] What iit amounts to is that *sattā* manifests inself in the form of six processes which, when closely scrutinised, can be reduced to two. These two, *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*, form the basis of all action. Every action is a kind of coming into the light or going into hiding, a rising or setting.

In this context Bhartṛhari refers to a view which he mentioned in connection with *sādhana* and which, according to the commentator, is associated with the *Mīmāṃsakas*. According to this view, action is *Pravṛtti*. It is an eternal force and does not reside anywhere in particular. Together with the powers of the accessories, it brings about the result.[34] In its first stage, it may be looked upon as the *apūrva*, the moral force generated by the previous actions of beings. Later, it assumes differentiation on account of the activities of the accessories. It is then that it becomes a process and is called action.[35] While still in the undifferentiated state, it sets in motion the powers of the accessories. As long as it is undifferentiated, it resides nowhere in particular. When it is differentiated, it resides in the accessories and gets the name of the particular action accomplished by the acces-

33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.

sories. That is why action has been defined as the particular mode of behaviour of the accessories. This eternal original force has been called *prakṛti* because it is the source of the powers of the accessories. It sets the accessories in motion. It carries them along in its flow. Being eternal, it has not been brought about by other accessories. In fact, it should be looked upon as the very first *kāraka*, because it brings into existence the other *kārakas*.[36] It is this very initial force which becomes particular actions when associated with particular accessories. Others, however, think that this initial force called *Pravṛtti*, not associated with any accessory at all must be kept quite distinct from all the other actions associated with particular accessories.

So far it has been stated that action is a process having parts arranged in a temporal sequence, that it is a particular mode of behaviour of the accessories and that it is the verb which expresses it. But the verb expresses other things also. It expresses the accessory, number, time, person and aspect (*upagraha*). These different notions are not expressed in the same way. One of them is usually more important than the others. It is action which verbs primarily express because it is that which is *sādhya*, to be brought about The accessories are all already there. They are concrete accomplished objects. Compared to what is already there, what is yet to be is more important.[37] It is true that the ultimate fruit for which the action is done is also *sādhya*, that is, something yet to be brought about but that is expressed by another word altogether. Here the question is : of the many things expressed by the same word, namely, the verb, which is the most important ? Here grammarians look upon action as the main meaning of the verb, though it may convey other notions also. Number and person help the action by qualifying its accessories, namely, the agent and the object. Time and aspect (*upagraha*) are directly subordinate to action. Where the verb is impersonally used (*bhāva*), there is the importance of the action in regard to number etc., because it does not express any accessory and number cannot, therefore, be subordinate to it. As for action itself, not being a concrete thing, it has no number at all. One must not misunderstand the statement of the *Mahābhāṣya* that action is One[38] The word one there does not stand for the number one. All that it means is that the action conveyed by a verb does not denote all its varieties. One of the questions which can be asked about the meaning of any word is

36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. M. Bhā. I, p. 238, l. 10.

whether it admits of the ideas of singularity or plurality to be associated with it. Another question which can be asked is whether the word expresses an idea only in a general way or whether it also expresses all the variety which it is capable of. Jespersen considers the meaning of such English words as leisure, music, success, satisfaction, admiration, restlessness, justice etc. as uncountable. These are all nouns and ordinarily, the meanings of nouns come under the category of countable. According to Indian grammatical tradition also, nouns denote things which are susceptible to distinctions of gender and number. As for the meanings of verbs, Jespersen is of the opinion that the idea of one or more than one is not incompatible with them, though he points out that in English and in most languages, the verb does not usually express the singularity or plurality of the action expressed by it.[39] As stated already, when the Indian grammarian says that the action, as presented by the Sanskrit verb is one, all that he means is that it is presented in a general manner, without touching upon all the infinite variety of which an action is capable. Even such a simple action as cooking is capable of great variety on account of the great variety that there can be in the things cooked, in the modes of cooking, in the persons who cook and in the time taken by cooking. But without the aid of other words, the verb cannot express all this variety. This point has already been dealt with in the chapter entitled 'Bhartṛhari on the Sentence.'[40]

While Bhartṛhari, following Patañjali, has declared action to be *ekā* in the sense that, as conveyed by the verb, it cannot convey all its varieties, it is admitted that some kind of plurality in connection with it can be expressed. It may itself be devoid of variety, that is plurality, but one can express number in connection with its repetition. This is possible only when there is a combination of *bheda* (difference) and *abheda* (identity). Repetition of an action means that the action is the same which is equal to identity (*abheda*) and that it is done again and again which is equal to difference.[41] When an action is repeated, the action remains the same because the agent and the fruit remain the same but it undergoes repetition. In such a case we can have expressions like *pañcakṛtvaḥ pacati* = 'he cooks five times' in which the unity of the action and the plurality of the repetition are both found.[42] Repetition (*abhyāvṛtti*) is possible only when action is presented by the verb as a process (*sādhya*) and not when it is presented by the noun as a

39. Jespersen—Philosophy of Grammar, p. 210.

40. See p. 201.
41. See Texts.
42. See P. 5.4.17 and M. Bhā. on P. 3.4.19.

thing (*siddha, dravya*). That is why we cannot say *pañcakṛtvaḥ pākaḥ*.

Action becomes associated with number only when it is presented as a thing by a word ending in a primary suffix (*kṛt*). That is why we can say *pākaḥ pākau, pākāḥ*, in which the action of cooking, presented as thing, is associated with all the three numbers. In some expressions, even an action presented as a thing seems to be connected with a *kāraka*. For example, *odanasya pEkaḥ* = 'the cooking of rice'. Here rice is the *kāraka* called *karma* of the action of cooking. But, strictly speaking, it is only when action is presented as a process that it requires the accessories for its accomplishment. Here it is not so presented. Moveover, the case-ending in the word *pāka* denotes number which is an attribute of a thing (*siddha*) and not of a process. So the action conveyed by the word *pāka* seems to be both *sādhya* and *siddha* which is a contradiction.[43] Bhartṛhari tries to remove this contradiction, without going against the statement of Patañjali that there is a difference between an action as presented by a verb and an action as presented by a noun.

The contradiction, as pointed out, lies in the fact that an idea having two contradictory attributes or two contradictory ideas are deemed to come from the same word or verbal element. All this implies division of the word used for communication. In reality, it is the indivisible word which is used in real life. Division is done only in the *śāstra* and that too for the sake of convenience. The divisions are not real.[44] When the artificial division is made in the *śāstra*, it is found that a verb like *pacati* has two parts, the root and the suffix of which the former expresses action and the latter the accessory. The same is true of a noun like *pāka* also. The position, therefore, is this : The same root is found in the verb as well as in the noun and in both it expresses action as a process. Once it is expressed as a process, it would require accessories for its accomplishment and it would, therefore, result in the use somewhere of case affixes expressive of accessories. That explains why there is the sixth-case affix expressive of *karma* in the expression *odanasya pākaḥ*. The primary affix which may be found after the root in a noun 'would present the same action as a thing and that would naturally invite the addition of case affixes.[45] This makes quite clear the difference between a verb and a noun ending in a primary affix, pointed out by

43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.
45. See Texts.

Patañjali. This also brings out the fact that the two apparently contradictory attributes are expressed by two different elements forming parts of the same word *pāka*. How one and the same word can express two different things through its two parts can be illustrated through the word *bandhutā* = 'collection of relatives'. Here the suffix expresses the idea of *samūha*[46] = 'collection' and the stem that of relative. And yet, the collection is not something quite apart from the relatives because it is a collection of relatives. The two ideas, expressed by the two parts, enter into close union and refer to one thing. Everything is relative. In the sentence : '*paśya ! mṛgo dhāvati* = look ! the deer is running', the suffix in the verb denotes the agent and in regard to that the action of running, the meaning of the root, is a process (*sādhya*), but in regard to the action of looking, it is the object, that is, a thing (*siddha*).[47] It is not the deer which is the object of the action of looking, but the act of running. As the deer is perceptible, its running is also conceived of as perceptible and thus becomes the object of the act of looking. Of course, as the object of another action, the action of running ceases to be a process and becomes a thing.[48] On the above analogy, in words like *pāka* ending in suffixes like *ghañ*, while the root expresses the action as a process (*sādhya*), the suffix expresses it as a thing (*siddha*). As the meaning of the suffix is more important, the process aspect becomes subordinate to it. That is why the suffix *kṛtvasuc* cannot be used after a numeral in the sense of counting the repetitions, because there cannot be repetition where the action is not primarily a process.

The final position is as follows — The root everywhere expresses action as a process. This remains its predominant meaning when a *tiṅ* suffix is added to it and a verb formed. The same thing happens when *kṛtya, kta* and *khalartha* suffixes are added to it.[49] So the meaning of the root stands in need of accessories for its accomplishment. It is when association with accessories takes place that the meaning of the root is seen to be a process.[50] When the case affixes are added to a stem, we realise that its meaning is a thing and not a process, because words ending in the case affixes express gender and number and only things have gender and number and not processes.

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46. See P. 5.2.43.
47. See Texts.
48. See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.

The word *bhāva* is used to indicate the meaning of a root, of suffixes like *ghañ* and of verbal affixes. What is the distinctive feature of each ? The fact is that they are the same and yet they are not the same. In this respect, they are like the meanings of the words *vana* = 'forest' and *vṛkṣāḥ* = 'trees'. From both the words one understands trees, but as a collection in the former case and as different from another in the latter case. In the same way, *bhāva* as the meaning of the root is the basic initial one of the three and it is, therefore, the inner one (*ābhyantara*). It has the form of a process (*sādhya*) and, therefore, differs from the *bhāva* denoted by suffixes like *ghañ* because the latter has the form of a thing and is, therefore, the outer one (*bāhya*).[51] The *bhāva* conveyed by the root is understood as one without any differentiation, because, being a process, it is not qualified by number which is the property of a thing and not of a process. Differeniation in the meaning of a verb is always understood through differentiation in the accessories. The meaning conveyed by the verb is associated with its own attribute, namely, Time and with the notion of 'person' which is really an attribute of the means (*sādhana*). As action leads to a result, it is also associated with such attributes of the result as the fact of being meant for the agent etc., expressed by the *ātmanepada* suffixes and so on.[52] The meaning of word ending in suffixes like *ghañ*, being in the nature of a thing, has no association with Time. It has association only with gender and as for the *bhāva* which is conveyed by impersonal verbs like *śayyate, sthīyate,* it is also a process like the *bhāva* expressed by the root. It is contained within itself and is not associated with a means and with the quality of being a thing. Being something to be brought about, it has connection with an agent. Compared to the *bhāva* conveyed by the root, it is external, so that external *bhāva* is of two kinds : that which is conveyed by a *kṛt* suffix and that which is conveyed by an impersonal verbal suffix.[53]

Bhāva can be expressed by suffixes in all the genders and numbers, even though Pāṇini has used a word in the masculine gender and singular number to teach this point. Some gender and number have to be used in teaching anything but that does not mean that the words formed according to that teaching cannot have other genders and numbers. The *sūtra 'Bhāve'* (P. 3.3.18) indicates that the suffixes are to be added in the sense of action but without association with any particular gender or number. It also implies comparison. Thus the

51. See Texts.
52. See Texts.
53. See Texts.

sūtra would mean : Just as *bhāva* is the meaning of the root *bhū*, so is *pāka*='cooking in general' that of the root *pac*, *tyāga*='abandonment' that of *tyaj* and so on and this meaning is that of the suffix *ghañ*.

Suffixes like *ghañ* express *sattā*='Being' in their own way, that is, as a thing. Words like *sattā* and *bhāva* express it in a general form whereas words like *pāka* express it in a particular form. Thus this *sattā* attains a two-fold differentiation.[54] Words like *pāka* bring about one kind of differentiation as compared with words like *sattā*. The different genders of the words formed from the same root bring about another kind of differentiation. Thus the words *paktiḥ*, *pacanam*, *pākaḥ* mean the same thing and yet bring about a differentiation in it. However, the common element persists in the midst of all the differentiation. It includes all the particulars within it. But the particular cannot appropriate the whole of the field to itself. *Bhavati* (Being in general) includes the whole of *pacati* (being in the form of cooking), but *pacati* does not appropriate *bhavati* to itself.[55] The same thing can be the universal in regard to one thing and the particular in regard to another. It is like the same person being a teacher in regard to one person and uncle in regard to another.[56] In regard to the different individual acts of cooking, cooking in general is the universal (*sāmānya*). In regard to *bhāva* (Being in general) the universal of cooking is a particular.

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54. See Texts.
55. See Texts.
56. M. Bhā. II, p. 144, l. 23—p. 145, l. 1-3.

7. ON PERSON AND ASPECT (*PURUṢA AND UPAGRAHA*)

While the verb conveys on action or process primarily, it also conveys time, person and aspect as associated with a process, indirectly, if not directly. How time is associated with a process has been explained in the previous section and in the chapter entitled : 'The Metaphysical background of the *Vākyapadīya.*' This is the appropriate place to say a few words about how Bhartṛhari understood person and aspect. Three persons have been recognised, the First, the Second and the Third, or rather, the Best (*uttama*), *the Medium* (*madhyama*) and the First (*prathama*), according to Sanskrit terminology. It will, however, be convenient to use the first set of names, rather than the ones based on the Sanskrit words. The First and the Second Persons as notions, are attributes of the agent and the object of the action. The three persons have each their own suffixes to express them.[1] The First Person, as a notion, means the fact of the action co-existing with the ego-sense (*ahaṃkāra*) in the Self.[2] It is an attribute of the agent or the object as expressed by the verbal suffixes and it is understood from both kinds of suffixes, namely, *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. From the words *pace* and *pacāmi*, one understands that it is the speaker who cooks and that is due to the First Person suffixes. Thus the fact of the action being associated with the speaker himself is the notion of the First Person and the suffix is the verbal element which expresses this notion. The fact that the speaker is the agent of the action of cooking is understood from both kinds of suffixes, *parasmaipada* and *ātmanepada*. That the speaker is the object of the action can be understood only from the *ātmanepada* suffix, as in *pacye.* The notion of the Second Person is explained by the word *paratvam,* to distinguish it from the First Person which is explained as *pratyaktā. Paratvam* means the fact of being different from the speaker, while *pratyaktā* means the fact of being co-existent with the ego-sense (*ahaṃkāra*). The Second Person also refers to the conscious self and, as a notion, it can also be the attribute of the agent and the object, as seen in the expressions *pacasi* and *pacyase.* The Second Person suffix is its special means of expression.

These two notions : *pratyaktā* and *parabhāva,* as defined above, are possible only in the case of sentient beings. But then we find the

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1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.

First and Second Person suffixes used even when the agent of the action is an insentient object, as in the expression : *śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ* = 'listen, O ! stones.' The explanation is that sentiency, as associated with the ego-sense or with the other (*para*) may be real or superimposed and the suffixes in question can express either. The fact is that it is not a question of whether any particular agent is sentient or not but of whether it is presented by words as sentient or not.[3] In *śṛṇota grāvāṇaḥ,* words present the stones as sentient. The Third Person suffix cannot express real or superimposed sentiency. From the word *pacati,* one understands the agent of the action of cooking but whether that agent is sentient or not cannot be understood from the third person suffix *ti.* Sometimes the agent of an action expressed by the verb in the Third Person is a sentient being but that fact cannot be understood from the suffix. That is understood from some other word in the sentence. In *āsyate tvayā,* the person who sits is a sentient being but that is not understood from the suffix in the verb. It is understood from the word *tvayā.* The Third Person suffix is to be used where the agent has neither real nor superimposed sentiency. That is the force of the word *śeṣa* in P. 1.4.108. One must not be misled by expressions like *budhyati, jānāti* = 'he understands, he knows' where the Third Person suffix is used and yet the agent is sentient. It is not from the suffix that this fact is understood. In these expressions, the meaning of the root itself can be the attribute only of a sentient being.[4] That meaning qualifies the agent or the object. When the root itself does not mean something which is the attribute of a sentient-being, the Third Person suffix can do nothing as in *kūlaṃ patati* = 'the river bank is crumbling'. The First and Second Person Suffixes have been taught when the agent or the object are 'I' and 'You' respectively and they are naturally understood as being sentient. The Third Person suffix on the other hand, has been taught as being expressive of the 'rest'. Therefore, where it is used, one would naturally understand that the agent is insentient.

It was said before that the Second Person suffix expresses something sentient different from the sentient being which has the ego-sense. According to some, it does something more than that. It also draws the attention of the person spoken to, even when no command is expressed. This is the effect of the first case ending coming after *yuṣmad* when the verb is in the Second Person, as in *tvam pacasi* =

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3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

'thou cookest'.[5] Everybody agrees that where there is command or request, one would first address the person spoken to in order to draw his attention but according to the others, this takes place even where there is no command or request. According to them, the vocative idea means only drawing the attention of the person spoken to and not actually addressing him. Whenever, however, the word ending in the first case ending is part of the predicative portion of a sentence, it cannot express the vocative idea, as in *rājā bhava, yuddhyasva*="become a king and fight." Here, though there is command the word *rājā*, ending in the first case ending, does not express the vocative idea, because it belongs to the predicative portion of the sentence. One can only draw the attention of what is already there. The predicative portion of a sentence is not already there. Therefore, though there is command here, there is no *sambodhana*.

Thus the meanings of personal suffixes are fixed. But this must not lead to any misunderstanding. For teaching the suffix *ṭhak* after words expressive of the means of gambling, Pāṇini uses the *sūtra* : *tena dīvyati khanati jayati jitam*='after a word expressive of means or instrument and ending in the third case ending, the suffix *ṭhak* is to be added in the sense of 'he gambles with it', or 'he digs with it,' or 'he wins with it', or 'it has been won with it'. (P. 4.4.2). This does not mean that the word so formed can be associated only with the third person. We can also say *ākṣiko'smi*'='I am a gambler with dice' just as we can say, *ākṣiko'si*='thou art a gambler with dice'. The fact is that the different meanings in which Pāṇini teaches the different suffixes are not the eternal meanings which, according to the *śāstra,* are the real meanings, but are the products of grammatical analysis (*apoddhāra*). They have to be presented in some garb or other in the *śāstra* but the garb should not be taken too seriously. The meanings are valid not only for the particular garb presented but for all garbs. Words and meanings are eternal and the *śāstra* has to teach both. It has to take something as the basis of teaching. It takes a meaning which is nearest to the real meaning as the basis of exposition. But that must not be taken too seriously.[7] A verb the meaning of which is a process (*dīvyati*) has been used to teach the suffix *ṭhak* but the word formed with this suffix would not be a verb. It would be a word ending in a secondary suffix the meaning of which is not a process, but a thing.

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5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.

Aspect (*upagraha*)

The fact that one of the fourteen sections of the third Kāṇḍa of the *Vākyapadīya* is entitled *Upagrahasamuddeśa* shows that Bhartṛhari attached some importance to this concept. The word occurs in the *vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣa* on P. 3.1.40, 3.2.127 and in the *Mahābhāṣya* on P. 3.1.25. According to the *Kāśikā* on P. 6.2.134, the word was found in a variant reading of that *sūtra* current in those days and that grammarians earlier than Pāṇini had used it in the sense of a word ending in the sixth case-ending.[8] The word, however, is not used in this sense in the orthodox grammatical literature but even here there is the tradition that it was a technical word used by Prepāṇinian grammarians.[9] Though it is not a commonly used word, it was known to orthodox grammarians from Kātyāyana and Patañjali to Bhoja and Nāgeśa and there seems to be a certain amount of uniformity and consistency in the meaning given to the word.

Kātyāyana and Patañjali use the word is such a way as to suggest that the word was well known in their days and did not require any explanation. Even Kaiyyaṭa explains the word only once and then he equates it with the word *ātmanepada*.[10] For Jinendrabudhi, it is more than that. For him it means primarily a particular action or a peculiarity in an action, suggested by the verbal suffixes. As these suffixes are *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada*, the word is secondarily applied to these two kinds of suffixes also.[11] The statement of Jinendrabuddhi that, primarily, *upagraha* is the name of a particular kind of action or peculiarity in action suggested by the verbal suffixes is interesting because, in that way, it becomes the name of a grammatical notion for which the language has a special means of expression. It is necessary to find out which among the many notions expressed by the verbal suffixes is called *upagraha*. Apart from the very few scattered remarks about *upagraha* found in the *Vārttikas* and the *Mahābhāṣya*, it is in the *upagrahasamuddeśa* of the *Vākyapadīya* that there is the earliest connected statement on the subject.

Where a verb is made up of many elements : root, preposition. infix and suffix and expresses a complexity of ideas, it becomes sometimes difficult to say quite definitely which idea is expressed by which element. This difficulty is reflected in the controversy which has been

8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.

carried on in grammatical circles as to whether a preposition is expressive or only suggestive (*dyotaka*). That question can be asked not only about prepositions but about other verbal elements also. Various meanings have been mentioned by Pāṇini as the occasions for the use of the *ātmanepada* suffix and it is interesting to note that, while some of these are accepted by the commentators as belonging to the *ātmanepada* suffix itself, others are attributed to the particular preposition which is always used on the same occasion. The Science Grammar teaches the use of the *ātmanepada* with particular roots or suffixes or prepositions or with particular meanings of roots or suffixes or prepositions. Where the *śāstra* itself associates the special meaning with the root or the preposition or some special suffix, it is necessary to determine the exact part played by the *ātmanepada*. The problem is further complicated when the *ātmanepada*, in its capacity as a verbal suffix, expresses various other meanings such as the different points of time and the different moods of the speaker.

The notion of *upagraha* is said to be *alaukika*, perhaps in the sense that it is recognised in Grammar only and not by the ordinary man in the world.[12] It is not the name of any one idea or notion. It is the name of a number of notions denoted by the *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* suffixes. Some of these notions may be expressed by other elements in the word than these two kinds of suffixes, but then they are not called *upagraha*. Another noteworthy thing about it is that it is said to be suggested rather than expressed by these two kinds of suffixes.[13] The most important and distinctive notion attributed to the *ātmanepada* or *parasmaipada* suffix is that of the fruit of the action denoted by the root coming to the do-er or going to somebody else. The action of one who performs a sacrifice in order to go to heaven is *yajate* while that of the priest who officiates merely to get his fee is *yajati*. In the former case, the fruit (heaven) of the action denoted by the root *yaj* comes to the do-er of that action while in the latter it goes to somebody else. The two actions differ from each other in scope and aim.[14] These two shades of the same meaning come under *upagraha*. These two shades can be found in the meanings of a very large number of roots in the Sanskrit language. They are, therefore, the most comprehensive of all the notions coming under *upagraha*. Though ordinarily they are expressed by the two kinds of suffixes under discussion, these may be dispensed with if something else can do their work. Thus in *svaṃ yajñaṃ yajati* = 'he performs

12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See Texts.

own sacrifice', the idea that the fruit of the action of performing a sacrifice comes to the sacrificer is indicated by the word *svaṃ* in the sentence. Hence the *ātmanepada* has been dispensed with.[15] Another idea which is sufficiently comprehensive because of its being applicable to the meanings of a very large number of roots is that of somebody doing the work of somebody else, that is, *karmavyatihāra*, as in *vyatilunīte* = 'one does the cutting which somebody else should do'. The *Bālamanoramā* explains: *śūdrādiyogyaṃ sasyādilavanaṃ brāhmaṇaḥ karoti* = 'a brahmin does the cutting of plants etc. fit for *śūdras* and others to do'.[16] This idea can be found even where the *ātmanepada* is absent: *vyatipaṭhanti* = 'they read what others should be reading'. One can legitimately ask whether the combination of the prepositions *vi* and *ati* is not really the expressive element here but the Sanskrit grammatical tradition gives the credit to the *ātmanepada* or the *parasmaipada* suffix. What we have to note here is that this idea also comes under *upagraha*. It is a way of doing things, a *kriyāviśeṣana*.[17] *Karmavyatihāra* includes also the idea of mutuality of action as in *saṃpraharante rājānaḥ* = 'the kings strike one another'. That would also come under the idea of *upagraha* though here also one can legitimately ask whether the idea of mutuality would be conveyed if the preposition *sam* were absent. Sometimes, certain roots, in combination with particular prepositions, denote a particular kind of action and take the *ātmanepada*: *utkurute* = 'he gives an indication maliciously'. The idea expressed is not comprehensive at all because it cannot be expressed by the other roots in the language. Here one is definitely inclined to give the credit for the expression of the idea to the combination of preposition and root rather than to the suffix. In other words, the expression of the idea has a lexical rather than a morphological significance. The traditional view is that the idea actually belongs to the root and preposition but that it is the suffix which reveals it.[18] Such ideas belonging to particular roots also come under *upagraha*.

We have seen so far that the ideas coming under *upagraha* are either attributes of actions or special ways of doing things or particular kinds of actions. Auxiliaries of actions also come under it. Both the agent and the object would come under *upagraha* if they are expressed by the two kinds of verbal suffixes. In *paṭhita*, the suffix *kta* expresses *karma* which, therefore, does not come under *upagraha*.

15. P. 1.3.77.
16. *Bālamanoramā* on P. 1.3.14.
17. See Texts.
18. See Texts.

In *pācaka,* the suffix *ṇvul* expresses the agent and so the latter does not come under *upagraha.* Even an implied attribute of the agent, if somehow associated with the *ātmanepada* can come under *upagraha.* In *sampravadante brāhmaṇāḥ* = 'the brahmins utter together', the verb takes the *ātmanepada* because the uttering together is done by articulate beings. The fact of being articulate is an attribute of the agent of the act of uttering.[19] This attribute also comes under *upagraha.*[20]

Of the many ideas coming under the concept of *upagraha,* the most comprehensive is that of the fruit of the action coming to the agent or going to something else. This implies two motives in the performance of an action : one acts for oneself or for somebody else. The sacrificer acts in order that he may get the fruit (heaven) himself whereas the officiating priest acts in order that somebody else may get the fruit. Some people did not admit this distinction of motives. They maintained that, in the last resort, everybody acts for himself. But, then, when we are in the realm of words, the question is not whether there is, in reality, a distinction of motives or not but how words present things. Verbs sometimes present actions in such a manner as to imply that the agent wants the ultimate fruit to come to himself while, at other times, they present them in such a manner as to imply that the ultimate fruit goes to somebody else. From *pacate* we understand that one cooks in order that one may ultimately eat the food that is cooked. The emphasis is not on one's actually doing oneself the various little acts which constitute the act of cooking. One may get them all done by somebody else and yet one would be said to be cooking, because one is ultimately going to eat the food that is cooked. *Devadattaḥ pacate,* therefore, means : Devadatta makes arrangements for cooking, whereas *Devadattaḥ pacati* would mean that Devadatta actually cooks. In other words, the *ātmanepada* expresses the idea of making arrangements for the performance of an action the ultimate result of which one would enjoy oneself. From *yajate* we understand similarly that the sacrificer (*yajamāna*) makes all the necessary arrangements for the performance of a sacrifice in order that he may ultimately enjoy the fruit thereof; namely, heaven. *Ātmanepada,* therefore, stands for making arrangements (*saṃvidhāna*).

Now it becomes necessary to distinguish this idea from the meaning of the causative affix *ṇic* which is that somebody causes somebody

19. P. 1.3.49.
20. See Texts.

else to act. Making arrangements or *saṃvidhāna* also implies that somebody causes somebody else to act. But it is different from the meaning of *ṇic* which does not come under *upagraha*. From the word *yajate*, what we understand is that somebody, desirous of getting the main fruit of the sacrifice, brings about the performance of it. There is what is called the *bhāvanā*, bringing about, of the sacrifice and for this, it is but natural that the agent should be one who acts on his own. He makes arrangements for the performance of the sacrifice (*saṃvidhāna*). This involves making other people do things, but that is not directly understood from the word itself. From the word *yājayati*, on the other hand, one understands that one causes another to act. This being the difference between the two actions, they are not alternative ways of saying the same thing, as some people seem to think.[21] Their scope is different : *Ātmanepada* expresses *saṃvidhāna*, making arrangements and *ṇic* expresses *praiṣa*, prompting or command.[22] Where we understand that one acts being prompted by another, there cannot be *ātmanepada*, as in *uktaḥ karoti*, *preṣitaḥ karoti*. Similarly, the difference between *ajāṃ nayati grāmam* and *ajāṃ nayate grāmam*, according to Helārāja is that, from the former sentence, we understand that somebody like a servant is taking the goat to the village on the prompting of another, whereas, from the latter sentence, one understands that the owner himself is taking the goat to the village.[23]

The illusion that the *ātmanepada* and *ṇic* have the same scope and are interchangeable arises from the failure to make a distinction between what a word conveys directly and what is understood from the sentence or from the context. In the sentence *keśaśmaśru vapate* = 'he shaves his hair and beard' there is *ātmanepada* because the ultimate result will go to the person who shaves. But from the context we know that he does not actually do the shaving himself but gets a barber to do it. This is not openly expressed but understood from the context. That is why there is no *ṇic* here but *ātmanepada* instead.[24]

Though the idea of the fruit of the action coming to the agent is a sufficiently comprehensive one, Helārāja makes it clear that the meanings of all roots are not susceptible to this idea. Two roots may have the same meaning and yet one of them may be susceptible to it and not the other. The idea of the fruit of the action coming to the agent

21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.
23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.

implies *saṃvidhāna,* making arrangements, as we have already seen. It is allied to the idea of *praiṣa,* the meaning of *ṇic.* And yet the meanings of practically all roots are susceptible of being modified or qualified by the idea of *praiṣa,* but not by that of *saṃvidhāna.*[25] This is due to the essential nature of language which is not a matter of logic. In the *Dhātupātha,* the roots *yā* and *nī* are given as having the same meaning : *yā prāpaṇe* and *ṇīñ prāpaṇe.* And yet, the meaning of the latter is susceptible of being associated with and modified by the idea of *saṃvidhāna* and, therefore, to be expressed by the *ātmanepada,* as in the expression *ajāṃ nayate grāmam.* But we cannot say *yāte.*[26] It is in order to help those who cannot themselves find out by examining usage which root is susceptible and which not that the circumflex accent and the letter *ñ* have ben added to roots which are so susceptible.[27] Some can, of course, understand this by examining usage itself and so do not need any indication. They are *prayogadarśinaḥ* = 'those who look at usage' or *vṛttajñāh* = 'those who know the facts of the language', and must be distinguished from those who are *vacanānusāriṇaḥ* = 'those who follow the words of teachers'.[28] It is not only in this respect that roots having the same meaning behave differently. By adding the same preposition to roots having the same meaning, one does not get the same result. *Dṛṣ* and *Īkṣ* have the same meaning but *pratidṛś* and *pratīkṣ* have not. *Rakṣati* and *pālayati* have the same meaning but not *pratirakṣati* and *pratipālayati. Harati* and *nayati* have the same meaning but not *saṃharati* and *saṃnayati.* This is due to the natural power of words (*śabdaśakti*) which is not a matter of logic but of usage.[29]

In the preceeding pages, a distinction has been made between the fruit going to the agent of the action or to somebody else. This distinction might be said to be invalid considering that everybody gets some result from what he does. The employer who does not actually do the work does hope to get some result from it while the employee gets his wages, if nothing else. As the distinction is meant to regulate the use of *ātmanepada,* it is necessary to define quite clearly what fruit is meant in this context. Following Patañjali, Bhartṛhari makes it quite clear that the basis of the distinction is that fruit to obtain which the action itself is undertaken and not the minor results like wages which the employee gets. If the action in question is that of

25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.
28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.

cooking, the food cooked is the result. If it is the performance of a sacrifice, the fruit thereof is heaven and not the fee which the officiating priest is paid. The cook can get his wages and the officiating priest his fee in other ways also, but cooked food can result only from the act of cooking and heaven only from the performance of a sacrifice.[30]

We have seen that, of the ideas which come under *upagraha,* some can be expressed by verbal forms only while others like the idea of somebody doing the action of somebody else or of mutuality of action or of agent and object can be expressed by nouns also. The idea of the fruit of the action coming to the do-er can come from a verbal form like *yajate* only, whereas both *saṃpraharante* and *saṃpraharaṇam* can express the idea of mutuality of action. The idea of the fruit of the action coming to the do-er or going to somebody else stands, therefore, apart from the others, though all of them have been included under *upagraha.* This idea is something like what modern linguists call aspect of the verb of which there are many kinds and to express which some languages have special morphemes. 'Aspect' stands for certain ideas apart from the different points of time; that is, tenses which the verbs express in some languages. Jespersen has brought the following notions under 'aspect' : (1) the tempo-distinction between the aorist and the imperfect, (2) the distinction between conclusive and non-conclusive, (3) that between duration or permanent and punctual or transitory, (4) that between finished and unfinished, (5) that between what takes place only once and repeated or habitual action, (6) that between stability and change, (7) that between the implication or non-implication of a result.[31] To this list can be added the distinction between the result going to the do-er or to somebody else and *upagraha* may be looked upon as the Sanskrit word for aspect. For the French language, Brunot points out the following aspects : (1) that of accomplishment in the future or the past, (2) that of beginning, (3) that of development in the past, (4) that of duration in the past, (5) that of repetition in the past, (6) that of habit.[32] 'Aspect' being such a comprehensive notion, what the *ātmanepada* suffix stands for would also naturally come under it.

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30. See Texts.
31. Jespersen — Philosophy of Grammar, pp. 286-288.
32. Brunot—La Pensée et La Language, pp. 450 ff.

8. ON NUMBER (*SAṂKHYĀ*)

The notions of process, time, person and aspect can be expressed by verbs only and they have been briefly expounded. The notion of number can be expressed both by verbs and nouns. It is necessary to see what Bhartṛhari has to say about a notion which is common to verbs and nouns, the two chief kinds of words that constitute a sentence.

Things are characterised by difference and number denotes this difference. The number one expresses their unity or identity and the other numbers express their diversity.[1] According to the *Vaiśeṣikas*, number is a quality which inheres in substances. Some people argue that when a thing is by itself, it is one and when it is with others, we talk about them as two or three and so on. It is a question of whether a thing is in company or not. Number is not anything different from the things themselves. But this is not right.[2] Our cognitions differ in the two cases. It is not the same to perceive a thing in company and to perceive it as one of two or more objects. Even what is in the company of other objects can be perceived as being one. Mere lack of company is not the same as being one. Numbers like hundred exist in several things taken together. They are *vyāsajyavṛtti*, pervading many things at the same time and they are perceived by *apekṣābuddhi*. So argue the *Vaiseṣikas*. Others maintain that number is not different from the object where it is found. It cannot be perceived apart from it. A thing is perceived as qualified by a number and this can never be if number were absolutely different from its abode.[3]

In the midst of this difference of opinion, we are reminded of the grammarian's point of view and of his indifference to the question whether number is identical with or different from the things where it is supposed to be found. We are told that he is only concerned with number as words present it and words present it as something which helps to distinguish things. Our description of things as one or two or three cannot be explained by the bare nature of those things. They must have some attribute which is the cause of this distinction

1. See Texts.
2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.

and that attribute is number.[4] It helps us to speak about (*sañcaṣṭe*) things and that is why it is so called.

It is really an attribute which belongs to things, to substances but language sometimes presents it as existing in other things such as qualities, universals and non-existence. That is why we can speak about 'hundreds', twenty-four qualities, two universals, four kinds of non-existence and so on. But number is only attributed to these things.[5] It really belongs to substances. Language deals, not only with real things, but also with attributed things. As far as numerals are concerned, they present distinctions in qualities etc. and that is all that matters to us.

How number, while inhering in substances, helps to differentiate qualities etc. is explained by means of an illustration. It is with number as with the notions of prior and posterior. Due to association with particular regions, things are described as prior (*para*) or posterior (*apara*). Priority and posteriority are thus qualities which inhere in substances. But we speak about them in connection with qualities also. That is, however, a secondary use of language. Similarly, number, which serves to express distinction in substances or things, is used for the same purpose in the case of qualities etc.[6] Elsewhere also one sees that properties of the substance are attributed to the qualities which reside in them. When we say *śuklaḥ paṭaḥ*, language presents cloth as the main thing and 'white' as a quality residing in it and, therefore, subordinate to it. This also corresponds to outside reality. But when we say : *paṭasya śuklaḥ*, language does not present white as a subordinate thing. It is presented as detached from the substance and independent of it.[7] But this kind of independence is a property of substance and not of qualities. Similarly, when we say *paṭasya rūpam ekam* = 'the unique colour of the cloth', we are differentiating in language a quality by a number. To be differentiated by number is really an attribute of substance. To extend it to qualities also is an example of the power of words. Words express things only in terms of some property which exists in them and not directly. This is as true in the case of qualities as in the case of substances. Things do not enter into the field of communication in their own nature. When colour is presented as something independent as in *paṭasya rūpam*, it is presented as being served by number etc. as

4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.

substance would be. In other words, a word is not directly expressive of anything. It is expressive of it only in terms of something which say that there is a certain falling off from its function of expressing it.[8] exists in it. When an object is called a cow, the word describes it in terms of the universal '*gotva*' which exists in it. As the word is not able to describe anything as it is, free from all attributes, one might It is like cognition which can be described only with reference to the object which figures in it. To talk about something as separate when it is always found united to something else is a practice common to the ordinary man and the expert. Universality and particularity are always found in other things. They are never found in isolation and yet the *śāstra* sometimes talks about them as though they were different. Once that is done, other characteristics of independence naturally follow. Whether these characteristics really exist or not is immaterial. That is how it is not impossible to think of another universal in the different universals brought to the mind by perception or by words. The different universals brought to the mind become things (*dravya*) as it were. This applies also to the different particulars. We can think of a common feature in all of them, because they also produce within us a uniformity of cognition and make us apply the same word to all of them. Number also can be thought of as a thing, in which case a number also would be able to have a number. That is why we can say *śatam, śate, śatāni*. Gender also can be thought of as a thing when it is conveyed by a word and it can take another gender. That is why we can say *pauṃsnam, pumān, puṃstā*[9].

From the point of view of the *Vaiśeṣikas* then, number is a property of substances. In fact, for them, all properties inhere in substances. That is why they have been called *saṃsargavādinaḥ*.[10] Number helps to introduce distinction in things which are beyond all distinction and identity. One is the cause of the cognition of identity and the other numbers are the cause of the cognition of difference. Though in real life, things are all found mixed up, everything is perceived through a means of valid knowledge and has its own function to perform. The elements are all found together but each one has its special activity. The different categories of the *Vaiśeṣikas* are all found mixed up in real life but there is no confusion because each has its definite place in the scheme of things. The three *guṇas* of the *Sāṅkhyas* are similarly found everywhere but each one fulfils its special purpose.

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8. See Texts.
9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.

It has been said that the number One is the cause of the cognition of identity and the other numbers are the cause of the cognition of difference. Bhartṛhari also says something about how the numbers from two onwards arise. It is stated that one-ness or unity is the source of duality etc. All distinction is preceded by one-ness. Without One, the other numbers cannot come into existence.[11] When two things are seen, we see a unity in each of them. We also see the common feature of these two unities by means of *saṃyukta-saṃaveta-samavāya* = 'contact consisting in inherence in what inheres in the object with which the sense is in contact'. The eye is in contact (*saṃyukta*) with two things. Unity inheres in each of them (*samaveta*) and the common feature inheres (*samavāya*) in each of the two unites. The two unites are thus cognised as qualified by their own common feature. These two unites, depending upon this cognition, produce the duality which inheres in the two things which are their substrata. The two things are the intimate material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) of the dualiity. The two unites are its non-intimate cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) due to proximity consisting in inhering in the same thing. The related cognition (*apekṣābuddhi*) is the efficient cause (*nimittakāruṇa*) because, unless the two unities are cognised, the cognition of the duality cannot take place. Therefore, through agreement and difference, the related cognition must be looked upon as a cause. It cannot be the intimate cause because only a substance can be so. As there is no proximity or contact it cannot be the non-intimate cause either. So it must be looked upon as the efficient cause. According to the *Vaiśeṣikas,* the process is as follows—first, duality in general is cognised, then it is cognised as an attribute of the two things and lastly, the two things are cognised as qualified by it. Unless the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is cognised one cannot cognise anything as qualified. Some think that there is no need to bring the related knowledge into the process at all. They argue that the function of the two unities is to cause the cognition of duality. So, without depending upon the related knowledge, they produce duality. Helārāja claims that he has explained this matter in his commentary on the first *kāṇḍa*.[12] Others again believe that duality is really not something different from the unities. The forest is not different from the trees. Two is only a name for the collection of two units, three is the name of a collection of three units and so on. But if duality is not a separate entity but stands for a collection of two units, one cannot account for the use of the dual number by Pāṇini in his *sūtra* : *Dvyekayor dvivacanaikavacane* (P. 1.4.22), because there are altogether

11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.

three units and the plural number is called for. Therefore, duality must be looked upon as a new unit, produced by the two unities. The same thing applies to trinity etc. up to number ten. But if duality is a new unit, a unit being one, why ever use the dual or the plural in connection with duality or the higher units? The answer is that even though a new unit is formed, the unities which created the new unit are kept in mind and the dual and the plural are used on account of them.

9. ON GENDER (*LINGA*)

The notion of gender can determine the form of a Sanskrit word before it enters into a sentence. The modern linguist's knowledge of many languages of the world, belonging to different linguistic families, has enabled him to collect a very large number of facts relating to gender and other similar distinctions in languages. As a result of his labours, we now know that corresponding to the division of words into masculine, feminine and neuter in some Indo-European languages, some other languages divide them into animate and inanimate or names of big things or names of small things and so on. The word gender is now used by linguists to designate all such distinctions. As Jespersen puts it : "By the term gender is here meant any grammatical class division presenting some analogy to the distinction in Aryan languages between masculine, feminine and neuter, whether the division be based on the natural division into the two sexes or on that between animate and inanimate or on something else."[1] All these divisions are based upon some feeling or appreciation of things and events outside. But it has been noticed that none of these distinctions is based upon a consistent or logical division of things and events. The lack of correspondence between distinctions of gender and divisions of reality outside has become a commonplace in the literature on Linguistics. A few examples will suffice : masculine words can denote female beings : *dārāḥ* for wife in Sanskrit, *wiesel* for the *queenbee* in German; neuter words can stand for female beings : *kalatram* for wife in Sanskrit, *mädchen* for maiden in German. Masculine and feminine words denote sex-less things in many languages.

Modern linguists have tried to give an explanation of these facts. As in the case of their enquiry into other aspects of language, here also, their point of view has been an historical one. They have tried to find out, if possible, what feelings or appreciations of things and events led men to divide the words standing for them into various kinds and to follow these divisions in the different stages in the history of a language to see what changes occur in them. Neither on the question of the origin of these distinctions nor on that of the causes of change in them are all linguists in complete agreement. But certain points have now become clear. Whether gender distinctions were originally based on a division of things into animate and inanimate or male and female or

1. Jespersen—Philosophy of Grammar, p. 226,

small and big, the history of these distinctions in particular languages is determined by external and formal reasons only.

In Ancient India, thinkers were not particularly concerned with historical questions. They must have noticed that certain words changed their gender while passing from Sanskrit into Prakrit, but they did not enquire as to why the change occurred. Instead of that, they raised the more fundamental question of the nature of gender itself. While commenting on P. 4.1.3, the very first question which Patañjali asks is : what is gender ?[2] Even though they had only data derived from Indian languages, particularly Sanskrit, before them, they realised the main difficulties in regard to gender. The lack of correspondence between gender and sex was the first thing which came to their notice also. In languages like English, the word sex stands for the distinction found in objects and the word 'gender' for the distinction found in the words of a language. In spite of this difference in terminology, the two distinctions belonging to two different spheres are sometimes confused and the popular mind expects to find a close correspondence between the two. In Sanskrit, there is only one word standing for both kinds of distinctions and it is only natural that a belief in the existence of a close relation between the two should have arisen very early in India. The relation betwen words and the objects conveyed by them has always been considered to be close and intimate. In Bhartṛhari's thought, we have seen, the relation is identity (*abheda*). Even those who maintained that there was only a conventional relation between the two, conceived of this convention as being God's own desire. The view that the relation is arbitrary and established purely by human convention was very rarely held. If the relation between the two was so intimate, it is only natural that words should reflect in some way the nature of the objects and events which they convey and that the properties of words should be symbolic of the properties of things. One of the properties of words in the Sanskrit language is gender (*liṅga*). It is natural that *liṅga* should have been thought of as the property of things also. That is why Patañjali asked the question : what is gender ? Bhartṛhari also raised the same question and gives an answer which is based on the answer which Patañjali had already given.

The following are some of the facts regarding gender in Sanskrit which Bhartṛhari had noticed. (1) Some words like *śaṅkha* and *padma* are both masculine and neuter. (2) Others are feminine and neuter like *bhāgadeyam, bhāgadeyī,* (3) others are masculine and

2. M. Bhā. I, p. 195, l. 25.

feminine like *iṣu* and *aśani,* (4) some are masculine only like *vṛkṣa,* (5) some are feminine only like *khaṭvā,* (6) some have all the three genders as in *taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam,* and (7) some are neuter only like *dadhi.*[3] Other relevant facts are : (1) that gender sometimes varies with number as in *gṛham* and *gṛhāḥ,* (2) that it varies with meaning as the word *ardha* which is neuter when it means 'half' but masculine when it means a part, (3) that the words *strītvam, strītā* and *strībhāvaḥ* all mean femininity though they have three different genders, (4) that sometimes gender varies when the idea of magnitude has also to be expressed : *mahaddhimaṃ himānī, mahad araṇyam arṇyānī* and so on. On the basis of these facts, the problem that arose for grammarians like Patañjali and Bhartṛhari was: is the distinction of masculine, feminine and neuter found in the nouns and adjectives of the Sanskrit language based on some real attributes found in the things denoted by these words or is it only a distinction belonging to the realm of words ? In other words, is gender *śabdadharma* or *vastudharma ?*

Bhartṛhari begins his treatment of the subject by referring to seven views which were current in his day. These seven include his own view also, based on that of Patañjali.[4] Of these the first two do not differ much from each other and so they may be taken up first. The first looks upon gender as the connection with the sex signs while, according to the second view, the sex signs themselves constitute it. From the fact that some words of masculine gender denote male beings, some of feminine gender denote female beings and some of neuter gender denote sexless things, the conclusion was drawn that *liṅga* stood for sex. It is this view which is expressed in a verse quoted in the *Mahābhāṣya*[5] and in the first verse quoted under note 4. This is the popular conception of gender according to which there are three kinds of things in the world, males, females and sexless things and masculine, feminine and neuter words denote these three kinds of things. Male and female have been defined by reference to the male and female sex signs taken in their widest possible sense. Neuter has been defined as that which has not got the signs of the male or the female sex and yet resembles that which has. This partly negative and partly positive character of the neuter is meant to explain certain facts of the Sanskrit language. The meaning expressed by verbs in Sanskrit does not possess sex-signs of the male or the female and if that was the only characteristic of the neuter, verbs would be neuter in gender. But

3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.
5. See Texts.

they are not. That is because the things which the verbs stand for do not possess the other characteristic of the sex-less referred to above namely, that it should resemble the masculine and the feminine in having its own characteristic. Verbs denote processes and not things and processes cannot have any characteristics resembling sex signs. This definition does not explain why words like *khaṭvā* and *vṛkṣa* expressive of things which do not possess the female or the male sex signs, are yet feminine and masculine in gender. Two explanations might be offered, without modifying in any way the definition. The first is that though the objects denoted by *khaṭvā* and *vṛkṣa* have no female and male sex signs respectively we cognise them through error, as we cognise water in a desert (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*) or a *gandharva* city in the sky.[6] This erroneous cognition is reflected in the words which we use for these objects. Language is as good an instrument for conveying invalid cognitions as for conveying valid cognitions. Some words, therefore, express the persistent erroneous cognitions of a speech-community and *khaṭvā* and *vṛkṣa* are examples of such words. Facts of a language can be explained not only by reference to outside reality but also by our valid and invalid cognitions of them. The second explanation which might be offered is that objects like *khaṭvā* and *vṛkṣa* have sex signs but we can never perceive them. We infer their existence from their effect, namely, that the words which express these objects are feminine or masculine. But this explanation is unsatisfactory. How can we feel that the gender of these words is an effect if we can never perceive their alleged cause, namely, the sex signs of the objects denoted by these words? Do we say that a bed has sex because the word expressive of it, *khaṭvā*, is in the feminine gender or do we say that the word is feminine because the bed has sex? We seem to be arguing in a circle.[7]

The popular conception of gender, expressed in the verse quoted by the *Mahābhāṣya*, is thus found to be unsatisfactory. Another reason for it is that one and the same thing may be expressed by the same word in three different genders: *taṭaḥ, taṭī, taṭam*. How can one and the same thing be presumed to have all the three kinds of sex signs, all invisible? Sometimes, the same thing may be referred to by three different words in three different genders. The words *artha, vyakti* and *vastu* can refer to any object in the world and they have three different genders. They, therefore, point to the existence of three different sexes in the same thing and that is impossible.[8]

6. See Texts.
7. See Texts.
8. See Texts.

The *Vaiśeṣikas*, therefore, put forward another view, the third view, on gender. According to them, gender is a universal (*jāti*) and each one of the three genders is a universal. It co-exists in an object with other universals. In an object like cow, conveyed by the word *gauḥ* we cognise not only the universal *gotva* but also the universal of the feminine gender, the *strītva*. These two universals can co-exist in the same object. The universal of gender is manifested by the sex signs, but it is different from them. The cognitions of different things belonging to different classes, arising from words, have gender as one of their elements. Things may vary but some gender or other is always associated with these when they are cognised through words. Whether we cognise a female elephant or a mare, femininity is a constituent part of our cognition.[9] As has already been said many times, the object is as the word conveys it. Whatever object is understood from a word as belonging to whatever *jāti*, is always understood as having some *liṅga* or other. The same thing can be presented by different words as having different universals of gender. For instance, the word *bhāva* presents Being as endowed with the universal of the masculine gender whereas the word *sattā* presents the same Being as endowed with the universal of the feminine gender, and, lastly, the word *sāmānya* presents the same thing as endowed with the neuter gender.[10] When words express anything as a thing (*dravya*) they always do so as qualified by some gender or other. Even a particular gender can be presented by different words as having all the three genders. That is why we can say : *strītvam, strītā,* and *strībhāvaḥ*[11] What happens here is that the word *strī* conveys a thing qualified by femininity. The abstract suffix which is added to it, conveys the meaning of the word as qualified by the neuter gender, due to its own nature.[12] It is through the word that a *liṅga* is added on to another.

The third view that gender is a universal manifested by the sex signs is not much better than the two previous views because it is also connected with the sex signs and the disadvantages of that have already been pointed out. That is why Patañjali declares that there is need for Grammarians to formulate their own definition of gender.[13] And the definition which he formulates[14] is given by Bhartṛhari as the

9. See Texts.
10. See Texts.
11. See Texts.
12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See Texts.

fourth and fifth views in the text quoted under note 4. A study of the relevant passage in the *Mahābhāṣya* brings out the following points.

1. What is called *liṅga* is an attribute of things (*vastudharma*), of what is talked about and expressed in words. The three genders of words only reveal this attribute belonging to things. To this extent, Bhartṛhari's conception agrees with the popular one and with that of the *Vaiśeṣikas.*

2. But the properties of things which the three genders of words reveal are not the sex signs as in the popular conception, but the three conditions or states of the three qualities or *guṇas* of which everything is made up according to the *Sāṅkhyas.* Or the three qualities themselves rather than their three states) can be looked upon as the three genders. These two ways of looking at the *guṇas* make up the fourth and fifth views enumerated by Bhartṛhari in the text quoted under note 4. Helārāja says quite definitely that Patañjali has adopted the Sāṅkhya view of gender.[15] The *Sāṅkhyas* believe that everything is an evolute of *Prakṛti* or primordial matter of which the three constituents are *sattva, rajas* and *tamas,* the three qualities or *guṇas.* They stand respectively for the principles of light, activity and darkness or inertia. Because everything in the universe is a development from *Prakṛti,* it is made up of these three *guṇas*: Things differ from one another due to the predominance of one of these *guṇas* over the other two which are also present in everything. They cannot be perceived, they can only be inferred from their effects. Among their effects are the five things also called *guṇas* or *tanmātras* namely, *śabda, rūpa, rasa, gandha* and *sparśa,* which like their causes are dynamic in nature, constantly changing. Everything is a product of these five *guṇas* and ultimately of the original there *guṇas.* They are constantly developing, increasing, declining, decreasing and disappearing. The former condition is called *prasava* and the latter *saṃstyāna* and it is these two functions or states of everything in this world which are called masculine gender and feminine gender respectively.[16]

While explaining this conception of the masculine and feminine genders, Patañjali has used the terms *vardhate* = 'increases' for *prasava* and *apāyena yujyate* = 'decreases' for *saṃstyāna.*[17] Once he uses *pravṛtti*= 'activity' as the synonym of *pumān.* The meaning of these words and their implications must have been much discussed in

15. See Texts.
16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.

grammatical circles in the old days, because we see a great many words used in explanation of them. Helārāja gives a quotation from the *Saṃgraha* which consists of a series of synonyms for *strītva, puṃstva* and *napuṃsaka*.[18] It is a great pity that we do not possess the *Saṃgraha*. Without it, we are not in a position to understand the full implication of all the terms used to bring out the meaning of the words *saṃstyāna*, and *prasava*. The occurrence of the word *pravṛtti* in the explanation of both the words is surprising but cannot be a mere error. The word cannot obviously mean the same thing in both cases. Bhartṛhari picks out three out of this long list of words and declares that they stand for the three genders : *pumān, strī* and *napuṃsaka*. The three words are : *āvirbhāva, tirobhāva* and *sthiti*.[19]

Everything in the world is in a state of flux, changing constantly like boiling water.[20] A new condition comes into being every moment (*āvirbhāva*) and the former condition disappears, (*tirobhāva*). It is these two aspects of change which are meant by the masculine and the feminine genders. As these two aspects are found in everything, both the genders are found in everything. Even inanimate things have them because they are also in a state of flux. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, the self is eternal and without change and yet the two words, *puruṣa* and *citi*, one masculine and the other feminine, refer to it. That is because the Self is the *bhoktā*, the Enjoyer and the attributes of the things enjoyed are ascribed to the Enjoyer. The things enjoyed are in a constant state of flux and the Enjoyer is also presented as in a state of flux by these two words. The two aspects of change, *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva*, in other words, the masculine and feminine genders are attributed to him and it is these superimposed attributes which are expressed by the words *puruṣaḥ* and *citiḥ*.[21] Of course, this is only a superimposition and, therefore, a kind of error, but, as stated before, words can get their forms on the basis of valid as well as invalid cognitions. If *liṅga* means the two aspects of the constant change of the five qualities which are the constituents of everything, what about each one of these qualities ? The words expressive of each one of them have also gender which means that the two aspects of change must exist in each one of the qualities, even though they cannot be made up of all the five of them. The truth is that change, in its two aspects, is found in each one of them.[22] Change is the universal law of life. This change is

18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.
20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.

imperceptible to ordinary mortals. It can be seen only by those who are gifted with a superior vision.[23]

So far we have been considering the nature of the masculine and the feminine genders and we found that, according to Bhartṛhari, they stand for *āvirbhāva* and *tirobhāva,* the coming into being of a new condition and the disappearance of an old one. But some words in Sanskrit are in a third gender, the neuter and we have to see what attributes of things the neuter gender expresses. It also expresses something really belonging to things. Patañjali has contented himself with a very brief reference to this gender and even that very brief remark is bedevilled by uncertainty of the text. All that he says is : *saṃstyānavivakṣāyāṃ strī, prasavavivakṣāyāṃ pumān, ubhayor avivakṣāyāṃ napuṃsakam*[24] = 'when *saṃstyāna,* that is, *tirobhāva,* disappearance, is meant to be conveyed, the feminine gender is used. when *prasava,* that is, *āvirbhāva,* coming into being is meant to be conveyed, the masculine gender is used and when neither is meant to be conveyed, the neuter gender is used'. Another reading of the last part is : *ubhayavivakṣāyāṃ napuṃsakam* = 'when both are meant to be conveyed, the neuter is used'. It is not clear what reading Bhartṛhari had, but Helārāja seems to have had *ubhayor avivakṣāyām.* If the reading which Bhartṛhari knew is not clear, how he understood the neuter gender can be gathered from one or two of his stanzas.[25] As stated before, the neuter gender stands for *sthiti* according to him, a word already found in the quotation from the *Saṅgraha* given by Helārāja. He gives several alternative ways of understanding *sthiti*:—

(1) Development and decay are the law of life to which everything is subject. When there is a stream of development, there is increase at every moment and when the increases of many moments are looked upon as a whole, there is what is called *sthiti.* Similarly, when the decreases of many moments are looked upon as one, that is also *sthiti.*[26]

(2) Increase and decrease or development and decay are both changes. Change, then, is the common point in both and this common point is looked upon as *sthiti* or neuter.[27]

23. See Texts.
24. M. Bhā. II, p. 198, l. 10.
25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.

(3) When something disappears, something else comes in its place at once. Thus disappearance is never final. This non-finality of disappearance is what is called neuter.[28]

In addition to the above three ways of looking at *sthiti,* the essence of the neuter gender, Bhartṛhari speaks about it as that thing by which we perceive the *guṇas* as *guṇas* even when they are constantly changing. We perceive their identity. The cause of this perception of identity is *sthiti.*[29] It may be looked upon as the universal of which the other two are the varieties. Looked at in this way, the neuter is the common gender which includes the other two within itself.[30] That is why one can use it when one is not sure about the gender or when one does not want to convey either of the other two.

These three states are present in everything and thus all three *liṅgas* are present in everything and the three genders of words are expressive of these states. Any particular word can express only one of these states of a thing, even though all the three are present in everything. It is the nature of words to pick out one particular attribute of things from among many and express that. A carpenter, in the course of his work, has to perform various acts and yet he is called *takṣan* after one of these acts, namely, *takṣaṇa* = 'cutting, chiselling'.[31] All the *liṅgas* are properties of things but it is open to a word to pick out one of them and express it through its form. That word is correct only when it has the particular form which expresses that particular gender. That particular form is known to us only from the usage of cultured people gifted with insight (*śiṣṭās*). The gender of a word means the particular form which it has in order to express one of the three *liṅgas* found in everything. Pāṇini has declared quite clearly that this form can be known only from the usage of cultured people. It is not the business of Grammar to teach it. The *śiṣṭās* (cultured people), gifted with insight, can see which gender associated with which word can lead to *dharma* and they reveal it to others.[32] The cultured may see it and reveal it to others, but it is not they who decide what the gender of a word should be. If all the three genders exist in everything, there must be some way of deciding which particular one a word must express. The decisive factor,

28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.
31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.

according to Bhartṛhari who follows Patañjali, is *vivakṣā,* the desire to express.[33] It is made clear in the *śāstra* that it is not the individual speaker's desire which is the deciding factor. It is the *vivakṣā* of the speech community which is the deciding factor, only usage can tell us what the *vivakṣā* of the speech community is and only the *śiṣṭas* the cultured, can tell us what correct usage is.

The fourth and the fifth views on gender described in the preceding paragraphs are considered to be the accepted views of the grammarians from Patañjali downwards. Bhartṛhari mentions two more views, related to each other but with a difference. Helārāja thinks that the germs of these views can be found in the *Mahābhāṣya.* One view is that gender is a matter of extension. After seeing that some words having the masculine or the feminine gender actually denote objects belonging to the male or the female sex, one imagines that all objects, even inanimate ones, have the same properties and the words expressive of them are considered to be correct only if they have some gender or other.[34] In the case of the objects which have no sex signs at all, their words create sex, as it were, in them by this process of extension. It is like the word *dārāḥ* creating plurality, as it were in the object which one knows to be single. It is because words bring about the gender that one and the same thing can be referred to by three different words having three different genders like *artha, vyakti* and *vastu.* What it amounts to is that in the case of most of the words, gender is nothing more than what gives correctness to the word. It does not point to something which actually exists in the object. There may be something real in the case of the objects denoted by a few words. In the case of the objects denoted by the other words—and they probably form the majority—there is nothing but the words having different genders impose a corresponding *liṅga* (*samāropa*) on the objects.[35] The fact of the word itself creating the gender and imposing it on the object by a process of extension is the chief point in this sixth view which, of course, is not the accepted view.

The seventh view is allied to the sixth, with a slight difference. According to this, the very fact that the same thing can be referred to by three different words having three different genders shows that *liṅga* cannot be *vastudharma,* a property actually existing in things and expressed by the gender of words. It is nothing more than some-

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33. See Texts.
34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.

thing which gives correctness or completeness to the word and makes it fit to be used.[36] It makes us think that there is something corresponding to it in the object but it is a mere property of words (*śabda-dharma*). It is an attribute of words which the grammarian derives from the words themselves and he makes use of it when he is called upon to explain the formation of words.

It is a mere attribute of words. It differs, however, from other attributes of words like aicent. Accent never appears to us to be an attribute of things. We never think that, as an attribute of words, it points to the existence in things of something corresponding to it.[37] This is not the case with gender. It makes us believe that things might have an attribute corresponding to it.

The view that gender is only a *śabdadharma* and that there is nothing corresponding to it in the objects was held to be an inferior view. Helārāja says quite plainly that such a view is held only by those who are not capable of understanding the orthodox conception of the three genders, namely, that they are expressive of the three states *āvirbhāva, tirobhāva* and *sthiti* through which everything passes. To hold the view that gender is only *śabdasaṃskāra* is to betray one defeciency in intellectual and spiritual development. It is only the second best.[38]

Bhartṛhari makes a last point about gender. His finally accepted view is that the three states of the *guṇas* constitute the three genders, that they exist in everything but that only one of them is expressed by the word through its gender. The *śiṣṭas* can see the three *liṅgas* but not we ordinary mortals. Even though they cannot be seen, they become the cause of the determination of the correctness and completeness of the word. There is nothing surprising in this. This kind of thing is happening elsewhere also. The sense of vision gives us a knowledge in which figures some object or other. It also distinguishes that object from others, even though it is itself not perceived.[39] Even an invisible cause can determine its effect. To take another illustration, according to the view that the word denotes the individual, the particular, the universal cannot be cognised from the word and yet the uncognised universal determines its own substratum, so that, from

36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. See Texts.
39. See Texts.

a word like *gauḥ,* a particular kind of individual or particular is understood. Similarly, the *liṅga* of an object, though invisible can produce its effect, namely, that of giving the word its completeness and correctness (*śabdasaṃskāra*).

10. ON COMPLEX FORMATION (*VṚTTI*).

The notions which have been dealt with so far chiefly concern the formation of individual words. Sanskrit Grammar recognises five complex formations (*vṛtti*), each made up of meaningful elements and giving an integrated meaning somewhat different from those of the parts. They are : (1) primary derivatives (*kṛdanta*), (2) secondary derivatives (*taddhitānta*), (3) compounds (*samāsa*), (4) retention of one (*ekaśeṣa*) and (5) denominative verbs (*nāmadhātu*). Some of the notions explained in the previous pages play a part in the coming into being of these formations. In addition to that, some other ideas also underlie some of these formations. There is a good deal of variety in these ideas and they have been dealt with in a very big section of the third *kaṇḍa*, called the *vṛttisamuddeśa*. This section offers us miscellaneous fare as it deals with topics relating to some *vṛtti* or other and sometimes even to the sentence. If one must indicate any one *vṛtti* as having been treated in greater detail than the others, it is certainly the *samāsavṛtti*, provided that it is clearly understood that the others, especially the *taddhitavṛtti* has received due attention. We have to remember that the *Vākyapadīya* is not a work which teaches grammar proper. It does not deal with the different topics systematically, step by step with a view to achieve completeness. The section dealing with the *vṛtti* is rather a series of observations on some of the important features of the different *vṛttis* and does not aim at giving a complete knowledge of any of them. All that can be done here is to say briefly what observations Bhartṛhari has made on some selected topics.

(a) *Dvandva* and *Ekaśeṣa*.

When things are conceived together in order to be connected with an action and are expressed together for that purpose, we get the formations called *dvandva* = 'conjunctive compound' and *ekaśeṣa* = 'retention of one'.[1] Here there is a grouping of things but the group is not different from the elements in the group. In the cognition of the group which results, the parts also figure. That is why the dual and the plural numbers also occur in these formations. In other compounds, the meaning of one of the terms is the important one and

1. See Texts.

it is qualified by that of the other. That is not the case here. The meaning of the compound is the group in which the parts also figure, because the cognition is of that nature.[2] Where the group is totally different from the parts, there is a separate word altogether for it, like *vanam* = 'a forest' or *yūtham* = 'a herd'. That is not the case in a *dvandva* compound. Here there takes place *sahavivakṣā*, the desire to give simultaneous expression to many things. So there is the cognition of a group in which many things figure.

The desire to give expression to many things is present in the two kinds of *dvandva* which are recognised, namely, the *itaretarayoga-dvandva* = '*dvandva* of mutually related words' and the *samāhara-dvandva* = '*dvandva* of collection'. There is, however, a difference between the two. Where there is cognition of unity in which plurality also figures, there are two possibilities : the unity may be more important or the plurality may be so. In the former, plurality is more important and in the latter, the group or collection is more important[3]. The interesting feature of a *dvandva* compound is that the group is expressed by each term in the compound. It is not only here that the whole appears in each part. This is true of action also. The action called cooking which is the name of a series of acts is felt to be present in each act in that series. The whole is superimposed on the parts,[4] as has been explained in the section dealing with action. It is a kind of *adhyāsa* = 'superimposition'. When somebody is just lighting the fire, we can say : 'he is cooking'. The universal is also present in every particular or individual. Similarly, the group which is the meaning of the whole is present in each part of a *dvandva* compound.

Somebody might object that the words *dhava; khadira* etc. have different meanings when they are part of a sentence. How then can they convey the same things when they enter into a *dvandva* compound and form the word *dhavakhadiran?* This is answered by means of analogies. In the *sūtra* : *saptamī śauṇḍaiḥ* = 'a word ending in the seventh case affix is compounded with *śauṇḍa* or one of the rest (and the resulting compound would be a *tatpuruṣa*) (P. 2.1.40), the plural number comes after the word *śauṇḍa* because that word stands for itself and for all the other words included in the group (*gaṇa*) of which it is the first word. Similarly, in the word *ardharcāḥ*

2. See Texts.
3. See Texts.
4. See Texts.

of P. 2.4.31, there is the plural suffix because that word stands for itself and for the others included in the group headed by it. The word *chatriṇah* = 'umbrella-bearers' means not only those who carry an umbrella but also those who do not when they are all going together. In all these cases, a word stands not only for itself but also for those with which it is associated.[5] In the same way, the *dhava* and *khadira* stand for the group when they enter into a *dvandva* compound and that group in expressed by each one of them. Each word in the compound expresses the group in which the parts are also manifested.[6] This principle is called *yugapad-adhikaraṇatā*. Each word conveys at the same time all the things meant to be conveyed by the *dvandva* compound as a whole.[7] This power of a word to convey the meaning of another word is limited in scope. In *plakṣanyagrodhau*, *plakṣa* conveys both *plakṣa* and *nyagrodha* and *myagrodha* conveys both *nyagrodha* and *plakṣa*. The two words do their work like two labourers together lifting a load.[8] It is only when the two words enter into a *dvandva* compound that they can do this. The same words in a sentence cannot do this. That is why the dual or the plural suffix is added to such a compound. It is the result of the *yugapadadhikaraṇavacanatā*.

Patañjali has pointed out some difficulties in this conception. In fact, he has declared it to be *duḥkhā* and *durupapādā* = 'difficult to understand and difficult to prove'. In the compound : *plakṣanyagrodhau*, the two things come to the mind from the compound as a whole and not from each one of its terms. Meanings are based on convention. From each one of the two words in the compound, only one thing is understood, that is, its own meaning. The two things are understood from the compound as a whole. Where both the words are actually used as in a *dvandva* compound, it is simpler to assume that the two ideas come from their respective words and that the group is understood from the compound as a whole. In an *ekaśeṣa* word, where only one is retained, the position is different. The two or more things meant to be conveyed must be understood from the only word which is used. In a *dvandva* the dual or the plural suffix is added not to the final term but to the compound as a whole. Therefore it is not necessary to assume that each word conveys both the things (*yugapadadhikaraṇatā*) merely for the sake of explaining the dual or the plural suffix. The compound is really something indivisible

5. See Texts.
6. See Texts.
7. See Texas.
8. See Texts.

but divisions are postulated for the sake of explanation. These divisions look like other independent words in the language and, therefore, can only have meanings similar to those of the independent words. In the process of division, the words may depend upon one another and yet each word conveys its meaning only. On account of this mutual dependence, the group results but it cannot be understood from any single word. It is true that the words in a *dvandva* compound do not stand towards one another in the relation of *viśeṣaṇa* and *viśeṣya* but that does not mean that the meanings cannot be united. They are all connected with some action or quality and they become united because of their dependence on action or quality.

It is for the above reasons that the author of the *Bhāṣya* has declared that it is difficult to understand and to explain to others the idea that in a *dvandva* compound, each word conveys the meaning of all the words. And yet it has been somehow accepted for practical purposes.[9] One has to explain compounds like *plakṣanyagrodhau, dhavakhadirapalāśāḥ*. For the purpose of explanation, divisions are postulated in something which is essentially indivisible. Whatever meaning belongs to the whole is attributed to the parts. The part cannot denote its own meaning only but denotes the whole. The part is employed with a view to express the meaning of the whole and not to express its meaning only.[10] It is true that when the word is not part of a compound word, it has not got this meaning. It is well known that sometimes words have different meanings in compounds and sentences. But only sometimes. The word *śyāmā* in the compound *śastrīśyāmā* stands for the particular, that is, for the standard of comparison or for the object of comparison but in the sentence *śastrīva śyāmā,* it stands for the general idea. Thus the same word may have a different meaning according as it is in a sentence or in a compound. The idea of *anyapadārtha* = 'the fact of qualifying a word which is outside the compound' is conveyed by the words of a *bahuvrīhi* compound but when these very words are in the analytic sentence, they cannot do it. Similarly, the ideas of mutual relation (*itaretarayoga*) and collection (*samāhāra*) can be conveyed by a *dvandva* compound, but in its analytic sentence (*vigrahavākya*), they are conveyed by the word '*ca*'.[11] The element *niḥ* in *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* means *niṣkrānta* but in its analytic sentence, it cannot mean that and that is why the full word *niṣkrānta* has to be used in it. The words

9. M. Bhā. I, p. 434, l. 3. Also See Texts.
10. See Texts,
11. See Texts.

gaurakhara and *kṛṣṇasarpa* can denote a particular universal only when they are in the form of a compound and not when the two elements which constitute them are separate words in a sentence.[12] Patañjali also points out on some occasions that the meaning which a compound can convey cannot be conveyed by the same words in a sentence. He objects to the word *nityam* in P. 3.1.23 because the formulation with *yaṅ* is essential if the particular meaning is to be understood. *kuṭilaṃ krāmati* cannot mean what *caṅkramyate* means, though the former roughly indicates the meaning of the latter. The word *dantalekhaka* can denote a trade but not the expression *dantasya lekhakaḥ*. Similarly, the meaning which a sentence can convey cannot be conveyed by a compound made up of the words of that sentence. For example, one can say *gavāṃ kṛṣṇā sampannakṣīratamā* = 'of cows, the black is the most milk-yielding', but that meaning cannot be understood from *gokṛṣṇā sampannakṣīratamā*. That is why P. 2.2.10 does not allow compounds like *gokṛṣṇā*.

(b) On the Compound (*samāsa*) and the Sentence (*vākya*).

In the preceding paragraphs, difference between the compound and the sentence was pointed out. This raises the whole question of the relation between word groups called sentences and word groups called compounds. P. 2.1.1. speaks about *sāmarthya*, the fact of being connected in meaning. Now this is possible both in a compound and in a sentence, but in two different ways. The way in which the words are connected in a sentence is called *vyapekṣā* = 'mutual dependence' and the way in which they are connected in a compound is called *ekārthībhāva* = 'integration of meaning'. This distinction is, of course, not mentioned in the *sūtra* referred to above but Kātyāyana and Patañjali who know the facts of the Sanskrit Language, have brought out this distinction.[13] Because the connection of the words in a compound is integration of meaning, certain formal consequences follow and they have been enumerated in the *vārttikas* and explained in the *Mahābhāṣya*.[14] The fact that when words enter into a compound, their case-endings are elided according to P. 2.4.71 is an indication that integration of meaning takes place in a compound. In a sentence, the difference between the meanings of the different terms is preserved and that is why the case endings are not elided. Patañjali has treated this topic by pointing out what can

12. See Texts.
13. See Texts.
14. See M. Bhā. I, p. 362, l. 4 ff.

happen in a sentence but not in a compound. For instance, if we take the compound *rājapuruṣaḥ* = 'the King's man', its two words *rājā* and *puruṣa* seems to be the same as in the sentence *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ*. But there is a difference. We can say *ṛddhasya rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = 'the prosperous king's man' but these words cannot be turned into *ṛddhasya rājapuruṣaḥ*. In a compound, the secondary word (*upasarjana*) cannot be qualified by a word which lies outside it, because it is linked with the main word. It is not independent. That is not the case in a sentence where the relation between words is only mutual dependence (*vyapekṣā*) and not integration (*ekārthībhāva*). In the sentence, the word *rājā* is somewhat autonomous. The word *rāja* in the compound looks like the other word and we identify them, but they are not the same. That is why the secondary word in a compound cannot be qualified by a word which lies outside it. As the *M. Bhā.* puts it : in a sentence there can be *upasarjanaviśeṣaṇa* = 'joining an adjective to the secondary word, but not in a compound'.[15] The particular meaning which is intended to be conveyed would not be conveyed if an adjective is added to it in a compound.[16] Where it would be conveyed, an adjective or other qualifying word can be added as, for instance, when the secondary word is a *sambandhiśabda*, that is, a relative term. For example, *gurukulam* = 'the *guru's* family'. Here the secondary word is *guru*.[17] Now the meaning of *guru* is a relative idea. Nobody is a *guru* except in regard to somebody else who is a pupil (*śiṣya*). The meaning of *guru* requires some other idea for its completion. This remains the case even when the word enters into a compound. Therefore, an adjective which is not part of the compound may be used in connection with it. The intended meaning would be conveyed. Some believe that, in such cases, the adjective is connected with the meaning of the whole compound and not with that of the secondary word only. Even then, it becomes connected with the meaning of the compound only indirectly.

It has been shown so far that compounds and sentences are different things even though they may be made up of apparently the same words and that their meanings are also different. There is, however, a tradition that a compound is used optionally instead of a sentence. If that is the case, their meanings must be the same. Unless the same purpose is served, there would be no point in allowing alternatives. How is it then maintained that they are different things ? The fact is that

15. Ibid, p. 362, l. 27.
16. See Texts.
17. See Texts.

compounds like *rājapuruṣa* denote a meaning which is a qualified whole. They are really indivisible. But they are artificially divided for the purposes of grammar. These divisions are like the drawing of an animal. It helps us to understand the real animal. But the drawing is, after all, different from the real object. To identify the two is really a mistake. Similarly, the sentence, which explains the meaning of a compound (*vigraha*) is really different from a compound. The relation between the words in it is *vyapekṣā* whereas in a compound it is *ekārthībhāva*...Where the meaning is different, the word is also different, in spite of resemblance in sounds. Between the sentence and the compound, there is not only difference in meaning but also in form. Ends of compounds often undergo change (*samāsānta.*)[18]

In a compound, the elision of the case-endings is taught, in order that the correct form may be obtained. It might be asked why the elision of words like *yukta* is not taught for obtaining compounds like *go-ratha* from *goyukto rathaḥ*. The answer is that only the elision of those elements are taught which were preesnt before the word entered into the compound. *Go-ratha* is a compound of *gavāṃ rathaḥ*. The word *yukta* was not there at all. There can, therefore, be no question of its elision.[19] The sixth case affix in *gavām* stands for the relation of that which is drawn (*vāhya*) and that which draws (*vāhaka*), which is not possible unless some such action as is denoted by *yuj* is understood. But the science does not teach the elision of what is merely understood. The sentence *go-yukto rathaḥ* no doubt does contain the word *yukta*, but that is not the sentence of which *goratha* is the alternative. It is the alternative of *gavāṃ rathaḥ*. Sentences are of two kinds: (1) those which are actually used in the world, (2) those which are used in the *śāstra* only. These latter are like drawings. They are only a means of teaching. Thus there is difference of meaning between compounds and sentences actually used in the world, though, roughly speaking, they have same the meaning.

The compound is really indivisible and that which is indivisible cannot be explained in the *sāstra*. In order to explain it, sentences resembling worldly sentences are used as a means. The ignorant think that compounds and such sentences have the same meaning. For instance, in the sentence *nīlam utpalam*, the two words are in apposition to each other. They also stand towards each other in the relation of the qualifier and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*). Therefore, they argue, these two things exist in the compound *nilotpalam* also. In

18. See Texts.
19. See Texts.

both *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* and *rājapuruṣaḥ,* they argue, there is the same relation between the words. According to them, *vyapekṣā,* mutual dependence is the relation between the words in both the sentence and the compound. They believe that words are effects and, therefore, transitory and as the compound is taught as an alternative to the sentence, in it the relation between words is mutual dependence. The two must have the same meaning. It is true that in a compound, the case ending is elided but that does not mean that its sense is absent. The stem, without the case ending, is capable of expressing the meaning of the latter. In fact, the bare stem, without any suffix, is sometimes capable of conveying all the five meanings (*pañcaka*), namely, *jāti, dravya, liṅga, saṃkhyā* and *kāraka.* Therefore the sentence and the compound are really synonyms. There is no such thing as *ekārthībhāva,* integration of meaning, the so-called special characteristic of a compound. Mutual dependence is the relation everywhere.[20]

But this is not the correct view. It is refuted as follows-- It has been shown before that individual words like *vṛkṣa* have no parts. Similarly, compounds like *rājapuruṣa* and *nīlotpala* have no parts and they denote a single meaning, cognised by a single act of cognition.[21] Parts in a compound are not far removed from the compounds in meaning. In a sentence, the meanings of the different words remain separate. Hence, the case-endings connecting them are necessary. Not so in compounds. Hence they are elided. In a compound there is integration of meaning. Therefore it is quite different from a sentence. To identify them because they sometimes seem to resemble each other is a mistake. Even their apparent resemblance does not exist in some cases. In order to explain *vāsiṣṭha* and *gārgya,* stems and suffixes are postulated which resemble the original words. But what about *śrotriya?* One cannot see any resemblance in it to the original (*prakṛti*) out of which it is supposed to be formed. Even the apparent resemblance is not found in the case.[22] In some complex formations, there is no difference in meaning between them and the corresponding sentences as there is in the case of the word *sapta-parṅa* which is supposed to mean : *parvaṅi parvaṇi sapta parṇāny asya* = 'that which has seven leaves at every joint'. The word *parvan* is not found in the formation at all and yet the repetition of it is supposed to be the chief element in the meaning of the word. It is because the chief element is missing that the compound *saptaparṇa* is supposed to be a pure conventional

20. See Texts.
21. See Texts.
22. See Texts.

word (*rūḍhi*) whereas *rājapuruṣa* is looked upon as *yaugika* word, that is, made up of meaningful parts.[23] The conclusion reached is: compound, are indivisible units. They are artificially divided for the sake of explanation. They are different from corresponding sentences. In a sentence, the relation between the words is mutual dependence and in compounds, it is *ekārthībhāva*, integration of meaning.

It was pointed out before that, in a compound, the secondary word cannot be qualified by a word which is not part of the compound. Where there is no compound, the secondary word can be qualified or specified (*viśeṣa*). That is why we can say *ṛddhasya rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* but once the compound *rājapuruṣa* is formed, the adjective *ṛddhasya* has to be omitted. This is a good indication that there is a real difference between a compound and a sentence and that the latter is not the original or the source of the former. They are two independent ways of expressing oneself. One does not derive from the other. In *citrā gāvo yasya Devadattasya* = 'Of Devadatta whose cows are motely coloured', Devadatta specifies or particularises the outside object (*anyapadārtha*) indicated by *yasya*. In this respect, it is like *ṛddhyasya* which also specifies. Neither the one nor the other enters the respective compounds : *rājapuruṣa* and *citragu*. As far as the *bahuvrīhi* compound is concerned, the principle is that though it is formed in the sense of the outside object (*anyapadārtha*), by itself it conveys it only in a general manner and not in its specific form.[24]

It has been stated that the secondary word in a complex formation (*Vṛtti*) cannot be qualified by an adjective or cannot be connected in meaning with a word which is not a part of the complex formation. The impossibility of having an adjective like *ṛddhasya* to qualify the word *rājan* in *rājapuruṣa* was given as the example. But this principle would create a difficulty for explaining forms like *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam* = 'one who has made a mat before'. Here *kṛta* is a secondary word in the complex formation *kṛtapūrvī*, formed according to P.5.2.86 and 87. The word *kaṭam* is not part of the formation and yet it is connected with the secondary word *kṛta* in meaning and that is why it has the second case affix expressive of the object (*karma*). The expression is quite correct. How is one to explain this connection and the resulting second case-affix ? This complex formation is explained by means of the sentence: *kṛtaḥ pūrvaṃ kaṭo 'nena* = 'one who has made a mat before'. In this explanatory sentence the words *kṛtaḥ* and *kaṭaḥ* are

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23. See Texts.
24. See Texts.

obviously connected with each other. The word *kṛtaḥ* expresses : (1) the act of making and (2) the fact of something being the object of that action. The word *kaṭaḥ* specifies that particular object. It does not take the second case affix because the suffix *kta* in *kṛtaḥ* has already expressed the idea of something being the object of the act of making and as the two words are in apposition to each other, one would understand without the help of the second case-affix that it is the mat which is the object of the act of making.[25] The complex formation *kṛtapūrvī* cannot be made to express this specific relation between the making and the mat. When the word *kṛta* enters the complex formation, it denotes nothing more than the act of making. It does not denote the fact of something being he object of the act of making. Secondly, its meaning becomes secondary to the meaning of *pūrvī* which is that of agent. So *kṛtapūrvī* can mean only : 'one who made before' (*kṛtaṃ pūrvam anena* or *pūrvam kṛtavān*). The question : what was made before naturally arises : Mat is the answer and so the word *kaṭa* expressive of it naturally takes the second case affix. All this amounts to saying that when the word *kṛta* enters the formation *kṛtapūrvī,* it becomes an intransitive word, whereas in the explanatory sentence given above, it is a transitive word.[26] In *kṛtapūrvī,* the act of making is understood as one with the agent and not as distinct from it and it becomes connected with an object expressed by an outside word. It is as in *grāmaṃ gato devadattaḥ* = 'Devadatta has gone to the village. In *gataḥ,* the suffix expresses the agent and the action of going is not understood as distinct from it. It is indistinct because it has no separate form. And yet it is connected with the object expressed by another word in the sentence. That is what happens in *kṛtapūrvī kaṭam.*[27]

C. On the relation of the qualifier and the qualified (*viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyabhāva*) in a complex formation.

It has been maintained in the preceding pages that there is integration of meaning in a complex formation. The question, therefore, arises whether there can be the relation of the qualifier and the qualified within the meaning of a complex formation, considering that such a relation presupposes difference and not integration. It is said by some that if both the qualifier and the qualified are understood in one cognition, they cannot have anything to do with each other and

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25. See Texts.
26. See Texts.
27. See Texts.

so there cannot be the relation of qualifier and qualified. But they cannot be grasped in one verbal cognition, because the two words come in a sequence and so their meanings must also be understood in a sequence. The qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) is understood first and then it is added on to the *viśeṣya* which is grasped next. After that, when the two are unified, the qualifier as such does not exist. After qualifying the *viśeṣya,* it disappears. All that remains is the qualified *viśeṣya* and that is understood from the complex formation.[28]

But this explanation is not satisfactory. The previous cognition of the qualifier does not affect the qualified because it does not yet exist, When it is cognised, it is not cognised as qualified by the qualifier which has by then disappeared, without qualifying the *viśeṣya.* Each one is grasped in its own form and not as the qualifier or the qualified. Therefore, no relation of qualifier and qualified is grasped. Nor can one argue that the cognition of the qualified is coloured by the impression of the cognition of the qualifier and that the impression produces a remembrance which brings about the relation of the qualifier and the qualified. Remembrance can only follow previous experience and it cannot unite the two by the relation of qualifier and qualified. Nor does one get over the difficulty by saying that the relation is brought about by an inner power of the experiencer, because, in that case, the relation would be a creation of the experiencer and not real. If the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is the work of the mind of the experiencer, why not say that everything is really the mind appearing as external ? Why postulate the existence of the external object at all ? Why say that the relation of the qualifier and the qualified exists in the external objects ?[29]

Thus it has been shown that the attempt to explain the relation of the qualifier and the qualified on the basis of their separate cognition is not successful. It is, therefore, explained on the basis of the uniity of cognition. Cognitions take place according to the nature of objects. Objects are combined unities and so are cognitions. The object, as qualified by the universal, quality and so on enters into cognition as one.[30] It is not that these things are first cognised separately and then combined. Our cognition is one and is intertwined with all the elements like universals. In reality, objects are not combinations of separately existing elements. The two things, substance and quality,

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28. See Texts.
29. See Texts.
30. See Texts.

in a thing like blue lotus appear in one single cognition and there is no relation of qualifier and qualified between them on the basis of difference. But we cannot communicate such complex indivisible unities to others. So, at the time of communication, the complex unity is analysed into its elements and they are communicated separately. The listeners also understand them in that way. The relation of qualifier and qualified does exist in the external object and it is analysed separately for the purpose of communication. The elements analysed, namely, substance, quality, universal, the relation of inherence are all real. The complex unity is communicated by the method of analysis. In this analysis, the relation of qualifier and qualified also comes out.[31] The analysis and communication take place in sentences but the impressions of the sentence stage persist and so the relation of qualifier and qualified is understood in the complex formation also.[32] Really speaking, this formation and its meaning are both indivisible.

d. On the nature of *Vṛtti* :

Some people look upon the compound word as made out of the sentence which is eternal. The compound would thus become an effect and the effect may have properties which the cause did not have. In this case, the new property of the effect is *parārthābhidhānam* = 'the fact of conveying the meaning of something else. The secondary word in a compound expresses the meaning of the main word. In *rājapuruśaḥ*, *rāja* expresses the meaning of *puruṣa*. Some think that it gives up its own meaning before expressing the meaning of another, just as a carpenter, engaged to do some royal work, suspends his own work. Others, however think that it does not give up its own meaning, but expresses another one in addition to its own. Thus there are two possibilities : *jahatsvārthā vṛttiḥ* = 'integration in which its own meaning is abandoned' and *ajahtsvārthā* = 'integration in which its own meaning is not abandoned. In either case, the meaning of the secondary word qualifies that of the main word. The meanings of both are understood. This does not result in the use of the dual number at the end of the compound because the latter expresses one qualified meaning and not separate meanings. The secondary word gives up its meaning only after having qualified the meaning of the main word. In other words, in what is called *parārthābhidhāna*, there is abandonment (*tyāga*) as well as addition (*abhyuccaya*).[33]

31. See Texts.
32. See Texts.
33. See Texts.

About the rôle of the secondary word in a compound, there are several views. Some say that some trace of its meaning is left even if it is abandoned, just as the changed colour of an object due to heat persists even after the heat has been removed. The smell of a rose persists in a vase even after the rose is removed. Another view is that only that part of the meaning of the secondary word disappears which is opposed to the meaning of the main word. So much for *jahatsvārthā vṛtti*, integration in which the meaning of the secondary word is abandoned. Some hold that the secondary word keeps its meaning and also expresses that of the main word. With its meaning, it qualifies that of the main word. Thus it is *dvyartha*, a word having two meanings[34] There are also those who hold that the secondary word completely gives up its meaning and that only the meaning of the main word is understood from the compound. In this way, the main word and the compound become synonyms.[35]

Even though a qualified meaning is understood from a compound as from a sentence, the secondary word does abandon something when it enters into a complex formation. The meaning of the secondary word abandons its importance and becomes a mere qualifier of the meaning of the main word. The compound does express one qualified meaning and it is also one word. While explaining it, it is split up into parts, but that is only a means to an end. As in the case of the sentence meaning, the two elements : difference and connection (*bheda* and *saṃsarga*) are found in the compound also, either as alternatives or together in the relation of important and secondary.[36] As the meaning of the primary word is qualified by that of the secondary one, there is no question, in the case of the compound *rājapuruṣa*, of completely ignoring the meaning of *rājan*.

Those who thnk that the sentence and the compound have the same meaning consider that the secondary word does not give up its meaning (*ajahatsvārthā*). Those hold that they have different meanings adopt *jahatsvārthā*. As the means of explaining indivisible words by the method of grammatical analysis will always differ according to ones' taste, difference of opinion is natural.[37] As in other matters. Bhartrṛhari's treatment of *vṛtti is* based upon that of Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya*.[38]

34. See Texts.
35. See Texts.
36. See Texts.
37. See Texts.
38. Dr. S. D. Joshi—Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya-Samarthāhnika*, pp. 10, 51, 75 ff. (Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit University of Poona—Class C. No. 3, 1968).

e. On the number expressed by the secondary word in a compound : *abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā.*

While considering the nature of *vṛtti,* the discussion centred round the meaning of the secondary word. The conclusion that emerged after the discussion was that there was a difference between the meaning of a sentence and that of the compound based on it. This conclusion is confirmed when one considers the nature of the number expressed by the secondary word in a compound. Patañjali had already pointed out that while a particular number (*saṃkhyāviśeṣa*) is expressed in a sentence, this does not happen in a compound.[39] Bhartṛhari elaborates this point. If the meaning of the stem is *trika,* the group of three, namely, the universal, the particular and gender, then the case ending is expressive (*vacaka*) of number.. If the meaning of the stem is the group of five (*pañcaka*) consisting of the three mentioned above, plus number and accessory, then the case ending is only indicative (*dyotaka*) of number. In sentences like *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* = the King's man, *rājñoḥ-puruṣaḥ* 'the two kings' man *rājñāṃ puruṣaḥ* = 'the many kings' man' the number in the first word is expressed by the case ending. In the compounds formed out of the above sentences, the first term or the secondary word would correspond to the first word in the above sentences. The same case endings should be found there also, because the same meanings are there. But the elision of the case endings in a complex formation is taught in P. 2.4.71. That does not mean that the meaning is not there. What really happens is that once the word *rājan* enters into the compound *rājapuruṣa,* its meaning gets mixed up with that of the main word and so the particular number which was part of that meaning disappears and so the case ending expressive of it is not added to the word. Thus the meaning of the sentence and of the compound formed out of it are not the same. They only resemble each other. In a sentence a particular number is expressed while in a compound, it is not.[40]

That the secondary word of a complex formation has no differentiation in number is the view of some. Others think differently. The secondary word is expressive of a thing and so it must have a number. But no particular number is understood from it. So one infers that it expresses number in general from which, according to need, any required number can be understood. This is what is called *abhedai-*

39. Ibid, para 54.
40. See Texts.

katvasaṃkhyā. This *abhedaikatva* is an amalgam of all three numbers. All of them have merged in it and become one. It must be clearly distinguished from the singular number which would exclude the dual and the plural. This includes everything, so that, according to need, the required number can be understood from it.[41] It is like the flavour of honey which is an undifferentiated combination of the flavours of many flowers. The property of the honey depends upon the properties of the flowers whose flavours have made it up. From the effects of the honey we infer the presence in it of the flavours of different flowers in an undifferentiated form.[42] Another way of looking at it is this : As all the particular numbers are set aside, the mere universal of number remains. In the previous view, it is an amalgam of all the particular numbers in an undifferentiated state. Here it is looked upon as number in general only. Of course, when circumstances allow it, a particular number is understood.[43]

Universals are established on the basis of uniformity of cognition. Here, on the other hand, this amalgam of numbers, devoid of all differentiation, has no effect like uniformity of cognition, because the operations of grammar relate to particular numbers. What would then be the evidence for the existence of this *abhedaikatva?* This is answered with the help of an analogy. Even if, from a distance, one cannot see the exact colour of a thing one can tell that it has some colour. In the same way, we know that the meaning of the secondary word, being in the nature of *sattva,* must have some number though we may not know which particular one. This is the effect of *abhedaikatva*.[44] When there is any special favourable circumstance, a particular number is understood, as when *tavaka* and *mamaka* are substituted for *yuṣmad* and *asmad* when the suffix *khañ* or *aṇ* follows in the singular number according to P. 4.3.3.

The position then is that the secondary word in a compound denotes number in general and when the circumstances are favourable, a particular number. In this way, due to the nature of words, the meaning of the secondary word comes between that of indeclinables whose meaning is not *sattva* and so not susceptible of gender and number and that of ordinary nouns ending in case affixes expressive of a particular number.

41. See Texts.
42. See Texts.
43. See Texts.
44. See Texts.

The question as to the nature of the number expressed by the secondary word in a compound arises because, normally, the case ending expressive of a particular number, coming at the end of the secondary word is elided. Because it is elided, it is held that it cannot and does not express any particular number but only number in general. But there are cases of compounds where the case ending is not elided. The question naturally arises as to the nature of the number expressed by the secondary word in such cases. There are compounds like *goṣucara, varṣāsuja* and *apsuyoni* formed according to P. 6.3.14 in which the seventh case ending in the plural is not elided. The first thing to decide is : what kind of plural do we have in these words ? The plural number can express the plurality of the individuals according to P. 1.4.21 or it can express the universal according to P. 1.2.58. It cannot be the former because the plurality of the individuals is not meant to be conveyed in these cases. For instance, *goṣucara* means 'that which moves about among cows'. Helārāja says in one place that the insect called *indragopa* (ladybird, firefly ?) is meant while in another place he says that it means a cock.[45] Whether it be the insect or the bird, even if it moves about only in one or two cows, it would still be called *goṣucara*. No plurality of the individuals is meant to be conveyed here nor is it understood from the compound. The plural case ending is used to express the universal according to P. 1.2.58 and it is not elided according to P. 6.3.14. As this plural suffix does not denote multiplicity or any other number, it must be taken to stand for the universal, even if *abhedaikatva* is recognised.

So the position can be summed up as follows—The power of words to convey meanings varies enormously. It is not possible to describe it in detail. One can only put forward some general principles. Integration of meaning has been stated to be the characteristic of a complex formation. In that connection, it has also been stated that, in a complex formation, the secondary word conveys number in a general way but that in a sentence, words convey number in a differentiated manner. This is true on the whole, if we do not pay any attention to some differences in detail within the complex formation itself. One cannot say that nowhere in a complex formation does the secondary word express a particular number. In such complex formations as *śaurpika, māsajāta* and *tāvakīna*, a particular number is understood from the secondary element. From all the three of them, the singular number is understood. But in compounds like *rājapuruṣa*, no particular number is understood. Thus, in spite of the few complex formations where

45. See Texts.

a particular number is understood, the difference between *vṛtti* and *vākya* as pointed out before does stand. It is not merely in *vyākaraṇa* that definitions have limitations. The position is the same in the other *śāstras* also. The *Vaiśeṣikas* define substance as that in which qualities and actions inhere and which can be the intimate material cause of things. This definition is meant to enable us to distinguish substance from other things like quality. In *ākāśa* = 'ether' which is an all-pervasive substance, no action or movement inheres. That does not invalidate the definition. On the whole, it works. This is also true of the distinction between *Vṛtti* and *Vākya*.[46]

Just as the secondary word does not express a particular number, sometimes it does not express a particular gender either. In compounds like *kukkuṭāṇḍam*='hen's egg', *mṛgadugdha*='deer milk', the secondary words *kukkuṭa* and *mṛga* are chiefly expressive of a universal and are meant to qualify the meaning of the main word by the exclusion of other universals. So the masculine form of the words is taught by a *vārttika* on P. 6.3.42. Where the emphasis is not on a particular universal and the exclusion of other universals, the masculine form would not be used as in *gārgīputraḥ* = 'the son of *Gārgī*. The reference is to a particular individual and not to the universal.

f. On the possessive compound (*Bahuvrīhi*).

A possessive compound (*bahuvrīhi*) is formed in the sense of the meaning of a word which is not a constituent part of it. It relates to the meaning of the other word only in a general manner. Therefore, the other word itself has to be used in apposition to it in order to particularise it. In this respect, it is not like a *dvandva* compound which is formed in the sense of *ca* and so, once the compound is formed, there is no more occasion for using the word *ca* also. In the case of the *bahuvrīhi*, on the other hand, though it is formed in the sense of another word, the latter has also to be used in apposition to it for the sake of completeness. The compound itself can denote the meaning of the other word only in a general way, because its function is only to be a qualifier. What is qualified is understood in a general way because a qualifier always implies the qualified. The desire to know specifically what the qualified is naturally arises in one's mind and that can be satisfied only if a word expressive of it is used in apposition to the compound.[47] That is what usually happens. Where the qualified object is well-known, there a word expressive of it need not be used in apposition to the compound. For example, the pos-

46. See Texts.
47. See Texts.

sessive compounds *vajrapāṇiḥ* = 'one who holds the weapon *vajra* in his hand' and *tryakṣa* = 'one who has three eyes', need not be followed by the names *Śakra* and *Śiva,* because they would be understood from the compounds themselves.[48] But that is not the case with the compound *citraguḥ* = 'one who has motley coloured cows'. No particular person answering to that description is well known. Therefore, the name of such a person has to be used in apposition to it. It has been shown already that the compound and the sentence are different from each other in form as well as in meaning. The sentence can denote the particular but not the compound which can denote only the general. The sentence conveys a meaning with all specifiations. The compound has not the power to express such a meaning. It gives the meaning of the sentence only approximately (*adūraviprakarṣeṇa*). For instance, it cannot convey the particular number.[49] It is not that a *bahuvrīhi* compound is totally incapable of particularising. There is, at least, some negative particularisation. The compound *citragu,* for instance, excludes one who has no cows and one whose cows are not motley coloured. When a word expressive of a particular qualified object is used in apposition to the compound, then completeness results. Even when a general word is used, such as *sarva, viśva, tat* in apposition to the compound, that would also perform the function of exclusion. It would exclude particular qualified things. Such general words would become particular words. As Patañjali says : the general is as good as the particular.[50]

The *bahuvrīti* has been taught in the sense of the meaning of a word not included in the compound. That meaning can be that of the stem or of the suffix or of both. If it is the meaning of both, then how a word expressive of the particular qualified object is used in apposition to the compound has been explained. If the compound is taught in the meaning of the suffix, namely, *sambandha* (relation) even then the use of such a word is necessary and justifiable. It is the sixth case affix which expresses *sambandha* and that, by itself, cannot be used in apposition to the compound. So the word expressive of the related has to be used.[51] Even if it is held that a *bahuvrīhi* compound denotes relation, the meaning of the suffix, it can be connected with action because relation would naturally bring the related to the mind. Action cannot be applied to the bare relation. Just as the universal naturally brings the individual to the mind for being connected with

48. See Texts.
49. See Texts.
50. See Texts.
51. See Texts.

action, in the same way, relation inevitably brings the related to the mind for the same purpose. Similarly, an action to be performed on a number would naturally apply to what is numbered just as an action enjoined upon a collection would naturally be performed on the things collected.[52] There is the relation of identity between the relation and the related and so the compound would be in apposition to the word expressive of the related and would take the gender and number of the latter according to P. 1.2.52. If the *bahuvrīhi* denotes the relation as distinct from the related, then it would not take the gender and number of the latter and so the whole meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*) would not be expressed. It is never formed in the sense of the other suffix meaning only. In the meaning of the other word, the substance element (*dravya*) is the main thing. *Anyapadārtha* means the whole meaning of the other word, neither more (excluding the sentence meaning) nor less (not the suffix meaning only). Therefore, it stands for a thing qualified by a gender and a number. In other words, *anyapadārtha* means the meaning of the whole word and not that of the suffix only. Therefore, the use of a word expressive of the particular and having its gender and number is necessary.[53]

Thus the two views in regard to a *bahuvrīhi* compound are: (1) that its basis is a relation determined by the meanings of the two constituent words, (2) that the meanings of the two constituent words, determined by a relation, form its basis.[54] Those who hold the view that the *bahuvrīhi* compound is formed in the meaning of the other word consisting of a thing with its gender and number compare it to a *taddhita* formation (secondary derivative). Taking the secondary derivative *daṇḍin,* it is formed from the word *daṇḍa* = 'stick' (qualified by the relation of contact) by the addition of the suffix *in*(*i*) by P. 5.2.115 in the sense of one who holds the stick qualified by the relation of contact. The basis of the secondary suffix is one who is characterised by his relation with the stick. Similarly, the *bahuvrīhi* compound which expresses the idea of possession as the possessive suffix (*matvarthīya*) does, has, as its basis, the related (*sambandhī*) qualified by a relation and expressed by the constituent words.[55] For instance, in the compound *palāśadaṇḍaḥ* = 'One who holds a stick made of *palāśa* wood' the related qualified by the relation of contact (*saṃyoga*) is the basis. In the same way, in the com-

52. See Texts.
53. See Texts.
54. See Texts.
55. See Texts.

pound *tigmaviṣāṇa* = 'one having sharp horns', the related qualified by the relation of inherence (*samavāya*) is the basis. The point to note in the above explanation is that it is the related as determined by a relation which is looked upon as the basis of the secondary derivative or of the compound. Others, on the other hand, put the emphasis on the relation as determined by the related. The fact is that both the relation and the related are the basis of the formation of words like *daṇḍin* and *viṣāṇin*. Similarly, in a *bahuvrīhi*, a relation as determined by the related and the meaning of the suffix are the basis of the formation.[56]

g. On the negative compound (*nañ-samāsa*).

Which of the two terms is the main one in a negative compound or is it formed in the sense of an outside word—this point is discussed in the *Mahābhāṣya*. Such a discussion, carried on in grammatical circles, is only for the sake of arriving at the correct way of forming the word and not for deciding its correct meaning. Grammar does not prescribe the meaning of words. Meaning is understood from the usage of the cultured. There is a certain fixity about it (*sthitalakṣaṇa*). Secondly, though the difference between the sentence and the compound, in form and in meaning, has been pointed out, many of the discussions regarding the compound have been carried on on the assumption that they are very similar, if not identical. In the sentence *na brāhmaṇah* = 'not a brahmin', there is the negative particle *na* but in the compound word corresponding to it, there is no *na*.[57] Instead of that, there is *a* which is identified with the *na* of the sentence. Whatever characteristic one sees in the meanings of the two terms of a compound is based on our assumption of the similarity, it not the identity of the sentence and the compound. As we understand the idea of non-existence or negation from a negative compound we conclude that the *a* in it corresponds to the *na* of the sentence. In the words *adhika* and *apanaya* also, there is *a* but we do not think that it corresponds to a *na*, because we do not understand non-existence or negation from it. In reality, like other words, the negative compound is really indivisible.

While discussing the negative compound, Bhartṛhari has in mind the three interpretations of it mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya*. They are briefly as follows—(1) In the compound *abrāhmaṇa*, if the second

56. See Texts.
57. See Texts.

term stands for the universal, then it is a *bahuvrīhi* and the analysis would be : *avidyamānaṃ brāhmaṇyam yasya* ='one who has no brahminhood'. As the *bahuvrīhi* is formed in the sense of the other word not forming part of it, that becomes the main meaning (*anya-padārthaprādhānya*. (2) When the negative particle in the compound stands for non-existence in general and is qualified by the meaning of the second term, thus yielding the meaning : not existing as a *brāhmaṇa*, the result would be the same as in the previous interpretation. The compound would become applicable to anybody who is not a brahmin. Here the meaning of the first term is the main one. (3) When the name *brāhmaṇa* is applied, through wrong direction or error to, say, a *kṣatriya* and the negative particle conveys the natural absence of brahminhood in him, then the meaning of the second term is the main one.

In the sentence, the negative particle stands for negation or non-existence. Negation is never self sufficient, because it is always the negation of something. A thing which actually exists cannot disappear merely by the use of the negative particle. It can only make known the non-existence or disappearance of something, due to other reasons.[58] A word can denote what does not exist in the outside world because, as shown already, words move about in the realm of secondary Being, the fact of figuring in one's cognition. For grammarians, the object is what the word conveys and not the external object.

If the negative particle, the first term of the compound, has no self-sufficient meaning, it cannot be the main thing. If it has and if it is connected with that of the second term, the latter would lose its own nature and cannot be the main thing. If the meanings of the two terms are not connected, the meaning of the other word, determined by the connected meanings of the constituent words, cannot become the main thing either. Thus, none of the three meanings can become the main one. If the negative particle negates the action relating to the meaning of the second term, there cannot be a compound at all. For example, in *brāhmaṇo na bhuṅkte* = 'the *brāhmaṇa* does not eat', the action which is negated is expressed by a separate word in the sentence. The negative particle is connected with the verb and not with the word *brāhmaṇaḥ*. So in this sense, there cannot be the compound *abrāmaṇo* (*bhuṅkte*).[59] Therefore, the question as to which meaning is the main one cannot arise at all. But there

58. See Texts.
59. See Texts.

can be a compound corresponding to *brāhmaṇo nāsti.* We can just say *abrāmaṇaḥ,* because the connection of *na,* though outwardly with *asti,* is with *brāhmaṇa* also because *sattā,* Being or Existence, the meaning of *asti* is inherent in every object.

A point which is emphasized in connection with a negative compound is that the negative particle in it is expressive (*vācaka*) whereas in a sentence it is only indicative (*dyotaka*). In a compound, the negative particle means the substratum in general of the action of existence, coloured by non-existence[60] The desire to know which substratum is satisfied by the word with which the negative particle is compounded. Thus in a compound like *abrāhmaṇa,* the negative particle conveys the non-existence of the substratum in general of the action of existence and the word *brāhmaṇa* conveys the particular substratum. The meanings of the two parts of the word stand in the relation of qualifier and qualified to each other. Which is the qualifier and which the qualified is a matter of the speaker's intention. If the meaning of the negative particle, the generic meaning, is the qualified, that of the second term would be the qualifier and the compound would mean : the brahmin's non-existence. That would result in the meaning of the first term being the main one. If the two terms are in apposition to each other, the compound would mean *asan brāhmaṇaḥ* = 'the non-existent brahmin' and the meaning of the second term would be the main one. If the meaning of the compound amounts to : *asad brāhmaṇyam asya* = 'one whose brahmin-hood is non-existent', the meaning of the other word (*anyapadārtha*) would become the main one. In this manner, one can interpret the compound *apācaka* also in three ways. In *akṛtvā* = 'after not doing', the negative particle conveys the non-existence of the *sattā* which exists in the action denoted by the root *kṛ.* Thus by adopting the view that the negative particle is expressive (*vācaka*) one can interpret all negative particles in three ways.

How the negative particle which is indicative (*dyotaka*) only in a sentence but becomes expressive in a compound is explained by means of an analogy. The process is similar to what happens in compounds like *niṣkauśāmbiḥ* = 'one who has gone out of *kauśāmbī*'. The compound is formed in the sense of *niṣkrāntaḥ kauśāmbyāḥ.* Here *niṣkrāntaḥ* expresses an action together with its agent. It is combined with the word *kauśāmbī,* the name of a place, which is the starting-point (*apādāna*) of the action of coming out. When it is combined

60. See Texts.

with *kauśāmbī* it becomes *niḥ* which also denotes the agent to which the action is secondary. In other words, it denotes primarily a thing to which an action is subordinate. It has the same meaning as *niṣkrāntaḥ* in the corresponding sentence, it denotes *asattva*. In the same way, the negative particle in a compound is expressive of non-existence in general which is also *sattva*.[61]

Thus it has been shown that all the three interpretations of the compound *abrāhmaṇa* are possible.[62] In a sentence, on the other hand, the negation is understood as closely linked to what is negatived. It is not self-sufficient. It is not expressive. It is only indicative (*dyotaka*). Its meaning is not susceptible to being associated with gender and number. The negative particle in a compound expresses a thing (*sattva*).[63]

Bhartṛhari makes some observations on each of the three interpretations of a negative compound, found in the *Mahābhāṣya*. He takes, first of all, that interpretation according to which, the meaning of the second term is the main one. According to that, the meaning of the negative particle is the qualifier (*viśeṣana*) and that of the second term, the qualified (*viśeṣya*). How is this possible considering that the negative particle stands for non-existence and the word *brāhmaṇa,* the second term, for something which has a positive existence. The fact is that the word *brāhmaṇa* here means one in whom brahminhood does not exist. The word has the same form as when it means one in whom brahminhood does exist. The non-existence of brahminhood, already the meaning of *brāhmaṇa,* is made manifest by the negative particle which thus becomes a qualifier. It means non-existence in general whereas the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for a particular non-existence. There is no opposition between the general and the particular and so there is the relation of the qualifier and the qualified between the meanings of the two terms.[64] It is like what happens in the expression *gauro brāhmaṇaḥ*. Here the word *gauraḥ* makes explicit what was implicit. Any *brāhmaṇa* can be *gauraḥ* but when the word is added as an adjective, it specifies that the brahmin in question has that colour. Similarly, non-existence is implicit in all objects and the negative particle brings it out, specifies it. Thus it becomes the qualifier.

61. See Texts.
62. See Texts.
63. See Texts.
64. See Texts.

It looks odd that the negative particle should be considered to be an adjective, considering that it negates the very existence of what is denoted by the word with which it is in association. Ordinarily, adjectives bring out peculiarities present in an existent object. By negating the very existence of the object, the use of the word seems to become unjustified. The position is this : From an uttered word, one understands a meaning or an object which is common to both existence and non-existence. The external object is not like that. That is based on existence only. If that were the meaning of a word, the use of *san* in *san brāhmaṇaḥ* would be inexplicable because the external object is always associated with existence and there would be no point in saying *san*. But we do say *san brāhmaṇaḥ*, because the idea conveyed by the word *brāhmaṇa* can be associated with both existence and non-existence and the word *san* specifies which one is meant in a particular case.[65] What is conveyed by the word has secondary existence (*upacārasattā*) and so it can be associated with both existence and non-existence. What has primary *sattā* is associated with existence only. The intellect conceives of a thing irrespective of its external existence or non-existence and such a thing is capable of being qualified by conforming or opposing attributes. A unified object like the lotus is mentally divided into substance and quality and we say *nīlam utpalam* by using two separate words. There is no such thing in the world as a bare lotus without colour, to which later a colour like blue would be attached. Substance and colour are always found together. In speech, we split the two. In *abrāhmaṇa*, it is *sattā*, existence which is negated. Secondary existence was wrongly thought of as primary existence, which is, therefore, negated.

The negative compound is used when something is first mistaken for something else and, later, the mistake is realised. The initial mistake and its later removal can be seen in expressions like *abrāhmaṇo' yaṃ kṣattriyaḥ* = 'this *kṣattriya* is not a brahmin'. Here the negative particle removes the idea of *brāhmaṇa* wrongly applied to a *kṣattriya* and says : 'this is not a *brāhmaṇa*, he was wrongly so understood, he is only similar to a *brāhmaṇa*'.[66]

So far, the negative compound has been explained on the basis of *upacārasattā*. According to that, the negative compound amounts to this : the idea of a *brāhmaṇa* is first mentally conceived and to deny its actual existence in a *kṣattriya* and others, the word *brāhmaṇa* is

65. See Texts.
66. See Texts.

used in association with a negative particle. It can be explained in another way. The negative particle in the compound manifests the non-existence of those qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* which are naturally absent in others. The existence of the other qualities is naturally implied. In other words, the negative particle reveals that in the compound *abrāhmaṇa,* the second term stands only for part of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa,* because the negative particle reveals the absence of the other part. The word *brāhmaṇa* is applied to one who is so in the full sense as well as to one who has only some of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa.* But, as the form of the word is the same in both cases, one does not see the difference. The negative particle helps us to see it.[67]

The compound *abrāhmaṇa* is somewhat like the compound *kṛtākṛta* = 'done and yet not done'. When a work is not done but all the materials required for doing it are ready and there is a reasonable chance of completing it, one sometimes applies the expression 'it is done' to it. Similarly, seeing some qualities similar to those of a brāhmin in, say, a *kṣattriya,* one identifies them with the totality of the qualities of a brahmin and applies the name to him. Then the negative particle reveals that it is only a secondary usage. He is a brāhmin and yet not one, just as the work the materials for doing which are all ready 'is done and not done'.[68] The use of the word *brāhmaṇa* to one who has only some of the qualities of a brahmin is secondary usage, but as the word is the same, one might mistake it for primary usage. The use of the negative particle makes the intention of the speaker clear.

The view that in a negative compound, the second term is the main one explains compounds like *anekam.* Here, the second term *eka,* being the main word, the singular number comes in and its being a pronoun (*sarvanāma*) is also preserved and we get forms like *anekasmai.* If the second term is the main word, even though the compound *anekam* denotes other numbers, it takes the singular number, that is, the number of the main word.[69] The plural number cannot be used simply because singularity, which has been superimposed on the other numbers, is set aside by the negative particle. The other numbers have become coloured by the number one and have lost their own nature and can be cognised only through the number one. The

67. See Texts.
68. See Texts.
69. See Texts.

singular number is the main idea, because it is the qualified one.[70] Just as the word *brāhmaṇa,* in the compound *abrāhmaṇa* stands for, say, *kṣattriya,* because of association with the negative particle, in the same way, in *aneka, eka* stands for other numbers because of association with the negative particle. From *aneka,* a meaning similar to that of the second term is understood as in the case of *abrāhmaṇa.*[71] What the negative particle sets aside is the single-ness superimposed on two etc. To indicate the object of the negation, the word *eka* is used and it follows its properties both in the sentence and in the compound. In the sentence, the word *eka,* without giving up its own number, stands for the other numbers. Similarly, in *aneka, eka* is the main word and it does not give up its own number. In order to indicate the object of the negation, the second term is used even though its meaning is not wanted. It is used in order to show what is superimposed. Singleness is superimposed on two etc. and that is set aside. Unless the second term is in the singular number, what is to be set aside would not be understood. If the dual or the plural is used, the number one would not be understood as something to be set aside. So the use of the singular number is a means of understanding the number meant to be conveyed.

The next interpretation of the negative compound is that it is formed in the sense of something outside the compound. It denotes something which is the opposite of what the second term denotes. If the view is that the second term denotes something, say, *kṣattriya* on whom the fact of being a brahmin is superimposed, then the meaning of the second term is the main thing. But if the view is that the negative particle stands for non-existence in general and it enters into the relation of qualifier and qualified with the meaning of the second term which is of a positive nature and together they denote something external, then this external thing is the main thing. *Abrāhmaṇa,* for instance, would mean something of which the *brāhmaṇa* is not the substratum, that is, the universal of *kṣattriya* which is external because it is not the meaning of any one of the two terms.[72]

According to the view that it is the meaning of the second term which is the main thing, it belongs to something which is within the compound. The negative compound has not been taught in the sense of something outside. How can it then be so interpreted? In answer

70. See Texts.
71. See Texts.
72. See Texts.

to this objection, the analogy of another *tatpuruṣa* compound is given. The compound *śastrīśyāmā* = 'dark like a dagger' is used in apposition to another word, say, *kanyā* and so it refers to something outside the compound and yet it is a *tatpuruṣa,* not a *bahuvrīhi.* The negative compound is in the same position.[73] Another illustration would be the compound *asāsno gauḥ* = 'a cow without a dewlap'. It means the '*gayal*'. It is an animal without a dewlap but otherwise resembles a cow. The negative compound *abrāhmaṇa* also means somebody who has not got the universal *brāhmaṇatva* but otherwise resembles a brahmin. From the compound *asāsno gauḥ,* nobody understands a cow without dewlap but an animal in which inheres another universal altogether.[74] When, after being told that the *khadira* and the *kharjūra* trees are similar in that both have a light coloured trunk and fine leaves, it is added that the *khadira* has thorns (*kaṇṭakavān khadiraḥ*), one understands that the *khadira* belongs to a different species. Similarly, one first understands identity because of the presence of the qualities of a *brāhmaṇa* but when the expression *abrāhmaṇa* is heard, one understands that the person concerned belongs to a different caste, though there are similar qualities. The three words *śastrīśyāmā, asāsnaḥ* and *kaṇṭakavān* refer to an external object on the basis of resemblance. Similarly, the compound *abrāhmaṇa* refers to an outside object like *kṣattriya* on the basis of resemblance. Except for the universal *brāhmaṇatva,* other properties of a brahmin are present in the person in question. One does see other negative compounds also based on resemblance, as for instance, *avarṣā hemantaḥ* = 'winter without rain'. It means that there is resemblance between winter and and the rainy season. When the sky is covered with dark clouds but it is not actually raining, one can say *avarṣāḥ.* When the winter day is dark, it is like a rainless day in the rainy season. So one can say *avarṣāḥ hemantaḥ,* on the basis of resemblance.[75] Because of resemblance, the word *avarṣāḥ* can be applied to a winter day, an outside object. In itself, the compound is a *tatpuruṣa* which stands for the meaning of its own terms, but because of resemblance it points to an external object. Similarly, in *abrāhmaṇa,* the meaning of an outside word is the main thing, because of the comparison which it involves.

Some explain in another way how the compound *abrāhmaṇa* denotes an external object. All words denote the universal primarily. So does the word *brāhmaṇa* in the compound. But the compound

73. See Texts.
74. See Texts.
75. See Texts.

as a whole, denotes the individual and so it denotes something different from what the constituent words denote. In other words, the compound as a whole is formed in the sense of *anyapadārtha*.[76] Of course, it cannot denote an individual in which the universal *brāhmaṇatva* exists. Because of the negative particle, it denotes an individual in which that universal does not exist. So it denotes a *kṣattriya* or somebody else.

Even if the negative compound is considered to be formed in the sense of the meaning of the outside word, there is a difference between it and the *bahuvrīhi* compound. The latter is taught in the sense of the *matup* group of suffixes. Like the negative compound, it does not denote an external object characterised by a particular universal. In the expression, *agaur aśvaḥ, agauḥ* = 'not a cow', 'not having cow-ness' qualifies *aśva* = 'horse'. The corresponding *bahuvrīhi* would be *agur aśvaḥ*. Here *aguḥ* means 'that which has no cow'.[77] The idea of possession, the meaning of the *matup* suffix, is expressed by the *bahuvrīhi*, but not by the negative compound taught by P. 2.2.6.

The *Mahābhāṣya* has pointed out the defect in the view that the negative compound can be interpreted in the sense of *anyapadārtha*. The defect is that the word *avarṣāḥ*, when in apposition to *hemantaḥ* would have to take the gender and number of the latter and then the form obtained would be incorrect.[78]

And so the *Bhāṣyakāra* comes to the third interpretation according to which it is the meaning of the first term which is the main thing in a negative compound. The negative particle means non-existence. It is specified by the meaning of the second term *brāhmaṇa*. Thus, the meaning of the negative particle, namely, non-existence, specified or qualified by the meaning of *brāhmaṇa*, becomes the main thing in the compound. Such a meaning can be connected with action. One who exists as a *kṣattriya* does not exist as a *brāhmaṇa*. Thus, the negative particle expresses non-existence as connected with a particular thing and not total non-existence. Therefore, it can be connected with action. That is also how one understands something similar. Non-existence, not specified by something positive, cannot enter into verbal usage and so something which exists in one way is denied existence in some other way. Thus, as it involves something positive also, it is connected with action.

76. See Texts.
77. See Texts.
78. See Texts.

The author of the *Mahābhāṣya* has pointed out the defect of this view also. If it is the meaning of the first term which is the main thing in a negative compound, that being an indeclinable, the whole compound would become indeclinable and one could not get forms like *abrāhmaṇau, abrāhmaṇāḥ*. In a sentence, the negative particle means negation and not a thing. In a compound also, it means the same thing, specified by the meaning of the second term. Therefore, there cannot be gender and number. Even if it be held that the compound denotes a thing and not *asattva,* it would denote a thing in general and, therefore, there can only be the singular number and neuter gender and we should get the form *abrāhmaṇam.* The above objection has been answered by reference to the natural power of words. Though compounds have been taught in the same meaning as that of the corresponding analytic sentences, still there is a difference. In a sentence, the negative particle has some independence. It denotes negation apart from the thing negated and that being *asattva,* it cannot have any association with gender and number. In a compound the negative particle denotes the thing negated and negation is subordinate to it. The thing negated is the main thing and so the compound takes gender and number. This difference is based on the nature of words. Before entering a compound the negative particle expresses negation which is not a thing (*sattva*), but in a compound it denotes a thing. Following up of the basis (*nimittānuvidhānam*) does not take place everywhere because that is the nature of words. The basis referred to above is the idea of non-existence, the meaning of the negative particle. If this is followed up in the compound, the meaning of the latter would not only be incapable of having gender and number, but it cannot be connected with action either, that is, it cannot become the accessory to an action. There would be no point in teaching the formation of a noun if its meaning cannot become the accessory of an action. Thus a negative compound would become unfit to be grammatically formed. But we see that its meaning does become an accessory to action as in *abrāhmaṇam ānaya, abrāhmaṇam paśya.* The conclusion is that a negative compound denotes a thing and can take gender and number because, in it, the basis is not followed up.[79]

So far it has been shown how a negative compound becomes fit generally to take gender and number. How it takes a particular gender and number is explained on the basis of the *Mahābhāṣya.*

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79. See Texts.

Non-existence or negation in general, qualified by the meaning of the second term is the meaning of a negative compound. But, in order to specify it, a word expressive of the particular is used and the compound is qualified by it and becomes fit for use. It is right that it should take the gender and number of the particular.[80] Objects are different from one another and so something like a *kṣattriya* is the substratum of the absence of *brāhmaṇa*-hood, and so the compound should take the gender and number of *kṣattriya*. Moreover, an object can have any gender, but the word expressive of it restricts it to one of them. The same object can be referred to by words having different genders. *Kṣattriyaḥ* and *kṣattram* refer to the same thing. Similarly, the masculine word *abrāhmaṇa* can also refer to the same thing as *kṣattram*. It is nature which regulates gender and number just as it is nature which regulates that the compound should denote a thing and not *asattva*. Even though the general implies the particular, it does not specify which of the particulars is meant and so the word expressive of the latter is used and the compound takes its gender and number.

Before the compound is formed, the negative particle in the sentence means negation and the word *brāhmaṇa* stands for something in which real *brāhmaṇa*-hood is denied. Thus, the two words stand for two different things. The compound stands for one thing, namely, the meaning of the negative particle as qualified by that of the second term, whatever it may be. The second term does no more than specify the particular thing which is negated. All possible things are implied in the negation itself. Thus its meaning is the main thing.[81]

Those who hold that the negative compound denotes an external object do so under a misapprehension. When a word like *kṣattriya* or *vaiśya* is used in apposition to *abrāhmaṇa*, it makes explicit what is implied. If it is not used, what is implied will not become clear. The word *kṣattriya* does not bring in something different from what is already included in *abrāhmaṇa*. In that sense, it is not external.[82] But this meaning of the negative particle is not understood by some. Non-existence in general, qualified by that of the meaning of the second term and specified by a particular substratum like *kṣattriya*—this is the meaning of the negative particle. But this is not understood by some and so they think that the meaning of the compound is something external.

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80. See Texts.
81. See Texts.
82. See Texts.

The extension of gender and number can be explained only on the view that it is the first term which is the main thing. If the compound means non-existence in general, qualified by the meaning of the second term, when words like *kṣattriya* are used in apposition to it, it is natural that the compound should have the gender and number of these words. But when they are not used, the compound would take the common neuter gender and the common singular number. Nor could one get forms like *avarṣā hemantaḥ, anāpaḥ, pṛthivī,* because in *avarṣā hemantaḥ,* the gender of *hemantaḥ* would prevail.

But the view that, in a negative, compound, it is the meaning of the first term which is the main thing, is also wrong, because, according to that, there should be a short final vowel in *avarṣā* which would be wrong.[83] The accepted view is that the meaning of the second term is the main thing.[84] Therefore, the compound would get the gender and number of the second term. Thus, there is no question of the extension of gender and number according to P. 1.2.52. A negative compound is not like an adjective or a *bahuvrīhi* compound which are based on difference between their own meaning and that of the outside word and which, therefore, take the gender and number of the word which they qualify. So we can have expressions like *abrāhamaṇaḥ kṣattriyaḥ, abrāhmaṇaḥ kṣattram* where the gender of the compound is according to that of the second term. Number is also of the same nature. That is why they are said to be natural.

83. See Texts.
84. See Texts.

CONCLUSION

I hope that the exposition of the main ideas of Bhartṛhari in the preceeding chapters has made it quite clear that he has made a significant and original contribution to Indian thought. The central idea of his philosophy that the ultimate Reality is of the nature of the word which presupposes consciousness has resulted in the notion that all of us are born with the source of valid knowledge and of speech within us. This notion was quite distinct from what was held by the *Mīmāṃsakas*, the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Bauddhas* on that subject. To Bhartṛhari must be given the credit for raising *Vyākaraṇa* to the rank of a *Darśana*, that is, a discipline by following which man can attain liberation. To him again must be given the credit for putting together, for the first time, in a somewhat logical sequence all those general and particular notions which form the basis of the forms of the Sanskrit language. In this process emerged also those notions such as that of the *sphoṭa* which throw light, not only on the Sanskrit language but also on language in general. It is in the *Vākyapadīya* that one sees gathered together in one place all those ideas which might be called the contribution of Ancient India to General Linguistics. He saw more clearly than even Patañjali that words moved about in a realm of their own, a realm which had links with the outside world but which was different from it. He saw that the forms of language must be explained with the help of notions derived from this realm and not from an analysis of the outside world. It is remarkable how aware Bhartṛhari was, while explaining the notions derived from the realm of words, of the allied notions of those who were busy analysing the outside reality. He was aware of their work and its bearing on his own but he was quite conscious all the time that, as a Grammarian, his point of view and methods were different. It is true that he owes this idea to Patañjali, but it was left to him to develop it and to make the most of it. It is not an accident that Helārāja found it necessary to remind us of this point of view in practically every section of the third *Kāṇḍa*. The particular notion dealt with in each section became intelligible only from this point of view, only as long as we remembered that words moved about in their own realm.

As words move about in their own realm, a student of words has to confine himself to that realm and is not concerned with outside

reality. As Bhartṛhari puts it : *Kim asmākaṃ vastugatena vicāreṇa* = 'of what use is it to us to think about the outside reality ?' And yet while reading Helārāja's commentary, one often wonders whether he has not strayed away from the realm of words into that of outside reality. The fact is that it is sometimes difficult not to mix up the two, considering that they have many links and that the thinkers belonging to the two realms often make use of the same words. While reading the *Kālasamuddeśa* one sometimes feel, that Bhartṛhari is carried away and plunges into the task of determining the nature of Time rather than that of merely isolating the notion which accounts for the tense distinctions in Sanskrit. But it does not take Helārāja long to remind us that no attempt is really being made to determine the nature of Time philosophically.

Bhartṛhari's attitude towards the different systems of philosophy has already been clarified. Attention has been drawn to his spirit of accommodation. While he emphasizes his difference from the other systems, it is remarkable how frequently their views are brought into the discussion, not necessarily for refutation. Often they are brought in as analogies to explain some particular point which he wants to emphasize. One feels that the *Vaiśeṣika*, the *Sāṅkhya* or the *Bauddha* is always round the corner to take part in the discussion. All this takes place without the spirit of polemics being introduced. The other views are brought in for clarification and not for refutation.

While we may recognise the originality of his thought, he himself emphasized that it was based on Tradition, particularly the Vedic and the grammatical Tradition. It is not an accident that he pays homage to Āgama so often. In many places in the *Vākyapadīya* he is interpreting particular passages of the *Mahābhāṣya,* following the master's thought step by step. His contribution consists in having brought together in one place and arranged in some kind of sequence all the general notions on which the forms of the Sanskrit language are based. Secondly he linked these general notions on the word and its meaning with a general metaphysical and epistemological background. He claims that his metaphysical background goes back to the Vedic Tradition though it is certain that it was influenced by the development of the philosophical systems up to his day. He was very close to the philosophical circles and, of course, he was in the direct line of succession from *Pāṇini*, *Kātyāyana* and *Patañjali.*

Though Bhartṛhari has arranged the material gathered from the works of the *Munitraya* in some kind of sequence, one cannot say that it is all made up into a complete system. On many points, there is not enough information. For example, while he asserts that the child is born with *śabdabhāvanā* which is obviously not the knowledge of any language, he does not say how ultimately it learns the language or how the original *śabdabhāvanā* is transformed into knowledge of a particular language as the child grows up. The sentences are indivisible units and are the only elements which are real. The process by which the child learns the language must be, therefore, much more than merely learning the meanings of individual words by watching the usage of elders and using the method of agreement, difference and elimination, such as the Mīmāṃsakas conceived it. But Bhartṛhari is silent on the subject. Similarly, while he is emphatic that *Vyākaraṇa* is a means of attaining *Mokṣa* which he visualised as a process of spiritual ascent, he does not describe the different stages of that ascent and one is left to make guesses on the basis of some quotations in the *Vṛtti*. He does no more than mention in the stanzas the three stages of *Vāk*, namely, the *Vaikharī, Madhyamā* and *Paśyantī*. They are not defined and described in the stanzas. One suspects that they are connected with the process of ascent to *mokṣa* but how it is not clear. Similarly, there are gaps in our information relating to the details of the process of the manifestation of the cosmos from the *Brahman*—*śabdatattva* and of its merging into it. One gets the impression that Bhartṛhari believed that it was a cyclic process, but the cycle is nowhere described in detail. The fact is that he never forgets that hs is a grammarian and as one approaches the end of the *Vākyapadīya*, matters grammatical occupy his attention more and more and the metaphysical and cosmogonic background is forgotten.

TEXTS

Chapter I.

1. *Bhartṛhari and his works*

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
2	7	प्रायेण संक्षेपरुचीनल्पविद्यापरिग्रहान् । संप्राप्य वैयाकरणान् संग्रहेऽस्तमुपागते ॥ कृतेऽथ पतञ्जलिना गुरुणा तीर्थदर्शिना । सर्वेषां न्यायबीजानां महाभाष्ये निबन्धने ॥ अलब्धगाधे गाम्भीर्यादुत्तान इव सौष्ठवात् । तस्मिन्नकृतबुद्धीनां नैवावास्थित निश्चयः ॥ बैजिसौभवहर्यक्षैः शुष्कतर्कानुसारिभिः । आर्षे विप्लाविते ग्रन्थे संग्रहप्रतिकञ्चुके ॥ यः पतञ्जलिशिष्येभ्यो भ्रष्टो व्याकरणागमः । काले स दाक्षिणात्येषु ग्रन्थमात्रे व्यवस्थितः ॥ पर्वतादागमं लब्ध्वा भाष्यबीजानुसारिभिः । स नीतो बहुमार्गत्वं चन्द्राचार्यादिभिः पुनः ॥ न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गास्तानभ्यस्य स्वं च दर्शनम् । प्रणीतो गुरुणास्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः ॥ Vāk. II. 478-484. (University of Poona Sanskrit Series, Vol. II).
3	8	न तेनास्मद्गुरोस्तत्रभवतो वसुरातादन्यः कश्चिदिमं भाष्यार्णवमवगाहितुमलमित्युक्तं भवति । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 480).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
„	9	पर्वतस्त्रिकूटैकदेशवर्तित्रिलिङ्गैकदेशादिति । तत्र ह्युपलतले रावणविरचितो मूलभूतव्याकरणागमस्तिष्ठति । केनचिच्च ब्रह्मरक्षसानीय चन्द्राचार्यवसुरातगुरुप्रभृतीनां दत्त इति । ते खलु यथावद् व्याकरणस्य स्वरूपं तत उपलभ्य सततं च शिष्याणां व्याख्याय बहुशाखत्वं नीतो विस्तारं प्रापित इत्यनुश्रूयते । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 483).
„	10	अत्र कदाचिद् योगतो विचार्य तत्रभवता वसुरातगुरुणा ममायमागमः संज्ञाय वात्सल्यात् प्रणीतः इति स्वरचितस्यास्य गुरुपूर्वक्रममभिधातुमाह न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गांस्तान्.... ।
„	11	एवं तावद् भर्तृहर्यादिदर्शनमुक्तम् । वसुरातो भर्तृहरेरुपाध्यायः । (Pu. on Vāk. II, 484). (Siṃhasūri in his commentary on Mallavādin's *Nayacakra* as quoted by Prof. Sadhu Ram in J. G. R. Institute IX p. 136ff).
4	13	भर्तृहरिर्वाक्यपदीयप्रकीर्णकयोः कर्ता महाभाष्यत्रिपाद्या व्याख्याता च । (J. Eggeling—*Vardhamāna's Gaṇaratnamahodadhi* p. 2).
5	14	त्रैलोक्यगामिनी येन त्रिकाण्डी त्रिपदी कृता । तस्मै समस्तविद्याश्रीकान्ताय हरये नमः ॥ (Vāk. III. c. p. 272 University of Travancore Sanskrit Series No. CXLVIII).
6	19	तच्छेषभूते काण्डेऽस्मिन् सप्रपञ्चे स्वरूपतः । श्लोकार्थद्योतनपरः प्रकाशोऽयं विधीयते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. 1. p. 1, l. 9).
„	20	वर्त्मनामत्र केषांचिद् वस्तुमात्रमुदाहृतम् । काण्डे तृतीये न्यक्षेण भविष्यति विचारणा ॥ (Vāk. II. 485).
7	23	तत्र द्वादश षट् चतुर्विंशतिर्वा लक्षणानीति लक्षणसमुद्देशे सापदेशं सविरोधं विस्तरेण व्याख्यास्यते । (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. II. 76).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
„	24	एतेषां च वितत्य सोपपत्तिकं सनिदर्शनं स्वरूपं पदकाण्डे लक्षणसमुद्देशे विनिर्दिष्टमिति ग्रन्थकृतैव स्ववृत्तौ प्रतिपादितम् । आगमभ्रंशाल्लेखकप्रमादादिना वा लक्षणसमुद्देशश्च पदकाण्डमध्ये न प्रसिद्धः । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 77).
„	25	एषा च टीकाकृता स्ववृत्तौ सा च तुल्यबलेष्वसंभवादित्यादिना बहुप्रकारा दर्शिता । नेयत्ता प्रकाराणामस्यास्तेनापि तत्र दर्शिता । यस्मादुक्तम्–सेयमपरिमाण-विकल्पा बाधा विस्तरेण बाधासमुद्देशे प्रदर्शयिष्यते । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 77).
8	27	एतच्चोपमासमुद्देशेऽप्यर्थविचारणावसरे सविस्तरं प्रदर्शयिष्यति । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II. 126).
9	29	वैयाकरणतां त्यक्त्वा विज्ञानान्वेषणेन किम् । भवतामप्रस्तुतेन न केवलमिहोदितम् ॥ विज्ञानाभासनं यावत् समीक्षायामुदाहृतम् ॥ (Somananda—*Śivadṛṣṭi* II, 92-93, Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies LIV).
10	30	(a) अर्थप्रतीतिहेतुसाधुशब्दानुशासनव्यापारमेव वैयाकरणत्वं त्यक्त्वा मोक्षप्रयोजनैः शास्त्रैर्यत् सम्यग्ज्ञानमनुसरणीयं तदन्वेषणेन भवतां करणीयत्वेनाप्रस्तुतेन न किंचित् । न केवलं चात्रैव पश्यन्त्यभिधानेन सम्यग्ज्ञानाभास एव उक्तो यावच्छब्दधातुसमीक्षायामपि विद्वद्भर्तृहरिणा दिक्कालादिलक्षणेन व्यापकत्वं विहन्यते । अवश्यं व्यापको यो हि सर्वदिक्षु स वर्तते ॥ दिक्कालाद्यनवच्छिन्नानन्तचिन्मात्रमूर्तये । स्वानुभूत्येकमानाय नमः शान्ताय तेजसे ॥ इति लक्षणेन दिग्देशकालैरवच्छेदो विशिष्यमाणतया निषिद्धा । तच्चायुक्तम् । परिमितदेशकालादर्थात्तस्यावच्छेदात्, अन्यथा सर्वदिक्कालादिविशेषणभात्रे व्यापकत्वादि न स्यात् । (Ibid, p. 83-84).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
		(b) सुभाषितत्रिशती, p. 2 (Nirnaya Sagar Press).
11	36	संदर्भणेन च भर्तृहरिः पदानां कन्दर्पकार्मुकरसार्पणकर्मठेन । शृंगारनीतिविगतस्पृहतानुबन्ध– मन्यच्च पद्यशतकत्रयमाततान ॥ ग्रन्थोऽधिकृत्य किल वाक्यपदे बुधानां चक्रेऽथ तेन निखिलार्थविबोधहेतुः । यस्यातनोद् विवरणप्रणयेन: हेला- राजः शशीव किरणेन विवृद्धिमब्धेः ॥ (Rāmabhadra Dīkṣita—Patañjalicarita, 8, 10-11 Kāvyamālā 51).
14	42	(a) कविकुलकृतिकैरवहरकाटः श्रीभर्तृहरिः कविर्भट्टिकाव्यं चिकीर्षुः तस्याशेषाशुभशमनैकप्रयोजनश्रीरामचन्द्रचरितरूपस्य स्वत एव निष्प्रत्यूहेन समाप्तिं निश्चिन्वन् स्वतन्त्रेण मङ्गलाचारं परिहरन् साकांक्षपद्येन ग्रन्थार्थमुत्थापयति अभूदिति । (Beginning of Jayamaṅgala's commentary *Jayamaṅgalā*). (b) अत्र तावन्महोपाध्यायश्रीभर्तृहरिकविना शब्दकाव्ययोर्लक्षणलक्षितानि महाकाव्यतयाभिधेयानि । अतः सर्गबन्धः काव्यबन्धश्च कृतः । (Beginning of the *Vaijayantī* commentary of Kandarpaśarman). (c) अत्र कविना श्रीधरस्वामिसूनुना भर्तृहरिणा सर्गबन्धो (Beginning of Vidyavinoda's *Bhaṭṭicandrikā*).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
		(d) भर्तृहरिर्नाम कविः श्रीरामकथाश्रयं महाकाव्यं चकार। (In the beginning of the *Mugdhabodhinī* of Bharatamallika). (Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts of the Library of the India Office, Pt. II, p. 260, nos. 921-922—*Bhaṭṭi-Kāvya*).
”	43	गतविधप्रकारास्तुल्यार्था इति भर्तृहरिः। (Puruṣottamadeva—*Bhāṣāvṛtti* on P. 1.3.21).
”	44	धूमाच्चेति-भर्तृहरिः। (Ibid on P. 3.1.16).
15	45	तथापि आचार्यटङ्क – भर्तृप्रपंच-भर्तृमित्र-भर्तृहरि – ब्रह्मदत्त-शंकर-श्रीवत्साङ्कभास्करादिविरचितसितासितविविधनिबन्धश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो न यथान्यथा च प्रतिपद्यन्ते इति तत्प्रतीतये युक्तः प्रकरणप्रक्रमः। (Yāmunācārya—*Siddhitraya*—p. 6, Benares Edition).
		2. The commentaries on the *Vākyapadīya*.
20	10	(a) वर्णपदवाक्यविषयाः प्रयत्नविशेषसाध्या ध्वनयो वर्णपदवाक्याख्यान् स्फोटान् पुनः पुनराविर्भावयन्तो बुद्धिष्वारोपयन्ति। (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, p. 148, l. 5-6). (b) वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नाः तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिघ्नन्ति। (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, p. 154, l. 1.) (c) वाक्ये हि निर्भागे तदभिव्यक्तिविषयैः समुत्थाप्यमाना ध्वनयः... (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I. p. 136, l. 3).
”	11	(a) सा खलु परप्रदर्शितविषयग्राहिणामशक्तिः प्रतिपत्तॄणाम्। तथाभूतोपायक्रमवर्णान्तरसाध्यमेव हि तेषां शब्ददर्शनम्। निष्क्रमं तु दाशतयमप्युपायान्तरेण प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रतिपादयन्ति च। (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, p. 152, l. 1-3).

Page No.	Serial No	Text with reference
		(b) तस्मात् परोपदर्शितशब्दग्राहिगामनन्योपायतया विपर्यासनियमः। अपरप्रदर्शितविषयास्तु परमर्षयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणोऽव्याहतान्तःप्रकाशा विधूतविपर्यासक्रमं वाक्तत्त्वं प्रतिपेदिरे प्रतिपादयामासुरिति प्रतिज्ञायते। (*Sphoṭasiddhi*, Kā. 21, p. 53).
21	12	The S. S. first quotes Vāk. I, 86:— भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस्य वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः। क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाग् ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम्॥ S. S. p. 54. Immediately after, it quotes the following stanza quoted in in *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, 86. ज्ञेयेन न विना ज्ञानं व्यवहारेऽवतिष्ठते। नालब्धक्रमया वाचा कश्चिदर्थोऽभिधीयते॥ S. S. p. 54.
21	14	अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम्। विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥ न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते। (Somānanda—*Śivadṛṣṭi*, pp. 43-44).
29	58	सूत्राम्भसं पदावर्त्तं पारायणरसातलम्। धातूणादिगणग्राहं ध्यानग्रहबृहत्प्लवम्॥ धीरैरालोकितप्रान्तममेधोभिरसूयितम्। सदोपभुक्तं सर्वाभिरन्यविद्याकरेणुभिः॥ नापारयित्वा दुर्गाधममुं व्याकरणार्णवम्। शब्दरत्नं स्वयंगम्यमलंकर्तुमयं जनः॥ (Bhāmaha—*Kāvyālaṅkāra* VI, 1-3).
37	65	क्रमाख्या हि कालशक्तिर्ब्रह्मणो जन्मवत्सु पदार्थेषु जन्मादिक्रियाद्वारकमेव पौर्वापर्येणावभासोपगमविधायिनी नापरो द्रव्यभूतः काल इति

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		अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः । जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥ इत्यत्र शब्दप्रभायां निर्णीतोऽयमर्थः । (Vāk. III, pt. 1, p. 44, l. 23).
”	66	विस्तरेणागमप्रामाण्यं वाक्यपदीयेऽस्माभिः प्रथमकाण्डे शब्दप्रभायां निर्णीतमिति तत एवावधार्यम् । Ibid, p. 54, l. 9.
”	67	वाच्यवाचकसंबन्धानां भावतोऽद्वयरूपता । तत्र ह्यान्तरे तत्त्वे श्रुत्यर्थशक्ती संसृज्येते इति विवर्तदशायां श्रुत्यर्थशाखात्मना तस्यैव विकासाद्वाच्यवाचकरूपतया भेदावभासौ ज्ञानज्ञेयरूपतयैवाविद्येति ब्रह्मकाण्ड एव प्रपंचेनायमर्थोऽस्माभिर्निर्णीत इति तत एवावधार्यम् । Ibid, p. 116, l. 17.
”	68	चित्सामान्यानुगमाच्च विश्वस्य प्रमाणसिद्धोऽभेद इति प्रथमकाण्ड एव निर्णीतम् । Ibid, p. 35, l. 14.
”	69	(a) कल्पना चाविद्याशक्तिः । सा च तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनिर्वाच्येति ब्रह्मकाण्डे निर्णीतम् । Ibid, p. 171, l. 18.
		(b) अविद्यापि च तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यां परस्मादनिर्वाच्यानादिसिद्धजीवात्मगतभेदप्रतिभासकारिणीत्युपपादितं ब्रह्मकाण्डे विस्तरत इति तत एवावधार्यम् । Ibid, p. 173, l. 16.
38	71	तथा च तदपेक्षं कर्मणः कारकत्वमत्रेति वाक्यार्थप्रधानभूता क्रियेति क्रियाविवेके विस्तरेणास्माभिरभिहितमिति तत एवावधार्यम् । Ibid, p. 60, l. 10.

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„	72	द्रष्टृदृश्यरूपतया च तस्यैव विवर्तः । तथा हि दृश्यं तावद् भावजातं संविदुपारूढम् । वेद्यमानैकत्वादेव वेदनैकपरमार्थम् । अप्रकाशस्य प्रकाशमानता-योगात्– इति पूर्वकाण्डेऽद्वयसिद्धौ च वितत्य विचारितम् । Ibid, p. 117, l. 2-4.
„	73	वार्तिककारस्यापीदमेव दर्शनमिति वार्तिकोन्मेषे कथितमस्माभिः । (Vāk. c. Part I, p. 149).
39	74	मुक्तापीड इति प्रसिद्धिमगमत् काश्मीरदेशे नृपः । श्रीमान् ख्यातयशा बभूव नृपतेस्तस्य प्रभावानुगः । मन्त्री लक्ष्मण इत्युदारचरितस्तस्यान्ववाये भवो हेलाराज इमं प्रकाशमकरोच्छ्रीभूतिराजात्मजः ॥ (Vāk. c. pt. II, p. 272).
„	75	बद्धा द्वादशभिर्ग्रन्थसहस्रैः पार्थिवावलिः । प्राङ् महामतिना येन हेलाराजद्विजन्मना ॥ तन्मतं पद्ममिहिरो दृष्ट्वाशोकादिपूर्वकान् । अष्टौ लवादीन् नृपतीन् स्वस्मिन् ग्रन्थे न्यवेशयत् ॥ (Kalhaṇa—*Rājataraṅgiṇī* I. 17-18.
„	76	जयति गुरुरेक एव श्रीश्रीकण्ठो भुवि प्रथितः । तदपरमूर्तिर्भगवान् महेश्वरो भूतिराजश्च ॥ TA. I, p. 28.
„	77	एतद्विद्यात्रयं श्रीमद्भूतिराजो न्यरूपयत् । यः साक्षादभजच्छ्रीमाञ्छ्रीकण्ठो मानुषीं तनुम् ॥ TA. III, p. 194.
„	78	अथोच्यते ब्रह्मविद्या सद्यः प्रत्ययदायिनी । शिवः श्रीभूतिराजो यामस्मभ्यं प्रत्यपादयत् ॥ TA. XII, p. 196.

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„	79	ततो गुरुतरः श्रीमान् भूतिराजो महामतिः । जयताद्भक्तजनतासमुद्धरणसाहसः ॥ MVV, p. 1.
„	80	यदाहुर्भूतिराजगुरवः क्षेपाज्ज्ञानाच्च काली कलनवशतयाथ... Tartrasāra, p. 30.
40	81	श्रीमान् कात्यायनोऽभूद्वररुचिसदृशः प्रस्फुरद्बोधतृप्तः । तद्वंशालंकृतो यः स्थिरमतिरभवत् सौशुकाख्योऽतिविद्वान् । विप्रः श्रीभूतिराजस्तदनु समभवत् तस्य सूनुर्महात्मा येनामी सर्वलोकास्तमसि निपतिताः प्रोद्धृता भानुनेव ॥ (Concluding verse of Abhinavagupta's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*).
„	82	श्रीनाथसंततिमहाम्बरधर्मकान्ति– श्रीभूतिराजतनयः स्वपितृप्रसादः । TA. XII, p. 414.
„	85	श्रीमहावैयाकरणश्रीहरिवृषभविरचितवाक्यपदीयप्रकाशे आगमसमुच्चयो नाम ब्रह्मकाण्डं प्रथमं समाप्तम् । C. The Commentary of Puṇyarāja. Vāk. a, p. 62.
41	88	एवं शब्दस्य प्रयोजनसहितं स्वरूपादिकं लेशतो निर्णीतम् । तस्य च साधारण्येन वाचकत्वं व्यवस्थापितम् । इदानीं मतभेदेन केषांचित् पदं वाचकमन्येषां वाक्यमिति वाचकात्मनो वाक्यस्वरूपस्य तावद्द्वितत्य स्वरूपप्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयकाण्डप्रारंभः Vāk. II, p. 1, (Varanasi Sanskrit University Edition).
„	89	शशाङ्कशिष्याच्छुत्वैतद् वाक्यकाण्डं समासतः । पुण्यराजेन तस्योक्ता सङ्गतिः कारिकाश्रिता ॥ Vāk. a. p. 291.

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,,	90	चतुर्दशानामपि यः प्रसिद्धो विद्यास्थितीनां परपारदृश्वा । शशाङ्कपूर्वं धर इत्युदारं यन्नाम लोके नितरां प्रसिद्धम् ॥ तदीयशिष्यः सहदेवनामा कुले प्रसूतः खलु तोमराणाम् । व्याख्यामिमां काव्यविचारशास्त्रे व्यधत्त लब्धीमिह वामनीये काश्मीरदेशादपसर्पतो मे शब्दानुशुद्धिं त्रिमुनिं निशम्य ॥ (Quoted in the Upodghāta, p. 13 of Vāk. b. I).
43	91	यथैवाव्यपदेशशब्दभागोपायमन्तर्निवेशि वाक्तत्त्वमभिन्नं मुख्यः शब्दात्मेति प्रसिद्धं तथा व्यतिपातिनीषु व्यावहारिकीषु बाह्यास्वर्थमात्रास्वव्यपदेश्योपचीयमान-विशेषं क्रमेण प्रत्यर्थनियतमुत्पद्यमानं बुद्धितत्त्वं बाह्यवस्तुतत्त्वेनैव प्रत्युपभुज्यते । नित्यपक्षे वा क्रमशक्तिरूपनिर्भासमात्रया विवर्तते । न हि प्रतिलब्धार्थरूपविपर्यासां बुद्धिमन्तरेण बाह्यं वस्तु व्यावहारिकीष्वर्थक्रियासु समर्थं भवति । तस्मादन्तर्निविष्ट-रूपेणार्थेन सर्वो व्यवहारः क्रियते । अन्ये तु संक्रान्तविषयरूपाया बुद्धेरात्मनि सम-वायाद् बुद्धिरूपनिवेशेन तद्रूपतामिवापन्ने बोधात्मके पुरुषे पुरुषार्थस्य प्रसिद्धिं मन्यन्ते । प्रकाशस्वभावया बुद्धया चितिस्वरूपस्यार्थस्वरूपस्य च प्रतिबिंबकयोगेनो-पग्रहे संभवति प्राप्तविषयरूपविपर्यासायामुपगृहीतपुरुषरूपायां बुद्धौ भोग्यभोक्तृ-शक्त्योरत्यन्तविभक्तयोरत्यन्तासंकीर्णयोरविभागप्राप्ताविव सत्यां विभागः प्रकल्पते । *Vṛtti* on Vāk. II. 31 (Varanasi Sanskrit University C. The *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva. Edition).
44	92	यद्यपि टीका बह्वयः पूर्वाचार्यैः सुनिर्मला रचिताः । सन्तः परिश्रमज्ञास्तथापि चैनां ग्रहीष्यन्ति ॥ Vāk. I, p. 1, l 10.

Chapter II.

1. Problems of Interpretation

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48	2	आज की भाषा में जिसे भाषातत्त्वशास्त्र और भाषाविज्ञान कहा जाता है, वाक्यपदीय का विषय वही है। (Dr. S. Varma – भाषातत्त्व और वाक्यपदीय, p. 1.)
,,	3	पुरानी टीकाओं में केवल हरिवृषभ या हरि की टीका में ही वाक्यपदीय की वक्तव्यवस्तु को समझने का प्रयास मिलता है। (Ibid. p. 1.)
,,	4	टीकाकार हरि प्रायः व्याकरणात्मक ग्रन्थियों में उलझने का यत्न नहीं करते। उन्हों ने न्याय, मीमांसा या अन्य दार्शनिक उलझनोंमें भी जाने का यत्न नहीं किया है। (Ibid. p. 8.)
49	5	व्याकरण का क्षेत्र है – पद। भर्तृहरि ने उस तथ्य को पहचान कर ही महाभाष्य टीका में पदविवेचन तक ही अपने कार्य को सीमित समझा। उसका विद्रोह या उसकी अभावपूर्ति व्यक्त हुई वाक्यविवेचना के लिये रचे गये वाक्य-पदीय में। वाक्यपदीय के आरम्भ में ही वे व्याकरण के इस अन्तर को स्पष्ट करके कहते हैं – इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं (वा. १. १६) अर्थात् व्याकरण का क्षेत्र पद है। (Ibid, p. 36).
54	14	सीधे शब्दों में जब तक वक्ता या श्रोता में इच्छा की प्रेरणा नहीं होती वाणी की अभिव्यक्ति या उसके ग्रहण की पूर्णता का प्रश्न ही नहीं उठता। काव्यशास्त्रियों ने ग्रहणपक्ष में साधारणीकरण की एक स्थिति मानी है। यह मन से परे आत्मा की स्थिति है। अभिधा की भौतिक स्तर से भावना तक मन की

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		स्थिति मानी जा सकती है। पर व्यक्तिसंबन्ध से हीन होकर सार्वत्रिक और देशकालानवच्छिन्न (निर्वैयक्तिक) अनुभूति को पा लेना सब के बस में नहीं। शब्दार्थ को समझकर भी मूल भावना को न समझ पानेवाले व्यक्ति कम नहीं होते। साधारणीकरण में निर्वैयक्तिकता की यह स्थिति उन्हें ही प्राप्त होती है जो विषय के ग्रहण के साथ साथ मानसिक दृष्टि से भी अपने व्यक्तित्व से ऊपर उठते जाते हैं। दूसरे शब्दों में शब्द के भौतिक रूप से संबन्ध छूटकर जब उसकी आत्मा या वस्तु से संबन्ध हो जाता है तभी शब्द का अर्थ भी सार्थक होता है। इसी अर्थ में भर्तृहरि शरीर, आत्मा और वस्तु को एक मानते हैं – आत्मा वस्तु स्वभावश्च शरीरं तत्त्वमित्यपि । द्रव्यमित्यस्य पर्यायाः तच्च नित्यमति स्थितम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 43-44)
		2. The Contents of the *Vākyapadīya.*
56	1	अपोद्धारपदार्था ये ये चार्थाः स्थितलक्षणाः । अन्वाख्येयाश्च ये शब्दा ये चापि प्रतिपादकाः ॥ कार्यकारणभावेन योग्यभावेन च स्थिताः । धर्मे ये प्रत्यये चाङ्गं संबन्धाः साध्वसाधुषु ॥ ते लिङ्गैश्च स्वशब्दैश्च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नुपवर्णिताः । स्मृत्यर्थमनुगम्यन्ते केचिदेव यथागमम् ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 64, l. 1-6).
,,	2	त्रिष्वप्येषु श्लोकेषु प्रस्तुतस्य परिसमाप्तिः । (Ibid, p. 65, l. 1).
,,	3	यतोऽष्टौ पदार्था निरूप्यन्तेऽस्मिन् प्रकरणे । (Ibid, p. 2, l. 2).
,,	4	इह पदार्थाष्टकविचारपरत्वात् वाक्यपदीयस्य.... (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 1, l. 11).

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57	5	(a) ...आगमसमुच्चयो नाम ब्रह्मकाण्डं समाप्तम्। (Vāk. I, p. 235, l. 7).
		(b) ...प्रणीतो गुरुणास्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः। Vāk. II. 484 (University of Poona Sanskrit Series, vol. II).
,,	6	(a) नित्याः शब्दार्थसंबन्धा इत्येतत्पूर्वाः कारिकाः सर्वा एव व्याकरणप्रयोजनान्वाख्यानाय। (Vāk. I, p. 2, l. 18).
		(b) एवं व्याकरणप्रयोजनमभिधाय शास्त्रव्यवस्थापनद्वारेण तेनास्य प्रकरणस्य संबन्धार्थमुपोद्घातं करोति नित्याः... (Ibid, p. 51, l. 25).
,,	7	एवं शब्दस्य प्रयोजनसहितं स्वरूपादिकं लेशतो निर्णीतम्। Vāk. II, p. 1. (Varanasi Sanskrit University Edition).
,,	8	...प्रथमकाण्डेन प्रयोजनादिपदार्थे निर्णीते.... (Vāk. III, pt. i, l. 11).
58	9	एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग् भवति। (M. Bhā. III, p. 58, l. 14).
,,	10	(a) सोऽयमक्षरसमाम्नायो वाक्समाम्नायः पुष्पितः फलितश्चन्द्रतारकवत् प्रतिमण्डितो वेदितव्यो ब्रह्मराशिः। (M. Bhā. I, p. 36, l. 16).
		(b) पुष्पितः फलितश्च। दृष्टादृष्टाभ्यामभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसाभ्याम्। M. Bhā. Dīpikā, p. 92, l. 14 (B.O.R.I. edition).
,,	11	तद् द्वारमपवर्गस्य... (Vāk. I, 14).

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,,	12	इयं सा मोक्षमाणानामजिह्मा राजपद्धतिः । (Vāk. I, 16).
,,	13	तद् व्याकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते । Ibid, 22).
,,	14	तस्माद्यः शब्दसंस्कारः सा सिद्धिः परमात्मनः । तस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वज्ञस्तद् ब्रह्मामृतमश्नुते ॥ Ibid, 123 [131]
,,	15	(a) महता देवेन नः साम्यं यथा स्यादित्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । (M. Bhā. I, p. 3, l. 22)
		(b) अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तरवस्थितम् । प्राहुर्महान्तमृषभं येन सायुज्यमिष्यते ॥ Vāk. I, 122 [130]
60	16	शिष्टेभ्य आगमात् सिद्धाः साधवो धर्मसाधनम् । अर्थप्रत्यायनाभेदे विपरीतास्त्वसाधवः ॥ (Vāk. I, 27)
,,	17	ते साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः । तादात्म्यमुपगम्येव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः । न शिष्टैरनुगम्यन्ते पर्याया इव साधवः । ते यतः स्मृतिशास्त्रेण तस्मात् साक्षादवाचकाः ॥ Vāk. I, 141-142 [149-150]
,,	18	द्वावुपादानशब्देषु इत्यतः प्रभृति प्रकरणं प्रवर्तिष्यते । (Vāk. I, p. 1, l. 12).

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61	19	आख्यातशब्दः सङ्घातो जातिः सङ्घातवर्तिनी । एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्ध्यनुसंहृतिः ॥ पदमाद्यं पृथक् सर्वं पदं साकांक्षमित्यपि । वाक्यं प्रति मतिर्भिन्ना बहुधा न्यायवादिनाम् । (Vāk. II, 1-2).
63	20	वर्त्मनामत्र केषांचिद्वस्तुमात्रमुदाहृतम् । काण्डे तृतीये न्यक्षेण भविष्यति विचारणा ॥ (Vāk. II, 485)
,,	21	तच्छेषभूते काण्डेऽस्मिन् सप्रपंचे स्वरूपतः । श्लोकार्थद्योतनपरः प्रकाशोऽयं विधीयते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 1, l. 9-10).
,,	22	तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते । सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 41, l. 17-18).
64	23	संसर्गभूतात् सम्भूताः संविद्रूपादपोद्धृताः । शास्त्रे विभक्ता वाक्यार्थात् प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थवत् ॥ निमित्तभूताः साधुत्वे शास्त्रादनुमितात्मकाः । केचित् पदार्था वक्ष्यन्ते संक्षेपेण यथागमम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 182, l. 6-9).
,,	24	(a) दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः । शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः । (Ibid, p. 207, l. 2-3).

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		(b) तथाहि परोपाधिरूपाः शक्तयो दिगाद्याः पारतंत्र्यं च शक्तिलक्षणमिति क्रियापि द्रव्यपरतन्त्रा शक्तिरिति व्यपदिश्यते। (Ibid, p. 207, l. 5-6).
,,	25	तत्र गुणादीनां द्रव्यपरतन्त्रत्वात् प्रथमं तदाश्रयं द्रव्य लक्ष्यति। (Ibid, p. 187, l. 1).
,,	26	इदानीं गुणस्य शास्त्रीयलिङ्गानुमितं लक्षणमाह। (Ibid, p. 192, l. 1).
,,	27	तत्र दिशस्तावदनुमानेन स्वरूपं लक्षयति। (Ibid, p. 209, l. 13).
65	28	संख्यापुरुषौ साधनाधारद्रव्यधर्मत्वात् साधनद्वारेण क्रियामुपकुर्वन्तौ गुणभूतौ। तत्र कालोपग्रहौ तु साक्षादेव क्रियोपकारितया गुणभूतौ। (Vāk. III, pt. 2, p. 29, l. 8).
,,	29	लिङ्गं तु नामपदानामधिकं वाच्यमिति तदिदानीं विचारयितुं यथासंभवं दर्शनभेदेन तल्लक्षणमाह। (Vāk. c. pt. i. p. 135).
		3. Bhartṛhari and the Darśanas.
69	1	न्यायप्रस्थानमार्गांस्तानभ्यस्य स्वं च दर्शनम्। प्रणीतो गुरुणास्माकमयमागमसंग्रहः॥ (Vāk. II, 484).
,,	2	पूर्वापरादिविभागरहितमनुत्पन्नमविनाशि यच्छब्दमयं ब्रह्म तस्यायं रूपादिर्भावग्रामः परिणाम इति प्रतीयते। यथोक्तम् अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरं। विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः॥ इति Kamalaśilaś *Pañjikā* on *Tattvasaṅgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, vol. I. p. 67 (Gaekwad Oriental Series).

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70	3	वैयाकरणतां त्यक्त्वा विज्ञानाभासनेन किम् । भवतामप्रस्तुतेन न केवलमिहोदितम् । विज्ञानाभासनं तावत् समीक्षायामुदाहृतम् ॥ (Somānanda—Śivadṛṣṭi II, 72-73 (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies LIV).
71	9	यदन्तःशब्दतत्त्वं तु नादैरेकं प्रकाशितम् । तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता ॥ (Vāk. II, 30).
,,	10	अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता । कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्याः ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ॥ (Vāk. I, 93).
72	11	बहुलवचनस्याकृत्स्नत्वादुत्तरत्रानुक्रमणसामर्थ्यम् । (M. Bhā. I. p. 400, l. 4).
,,	12	सामान्यलक्षणं बहुलग्रहणादियुक्तं विषयविभागस्याप्रतिपादकत्वान्न तथा कारकम् । प्रपंचोऽप्यानन्त्यप्रसङ्गान्न कारक इति मध्यमावस्थाश्रीयत इत्यर्थः । (*Pradipa* on B. Bhā. on P. 6.3.14).
,,	13	अवश्यं खल्वस्माभिरिदं वक्तव्यं बहुलमन्यतरस्यामुभयथा वैकेषामिति । सर्व-वेदपारिषदं हीदं शास्त्रम् । तत्र नैकः पन्थाः शक्य आस्थातुम् । (M. Bhā. on 2.1.58).
73	14	(a) शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । शब्दश्च शब्दज्ञाने धर्ममाह नापशब्दज्ञानेऽधर्मम् । (M. Bhā. I, p. 11, l. 1). (b) एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग्भवति । (M.Bhā. II, p. 58, l. 14).

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,,	15	अयं दण्डो हरानेन । अस्ति दण्डस्य हरतेश्च व्यपेक्षेति कृत्वा निघातः प्राप्नोति । (M. Bhā. I, p. 366, l. 8).
,,	16	शब्दप्रमाणका वयम् । यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । शब्दश्चेह सत्तामाह । अयं दण्डः । अस्तीति गम्यते । स दण्डः कर्ता भूत्वान्येनाभिसंबध्यमानः करणं संपद्यते । (M. Bhā. I, p. 366, l. 12-15).
74	17	अनेन ग्रन्थेन विविधामनित्यतामाह विविधा ह्यनित्यता । संसर्गानित्यता विपरिणामानित्यता वस्तुविनाशनित्यता ।....संसर्गानित्यता यथा स्फटिकस्योपाश्रयविशेषैः संसर्गिभिर्द्रव्यान्तरैः प्रच्छादितं स्वरूपं नोपलभ्यते स्वतः सच्च तदपि तथा विपरिणामानित्यता यथा बदरस्य श्यामलतातिरोभावे (न) रक्तताप्रादुर्भावेन । वस्तुविनाशानित्यता यः सर्वेण सर्वप्रध्वंसो निरुपाख्ये । (M. Bhā. dī, pt. 1, p. 28, l. 1. ff).
75	21	प्रज्ञा विवेकं लभते भिन्नैरागमदर्शनैः । कियद्वा शक्यमुन्नेतुं स्वतर्कमनुधावता ॥ (Vāk. II, 486).
76	22	अधुना वैशेषिकदृष्ट्याप्यर्थगतसामान्यधर्माश्रयेण जातिपदार्थव्याप्तिमाह । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 27, l. 6).
,,	23	इदानीं विज्ञानवादेनापि पदार्थव्यवस्थामाह । अनुप्रवृत्तिरूपां यां प्रख्यातामाकृतिं विदुः । केचिद् व्यावृत्तिरूपां तु द्रव्यत्वेन प्रचक्षते ॥ सर्वपार्षदं हीदं शास्त्रम्, शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इति पदार्थव्यवस्थेयम् । (Ibid, p. 32, l. 9 ff).

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,,	24	प्रतिक्षिप्तमपि पक्षं व्यवहारार्थमङ्गीकरोत्येव टीकाकारः। यतः सर्वपार्षदं हि व्याकरणशास्त्रम्। तत्र चायं स्थित इत्यत्र पुनः पदपदार्थावङ्गीकरोति। (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II, 250).
77	27	यथा विषयधर्माणां ज्ञानेऽत्यन्तमसंभवः। तदात्मेव च तत् सिद्धमत्यन्तमतदात्मकम्॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 113, l. 8).
,,	28	...इति सर्वदर्शनेष्वविद्यान्वयिनी। एवमसत्याकारोपधानेन तत्त्वप्रतिभासः सिद्ध इति साधनान्वयो गृहीतः। (Ibid, p. 114, l. 4-5).
78	29	वैशेषिकादीनां भवन्तु निःसामान्यानि सामान्यानि। वैयाकरणानां शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इत्यभ्युपेयतामन्वयिरुपावच्छेदेन शब्दस्य प्रत्ययस्योत्पत्तेः जातिष्वपि जातिरविरुद्धाभ्युपगम्या। (Ibid, p. 24, l. 1-2, 4-5).
79	30	वस्तूपलक्षणं यत्र सर्वनाम प्रत्युज्यते। द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेद्यत्वेन विवक्षितः॥ (Ibid, p. 187, l. 2-3).
,,	31	नैष जातेः प्रकर्षः। कस्तर्हि। गुणस्य। गौरयं यः शकटं वहति। गोतरोऽयं यः शकटं वहति सीरं च। गौरियं या समां समां विजायते। गोतरेयं या समां समां विजायते स्त्रीवत्सा च। (M. Bhā. II, p. 413, l. 16-18).
80	32	संसर्गि भेदकं यद् यद् सव्यापारं प्रतीयते। गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्र उदाहृतम्॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 192, 2-3).

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„	34	स्तनकेशवती स्त्री स्याल्लोमशः पुरुषः स्मृतः । उभयोरन्तरं यच्च तदभावे नपुंसकम् । लिङ्गात्स्त्रीपुंसयोर्ज्ञाने भ्रुकुंसे टाप् प्रसज्यते ॥ (M. Bhā. II, p. 196, l. 4-6).
„	36	संस्त्यानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमास्थेयौ । .... संस्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिश्च पुमान् । कस्य पुनः सस्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिर्वा पुमान् । गुणानाम् । केषाम् । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानाम् । .... तच्चोभयं सर्वत्र । यद्युभयं सर्वत्र कुतो व्यवस्था । विवक्षातः । संस्त्यानविवक्षायां स्त्री पुंस्त्वविवक्षायां पुमान् उभयोरविवक्षायां नपुंसकम् । (M. Bhā. II, p. 197, l. 28 and p. 198, l. 4 ff).
„	37	आविर्भावस्तिरोभावः स्थितिश्चेत्यनपायिनः । धर्मा मूर्तिषु सर्वासु लिङ्गत्वेनानुदर्शिताः ॥ (Vāk. c. III, pt. 1, Liṅga 13).
81	39	नास्माभिर्दर्शनविवेकः प्रारब्धः । किन्तु शाब्दे व्यवहारे यदङ्गं तत परीक्ष्यम् । अस्ति च भिन्नकालः शाब्दो व्यवहारोऽभूदस्ति भविष्यतीति । (Vāk. III, p. ii, p. 62, l. 25-26).
„	40	पदार्थचर्चाविषये ब्रह्मदर्शननयेनैव संबन्धादिविचारे विनिगमनात् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 43, l. 10).
		4. Bhartṛhari and the *Pramāṇas*.
84	1	यथेन्द्रियं सन्निपतद्वैचित्र्येणोपदर्शकम् । तथैव शब्दादर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥ (Vāk. II, 134).
„	2	वक्त्रान्यथैव प्रकान्तो भिन्नेषु प्रतिपत्तृषु । स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण शब्दार्थः प्रविभज्यते ॥ (Ibid, 135).

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,,	3	एकस्मिन्नपि दृश्येऽर्थे दर्शनं भिद्यते पृथक् । कालान्तरेण चैकोऽपि तं पश्यत्यन्यथा पुनः ॥ (Ibid, 136).
,,	4	तलवद् दृश्यते व्योम खद्योतो हव्यवाडिव । नैव चास्ति तलं व्योम्नि न खद्योतो हुताशनः ॥ (Ibid, 140).
,,	5	तस्माददृष्टतत्त्वानां सापराधं बहुच्छलम् । दर्शनं वचनं चापि नित्यमेवानवस्थितम् ॥ (Ibid, 138).
,,	6	(a) ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किंचिदवस्थितम् । न तेन व्यवहारोऽस्ति न तच्छब्दनिबन्धनम् ॥ (Ibid, 139). (b) रूपणव्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ । ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिलापं च सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ । (Vāk. III, p. 163, l. 3-4).
85	7	दुर्लभं कस्यचिल्लोके सर्वावयवदर्शनम् । कैश्चित्त्ववयवैर्दृष्टैरर्थः कृत्स्नोऽनुमीयते ॥ (Vāk. II, 161).
,,	8	वेदशास्त्राविरोधी च तर्कश्चक्षुरपश्यताम् । रूपमात्राद्धि वाक्यार्थः केवलान्नावतिष्ठते ॥ (Vāk. I, 127 [135]).
86	9	शब्दानामेव सा शक्तिस्तर्को यः पुरुषाश्रयः । (Vāk. I, 129 [137]).

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,,	10	नागामादृते धर्मस्तर्केण व्यवतिष्ठते । (Ibid, 30).
,,	11	अदृष्टार्थानां च कर्मणां फलनियमे स्वभावसंविद् आगमप्रतिबद्धा । *Vṛtti* on the above.
,,	12	अवस्थादेशकालानां भेदाद् भिन्नासु शक्तिषु । भावानामनुमानेन प्रसिद्धिरतिदुर्लभा ॥ निर्ज्ञातशक्तेर्द्रव्यस्य तां तामर्थक्रियां प्रति । विशिष्टद्रव्यसंबन्धे सा शक्तिः प्रतिबध्यते ॥ (Vāk. I, 32-33),
,,	13	यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः । अभियुक्ततरैरन्यैरन्यथैवोपपाद्यते ॥ (Ibid, 34).
87	14	विच्छेदग्रहणेऽर्थानां प्रतिभान्यैवोपजायते । वाक्यार्थ इति तामाहुः पदार्थैरुपपादिताम् ॥ (Vāk. II, 143).
,,	15	इदं तदिति सान्येषामनाख्येया कथंचन । प्रत्यात्मवृत्तिसिद्धा सा कर्त्रापि न निरूप्यते ॥ (Ibid, 144).
	16	उपश्लेषमिवार्थनां सा करोत्यविचारिता । सार्वरूप्यमिवापन्ना विषयत्वेन वर्तते ॥ (Ibid. 145).

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,,	17	यथा द्रव्यविशेषाणां परिपाकैरयत्नजाः । मदादिशक्तयो दृष्टाः प्रतिभास्तद्वतां तथा ॥ (Ibid. 148).
,,	18	स्वरवृत्तिं विकुरुते मधौ पुंस्कोकिलस्य कः । जन्त्वादयः कुलायादिकरणे केन शिक्षिताः ॥ (Ibid. 149).
,,	19	अनन्तरमिदं कार्यमस्मादित्युपदर्शनम् । (Ibid. 118).
88	21	प्रमाणत्वेन तां लोकः सर्वः समनुपश्यति । समारंभाः प्रतायन्ते तिरश्चामपि तद्वशात् ॥ (Ibid, 147).
,,	22	स्वभावचरणाभ्यासयोगादृष्टोपपादिताम् । विशिष्टोपहितां चेति प्रतिभां षड्विधां विदुः ॥ (Ibid, 152).
,,	24	स्वभावेन यथा कपिः । (Puṇyarāja on the above)
,,	25	परस्याः प्रकृतेः प्रथमं सत्तालक्षणमात्मानं महान्तं प्रत्यानुगुण्यम् । सुषुप्तावस्थस्येव प्रबोधानुगुण्यम् । फलसत्तामात्रं निद्रायाः (*Vṛtti* on the above).
,,	26	....चरणनिमित्ता काचित् प्रतिभा । तद्यथा--का (च ?) रणेनैवावधृत-प्रकाशविशेषाणां वसि (ष्ठादीनाम् ?) (Ibid).

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89	27	अभ्यासनिमित्ता काचित् । तद्यथा कूपतटाकादीनां (°कादिखनकानाम् ?) (Ibid).
,,	28	परेषामसमाख्येयमभ्यासादेव जायते । मणिरूप्यादिविज्ञानं तद्विदां नानुमानिकम् ॥ (Vāk. I, 35).
,,	29	योगनिमित्ता काचित् तद्यथा योगिनामव्यभिचारेण पराभिप्रायज्ञानादिषु । (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. II, 152).
90	30	(a) तथा काचिददृष्टनिमित्ता । तद्यथा रक्षःपिशाचादीनां परावेशान्तर्धानादिषु । (Ibid).
		(b) प्रत्यक्षमनुमानं च व्यतिक्रम्य व्यवस्थिताः । पितृरक्षःपिशाचानां कर्मजा एव सिद्धयः ॥ (Vāk. I, 36).
,,	31	भावनानुगतादेतदागमादेव जायते । आसत्तिविप्रकर्षाभ्यामागमस्तु विशिष्यते ॥ (Vāk. II, 151).
,,	32	ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यागमपूर्वकम् । (Vāk. I, 30).
91	33	आद्यः करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योर्ध्वं समीरणम् । स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना शब्दभावनाम् ॥ (Ibid, 144 [122])

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92	35	साक्षाच्छब्देन जनितां भावनानुगमेन वा । इतिकर्तव्यतां तां न कश्चिदतिवर्तते ॥ (Vāk. II, 146).
,,	36	अभ्यासात् प्रतिभाहेतुः सर्वः शब्दोऽपरैः स्मृतः । बालानां च तिरश्चां च यथार्थप्रतिपादने ॥ (Ibid, 117).
,,	37	(a) चैतन्यमिव यश्चायविच्छेदेन वर्तते । आगमस्तमुपासीनो हेतुवादैर्न बाध्यते ॥ (Vāk. I, 41). (b) तथा चायं श्रुतिस्मृतिलक्षणः सर्वैः शिष्टैः परिगृहीत आगमः । (*Vṛtti* on the above). (c) वेदवाक्यानि तु चैतन्यवदपौरुषेयाणि । (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, 124 [132]).
93	38	आविर्भूतप्रकाशानामनुपप्लुतचेतसाम् । अतीतानागतज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षान्न विशिष्यते ॥ अतीन्द्रियानसंवेद्यान् पश्यन्त्यार्षेण चाक्षुषा । ये भावान् वचनं तेषां नानुमानेन बाध्यते ॥ (Vāk. I, 37-38).
,,	39	अन्तर्यामिणमणुग्राममभिजातिनिमित्तनिबन्धनमनभिव्यक्तं शब्दब्रह्म शक्त्यधिष्ठानं देवताः कर्मणामनुबन्धपरिणामशक्तिवैकल्यानि सूक्ष्ममातिवाहिकं शरीरं पृथगन्यांश्च तीर्थप्रवादेषु प्रसिद्धानर्थान् रूपादिवत् इन्द्रियैरग्राह्यान् सुखादिवत् प्रत्यात्मम संवेद्यान् ये शिष्टा व्यावहारिकादन्येन चक्षुषा मुक्तसंशयमुपलभन्ते तेषामनुमानविषयतातीतं ज्ञानं व्यभिचारिभिरनुमानैरपाकर्तुमशक्यम् । (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, 38).

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„	40	ज्ञानमस्माद्विशिष्टानां तासु सर्वेन्द्रियं विदुः । अभ्यासान्मणिरूप्यादिविशेषेष्विव तद्विदाम् ॥ (Vāk. III, p. 51, l. 11-12).
„	42	ऋषीणामपि यज्ज्ञानं तदप्यामगाहेतुकम् । (Ibid, 30).
		धर्मे स्वाभाविके नार्थः शास्त्रैः कश्चन विद्यते । धर्मो ज्ञानस्य हेतुश्चेत्तस्याम्नायो निबन्धनम् ॥ (Ibid, 126 [134])
94	43	अनादिमव्यवच्छिन्नां श्रुतिमाहुरकर्तृकाम् । शिष्टैर्निबध्यमाना तु न व्यवच्छिद्यते स्मृतिः ॥ (Ibid, 136 [144])
95	44	यां सूक्ष्मां नित्यामतीन्द्रियां वाचमृषयः साक्षात्कृतधर्माणो मन्त्रदृशः पश्यन्ति तामसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्योऽपरेभ्यः प्रवेदयिष्यमाणा बिल्मं समामनन्ति स्वप्नवृत्तमिव दृष्ट-श्रुतानुभूतमाचिख्यासन्त इत्येष पुराकल्पः । (Ibid, p. 24, l. 2 ff)
96	45	साक्षात्कृतधर्माणो ऋषयो बभूवुः । तेऽवरेभ्योऽसाक्षात्कृतधर्मभ्य उपदेशेन मन्त्रान् सम्प्रादुः । उपदेशाय ग्लायन्तोऽपरे बिल्मग्रहणायेमं ग्रन्थं समाम्नासिषुर्वेदं च वेदाङ्गानि च । बिल्मं भिल्मं भासनं च । Ni. I, 20.
97	46	अविभागाद् विवृत्तानामभिख्या स्वप्नवच्छ्रुतौ । भावतत्त्वं तु विज्ञाय लिङ्गेभ्यो विहिता स्मृतिः ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 225, l. 7-8).

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		येषां तु स्वप्नप्रबोधवृत्त्या नित्यं विभक्तपुरुषानुकारितया कारणं प्रवर्तते तेषामृषयः केचित् प्रतिभात्मनि विवर्तन्ते सत्तालक्षणं महान्तमात्मानमविद्यायोनिं पश्यन्तः प्रतिबोधेनाभिसंभवन्ति । केचित्तु विद्यायां विवर्तन्ते । ते मनोग्रन्थिमात्मानमाकाशादिषु भूतेषु प्रत्येकं समुदितेषु वा विशुद्धमनिबद्धपरिकल्पं तथैवाभिसंभवन्ति ।...... तेच स्वप्न इवाश्रोत्रगम्यं शब्दं प्रज्ञयैव सर्वमाम्नायं सर्वभेदशक्तियुक्तमभिन्नशक्तियुक्तं च पश्यन्ति । केचित्तु पुरुषानुग्रहोपघातविषयं तेषामर्थानां स्वभावमुपलभ्याम्नायेषु क्वचित्तद्विषयाणि लिङ्गानि दृष्ट्वा दृष्टादृष्टार्थां च स्मृतिमुपनिबध्नन्ति । श्रुतिं तु यथादर्शनमव्यभिचरितशब्दामेव प्रथममविभक्तां पुनः संगृहीतचरणविभागां समामनन्तीत्यागमः । (Vāk. I, p. 226, l. 3-6 and p. 227, l. 1-7).
,,	47	तेष्वपि तदर्थज्ञानमार्षमृषीणामागमिकेनैव धर्मेण संस्कृतात्मनामाविर्भवतीत्याख्यायते । *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, 30.

Chapter III.

1. The Metaphysical Background of the *Vākyapadīya*.

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93	1	(a) तद् व्याकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते । (Vāk. I, 22). (b) तस्माद्यः शब्दसंस्कारः सा सिद्धिः परमात्मनः । तस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वज्ञस्तद् ब्रह्मामृतमश्नुते ॥ (Vāk. I, 123 [131])
99	2	अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरमम् । विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥ एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् । अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥ अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः । जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥ एकस्य सर्वबीजस्य यस्य चेयमनेकधा । भोक्तृभोक्तव्यरूपेण भोगरूपेण च स्थितिः ॥ (Vāk. I, 1-4).
„	3	शब्दस्य परिणामोऽयमित्याम्नायविदो विदुः । छन्दोभ्य एव प्रथममिमं विश्वं व्यवर्तत ॥ (Ibid, 112 [120])
„	5	तथैवाम्नाये संहृतभोग्यभोक्तृशक्तेर्वागात्मनो बहुधा कारणत्वमाम्नातम् । (*Vṛtti* on the above, p. 184).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
,,	7	पुराकल्पोऽप्याह विभज्य बहुधात्मानं स छन्दस्य प्रजापतिः । छन्दोमयीभिर्मात्राभिर्बहुधैव विवेश तम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 185).
100	8	न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दनुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥ (Vāk. I, 115 [123])
101	9	तत्तु भिन्नरूपाभिमतानामपि विकाराणां प्रकृत्यन्वयित्वात् शब्दोपग्राह्य-तया शब्दोपग्राहितया च शब्दतत्त्वम् । (Vāk. I, p. 6, l. 1—p. 7, l. 1.)
,,	10	ब्रह्मेदं शब्दनिर्माणं शब्दशक्तिनिबन्धनम् । विवृत्तं सर्वमात्राभ्यस्तास्वेव प्रविलीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 14, l. 3).
,,	11	प्रत्यक्चैतन्येऽन्तःसन्निवेशितस्य परसंबोधनार्थां व्यक्तिरभिष्यन्दते । (Ibid. p. 7, l. 2-3).
,,	12	शब्देष्वेवाश्रिता शक्तिर्विश्वस्यास्य निबन्धनी । यन्नेत्रः प्रतिभात्मायं भेदरूपः प्रतीयते ॥ तत्र केषांचिज्जातयः सूक्ष्मशब्दाधिष्ठाननिबन्धनाः । ताः खल्वात्माभिव्यक्तिमधिष्ठानपरिणामेन प्रतिलभमानाः वाच्यवाचकभावेन व्यवतिष्ठन्ते । (Ibid, p. 180, l. 3—p. 181, l. 1).
102	13	तद् दृश्यं दर्शनं द्रष्टा दर्शने च प्रयोजनम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 116, l. 16).

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”	14	वागेवार्थं पश्यति वाग् ब्रवीति वागेवार्थं निहितं सन्तनोति । वाच्येव विश्वं बहुरूपं निबद्धं तदेतदेकं प्रविभज्योपभुङ्क्ते ॥ (Quatation in the *Vṛtti* on Vāk. I, 110 [118])
”	15	न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते । अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ॥ (Vāk. I, 115 [123])
103	16	(a) इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया । तां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, 113 [121]) (b) आद्यः करणविन्यासः प्राणस्योर्ध्वं समीरणम् । स्थानानामभिघातश्च न विना शब्दभावनाम् ॥ (Ibid, 114 [122])
”	17	अनादिश्चैषा शब्दभावना प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थितज्ञानबीजपरिग्रहा । न ह्यस्याः कथंचित् पौरुषेयत्वं संभवति । तथा ह्यनुपदेशसाध्याः प्रतिभागम्या एव करणविन्यासादयः । (*Vṛtti* on the above).
104	18	योऽपि प्रथमोपनिपाती बाह्येष्वर्थेषु प्रकाशः स निमित्तानामपरिग्रहेण वस्तुस्वरूपमात्रमिदं तदित्यव्यपदेश्यया वृत्त्या प्रत्यवभासयति । स्मृतिकालेऽपि तादृशानामुपलब्धिबीजानामाभिमुख्ये स्मर्तव्येषु श्लोकादिषु प्रकाशानुगममात्रमारूपमिव बुद्धौ विपरिवर्तते कोऽप्यसावनुवाकः श्लोको वा योऽयं मया श्रुतिमात्रेण प्रक्रान्त इति । (Ibid, p. 190, l. 7—p. 191, l. 2).
”	19	(a) तथैकेषामाचार्याणां सुप्तस्यापि जाग्रद्वृत्त्या सदृशो ज्ञानवृत्तिप्रबन्धः । केवलं शब्दभावनाबीजानि तदा सूक्ष्मां वृत्तिं प्रतिलभन्ते । (Vāk. I, p. 189, l. 4-5).

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		(b) याप्यसंचेतितावस्था तस्यामपि सूक्ष्मो वाग्धर्मानुगमोऽभ्यावर्तते । (Ibid, p. 190, l. 6).
,,	20	सा सर्वविद्याशिल्पानां कलानां चोपबन्धनी । तद्वशादभिनिष्पन्नं सर्वं वस्तु विभज्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 192, l. 4-5).
,,	21	योऽयं चैतन्ये वाग्रूपतानुगमस्तेन लोके ससंज्ञो विसंज्ञ इति व्यपदेशः क्रियते । (Ibid, p. 193, l. 3).
105	22	न सा चैतन्येनाविष्टा जातिरस्ति यस्यां स्वपरसंबोधो यो वाचा नानुगम्यते । (Ibid, l. 8).
,,	23	तस्माच्चितिक्रियारूपमलब्धवाक्शक्तिपरिग्रहं न विद्यते । वाक्तत्त्वरूपमेव चितिक्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । (Ibid, l. 9).
,,	24	सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते । तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैत्यन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥ (Vāk. I, 118 [126])
107	26	(ā) स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा । प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः ॥ I.P. Kā. V, 11). (b) चितिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परा वाक् स्वरसोदिता । स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परात्मनः ॥ (I.P. Kā. V, 13).

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”	27	....प्रत्यवमर्शश्चान्तरभिलापात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः, तच्च शब्दनं संकेतनिरपेक्ष-मेवाविच्छिन्नचमत्कारात्मकम्, अन्तर्मुखशिरोनिर्देशप्रख्यम्, अकारादिमायीयसाङ्के-तिकशब्दजीवितभूतनीलमिदं चैत्रोऽहमित्यादिप्रत्यवमर्शान्तरभित्तिरूपत्वात्, पूर्णत्वात् परा, वक्ति विश्वमभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च वाक्, अत एव स्वरसेन चिद्रूपतया स्वात्मविश्रान्तिवपुषा, उदिता सदानस्तमिता नित्या अहमित्येव । (Abhinavagupta—I.P.V. I, p. 253-254).
”	28	अहंप्रत्यवमर्शो यः प्रकाशात्मापि वाग्वपुः । नासौ विकल्पः स ह्युक्तो द्वयापेक्षी विनिश्चयः । (Utpala—IPK VI, 1).
”	29	(a) विषयरूपाच्छ्रोत्रग्राह्याच्छब्दादन्य एवान्तरवभासमानः संविद्रूपावेशी शब्दनात्माभिलापो वागित्यनेनोक्तः । (IPV I, p. 303). (b) एतेनात्र वाच्यवाचकसङ्केतकरणहेतोरान्तरस्य परामर्शस्यैव वाक्त्व-मुक्तम् न सु बाह्यस्य स्थूलशब्दस्य । (IPV I, p. 304).
108	30	तदेतेन विदुरित्येतत् निर्वाहितम् । (IPV. I, p. 266).
”	31	एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् । (Vāk. I, 2).
109	32	सर्वशक्त्यात्मभूतत्वमेकस्यैवेति निर्णयः । भावानामात्मभेदस्य कल्पना स्यादनर्थिका ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 34, l. 1-2).
”	33	अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते । (Vāk. I, 2).

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,,	34	एकस्य ब्रह्मणस्तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यां सत्त्वासत्त्वाभ्यां चानिरुक्ताविरोधिशक्त्युपग्राह्यस्य... (Vāk. I, p. 21, l. 3-4).
,,	35	एकत्वस्याविरोधेन शब्दतत्त्वे ब्रह्मणि समुच्चिता विरोधिन्य आत्मभूताः शक्तयः । (Ibid, p. 16, l. 1-2).
,,	36	अविरोधिन्य इति । विरुद्धकार्यप्रसवानुमितविरोधा अप्येकस्मिन्नाधारे यौगपद्येन वृत्तेरविरोधिन्यः । (Ibid, p. 21, l. 16-17).
,,	37	तस्माद् द्रव्यादयः सर्वाः शक्तयो भिन्नलक्षणाः । संसृष्टाः पुरुषार्थस्य साधिका न तु केवलाः ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 34, l. 7-8).
110	38	दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः । शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 209, l. 2-3).
,,	39	अध्याहितकलां यस्य कालशक्तिमुपाश्रिताः । जन्मादयो विकाराः षड् भावभेदस्य योनयः ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 18, l. 1-2).
,,	40	व्यापारव्यतिरेकेण कालमेके प्रचक्षते । नित्यमेकं विभु द्रव्यं परिमाणं क्रियावताम् ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. 2, p. 51, l. 3-4).
,,	41	कलाभिः पृथगर्थाभिः प्रविभक्तं स्वभावतः । केचिद् बुद्ध्यनुसंहारलक्षणं तं प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, p. 62, l. 8-9).

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111	42	पारमर्षनये सततपरिणामिषु भावेषु सत्त्वरजस्तमसां शक्तिमात्रमतीतादि-कालभेदसमाख्यम् । तथा च सर्वेषां भावानां गुणत्रयमयत्वाच्छक्तित्रययोगित्वे यथायथं शक्त्युद्भवानुद्भवाभ्यां सदसत्वेन व्यवहारः । (Ibid, p. 63, l. 4-6).
,,	43	व्याख्यातारस्तु कारणशक्तिरेव काल इति व्याचक्षते। तथा हि बीजशक्तिरं-कुरोपजनमभ्यनुजानती काण्डप्रसवं च तदानीं प्रतिबध्नती कालकार्यकरणात् कालः। एवङ्मकुरादिशक्तावपि यथोत्तरमनन्तरकार्यजननाद् व्यवहितकार्यप्रतिबन्धाच्च कालतत्त्वं बोद्धव्यम् । (Ibid, p. 64, l. 8-11).
,,	44	आत्मा पुरुषो जीव एव कालस्तस्यैव क्रमावभासात् । स हि यथातत्त्वमर्थान् प्रत्येतुमसमर्थः स्वाभासकालानुसारेण तत्र क्रममध्यवस्यति । ततश्च ततः कालभेद-प्रक्लृप्तेः स एवोपचारेण कालाख्यां प्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 64, l. 17-20).
,,	45	कालाख्येन स्वातन्त्र्येण... (Vāk. I, p. 18, l. 3).
,,	46	कालाख्या स्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिर्ब्रह्मण इति तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरेरभिप्रायः । (Vāk. III, pt. ii, l. 8).
,,	47	सर्वेषां हि विकाराणां कारणान्तरेष्वपेक्षावतां प्रतिबद्धजन्मनामभ्यनुज्ञया सह-कारिकारणं कालः ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 19, l. 1-2).
112	48	तमस्य लोकयन्त्रस्य सूत्रधारं प्रचक्षते । प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां तेन विश्वं विभज्यते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 42, 1. 7-8).

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,,	49	उत्पत्तौ च स्थितौ चैव विनाशे चापि तद्वताम् । निमित्तं कालमेवाहुर्विभक्तेनात्मना स्थितम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 41, l. 23-24).
,,	50	प्रतिबद्धाश्च यास्तेन चित्रा विश्वस्य वृत्तयः । ताः स एवानुजानाति यथा तन्तुः शकुन्तिकाः ॥ (Ibid, p. 45, l. 19-20).
113	51	विशिष्टकालसंबन्धाल्लब्धपाकासु शक्तिषु । क्रियाभिव्यज्यते नित्या प्रयोगाख्येन कर्मणा । जातिप्रयुक्ता तस्यां तु फलव्यक्तिः प्रतीयते । कुतोऽप्यद्भुतया वृत्त्या शक्तिभिः सा नियम्यते । ततस्तु समवायाख्या शक्तिर्भेदस्य बाधिका । एकत्वमिव सा व्यक्तीरापादयति कारणैः । अथास्मान्नियमादूर्ध्वं जातयो याः प्रयोजिकाः । ताः सर्वा व्यक्तिमायान्ति स्वच्छे छाया इवाम्भसि ॥ कारणानुविधायित्वादथ कारणपूर्विकाः । गुणास्तत्रोपलभ्यन्ते स्वजातिव्यक्तिहेतवः ॥ (Ibid, 16-20).
,,	25	(a) स्थितः संयोगिभिर्भावैः स क्रियास्वनुगृह्यते । नैषां सत्तामनुद्गृह्य वृत्तिर्जन्मवतां स्मृता ॥ (Ibid, p. 48, l. 19-20). (b) तथा च स्थितिपर्यन्ताभ्यनुज्ञोपपत्तिः । (Ibid, l. 24).
,,	53	जराख्या कालशक्तिर्या शक्त्यन्तरविरोधिनी । सा शक्तिं प्रतिबध्नाति जायन्ते च विरोधिनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 49, l. 4-5).

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		प्रयोजकास्तु ये भावाः स्थितिभागस्य हेतवः । तिरोभवन्ति ते सर्वे यत आत्मा प्रहीयते ॥ (Ibid, l. 11-12).
114	54	क्रिययोरपवर्गिण्योर्नानार्थसमवेतयोः । संबन्धिना विनैकेन परिच्छेदः कथं भवेत् ॥ (Ibid, p. 50, l. 4-5).
,,	55	दिष्टिप्रस्थसुवर्णादि मूर्तिभेदाय कल्पते । क्रियाभेदाय कालस्तु संख्या सर्वस्य भेदिका ॥ (Ibid, p. 41, l, 10-11).
,,	56	यथा तुलायां हस्ते वा नानाद्रव्यव्यवस्थितम् । गुरुत्वं परिमीयेत कालादेव क्रियागतिः ॥ (Ibid, p. 50, l. 16-17).
,,	57	(a) प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां वृत्तिर्या तस्य शाश्वती । तया विभज्यमानोऽसौ भजते क्रमरूपताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 51, l. 11-12). (b) एवं यौगपद्यमपि क्रमविरोधी धर्मः कार्यगतः काले समारोप्यते । (Ibid, p. 51, l. 17-18).
,,	58	कर्तृभेदात् तदर्थेषु प्रकर्षापचयौ गतः । समत्वं विषमत्वं वा स एकः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, l. 20-21).
115	59	क्रियाभेदाद् यथैकस्मिन् तक्षाद्याख्या प्रवर्तते । क्रियाभेदात्तथैकस्मिन् ऋत्वाद्याख्योपजायते ॥ (Ibid, p. 52, l. 2-3).

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,,	60	आरम्भश्च क्रिया चैव निष्ठा चेत्यभिधीयते । धर्मान्तराणामध्यासभेदात् सदसदात्मनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 52, l. 9-10).
,,	61	(a) यावांश्च द्व्यणुकादीनां तावान् हिमवतोऽप्यसौ । न ह्यात्मा कस्यचिद् भेत्तुं प्रचेतुं वापि शक्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 52, l. 17-18).
		(b) अन्यैस्तु भावैरन्येषां प्रचयः परिकल्प्यते । शनैरिदमिदं क्षिप्रमिति तेन प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 53, l. 1-2).
116	62	(a) क्रियोपाधिश्च सन् भूतभविष्यद्वर्तमानताः । एकादशभिराकारैर्विभक्ताः प्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 53, l. 19-20).
		(b) भूतः पंचविधस्तत्र भविष्यंश्च चतुर्विधः । वर्तमानो द्विधाख्यात इत्येकादश कल्पनाः ॥ (Ibid, p. 54, l. 1-2).
,,	63	(a) काले निधाय स्वं रूपं प्रज्ञया यन्निगृह्यते । भावास्ततो निवर्तन्ते तत्र संक्रान्तशक्तयः ॥ (Ibid, p. 54, l. 16-17).
		(b) कालसंक्रान्तरूपत्वेऽभूदिति व्यवहारात् कालसिद्धिः । (Ibid, p. 55, l. 2).
,,	64	भाविनां चैव यद्रूपं तस्य च प्रतिबिंबकम् । सुनिर्मृष्ट इवादर्शे काल एवोपपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 56, l. 4-5).

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,,	65	(a) मात्राणां परिणामा ये कालवृत्त्यनुयायिनः : नक्षत्राख्या पृथक् तेषु चिन्हमात्रं तु तारकाः ॥ (Ibid, p. 56, l. 5-6). (b) रुतैर्मृगशकुन्तानां स्थावराणां च वृत्तिभिः । छायादिपरिणामैश्च ऋतुधामा निरूप्यते ॥ (Ibid, l. 16-17).
,,	66	तस्याभिन्नस्य कालस्य व्यवहारे क्रियाकृताः । भेदा इव त्रयः सिद्धा यांल्लोको नातिवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, p. 58, l. 10-11).
117	67	एकस्य शक्तयः तिस्रः कालस्य समवस्थिताः । यत्संबन्धेन भावानां दर्शनादर्शने सताम् ॥ (Ibid, l. 17-18).
,,	68	द्वाभ्यां स किल शक्तिभ्यां भावानां वरणात्मकः । शक्तिस्तु वर्तमानाख्या भावरूपप्रकाशिनी ॥ (Ibid, l. 25-26).
,,	69	अनागता जन्मशक्तेः शक्तिरप्रतिबन्धिका । अतीताख्या तु या शक्तिस्तया जन्म विरुध्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 59, l. 5-6).
,,	70	द्वौ तु तत्र तमोरूपावेकस्यालोकवत् स्थितिः । अतीतमपि केषांचित् पुनर्विपरिवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, p. 60, l. 4-5).

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118	72	इदानीं धर्मधर्मिणोरव्यतिरेकं भाविकमाश्रित्य धर्मिणो युगपदपि व्यपदेशत्रयं धर्मद्वारकं प्रवर्तत इति महाभाष्यमतमाह युगपद्वर्तमानत्वं तद्धर्मा प्रतिपद्यते । केषांचिद्वर्तमानत्वाच्चैति तद्वदतीतताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 60, l. 23—p. 61, l. 1-2).
119	73	द्वे एव कालस्य विभोः केषांचिच्छक्तिवर्त्मनी । करोति याभ्यां भावानामुन्मीलननिमीलने ॥ (Ibid, p. 61, l. 24-25).
”	74	अभिव्यक्तिनिमित्तस्य प्रचयेन प्रचीयते । अभिन्नमपि शब्दस्य तत्त्वमप्रचयात्मकम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 65, l. 24-25).
”	75	प्राकृता हि ध्वनयः शब्दस्वरूपसंभेदेन श्रूयमाणाः स्वगतं कालभेदं तत्राव-भासयन्ति । (Ibid, p. 66, l. 3-4).
120	76	विशिष्टमवधिं तं तमुपादाय प्रकल्पते । कालः कलावतामेकः क्षणमासर्तुभेदभाक् ॥ (Ibid, p. 67, l. 22-23).
”	77	अपचयकाष्ठागतस्तु क्षण इत्युपचयकाष्ठाप्राप्तो मन्वन्तरमित्यादीति भावतो द्रव्यभूतस्यैकत्वे कालस्य कल्पनेयं बोद्धी । (Ibid. p. 68, l. 4-5).
”	78	प्रतिबन्धाभ्यनुज्ञाभ्यां नालिकाविवराश्रिते । यदम्भसि प्रक्षरणं तत्कालस्यैव चेष्टितम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 68, l. 8-9).

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,,	79	क्रमेण तु निःसरणात् कालोऽत्र सव्यापारो व्यतिरिक्त इति नांभःस्रुतिरेव कालः । (Ibid. l. 12-13).
121	80	दृष्टस्य हि कारणस्य कालशक्तेश्च परस्परमानुगुण्यात् सहभावान्नैकतराव-लम्बनेनेतरप्रतिक्षेपो न्याय्यः । (Ibid, p. 69, l. 7-8).
,,	81	व्यतिक्रमेऽपि भावानां तस्य नास्ति व्यतिक्रमः । न गन्तृगतिभेदेन मार्गभेदोऽस्ति कश्चन ॥ (Ibid, p. 70, l. 1-2).
,,	82	क्रियान्तरपरिच्छेदप्रवृत्ता या क्रियां प्रति । निर्ज्ञातपरिमाणा सा काल इत्यभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, l. 21-22).
122	83	(a) ज्ञाने रूपस्य संक्रान्तिर्ज्ञानेनैवानुसंहृतिः । अतः क्रियान्तराभावे सा क्रिया काल इष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 71, l. 3-4). (b) प्राणचारेण कलयन्त्येवार्थान् योगिनः । (Ibid, l. 9).
,,	84	नास्माभिर्दर्शनविवेकः प्रारब्धः । किन्तु शाब्दे व्यवहारे यदङ्गं तत्परीक्ष्यम् । अस्ति च भिन्नकालः शाब्दो व्यवहारोऽभूदस्ति भविष्यतीति । तत्र यथायोगम-विचारितरमणीयः कालोऽभ्युपगन्तव्य इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 62, l. 25-27).
123	85	अत एवैतत् कालदर्शनम् । अविद्यायां संसारहेतुभूतायां प्रथमं भेदावभास-मयो हि संसारः । भेदश्च देशकालाभ्याम् । तत्र च कालभेदो जगत्सृष्टेराद्यः ।

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		अक्रमा हि पश्यन्तीरूपा संवित् प्राणवृत्तिमुपारूढा कालात्मना परिगृहीतक्रमेव चकास्ति इति कृतनिर्णयं वाक्यपदीये शब्दप्रभायामस्माभिस्तत एवावगमनीयम्। निष्क्रमं हि ब्रह्मतत्त्वं विद्यामयमकालकलितमविद्यावशात् क्रमरूपोपग्रहेण यथायथं विवर्तते इति कालानुवेधात् पदार्थानां क्रमेण प्रत्यवभासोऽनादिसिद्धजीवात्मगतः, सर्वस्य भेदजातस्याविद्यामयत्वात्। कालेऽपि दर्शनभेदेन योऽयं विभागः सोऽप्यविद्याविजृंभित एव। आविर्भूतायां तु विद्यायां सर्वस्य भेदप्रपंचस्यापगमादयमप्यपैति। अतश्चात्र युक्तायुक्ततया विचारणं प्रयासमात्रफलमेव। व्यवहारे सर्वस्यैवासत्यतय तत्त्वव्यवस्थानुपपत्तेरित्यत्र तात्पर्यार्थः। (Ibid, p. 64 l. 23—p. 65, l. 6).
124	86	शक्त्यात्मदेवतापक्षैर्भिन्नं कालस्य दर्शनम्। प्रथमं तदविद्यायां यद् विद्यायां न वर्तते। (Ibid, p. 64, l. 6-7).
,,	87	शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते। अनागमविकल्पा तु स्वयं विद्योपवर्तते॥ (Vāk. II, 233).
,,	88	उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालनाः। असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते॥ (Ibid, 238).
125	89	मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तावविद्याशक्तिप्रवृत्तिमात्रम्। तौ विद्यात्मनि तत्त्वान्यत्वाभ्यामनाख्येयौ। एतद्धि अविद्याया अविद्यात्वम्। (Vāk. I, p. 9, l. 1-3).
,,	90	तदेतदमृतं ब्रह्म निर्विकारमविद्यया। कलुषत्वमिवापन्नं भेदरूपं विवर्तते॥ (Ibid, p. 14, l. 1-2).

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„	91	द्रष्टापि जीवात्मा अविद्याकृतावच्छेदो नियतः संसारी भोक्ता ब्रह्मैव चेतनत्वाद्भावतो भेदानुपपत्तेरिति तत्रैवावेदितम्। ....कालशक्त्यवच्छिन्नो हि क्रियाविवर्तः दिक्शक्त्यवाच्छिन्नश्च मूर्तिविवर्त इति मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तरूपं विश्वं प्रतिपादितम्। (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 117, l. 4-5, 8-11).
„	92	(a) विकल्परूपं भजते तत्त्वमेवाविकल्पितम्। न चात्र कालभेदोऽस्ति कालभेदश्च गृह्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 112, l. 17-18).
		(b) ....विकल्परूपं नानाविधभेदावभासम् अनादिसिद्धाविद्यावशाद् समवलम्बते। (Ibid, p. 113, l. 2-3).
126	93	कालशक्त्यवच्छिन्नो हि क्रियाविवर्तः दिक्शक्त्यवच्छिन्नश्च मूर्तिविवर्त इति मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तरूपं विश्वं प्रतिपादितम्। (Ibid, p. 117, l. 8-11).
„	94	अक्रमे ब्रह्मणि भेदावभासनमविद्याकृतम्। तत्रैव क्रमाभासनं कालाख्यस्वातन्त्र्यशक्तिकृतम्। (Ibid, p. 178, l. 15-16).
„	95	द्रष्टापि जीवात्मा अविद्याकृतावच्छेदो नियतः संसारी भोक्ता ब्रह्मैव चेतनत्वाद्भावतो भेदानुपपत्तेरिति तत्रैवावेदितम्। (Ibid, p. 117, l. 4-5).
127	96	शब्दस्य च निरूपितार्थविषयत्वान्निरूपणाप्रत्ययः कारणम्।...निरूपणाप्रत्ययश्च विकल्पः। स चैकैकव्यावृत्तिनिष्ठत्वाद्विकल्पानामकृत्स्नविषयावभासः। न हि विकल्पेन यथातत्त्वं वस्तु स्पृश्यते। (Ibid, p. 162, l. 7-8, 11-12).

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"	97	तत्रापि च मात्राकलापात्मको न प्रदेशः समस्तः शब्देनाभिधीयते, अपि तु तदेकदेशः। घटशब्देन हि घटत्वजातिरुच्यते। तत्रैव रक्तशब्देन गुणः। एवं शब्दान्तरैरपि प्रतिनियतभावाभिधानमुदाहार्यम्। (Ibid, p. 160, l. 17-19).
"	98	द्वे दशे शुद्धेरुपक्रमपरिसमाप्तिरूपे। इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरूपोपाश्रयनिरपेक्षया-शेषार्थावभासखचितं सर्वज्ञज्ञानमुपक्रमे शुद्धमित्युच्यते। निष्ठायां चाकारकालुष्यापगमात् प्रभास्वरं प्रशान्तकल्लोलं संविन्मात्रमेकघनं शुद्धं ग्राह्यग्राहकप्रपंचशून्यं ब्रह्म। (Ibid, p. 163, l. 17—p. 164, l. 1-3).
"	99	(a) यथा च ज्ञानमालेखादशुद्धौ व्यवतिष्ठते। तथोपाश्रयवानर्थः स्वरूपाद्विप्रकृष्यते॥ (Ibid, p. 164, l. 14-15). (b) ...उपाधिसंसर्गश्चातत्त्वमिति अर्थस्येयमशुद्धिः। जात्याद्युपाधिरूपेण समवेतेन शबलितमर्थवस्तु प्रतीयतेऽभिधीयते चेति तथा तद् व्यवहारमवतरति। (Ibid, p. 164, l. 18-20—p. 165, l. 1).
"	100	एवमर्थस्य शब्दस्य ज्ञानस्य च विपर्यये। भावाभावावभेदेन व्यवहारानुपातिनौ॥ (Ibid, p. 165, l. 4-5).
128	101	(a) शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते। अनागमविकल्पा तु स्वयं विद्योपवर्तते॥ (Vāk. II, 233). (b) अविद्योपमर्देन ह्युत्तरकालमागमविकल्परहिता शास्त्रप्रक्रियाप्रपंचशून्य विद्योपावर्तते प्रकटीभवति। एतदुक्तं भवत्यविद्यैव विद्योपाय इति। (Puṇyarāja on the above).

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129	103	(a) नाशोत्पादसमालीढं ब्रह्म शब्दमयं परम् । यत्तस्य परिणामोऽयं भावग्रामः प्रतीयते ॥ (Śāntarakṣita—*Tattvasaṅgraha* 128)
		(b) पूर्वापरादिविभागरहितमनुत्पन्नमविनाशि यच्छब्दमयं ब्रह्म तस्यायं रूपादिभावग्रामः परिणामः प्रतीयते । (Pañjikā on the above).
„	104	(a) अथाविभागमेवेदं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं सदा स्थितम् । अविद्योपप्लवाल्लोको विचित्रं त्वभिमन्यते ॥ (Ibid, 144).
		(b) न च तस्य परमार्थेन परिणामः । किं त्वविद्यातिमिरोपहतबुद्धि-लोचना नीलादिभेदेन विचित्रमिव मन्यन्ते । (Pañjikā on the above).
133	108	सत्यं वस्तु तदाकारैरसत्यैरवधार्यते । असत्योपाधिभिः शब्दैः सत्यमेवाभिधीयते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 107, l. 20-21).
„	109	(a) अध्रुवेण निमित्तेन देवदत्तगृहं यथा । गृहीतं गृहशब्देन शुद्धमेवाभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 108, l. 10-11).
		(b) इतरत्रापि य एष मनुष्यः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति सोऽध्रुवेण निमित्तेन ध्रुवं निमित्तमुपादत्ते वेदिकां पुण्डरीकं वा । (M. Bhā. I, p. 85, l. 11).
„	110	सुवर्णादि यथा भिन्नं स्वैराकारैरपायिभिः । रुचकाद्यभिधानानां शुद्धमेवैति वाच्यताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 109, l. 11-12).

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134	111	(a) विकारापगमे सत्यं सुवर्णं कुण्डले यथा । विकारापगमे सत्यां तामाहुः प्रकृतिं पराम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 118, l. 8-9). (b) यत्र द्रष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं वा विकल्पितम् । तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वं श्रितास्त्रय्यन्तवेदिनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 173, l. 9-10).
,,	112	विकल्परूपं भजते तत्त्वमेवाविकल्पितम् । न चात्र कालभेदोऽस्ति कालभेदश्च गृह्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 112, l. 17-18).
135	113	एकस्य तत्त्वादप्रच्युतस्य भेदानुकारेणासत्यविभक्तान्यरूपोपग्राहिता विवर्तः । (Vāk. I, p. 8, l. 3—p. 9, l. 1).
,,	114	नच परिणतिशब्दाभिप्रायेणायं विकारशब्दः, अनित्यत्वप्रसंगात्, अपि तु विवर्तपर्यायोऽयम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 48, l. 8-9).
,,	115	विशेषश्चानयोर्वाक्यपदीयेऽस्माभिर्व्याख्यात इति तत एवावधार्यम् । (Ibid, p. 119, l. 4-5).
136	116	तद् व्याकरणमागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते । (Vāk. I, p. 51, l. 6).
,,	117	यस्तु प्रयुङ्क्ते कुशलो विशेषे शब्दान् यथावद् व्यवहारकाले । सोऽनन्तमाप्नोति फलं परत्र वाग्योगविद् दुष्यति चापशब्दैः ॥ (M. Bhā. I, p. 2, l. 19-20).
,,	118	शास्त्रपूर्वके प्रयोगेऽभ्युदयः, तत्तुल्यं वेदशब्देन । (Ibid, p. 10, l. 21).

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„	119	एकः शब्दः सम्यग्ज्ञातः शास्त्रान्वितः सुप्रयुक्तः स्वर्गे लोके कामधुग् भवति । (Ibid, III, p. 58, l. 19).
„	120	चत्वारि शृङ्गा त्रयोऽस्य पादा द्वे शीर्षे सप्त हस्तासोऽस्य । त्रिधा बद्धो वृषभो रोरवीति महो देवो मर्त्यां आविवेश ॥ (RV IV, 58. 3, quoted in M. Bhā. I, p. 3, l. 15).
„	121	महता देवेन नः साम्यं यथा स्यादित्यध्येयं व्याकरणम् । (M. Bhā. I, p. 3, l. 22).
137	122	वर्णज्ञानं वाग्विषयो यत्र च ब्रह्म वर्तते । तदर्थमिष्टसिद्ध्यर्थं लघ्वर्थं चोपदिश्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 36, l. 14-15).
„	123	सोऽयमक्षरसमाम्नायो वाक्समाम्नायः पुष्पितः फलितः चन्द्रतारकवत् प्रतिमण्डितः ब्रह्मराशिः सर्ववेदपुण्यफलावाप्तिश्चास्य ज्ञाने भवति, मातापितरौ चास्य स्वर्गे लोके महीयेते । (Ibid, p. 36, l. 16-18).
„	124	दृष्टादृष्टफलाभ्यामभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसाभ्याम् । (Bhartṛhari—*Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, p. 92, l. 14. (B.O.R.I. edition).
138	125	अपि प्रयोक्तुरात्मानं शब्दमन्तरवस्थितम् । प्राहुर्महान्तमृषभं येन सायुज्यमिष्यते ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 199, l. 5-6).
„	126	तस्माद्यः शब्दसंस्कारः सा सिद्धिः परमात्मनः । तस्य प्रवृत्तितत्त्वज्ञस्तद् ब्रह्मामृतमश्नुते ॥ (Ibid, p. 201, l. 6-7).

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,,	127	यदेकं प्रक्रियाभेदैर्बहुधा प्रविभज्यते । तद् व्याकरणामागम्य परं ब्रह्माधिगम्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 51, l. 5-6).
,,	128	अतस्तत् प्रयोजनमाह यतः परमन्यन्नास्ति । किं पुनस्तत् । मोक्षः । स हि सर्वपुरुषार्थानां परम इति । ननु सोऽप्युक्त एव–महो देवो मर्त्यां आविवेश इति सत्यमुक्तम् । किन्तु यथा स व्याकरणात् प्राप्यते यादृशश्चासौ तत् सर्वं स्फुटतरं सोपपत्तिकं च प्रदर्शयितुं प्रयोजनवर्णनम् । यतो वक्ष्यति प्राप्त्युपायस्तस्य वेदः प्रथमं छन्दसामङ्गमिति । (Ibid, p. 2, l. 12-16).
139	129	इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम् । (Ibid, p. 49, l. 8-9).
141	130	ममाहमित्यहङ्कारग्रन्थिसमतिक्रममात्रं ब्रह्मणः प्राप्तिः । विकाराणां प्रकृतिभावापत्तिरित्यपरे । वैकरण्यम्, असाधना परितृप्तिः, आत्मतत्त्वम्, आत्मकामत्वम्, अनागन्तुकार्थत्वम्, परिपूर्णशक्तित्वम्, कालवृत्तीनामात्ममात्रास्वसमावेशः सर्वात्मना नैरात्म्यमिति प्राप्तिविकल्पाः । (Ibid, p. 22, l. 5—p. 23, l. 1-3).
,,	131	सर्वेश्वरः सर्वशक्तिर्महान् शब्दवृषभः। तस्मिन् खलु वाग्योगविदो विच्छिन्नाहङ्कारग्रन्थीन् अत्यन्तविनिर्भागेन संसृज्यन्ते । (Ibid, p. 201, l. 2-4).
,,	132	तत्र साधोर्यः संबन्धोऽर्थेन स ज्ञाने शास्त्रपूर्वके वा प्रयोगे धर्माभिव्यक्तावङ्गत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 72, l. 1).
142	133	एक (त ?) स्या एव ब्रह्मप्राप्तेः क्रममिदानीं वर्णयन्नाह अव्यत्रकीर्णाम्, इति । (Ibid, p. 48, l. 11).

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„	134	शब्दपूर्वं हि शब्दस्वरूपस्याभेदतत्त्वज्ञाने क्रमसंहारेण योगं लभते । (Ibid, p. 47, l. 6).
143	135	सोऽव्यतिकीर्णां वागवस्थामधिगम्य वाग्विकाराणां प्रकृति प्रतिभामनुपरैति । (Ibid, p. 48, l. 1).
„	136	विकारापगमे सत्यं सुवर्णं कुण्डले यथा । विकारापगमे सत्यां तथाहुः प्रकृतिं पराम् ॥ (Vāk. III, p. 118, l. 8-9). (a) भेदोद्ग्राहविवर्तेन लब्धाकारपरिग्रहा । आम्नाता सर्वविद्यासु वागेव प्रकृतिः परा ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 194, l. 1-2).
„	137	व्यवस्थितसाधुभावेन हि रूपेण संस्क्रियमाणे शब्दतत्त्वेऽपभ्रंशोपघातापगमादाविर्भूते धर्मविशेषे नियतोऽभ्युदयः । (Ibid, p. 201, l. 8—p. 202, l. 1).
„	138	तदभ्यासाच्च शब्दपूर्वकयोगमधिगम्य प्रतिभां तत्त्वप्रभवां भावविकारप्रकृतिं सत्तां साध्यसाधनशक्तियुक्तां सम्यगवबुध्य नियता क्षेमप्राप्तिः । (Ibid, p. 202, l. 1-3).
144	139	परं तु पश्यन्तीरूपमनपभ्रंशमसंकीर्णं लोकव्यवहारातीतम् । (Ibid, p. 216, l. 1-2).
145	140	प्राणवृत्तिमतिक्रान्ते वाचस्तत्त्वे व्यवस्थितः । क्रमसंहारयोगेन संहृत्यात्मानमात्मनि ॥ वाचः संस्कारमाधाय वाचं ज्ञाने निवेश्य च । विभज्य बन्धनान्यस्याः कृत्वा तां छिन्नबन्धनाम् ॥ ज्योतिरान्तरमासाद्य छिन्नग्रन्थिपरिग्रहः । परेण ज्योतिषैकत्वं छित्वा ग्रन्थीन् प्रपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 202, l. 4—p. 203, l. 1-4).

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,,	141	सर्वां वाचं ज्ञान एव स्थापयति, वाचं करणात् प्राणे प्रत्यर्पयति, प्राणाद् बुद्धाविति कथयति । (Ibid, p. 202, l. 25—p. 203, l. 10).
		2. The doctrine of *Sphoṭa*.
148	5	. . (a) अक्रमे तु वागात्मनि श्रुत्यर्थशक्ती संसृज्येते । (Ibid, p. 102, l. 4). (b) तत्र ह्यान्तरे तत्त्वे श्रुत्यर्थशक्ती संसृज्येते इति विवर्तदशायां श्रुत्यर्थशाखात्मना तस्यैव विकासाद् वाच्यवाचकरूपतया भेदावभासौ.... (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 116 l. 17—p. 117, l. 1).
,,	6	वायोरणूनां ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वापत्तिरिष्यते । कैश्चिद् दर्शनभेदोऽत्र प्रवादेष्वनवस्थितः ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 173, l. 1-2).
,,	7	स्वशक्तौ व्यज्यमानायां प्रयत्नेन समीरिताः । अभ्राणीव प्रचीयन्ते शब्दाख्याः परमाणवः ॥ (Quotation in the *Vṛtti*—Ibid, p. 174, l. 1-2).
149	8	अथायमान्तरो ज्ञाता सूक्ष्मे वागात्मनि स्थितः । व्यक्तये स्वस्य रूपस्य शब्दत्वेन विवर्तते ॥ स मनोभावमापद्य तेजसा पाकमागतः । वायुमाविशति प्राणमथासौ समुदीर्यते ॥ अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य वायुराश्रयतां गतः । तद्धर्मेण समाविष्टस्तेजसैव विवर्तते ॥ विभजन् स्वात्मनो ग्रन्थीन् श्रुतिरूपैः पृथग्विधैः । प्राणो वर्णानभिव्यज्य वर्णेष्वेवोपलीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 174, l. 5 ff).

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,,	9	तेन चान्यभेदरूपोपग्रहणोपप्लुतं शब्दतत्त्वमेवेदं वाङ्मनसाख्यमविभागमन्यथा प्रतीयते । (Ibid, p. 152, l. 8—p. 153, l. 1).
,,	10	आत्मा बुद्ध्या समर्थ्यार्थान् मनो युङ्क्ते विवक्षया । मनः कायाग्निमाहन्ति स प्रेरयति मारुतम् ॥ (Pāṇinīya Śikṣā, 1.6, quoted Ibid, p. 176, l. 5-6).
,,	11	तस्य प्राणे च या शक्तिर्या च बुद्धौ व्यवस्थिता । विवर्तमाना स्थानेषु सैषा भेदं प्रपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 178, l. 6-7).
,,	12	शब्दः खलु प्राणाधिष्ठानो बुद्ध्यधिष्ठानश्च । (Ibid, p. 179, l. 2).
150	13	अन्तरेण तु प्राणवृत्त्यनुग्रहं यत्र केवलमेव बुद्धौ समाविष्टरूपो बुद्ध्युपादान एव शब्दात्मा तत्परमोपांशु । (*Vṛtti* on Vāk. II. 19).
,,	14	तत्र प्राणवृत्त्यनुग्रहे सत्येव यत्र शब्दरूपं परैरसंवेद्यं भवति तदुपांशु । (Ibid).
151	15	एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक्स्थितौ । (Ibid, 31).
,,	16	(a) अक्रमे तु वागात्मनि श्रुत्यर्थशक्ती संसृज्येते । (Vāk. I. p. 102, l. 4). (b) प्रकाशकप्रकाश्यत्वं कार्यकारणरूपता । अन्तर्मात्रात्मनस्तस्य शब्दतत्त्वस्य सर्वदा ॥ (Vāk. II. 32).

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152	17	द्वावुपादानशब्देषु शब्दौ शब्दविदो विदुः । एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ॥ (Vāk. I. p. 100, l. 4-5).
,,	18	लब्धानुसंहारो निमित्तम्, उपजनितक्रमस्तु प्रत्यायक इत्येके । (Ibid, p. 102, l. 2).
153	19	क्रमवानक्रमनिमित्तम् । (Ibid, l. 4).
,,	20	(a) आण्डभावमिवापन्नो यः क्रतुः शब्दसंज्ञकः । वृत्तिस्तस्य क्रियाभूता भागशो लभते क्रमम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 110, l. 1-2). (b) सा चास्योदयप्रत्यस्तमयनिर्भासमात्रा क्रियारूपेणावसीयते । (Ibid, p. 111, l. 2).
154	21	यथैकबुद्धिविषया मूर्तिराक्रियते पटे । मूर्त्यन्तरस्य त्रितयमेवं शब्देऽपि दृश्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 111, l. 4-5).
,,	22	यथा प्रयोक्तुः प्राग् बुद्धिः शब्देष्वेव प्रवर्तते । व्यवसायो ग्रहीतृणामेवं तेष्वेव जायते ॥ (Ibid, p. 113, l. 1-2).
,,	23	अर्थप्रतिपत्तिभावनाभ्यासात्तु सा शब्दरूपपरिच्छेदावस्था न चित्रीक्रियते । (Ibid, l. 6-7).

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155	24	ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा । तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ॥ (Ibid, p. 115, l. 3-4). विषयत्वमनापन्नैः शब्दैर्नार्थः प्रकाश्यते । न सत्तयैव तेऽर्थानामगृहीताः प्रकाशकाः ॥ (Ibid, p. 116, l. 4-5).
,,	25	(a.) उच्चरन् परतन्त्रत्वाद् गुणः कार्यैर्न युज्यते । तस्मात्तदर्थैः कार्याणां संबन्धः परिकल्प्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 120, l. 7-8). (b) यथैव गामानय दध्यशानेत्यर्थपरतन्त्रा श्रुतिः क्रियासु साधनत्वं न प्रतिलभते तथा शब्दान्तरतन्त्रापि पारार्थ्यस्याविशिष्टत्वात् ॥ (Ibid, p. 120, l. 9—p. 121, l. 1).
156	26	स्वं रूपमिति कैश्चित्तु व्यक्तिः संज्ञोपदिश्यते । जातेः कार्याणि संसृष्टा जातिस्तु प्रतिपद्यते ॥ संज्ञिनीं व्यक्तिमिच्छन्ति सूत्रे ग्राह्यामथापरे । जातिप्रत्यायिता व्यक्तिः प्रदेशेषूपतिष्ठते ॥ (Ibid, p. 127, l. 4-7).
158	33	...इति तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः । (Kaiyyaṭaś *Pradīpa* on M. Bhā. I, p. 1, l. 10-11).
,,	34	अत्रानेकं दर्शनम् ।.... (M. Bhā. dī. p. 3, l. 23).

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,,	35	एतच्चार्थस्वरूपं स्फोटोऽयमेव शब्दात्मा नित्यः। ये तु क्रमजन्मानोऽयुगपत्-काला व्यक्तयो ध्वन्यात्मानस्ते। (Ibid, p. 4, l. 3-4).
159	36	द्वौ शब्दात्मानौ नित्यः कार्यश्चेति। कैश्चिन्नित्यमिति दृष्टः कैश्चिदनित्य इति। अथवा जातिर्व्यक्तिश्चेति। अथवा स्फोटो ध्वनिश्च। (Ibid, p. 13, l. 22-24).
,,	37	(a) प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जका भिन्ना वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये। तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि संकीर्णा इव शक्तयः॥ (Vāk. I, p. 153, l. 9-10). (b) इह निर्भागेषु अपूर्वापरेषु अभेद्येषु वर्णपदवाक्येषु ध्वनिनाभिव्यज्य-मानेषु...... (Ibid, p. 151, l. 4).
,,	38	वर्णपदवाक्यविषयाः प्रयत्नविशेषसाध्याः ध्वनयो वर्णपदवाक्याख्यान् स्फोटान् पुनः पुनराविर्भावयन्तो बुद्धिष्वारोपयन्ति। (Ibid, p. 148, l. 5-6).
161	39	यदन्तः शब्दतत्त्वं तु नादैरेकं प्रकाशितम्। तदाहुरपरे शब्दं तस्य वाक्ये तथैकता॥ (Vāk. II, 30).
162	40	यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति। आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरूप्यते॥ (Vāk. I, p. 148, l. 3-4).
,,	41	प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्येयैर्ग्रहणानुगुणैस्तथा। ध्वनिप्रकाशिते शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते॥ (Ibid, p. 149, l. 4-5).

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163	42	तथा हि कमलमित्युक्ते ककारमकारानुभवेऽपि किं कमलीयः स्फोटः कमनीयो वेति संदेहो नापगच्छति तावद् यावन्न चरमो लो नो वा नानुभूयते। तस्मादीषत्त्वं संदिग्धत्वं निश्चितत्वमेव स्फुटतरत्वम्। (Seṣakṛṣṇa—*Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*—p. 10 (Gujarāti Printing Press Edition).
„	43	यथैव दर्शनैः पूर्वैर्दूरात् सन्तमसेऽपि वा। अन्यथाकृत्य विषयमन्यथैवाध्यवस्यति॥ (Vāk. I, p. 155, l. 3-4). व्यज्यमाने तथा वाक्ये वाक्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुभिः। भागावग्रहरूपेण पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते॥ (Vāk. I, p. 156, l. 1-2).
164	44	प्रत्येकं व्यंजका भिन्ना वर्णवाक्यपदेषु ये। तेषामत्यन्तभेदेऽपि संकीर्णा इव शक्तयः॥ (Ibid, p. 153, l. 9-10). वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिघ्नन्ति। स्थानाभिघातप्राप्तसंस्काराश्च ध्वनयो यद्यपि परस्परव्यावृत्तस्वभावास्तथापि गोगवयजात्युपव्यंजनवद् भ्रमणरेचनादिकर्मसामान्यविशेषाश्रयवच्च तेषामुपव्यंजनानां दुर्ज्ञानो भेदः। सामान्यमात्रया कयाचिदनुगतः प्रविभक्तकार्याणामपि शक्तीनामात्मा कुतश्चित् कार्यविशेषात् संकरेणैवावस्थितः। ततश्चायं निरवयवेषु वर्णेषु मात्राविभागाध्यवसायः पदेषु च वर्णविभागाध्यवसायः वाक्येषु च पदविभागाध्यवसाय इति। (Ibid, p. 154, l. 1—p. 155, l. 2).
165	45	प्रतिबिंबं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात्। तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः॥ (Ibid, p. 107, l. 4-5).

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		तत्त्वपक्षेऽन्यत्वपक्षे वा चन्द्रादिप्रतिबिंबं यत्राधारे संसृष्टमिवोपलभ्यते न हि तत्तथा। तत्तु निष्क्रियमपि तोयतरङ्गादिक्रियाधर्मोपग्रहेणैव तोयादीनां भिन्नां प्रवृत्तिमनुपतत्येव। प्राकृतस्य वैकृतस्य च नादस्य ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतेषु द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितासु च वृत्तिषु तावानेव स्फोटो विचित्रां वृत्तिमनुविधत्ते। (Ibid, p. 108, l. 1-4).
166	46	यथाद्यसंख्याग्रहणमुपायः प्रतिपत्तये। संख्यान्तराणां भेदेऽपि तथा शब्दान्तरश्रुतिः॥ (Ibid, p. 153, l. 4-5). यथा शतसंख्यां सहस्रसंख्यां वा भेदिकामाश्रयस्य प्रतिपित्समानः तदुपायभू- ानेकत्वादीन् भिन्नकार्यान् शतादीनामवयवानिव प्रतिपद्यते तथा देवदत्तादिशब्दान्तरश्रुतिपरिच्छेदोपाया वाक्यरूपप्रतिपत्तिरिति नान्तरीयकं तासामुपादानम्। (Ibid, l. 7-8).
,,	47	यथानुपूर्वीनियमो विकारे क्षीरबीजयोः। तथैव प्रतिपत्तॄणां नियतो बुद्धिषु क्रमः॥ (Ibid, p. 156, l. 6-7). ...तथैषामवर्वाग्दर्शनानां प्रतिपत्तॄणां वाक्यस्वरूपग्रहणपूर्वकेन वाक्यार्थग्रहणेन प्रधानेन प्रयुक्तानां नियतोपाये साध्ये तस्मिन्नर्थे नियतक्रमपरिणामभागाकारप्रत्यवभासमात्रायुक्ता बुद्धयः प्रवर्तन्ते स्फोटेषु। (Ibid, p. 157, l. 1-3).
,,	48	असतश्चान्तराले याञ्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते। प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः॥ (Ibid, p. 157, l. 2-3). ....सा खलु परप्रदर्शितविषयग्राहिणामशक्तिः प्रतिपत्तॄणाम्। (Ibid, p. 152, l. 1).

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167	49	भेदानुकारो ज्ञानस वाचश्चोपप्लवो ध्रुवः । क्रमोपसृष्टरूपा वाग्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयव्यपाश्रयम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 152, l. 4-5). (b) तेन चान्यभेदरूपोपग्रहेणोपप्लुतं शब्दतत्त्वमेवेदं वाङ्मनसाख्यम-विभागमन्यथा प्रतीयत इति । (Ibid, l. 8).
”	50	निष्क्रमं तु दाशतयमपि उपायान्तरेण प्रतिपद्यन्ते प्रतिपादयन्ति च । (Ibid, p. 152, l. 2-3).
”	51	इन्द्रियस्यैव संस्कारः शब्दस्यैवोभयस्य वा । क्रियते ध्वनिभिर्वादास्तयोऽभिव्यक्तिवादिनाम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 144, l. 7-8). तत्र केचिन्मन्यन्ते...ध्वनिरुत्पद्यमानः श्रोत्रं संस्करोति । तच्च संस्क्रियमाणं शब्दोपलब्धौ द्वारतां प्रतिपद्यते । अन्ये त्वभिव्यक्तिवादिनो मन्यन्ते शब्द एव ध्वनिसंसर्गात् प्राप्तसंस्कारः श्रोत्रस्य विषयत्वमुपगच्छति । केषांचिद् ध्वनिरुभयोः शब्दश्रोत्रयोरनुग्रहे वर्तते । (Ibid, p. 145, l. 2 ff).
168	52	विषयसंस्कारस्तु तैलादीनामातपादिभिः पृथिव्याश्चोदकेन गन्धप्रतिपत्तिकाले दृष्टो न घ्राणेन्द्रियस्य । (Ibid, p. 146, l. 1-2).
”	53	चक्षुषः प्राप्यकारित्वे तेजसा तु द्वयोरपि । विषयेन्द्रिययोरिष्टः संस्कारः स क्रमो ध्वनेः ॥ इहालोकानुगृहीतं घटादिविषयं सन्तमसेऽवस्थितोऽयं प्रतिपद्यते । तत्र येषामप्राप्यकारि चक्षुस्तेषामालोकेन विषयः प्रायेणानुगृह्यते । प्राप्यकारित्वे तु चक्षुषस्तुल्यजातीयेन तेजसा नयनरश्म्यनुग्रहः क्रियते । (Ibid, p. 146, l. 4-8).

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169	54	यथाक्षेपविशेषेऽपि कर्मभेदो न गृह्यते । आवृत्तौ व्यज्यते जातिः कर्मभिभ्रमणादिभिः ॥ वर्णवाक्यपदेष्वेवं तुल्योपव्यंजना श्रुतिः । अत्यन्तभेदे तत्त्वस्य सरूपेव प्रतीयते ॥ आक्षेपविशेषाद्धि स्वजातिप्रयुक्ते भिन्नात्मनि प्रतिभेदं विनिविष्टस्वजातिविशेषे भ्रमणादौ कम्पनरेचनोत्क्षेपणादिभ्यो यो भेदः स न गृह्यते । आवृत्तौ तु दिग्विशेषावधिसंयोगविभागोपाधिकायामुपलब्धायामनुपलब्धपूर्वाः व्यक्तोपलब्धा वा भ्रमणरेचनाख्या जातिरुपलब्धॄणां स्वनिमित्तप्रत्ययहेतुः संपद्यते । (Vāk. II, 20-21 with part of the *Vṛtti*).
,,	55	(a) वर्णपदवाक्यविषयाः प्रयत्नविशेषसाध्याः ध्वनयो वर्णपदवाक्याख्यान् स्फोटान् पुनः पुनराविर्भावयन्तो बुद्धिष्वारोपयन्ति । (Vāk. I, p. 148, l. 5-6). (b) वर्णपदवाक्यविषया हि विशिष्टाः प्रयत्नास्तत्प्रेरिताश्च वायवः स्थानान्यभिघ्नन्ति । (Ibid, p. 154, l. 1-2).
170	56	इह द्विविधो ध्वनिः, प्राकृतो वैकृतश्च । (Ibid, p. 142, l. 1).
,,	57	तत्र प्राकृतो नाम येन विना स्फोटरूपमनभिव्यक्तं न परिच्छिद्यते । (Ibid).
,,	58	वैकृतस्तु येनाभिव्यक्तं पुनः पुनरविच्छेदेन प्रचिततरकालमुपलभ्यते । (Ibid, l. 2-3).
,,	59	ध्वनिना तु संसृष्टं स्फोटस्य रूपमुपलभ्यते यस्मात् तस्मात् ध्वनेः स्थितिकालः स्फोटोपलब्धिरूपः परिवर्तते । (Ibid, p. 141, l. 2-3).

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„	60	शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदे तु वैकृताः । ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 143, l. 4-5).
171	61	तस्य नित्यस्य येऽभिव्यंजकास्ते च केचित् प्राकृताः केचिद् वैकृताः । यः करणसन्निपातादुत्पद्यते यश्च तस्मात् तौ प्राकृतौ । ताभ्यां विशेषोपलब्धेः । यस्तु ध्वनिर्ध्वनेरुत्पद्यते स वैकृतः ततो विशेषाभावात् । (M. Bhā. dī. p. 49, l. 3-5).
„	62	द्रुतं श्लोकमृचं चोच्चरयति वक्तरि नाडिकाया यस्या नव पानीयपलानि स्रवन्ति तस्या एव मध्यमायां वृत्तौ द्वादश पलानि स्रवन्ति । (*Pradīpa* on M. Bhā. on P. 1.1.70).
172	63	ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतावृत्त्या नालिकासलिलादिषु । कथं प्रचययोगः स्यात् कल्पनामात्रहेतुकः ॥ वास्तवे ह्रस्वादौ कालस्याभेदेऽपि चिरक्षिप्रज्ञानवदुपचरितकालभेदे समाश्रीयमाणे ह्रस्वस्य पुनः पुनरुच्चारणे नालिकायाः पानीयस्रुतिरल्पा, ततस्त्रिभागाधिका दीर्घस्योच्चारणावृत्त्या ततोऽपि प्लुतस्य त्रिभागाधिकेति योऽयं प्रकर्षसंबन्धः सलिलस्रुतेः स कथं कल्पनामात्रकृतकालभेदात् स्वतः कालविभागशून्याद् ह्रस्वादिभेदाद् भवेत् । (Vāk. c. III, pt. ii, p. 65, l. 13-18).
173	64	ततश्चाभिव्यंजकाधीनत्वाच्छब्दतत्त्वोपलंभस्य यथाव्यंजकस्तद्धर्मः स्वरूपनिवेश्यैवेति भिद्यते नालिकासलिलस्रुतिः । (Ibid, p. 66, l. 5-6).
„	65	न हि यथा ज्ञानस्य विषयस्तथा शब्दस्य ध्वनयः विषयाकारस्य शताद्यात्मकस्य ज्ञानाकाराद् विवेकेन संवेदनाच्छब्दध्वनीनां चाविवेकात् । (Ibid, l. 18-19).

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,,	66	मात्रायाश्चतुर्थस्य भागस्यापचिततरध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यस्य दश अवयवा येषां ते दशतयाः समुदायाः ऋगात्मानः तेषां समूहस्य दाशतयस्य चतुःषष्ट्यात्मकस्य वेद-राशेः प्रचिततरध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यस्य कालपरिणामभेदेन विशेषो नास्ति । (Ibid, l. 25 ff).
,,	67	तद्यथा हस्तिमशकज्ञाने स्वरूपेणैकरूपेऽप्याकारोपप्लवाद् विलक्षणे इवानु-भूयेते एवं शब्दात्मा स्फोटस्वभावः सर्वत्र पदवाक्यविषयेऽप्यविलक्षणोऽभिव्यंजक-भेदाद् विलक्षण इव चकास्ति । (Ibid, p. 67, l. 2 ff).
,,	68	सर्वश्च ह्रस्वदीर्घानुनासिकत्वादिधर्मव्रातः शब्दात्मनि व्यंजकाधीन एव । (Ibid, p. 66, l. 11).
174	69	प्राकृतध्वनिभिरभिव्यक्ते शब्दतत्त्वेऽनुरणनरूपा ये पश्चात्कालभाविनो ध्वनयः सन्तानेन वर्तन्ते श्रोत्रान्तरल इव स्थिताः शीघ्रसन्तानावर्तनात् ते श्रोत्रप्रदेशमनुप्राप्ताः शब्दप्रचयग्रहणहेतुतां श्रोत्रगुणात् प्रतिपद्यमानाः द्रुतादिवृत्तिभेदं रचयन्ति । ततश्च ते शब्दतत्त्वाद् बहिर्भूता न भिन्दन्ति तत् । (Ibid, p. 67, l. 10-13).
,,	70	शब्देन संसृष्टो ध्वनिरुपाश्रयानुराग इव स्फटिकादीनामविभक्त उपलभ्यते । (Vāk. I, p. 147, l. 3-4).
,,	71	केषांचित्तु यथेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियगुणाश्चासंवेद्यस्वरूपा एव विषयोपलब्धिहेतवः त्तथायं ध्वनिरगृह्यमाणरूपः शब्दग्रहे निमित्तं भवति । (Ibid, l. 4-6).
175	72	अन्ये त्वाहुः—दृष्टा केवलस्य ध्वनेः स्फोटरूपानवधारणे दूरादुपलब्धिः । (Ibid, l. 6).

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,,	74	(a) नित्यपक्षे तु संयोगविभागजध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यः स्फोटः । एकेषां संयोग-विभागजध्वनिसंभूतनादाभिव्यङ्ग्यः । (Ibid, p. 168, l. 5). (b) तच्च सूक्ष्मे व्यापिनि ध्वनौ करणव्यापारेण प्रचीयमाने स्थूलेनाभ्र-संघातवदुपलभ्येन नादात्मना प्राप्तविवर्तेन तद्विवर्तानुकारेणात्यन्तम-विवर्तमानं विवर्तमानमिव गृह्यते । (Ibid, p. 103, l. 1-3).
,,	75	यः संयोगविभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते । स स्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोऽन्यैरुदाहृताः ॥ अनित्यपक्षे स्थानकरणप्राप्तिविभागहेतुकः प्रथमाभिनिर्वृत्तो यः शब्दः स स्फोट इत्युच्यते । तज्जातास्तु सर्वदिक्कास्तद्रूपप्रतिबिंबोपग्राहिणः सर्वद्रव्याणां स्वेना-मना निरवयवत्वात् आकाशस्यापि मुख्यसमवायिदेशवत् संयोगिद्रव्यान्तरदेशप्रविभा-गोपचारे सति देशनैरन्तर्यप्रत्यासत्त्या कार्यकारणसन्तानविच्छेदेन यथोत्तरमपचीय-मानपूर्वप्रतिबिंबोपग्रहशक्तयो मन्दप्रदीपप्रकाशितरूपकल्पाः क्रमेण प्रध्वंसमाना ये वर्णश्रुतिं विभजन्ति ते ध्वनय इत्युच्यन्ते । (Ibid, p. 167, l. 4—p. 168, l. 3).
176	76	दूरात् प्रभेव दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते । घण्टादीनां च शब्देषु व्यक्तो भेदः स दृश्यते ॥ इह केचिदाचार्या व्यक्तं स्फोटं सहजेन ध्वनिना सर्वतो दूरव्यापिना प्रकाश-स्थानीयेन गन्धेन युक्तं द्रव्यविशेषमिवाविर्भावकाल एव संबद्धं मन्यन्ते ध्वनिना । (Ibid, p. 170, l. 4-7).
,,	77	अनित्यपक्षेऽपि नैव शब्दानां प्रचये दीर्घप्लुतौ प्रचीयेते। किं तर्हि। द्रव्याभिघातप्रचयादेव । (Ibid, p. 171, l. 7-8).

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177	78	कम्पे तूपरते ये नादजा नादास्ते द्रुतादिवृत्तिभेदव्यवस्थाहेतवो भवन्ति। (Ibid, p. 172, l. 2-3).
,,	79	अनवस्थितकम्पेऽपि करणे ध्वनयोऽपरे। स्फोटादेवोपजायन्ते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरादिव॥ (Ibid, p. 172, l. 4-5).
		3. Bhartṛhari on the Sentence.
183	2	(a) ऋषीणां दर्शनं यच्च तत्त्वे किंचिदवस्थितम्। न तेन व्यवहारोऽस्ति न तच्छब्दनिबन्धनम्॥ (Vāk. II. 139). (b) यच्चोपघातजं ज्ञानं यच्च ज्ञानमलौकिकम्। न ताभ्यां व्यवहारोऽस्ति शब्दा लोकनिबन्धनाः॥ (Ibid, 297).
,,	3	रूपणव्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ। ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिलापं च सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 163, l. 3-4).
,,	4	केवलेन पदेनार्थो यावानेवाभिधीयते। वाक्यस्थं तावतोऽर्थस्य तदाहुरभिधायकम्॥ (Vāk. II, 41).
,,	5	संबन्धे सति यत्त्वन्यदाधिक्यमुपजायते। वाक्यार्थमेव तं प्राहुरनेकपदसंश्रयम्॥ (Vāk. II, 42).
184	6	सर्वभेदानुगुण्यं तु सामान्यमपरे विदुः। तदर्थान्तरसंसर्गाद् भजते भेदरूपताम्॥ (Ibid, 44).

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"	7	. . अर्थैकत्वादेकं वाक्यं साकांक्षं चेद्विभागे स्यात् । (Jaimini *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, II, 1.46).
"	8	(a) शब्दानां क्रममात्रे च नान्यः शब्दोऽस्ति वाचकः । क्रमो हि धर्मः कालस्य तेन वाक्यं न विद्यते ॥ (Vāk. II, 50).
		(b) वर्णानां च पदानां च क्रममात्रनिवेशिनी ॥ पदाख्या वाक्यसंज्ञा च शब्दत्वं नेष्यते तयोः ॥ (Ibid, 52).
185	9	आख्यातशब्दे नियतं साधनं यत्र गम्यते ॥ तदप्येकं समाप्तार्थं वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, 326 (7?)).
"	10	क्रिया क्रियान्तराद्भिन्ना नियताधारसाधना । प्रक्रान्ता प्रतिपत्तृणां भेदाः संबोधहेतवः ॥ (Ibid, 414).
187	11	यथैक एव सर्वार्थप्रत्ययः प्रविभज्यते । दृश्यभेदानुकारेण वाक्यार्थानुगमस्तथा ॥ (Ibid, 7).
"	12	चित्रस्यैकस्वरूपस्य यथा भेदनिदर्शनैः । नीलादिभिः समाख्यानं क्रियते भिन्नलक्षणैः ॥ (Ibid, 8).
"	13	वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोरखंडत्वं पानकरस—मयूराण्डरसचित्ररूपनरसिंहगवयचित्रज्ञानवत् समानमेवेत्युच्यते । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 7).

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188	17	पदप्रकृतिभावश्च वृत्तिभेदेन वर्ण्यते । पदानां संहिता योनिः संहिता वा पदाश्रया ॥ (Ibid, 58).
,,	18	असन्निधौ प्रतिनिधिर्मा भून्नित्यस्य कर्मणः । काम्यस्य वा प्रवृत्तस्य लोप इत्युपदिश्यते ॥ (Ibid, 70).
,,	19	विशिष्टैव क्रिया येन वाक्यार्थः परिकल्प्यते । द्रव्याभावे प्रतिनिधौ तस्य तत् स्यात् क्रियान्तरम् ॥ (Ibid, 71).
189	20	शुक्लादयो गुणाः सन्तो यथा तत्राविवक्षिताः । तथाऽविवक्षा भेदानां द्रव्यत्वसहचारिणाम् ॥ (Ibid, 69).
,,	21	तस्माद्व्रीहित्वमधिकं व्रीहिशब्दः प्रकल्पयन् । द्रव्यत्वमविरुद्धत्वात् प्राप्त्यर्थः सन्न बाधते ॥ (Ibid, 66).
190	23	प्रासङ्गिकमिदं कार्यमिदं तन्त्रेण लभ्यते । इदमावृत्तिभेदाभ्यामत्र बाधासमुच्चयौ ॥ (Ibid, 77).
,,	24	ऊहोऽस्मिन् विषये न्याय्यः संबन्धोऽस्य न बाध्यते ॥ सामान्यस्यातिदेशोऽयं विशेषोऽत्रातिदिश्यते ॥ (Ibid, 78).
,,	25	इयं श्रुत्या क्रमप्राप्तिरियमुच्चारणादिभिः । क्रमोऽयमत्र बलवानस्मिंस्तु न विवक्षितः ॥ (Ibid, 80).

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191	26	इदं प्रधानं शेषोऽयं विनियोगक्रमस्त्वयम् । साक्षादस्योपकारीदमिदमाराद् विशेषकम् ॥ (Ibid, 82).
”	27	(a) प्रसज्यप्रतिषेधोऽयं पर्युदासोऽयमत्र तु । इदं गौणमिदं मुख्यं व्यापीदं गुरु लघ्विदम् ॥ (Ibid, 84). (b) इति वाक्येषु ये भेदाः पदार्थोपनिबन्धनाः । सर्वे ते न प्रकल्पेरन् पदं चेत् स्यादवाचकम् ॥ (Ibid, 87).
”	28	विज्ञातार्थं पदं यच्च तदर्थे प्रतिपादिते । पिकादि यदविज्ञातं तत्किमित्यनुयुज्यते ॥ (Ibid, 72).
192	29	सर्वपार्षदं हि व्याकरणं शास्त्रम्, तत्र चायं स्थितः इत्यत्र पुनः पदपदार्थावङ्गीकरोति । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 250).
”	30	अविभक्तेऽपि वाक्यार्थे शक्तिभेदादपोद्धृते । वाक्यान्तरविभागेन यथोक्तं न विरुध्यते ॥ (Ibid, 88).
”	31	(a) न लक्षणेन पदकारा अनुवर्त्याः । पदकारैर्नाम लक्षणमनुवर्त्यम् । यथालक्षणं पदं कर्तव्यम् । (M. Bhā. II, p. 85, l. 4). (b) पदाम्नायश्च यद्यन्यः संहिताया निदर्शकः । नित्यस्तत्र कथं कार्यं पदं लक्षणदर्शनात् ॥ (Ibid, 59).

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,,	32	आह चैवं भाष्यकारः । तस्मान्मन्यामहे पदान्यसत्यानि । एकमभिन्नस्वभावकं वाक्यम् । तदबुधबोधनाय पदविभागः कल्पित इति । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 56).
193	33	राजशब्देन राजार्थो भिन्नरूपेण गम्यते । वृत्तावाख्यातसदृशं पदमन्यत्र युज्यते ॥ (Ibid, 35).
,,	34	रूपनाशे पदानां स्यात् कथं चावधिकल्पना । अगृहीतावधौ शब्दे कथं चार्थो विविच्यते ॥ (Ibid, 95).
,,	35	वैरवासिष्ठगिरिशास्तथैकागारिकादयः । कैश्चित् कथंचिदाख्याता निमित्तावधिसङ्करैः ॥ (Ibid, 171).
,,	36	यमर्थमाहतुर्भिन्नौ प्रत्ययावेक एव तम् । क्वचिदाह पचन्तीति धातुस्ताभ्यां विना क्वचित् ॥ (Ibid, 230).
,,	37	अन्वाख्यानस्मृतौ ये च प्रत्ययार्था निबन्धनम् । निर्दिष्टास्ते प्रकृत्यर्था स्मृत्यन्तर उदाहृताः । (Ibid, 231).
194	38	संप्रत्ययप्रमाणत्वात् पदार्थास्तित्वकल्पने । पदार्थाभ्युच्चये त्यागादानर्थक्यं प्रसज्यते ॥ (Ibid, 34).
,,	39	उपादायापि ये हेयास्तानुपायान् प्रचक्षते । उपायानां च नियमो नावश्यमवतिष्ठते ॥ (Ibid, 38).

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„	40	तथा पिकादियोगेन वाक्येऽत्यन्तविलक्षणे । सदृशस्येव संज्ञानमसतोऽर्थस्य मन्यते ॥ (Ibid, 92).
195	41	(a) एकस्य भागे सादृश्यं भागे भेदश्च लक्ष्यते । निर्भागस्य प्रकाशस्य निर्भागेणैव चेतसा ॥ (Ibid, 93).
		(b) तथैव भागे सादृश्यं भागे भेदोऽवसीयते । भागाभावेऽपि वाक्यानामत्यन्तं भिन्नधर्मणाम् ॥ (Ibid, 94).
„	42	अन्यथा प्रतिपन्नार्थं पदग्रहणपूर्वकम् । पुनर्वाक्ये तमेवार्थमन्यथा प्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, 239).
„	43	उपात्ता बहवोऽप्यथा येष्वन्ते प्रतिषेधनम् । क्रियते ते निवर्तन्ते तस्मात्तांस्तत्र नाश्रयेत् ॥ (Ibid, 240).
„	44	स्तुतिनिन्दाप्रधानेषु वाक्येष्वर्थो न तादृशः । पदानां प्रविभागेन यादृशः परिकल्प्यते ॥ (Ibid, 247).
„	45	यथैवानर्थकैर्वर्णैर्विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते । पदैरनर्थकैरेवं विशिष्टार्थोऽभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, 409).
„	46	यदन्तराले ज्ञानं तु पदार्थेषूपजायते । प्रतिपत्तेरुपायोऽसौ प्रक्रमानवधारणात् ॥ (Ibid, 410).

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,,	47	न पृथगेव शृङ्गग्राहिकया तस्य स्वरूपं विवेक्तुं शक्यते, परोपाधिद्वारकमेव सर्वदा तस्य निरूपणमवसातव्यमित्युच्यते । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 438).
196	48	पृथङ्निविष्टतत्त्वानां पृथगर्थानुपातिनाम् । इन्द्रियाणां यथा कार्यमृते देहान्न कल्पते ॥ तथा पदानां सर्वेषां पृथगर्थनिवेशिनाम् वाक्येभ्यः प्रविभक्तानामर्थवत्ता न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, 419, 420).
,,	49	दर्शनस्यापि यत् सत्यं न तथा दर्शनं स्थितम् । वस्तुसंसर्गरूपेण तद्रूपं निरूप्यते ॥ (Ibid, 422).
,,	50	(a) तस्मात्केवलपदार्थो व्यवहारातीतत्वान्नास्तीति व्यपदिश्यते । (*Vṛtti* on Ibid, 424, manuscript). (b) तस्मात् केवलः पदार्थः पदं वाऽव्यपदेश्यमेव । अतश्चैतदसत्यमित्युच्यते । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 424).
,,	51	वाक्यवाक्यार्थौ तु व्यवहार्यत्वात् सत्यभूतावित्यर्थप्रतिपत्तये वाक्यमेव प्रयुज्यत इत्याह । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 423).
,,	52	वाक्यार्थे योऽभिसंबन्धो न तस्यात्मा क्वचित् स्थितः । व्यवहारे पदार्थानां तमात्मानं प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, 437).

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197	53	अस्तित्वेनानुपक्तो वा निवृत्त्यात्मनि वा स्थितः । अर्थोऽभिधीयते यस्मादतो वाक्यं प्रयुज्यते ॥ क्रियानुषङ्गेण विना न पदार्थः प्रतीयते । सत्यो वा विपरीतो वा व्यवहारे न सोऽस्यतः । (Ibid, 423, 424).
,,	54	वाक्यं तदपि मन्यन्ते यत्पदं चरितक्रियम् । (Ibid, 326).
,,	55	आख्यातशब्दे नियतं साधनं यत्र गम्यते । तदप्येकं समाप्तार्थं वाक्यमित्यभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, 326).
198	56	यथाप्रकरणं द्वारमित्यस्यां कर्मणः श्रुतौ । बधान देहि वेत्येतदुपायादधिगम्यते ॥ (Ibid, 333).
,,	57	यत्र साधनवृत्तिर्यः शब्दः सत्त्वानिबन्धनः । न स प्रधानभूतस्य साध्यस्यार्थस्य वाचकः ॥ (Ibid, 334).
,,	58	(a) पारार्थ्यस्याविशिष्टत्वान्न शब्दाच्छब्दसन्निधिः । नार्थाच्छब्दस्य सान्निध्यं न शब्दादर्थसन्निधिः । (Ibid, 336). (b) एकपदमेव शब्दान्तराभिसंबन्धमन्तरेण प्रकरणादिवशात् तत्तदर्थ-प्रत्यायननिपुणमित्येव मन्तव्यम् । (Puṇyarāja on Ibid, 336).

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199	59	रूपं सर्वपदार्थानां वाक्यार्थोपनिबन्धनम् । सापेक्षा ये तु वाक्यार्थाः पदार्थैरेव ते समाः ॥ (Ibid, 325).
,,	60	आख्यातं साव्ययकारकविशेषणं वाक्यम् । एकतिङ् वाक्यम् । (M. Bhā. I, p. 367, l. 10, 16).
,,	61	बहुष्वपि तिङन्तेषु साकाङ्क्षेष्वेकवाक्यता । तिङन्तेभ्यो निघातस्य पर्युदासस्तथार्थवान् ॥ (Ibid, 442).
,,	62	यथानेकमपि क्त्वान्तं तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् । तथा तिङन्तं तत्राहुस्तिङन्तस्य विशेषकम् ॥ (Ibid, 6).
,,	63	तिङन्तान्तरयुक्तेषु युक्तयुक्तेषु वा पुनः । मृगः पश्यत यातीति भेदाभेदौ न तिष्ठतः ॥ (Ibid, 444).
,,	64	इतिकर्तव्यतार्थस्य सामर्थ्याद् यस्य काङ्क्ष्यते । अशब्दलक्षणाकांक्षं समाप्तार्थं तदुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, 445).
200	65	शब्दनिबन्धनाया आकांक्षाया तत्राभावात् वाक्यं विज्ञायते । (*Vṛtti* on Ibid, 445,, (manuscript)).
,,	66	प्राधान्यात्तु क्रिया पूर्वमर्थस्य प्रविभज्यते । साध्यप्रयुक्तान्यङ्गानि फलं तस्याः प्रयोजकम् ॥ (Ibid, 427).

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,,	67	प्रयोक्तैवाभिसंधत्ते साध्यसाधनरूपताम् । अर्थस्य वाभिसंबन्धकल्पनां प्रसमीहते ॥ (Ibid, 428).
,,	68	पचिक्रियां करोमीति कर्मत्वेनाभिधीयते । पक्तिः करणरूपं तु साध्यत्वेन प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, 429).
		योऽसौ येनोपकारेण प्रयोक्तृणां विवक्षितः । अर्थस्य सर्वशक्तित्वात् सर्वथैव व्यवस्थितः ॥ (Ibid, 430).
201	69	(a) फलवन्तः क्रियाभेदाः क्रियान्तरनिबन्धनाः । असंख्याताः क्रमोद्देशैरेकाख्यातनिदर्शनाः ॥ (Ibid, 448).
		(b) निवृत्तभेदा सर्वैव क्रियाख्यातेऽभिधीयते । श्रुतेरशक्या भेदानां प्रतिभागप्रकल्पना ॥ (Ibid, 449).
,,	70	इन्द्रियनित्यं वचनमौदुम्बरायणः, तत्र चतुष्ट्वं नोपपद्यते । अयुगपदुत्पन्नानां व शब्दानामितरेतरोपदेशः शास्त्रकृतो योगश्च । व्याप्तिमत्वात्तु शब्दस्याणीयस्त्वाच्च शब्देन संज्ञाकरणं व्यवहारार्थं लोके । (*Nirukta* I, 1).
,,	72	स्वार्थमात्रं प्रकाश्यासौ साकांक्षो विनिवर्तते । अर्थस्तु तस्य संबन्धी प्रकाशयति सन्निधिम् । (Vāk. II, 335).

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202	74	वाक्यस्य बुद्धौ नित्यत्वमर्थयोगं च लौकिकम् । दृष्ट्वा चतुष्ट्वं नास्तीति वार्तीक्षौदुम्बरायणौ ॥ (Ibid, 342). व्याप्तिमांश्च लघुश्चैव व्यवहारः पदाश्रयः । लोके शास्त्रे च कार्यार्थं विभागेनैव कल्पितः ॥ (Ibid, 343). न लोके प्रतिपत्तॄणामर्थयोगात् प्रसिद्धयः । तस्मादलौकिको वाक्यादन्यः कश्चिन्न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, 344).
203	75	असतश्चान्तराले याञ्छब्दानस्तीति मन्यते । प्रतिपत्तुरशक्तिः सा ग्रहणोपाय एव सः ॥ (Vāk. I, 85). यदन्तराले ज्ञानं तु पदार्थेषूपजायते । प्रतिपत्तेरुपायोऽसौ प्रक्रमानवधारणात् ॥ (Vāk. II, 410).
		4. The Relation between the Word and the Meaning.
204	1	तत्रान्तरङ्गत्वादहेयत्वादसाधारणत्वाच्च स्वरूपं मुख्यमभिधेयम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 127, l. 7).
205	2	सर्वपार्षदं पुनरिदं शास्त्रमिति ये बाह्यस्यार्थस्य शब्दवाच्यत्वं नेच्छन्ति तन्मतोपसंग्रहार्थं वक्त्रभिप्रायारूढस्यैव शब्दार्थत्वे तत्र कार्यकारणसंबन्धमाह । (Ibid, p. 122, l. 14 ff).

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,,	3	इन्द्रियाणां स्वविषयेष्वनादिर्योग्यता यथा । अनादिरर्थैः शब्दानां संबन्धो योग्यता तथा ॥ (Ibid, p. 142, l. 10-11).
,,	4	स्वरूपाविवेकेनैव ह्यर्थपरामर्शोऽभिधानमुच्यते । (Ibid, p. 123, l. 11).
,,	5	प्रतीतौ हि किंचित् तटस्थमेव तामननुप्रविशदेवोपायमात्रं दृष्टं यथेन्द्रियम्। किंचित् पुनस्तत्रानुप्रविशदेव प्रतीतिं जनयद् व्यधिकरणं भवति दण्ड इव यथा धूमादि लिङ्गम् । शब्दस्तु न जनकतामात्रेणार्थप्रतीतौ संबन्धमनुभवति, अपि तु तत्रार्थः शब्द्यमानः शब्दमय इवाभाति । (Ibid, p. 124, l. 1 ff).
,,	6	नित्येऽनित्येऽपि वाच्येऽर्थे पुरुषेण कथंचन । संबन्धोऽकृतसंबन्धैः शब्दैः कर्तुं न शक्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 149, l. 9-10).
206	7	नित्यः संबन्ध इत्यस्येदंभावे सति शब्दार्थयोः सोऽयमिति यः संबन्धः सोऽर्थादेशनस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वाद् औत्पत्तिकः स्वभावसिद्धः न केनचित् कर्त्रा कश्चित् प्रतिपत्तारं प्रति अज्ञातपूर्वः तत्प्रथमं कृत इति । (Vāk. I, p. 59, l. 1 ff).
,,	8	(a) समयाद्योग्यतासंविद् मातापित्रादियोगवत् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 144, l. 24). (b) इन्द्रियविषयवद्वा प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकभावेन समयोपाधिर्योग्यता शब्दार्थयोः संबन्धः । (Vāk. I, p. 60, l. 1).

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207	12	इयं च योग्यता शब्दानामर्थप्रतीत्यनुसारेण व्यवस्थापयितव्येत्यभेदेन शब्दार्थयोः प्रत्ययाद् अभ्यासफलैवावस्थितेति स एव मुख्यः संबन्धः । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 143, l. 2-4).
,,	13	ते साधुष्वनुमानेन प्रत्ययोत्पत्तिहेतवः । तादात्म्यमुपगम्येव शब्दार्थस्य प्रकाशकाः ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 230, l. 6-7).
208	14	अत्यन्तमतथाभूते निमित्ते श्रुत्युपाश्रयात् । दृश्यतेऽलातचक्रादौ वस्त्वाकारनिरूपणा ॥ (Ibid, p. 198, l. 1-2).
,,	16	बुद्धिप्रतिभासः शब्दार्थः । यदा यदा शब्द उच्चारितः तदार्थाकारा बुद्धिरुपजायः:इति प्रवाहनित्यत्वादर्थस्य नित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । (Kaiyyaṭa on M. Bhā. I, p. 7, l. 24).
209	17	शब्देनार्थस्य संबन्धो दृष्टादृष्टप्रयोजनः । क्रियते सोऽभिसंबन्धमन्तरेण कथं भवेत् ॥ नावश्यमभिधेयेषु संस्कारः स तथाविधः । दृश्यते न च संबन्धस्तथाभूतो विवक्षितः ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 148, l. 2-3, 9-10).
,,	18	नार्थविशेषाधानरूपः संस्कारोऽत्र संबन्धावेदकः, तस्यानुपूर्वीमात्राद्विशिष्टेन प्रभाववता रचितादपि निष्पत्तेः प्रत्यायकत्वानवेक्षणात् । (Ibid, p. 149, l. 1-2).
,,	19	व्यपदेशे पदार्थानामन्या सत्तौपचारिकी । सर्वावस्थासु सर्वेषामन्यरूपस्य दार्शिका ॥ (Ibid, p. 150, l. 9).

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„	20	बाह्यस्य वस्तुनो नियतरूपत्वाद् भावाभावसाधारण्यानुपपत्तेर्घट इत्युक्तेऽस्ति नास्तीति शब्दान्तरोपधीयमानरूपसंसर्गविरोधः स्यादित्युपचारसत्तासमाविष्टः शब्दार्थः । (Ibid, p. 151, 14-15).
210	21	तथा च जन्मविरोधः, सत आत्मलाभायोगात् । लब्धात्मा हि सन्नुच्यते । (Ibid, p. 154, l. 11).
„	22	तथा हि बुद्ध्या निरूपितार्थविषयाः शब्दाः । (Ibid, p. 150, l. 17-18).
„	23	तथा हि विद्यमानोऽपि वर्तमानकालिकोऽर्थो यावद् बुद्ध्या नावधृतस्तावद-विषयः शब्दानाम् । (Ibid, p. 159, l. 8-9).
211	24	तस्माद्भिन्नेषु धर्मेषु विरोधिष्वविरोधिनीम् । विरोधिख्यापनायैव शब्दैस्तैस्तैरुपाश्रिताम् ॥ अभिन्नकालामर्थेषु भिन्नकालेष्ववस्थिताम् । प्रवृत्तिहेतुं सर्वेषां शब्दानामौपचारिकीम् ॥ एतां सत्तां पदार्थो हि न कश्चिदतिवर्तते । सा च सम्प्रतिसत्तायाः पृथग् भाष्ये निदर्शिता ॥ (Ibid, p. 158, l. 13-18).
221	25	(a) उपचर्य तु कर्तारमभिधानप्रवृत्तये । पुनश्च कर्मभावेन तां क्रियां च तदाश्रयाम् ॥ अथोपचारसत्तैवं विधेयास्तत्र लादयः । जन्मना तु विरोधित्वान्मुख्या सत्ता न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 155, l. 2-5).

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		(b) तथा च तत्रोत्तरमसद्रूपमवस्थाविशेषं पूर्वावस्थायां कारकाणां कार्योन्मुखलक्षणायामुपचर्य अङ्कुर इत्यभिधानस्य प्रवृत्तौ जायत इति कर्तृत्वोत्पपत्तिः । (Ibid, p. 155, l. 8-10).
		(c) पूर्वस्मात् प्रच्युता धर्मादप्राप्ता चोत्तरं पदम् । तदन्तराले भेदानामाश्रयाज्जन्म कथ्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 45, l. 19-20).
		(d) पूर्वामवस्थामजहत् संस्पृशन् धर्ममुत्तरम् । संमूर्च्छित इवार्थात्मा जायमानोऽभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 320, l. 14-15).
”	26	तथाहि योऽयं ब्राह्मणार्थः स बहिरसन् केवलं भ्रान्त्या क्षत्रियेऽध्यवसित इति स्वाभाविकब्राह्मणार्थनिवृत्तिरत्र नञा द्योत्यते । (Ibid, p. 153, l. 17-18).
”	27	(a) स्फटिकादि यथा द्रव्यं भिन्नरूपैरुपाश्रयैः । स्वशक्तियोगात् संबन्धं ताद्रूप्येणोपगच्छति ॥ तद्वत् शब्दोऽपि सत्तायामस्यां पूर्वं व्यवस्थितः । धर्मैरपैति संबन्धमविरोधिविरोधिभिः ॥ (Ibid, p. 151, l. 10-13).
		(b) अविरोधिनो धर्मा भावात्मकाः । ते चोपचारसत्तायामनुगुणाः यथा स्फटिकस्य मल्लिकाकुसुमादयः इति न ते रूपतिरस्कारहेतवः । विरोधिनस्तु धर्मा अभावात्मकाः । ते हि प्रतिषेधात्मका रूपतिरोधानमुपचारसत्ताया जपाकुसुमादय इव स्फटिकस्य कुर्वन्ति । (Ibid, p. 152, l. 8-9, 14-16).

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213	28	शब्दस्य च निरूपितार्थविषयत्वान्निरूपणाप्रत्ययः कारणम् ।.....निरूपणा-प्रत्ययश्च विकल्पः । (Vāk. III, pt. 1, p. 162, l. 7, 10).
"	29	उपप्लवो हि ज्ञानस्य बाह्याकारानुपातिता । कालुष्यमिव तत्तस्य संसर्गे व्यतिभेदजम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 164, l. 5-6).
"	30	इन्द्रियसन्निकर्षादिरूपोपाश्रयनिरपेक्षतयाशेषार्थाभासखचितं सर्वज्ञज्ञानमुपक्रमे शुद्धमित्युच्यते । (Ibid, p. 163, l. 17).
"	31	द्वे दशे शुद्धेरुपक्रमपरिसमाप्तिरूपे । (Ibid).
"	32	( ) यथा च ज्ञानमालेखादशुद्धो व्यवतिष्ठते । तथोपाश्रयवानर्थः स्वरूपाद् विप्रकृष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 164, l. 14-15). (b) जात्याद्युपाधिरूपेण समवेतेन शबलितमर्थवस्तु प्रतीयतेऽभिधीयते वेति तथा तद् व्यवहारमवतरति । (Ibid, p. 164, l. 19).
"	33	(a) प्रदेशस्यैकदेशं वा परतो वा निरूपणम् । विपर्ययमभावो वा व्यवहारोऽनुवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, p. 160, l. 12-13). (b) संसर्गदर्शने स्वतो गौर्न गौः गोत्वाभिसंबन्धाद्गौरिति ब्रह्मकल्पं साक्षादव्यवहार्यमेव द्रव्यं परोपाधीयमानरूपविशेषं व्यवहार-मनुपतति । (Ibid, p. 161, l. 1-2).

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214	35	रूपणव्यपदेशाभ्यां लौकिके वर्त्मनि स्थितौ । ज्ञानं प्रत्यभिलापं च सदृशौ बालपण्डितौ ॥ (Ibid, p. 163, l. 3-4).
215	36	एवमविद्यामान्द्याद्विकल्पानां यथातत्त्वमवसायपाटवाभावात् समारोपितरूपेणावसायस्य सर्ववादिभिरभ्युपगतत्वात्तदुपदर्शितविषयविषयाः शब्दाः सर्व एव बहिरसमर्थविषयाः प्रत्ययोपारूढरूपाभिधायिनः सिद्धा इत्यतीताद्यभावादिशब्दानामप्यर्थसंबन्धे न विप्रतिपत्तव्यमिति स्थितम् । (Ibid, p. 162, l. 23-26).
,,	37	(a) सामान्यं वा विशेषं वा यस्मादाहुर्विशेषवत् । शब्दास्तस्मादसत्येषु भेदेष्वेव व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 174, l. 1-2).
		(b) सामान्यमपि सामान्यान्तराद् व्यावृत्तं शब्दैरुच्यते । तथा विशेषो विशेषान्तराद् व्यावृत्त इत्यसत्येषु भेदेष्वेव कृतपदबन्धा नाभिन्नमद्वयं तत्त्वं संस्प्रष्टुं शक्ता इति वितथ एव शाब्दो व्यवहारः । (Helārāja on the above).
,,	38	तथा च भावस्यापि शब्देनाभिधीयमानस्य ज्ञायमानस्य वा परोपाधिरूपतयाभावसमकक्ष्येता । (Ibid, p. 165, l. 8).
,,	39	अभावोऽपि हि घटाभावः पटाभाव इति परोपाधिरेव शब्दप्रत्ययावनुपततीति साम्यम् । (Ibid, l. 9).
,,	40	यत्तु परमं रूपं तन्नैव व्यवहारास्पदम् । (Ibid, l. 10-11).

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216	41	(a) एकस्मादात्मनोऽनन्यौ भावाभावौ विकल्पितौ । (Ibid, p. 166, l. 4). (b) तस्मादेकमेवाद्वयं तत्त्वमात्मशब्दवाच्यं व्यवहारे विकल्पदशायां भावाभावोपाधिरूपमविभक्तं चकास्ति । प्रकाशरूपस्य हि परस्य तत्त्वस्य सर्वथाविभिन्नस्वभावस्य महासत्तात्मनोऽभावप्रतियोगिनोऽविद्यावशात्सांवृतलोकयात्रानिर्वर्तनसमर्थस्य बहिरिदंतया प्रतिभाने वर्तमानकालोपाधितयार्थक्रियाकारिणो भावरूपता, अतीतानागतकालोपाधितया चान्तरेव संस्काररूपतयानुवर्तनाद्बाह्येन्द्रियविषयानुपगमात् सर्वप्रमातृसाधारणार्थक्रियाकरणादभावरूपतया व्यवहारः । (Ibid, p. 166, l. 8-15).
,,	42	अत एव त्र्यध्विकाः पदार्थाः समुद्घोष्यन्त इति नाभावो नाम कश्चित् । (Ibid, l. 17-18).
,,	43	सांवृतेन तु रूपेण सर्वं भावात्मकम्, प्रथमानस्य वस्तुत्वात्, अवस्तुनः प्रथनायोगात् । (Ibid, p. 169, l. 2).
,,	44	तथा हि मृदवस्था घटस्य प्रागभावः, कपालावस्था च प्रध्वंसाभाव इति वाच्यम् । (Ibid, p. 169, l. 14).
217	45	यत्र द्रष्टा च दृश्यं च दर्शनं वा विकल्पितम् । तस्यैवार्थस्य सत्यत्वं श्रितास्त्रय्यन्तवेदिनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 171, l. 9). ग्राह्यग्राहकादिप्रपञ्चस्य विकल्पपरिघटितस्यासत्यत्वात्सर्वप्रपंचसमतिक्रान्तं वाङ्मनसातीततत्त्वमविकल्पं परं ब्रह्मानादिनिधनं सत्यमिति ब्रह्मविदः प्राहुः । (Helārāja on the above).

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,,	46	तस्माच्छक्तिविभागेन नित्यः सदसदात्मकः । एकोऽर्थः शब्दवाच्यत्वे बहुरूपः प्रकाशते ॥ (Ibid, p. 180, l. 12-13). सर्वपरिकल्पातीतं तत्त्वं समाविष्टं सर्वाभिः शक्तिभिर्ब्रह्म यथायथं व्यवहारे भावाभावरूपतया तत्तदुपाधिखचितं शब्दाः प्रतिपादयन्तीत्यभावाभिधायिनामपि भावशब्दैस्तुल्यः संबन्धोऽविशेषाच्छब्दानामिति प्रकरणतात्पर्यमुपसंहृतम् । (Helārāja on the above).
218	47	व्यवहारश्च लोकस्य पदार्थैः परिकल्पितैः । शास्त्रे पदार्थः कार्यार्थं लौकिकः प्रविभज्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 181, l. 3-4).

Chapter IV.

1. Bhartṛhari on Grammatical analysis.

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219	1	प्रतिक्षिप्तमपि पक्षं व्यवहारार्थमङ्गीकरोत्येव टीकाकारः । यतः सर्वपार्षदमिदं हि व्याकरणशास्त्रम् । तत्र चायं स्थित इत्यत्र पदपदार्थावङ्गीकरोति । (Puṇyarāja on Vāk. II, 250).
220	2	यदन्तराले ज्ञानं तु पदार्थेषूपजायते । प्रतिपत्तेरुपायोऽसौ प्रक्रमानवधारणात् ॥ (Ibid, 410).
”	3	अविभक्तेऽपि वाक्यार्थे शक्तिभेदादपोद्धृते । वाक्यान्तरविभागेन यथोक्तं न विरुध्यते ॥ (Ibid, 88).
”	4	शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते । (Ibid, 233).
221	5	संबन्धे सति यत्त्वन्यदाधिक्यमुपजायते । वाक्यार्थमेव तं प्राहुरनेकपदसंश्रयम् ॥ (Ibid, 42).
”	6	तत्रापोद्धारपदार्थो नामात्यन्तसंसृष्टः संसर्गादनुमेयेन परिकल्पितेन रूपेण प्राप्तविवेकः सन्नपोद्ध्रियते । (Vāk. I, p. 65, l. 1).
”	7	विभागपूर्वकसंसर्गनिबेधायात्यन्तग्रहणम् । (Ibid, p. 64, l. 26).

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,,	8	संसर्गरूपात् संभूताः संविद्रूपादपोद्धृताः । शास्त्रे विभक्ता वाक्यार्थात् प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थवत् ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i. p. 182, l. 6-7).
222	9	आनन्त्याद्धि वाक्यानां स्वालक्षण्येनाशक्या व्युत्पत्तिः कर्तुमिति सदृशपदद्वारा तदुपपत्तिः । (Ibid, p. 2, l. 4-5).
,,	10	अखण्डवाक्यव्युत्पत्तौ उपायः पदव्युत्पत्तिः वाक्यवादिनाम् । (Ibid, p. 2, l. 3-4).
,,	11	अर्थापोद्धार एव हि पदापोद्धारस्य निमित्तम् । निमित्ते हि तस्मिन् वर्णापोद्धारस्यापि प्रसङ्गः । तेषामपि व्युत्पाद्यता स्यात् । (Ibid, p. 2, l. 16).
,,	12	(a) शास्त्रे पदार्थः कार्यार्थं लौकिकः प्रविभज्यते । (Ibid, p. 181, l. 4). (b) इदानीमन्वाख्यानाङ्गमपोद्धारपदार्थो द्रव्यगुणादिकः समुद्देष्टव्य इति प्रविभज्यत इत्युक्ते तस्य कुतः प्रविभाग इत्याह— (Ibid, p. 182, l. 4-5).
223	13	न हि दर्शनान्तरव्यवस्थितविरुद्धभावरूपानुगमो व्यवहारे ।... इदं च लौकिकानामेव शब्दानामनुशासनं शास्त्रम् । तदत्र लोकप्रसिद्धयैव पदार्थप्रक्रिया समाश्रयणीया इति अखण्डाद् वाक्यार्थात् क्रियावचनो धातुः सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि प्रत्यायकः प्रत्ययः इत्यादिशास्त्रीयकार्यप्रसिद्धयर्थं लौकिक एव क्रियाद्रव्यगुणादिलक्षणोऽपोद्धारपदार्थः प्रविभज्यते । (Ibid, p. 181, l. 6, 9-12).
224	14	सत्त्वे निविशतेऽपैति पृथग् जातिषु दृश्यते । आधेयश्चाक्रियाजश्च सोऽसत्त्वप्रकृतिर्गुणः ॥ (M. Bhā. on P. 4.1.44).

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„	15	संसर्गि भेदकं यद् यद् सव्यापारं प्रतीयते । गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्र उदाहृतम् ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 192, l. 2-3).
225	17	तस्मान्न वैयाकरणैः शक्यं लौकिकं लिङ्गमास्थातुम् । अवश्यं कश्चित् स्वकृतान्त आस्थेयः । (M. Bhā. I, p. 245, l. 21-23).
„	18	(a) ते लिङ्गैश्च स्वशब्दैश्च शास्त्रेऽस्मिन्नुपवर्णिताः । स्मृत्यर्थमनुगम्यन्ते केचिदेव यथागमम् ॥ (Vāk. I, p. 64, l. 5-6). (b) निमित्तभूताः साधुत्वे शास्त्रादनुमितात्मकाः ॥ केचित् पदार्था वक्ष्यन्ते संक्षेपेण यथागमम् ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 182, l. 8-9).
„	19	स्वाश्रये समवेतानां तद्वदेषाश्रयान्तरे । क्रियाणामभिनिष्पत्तौ सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः ॥ (Ibid, p. 230, l. 2-3).
226	20	सिद्धं त्वन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्याम् । (Vā. 9. on P. 1.2.45).
„	21	(a) अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ तु व्यवहारनिबन्धनम् । (Vāk. II. 12). (b) ये शब्दा नित्यसंबन्धा विवेके ज्ञातशक्तयः । अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां तेषामर्थो विभज्यते ॥ (Vāk. II. 166).

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	22	यत्र चाव्यभिचारेण तयोः शक्यं प्रकल्पनम् । नियमस्तत्र न त्वेवं नियमो नुट्शब्रादिषु ॥ (Ibid, 167).
227	23	(a) अन्वाख्यानानि भिद्यन्ते शब्दव्युत्पत्तिकर्मसु । बहूनां संभवेऽर्थानां निमित्तं किंचिदिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, 170). (b) यथा पथः समाख्यानं वृक्षवल्मीकपर्वतैः । अविरुद्धं गवादीनां भिन्नैश्च सहचारिभिः ॥ (Ibid, 172). (c) कैश्चिन्निर्वचनं भिन्नं गिरतेर्गर्जतेर्गमेः । गवतेर्गदतेर्वापि गौरित्यत्रानुदर्शितम् ॥ (Ibid, 174).
		2. The meaning of words obtained by analysis : the Universal and the Substance.
228	1	अस्त्यर्थः सर्वशब्दानामिति प्रत्याय्यलक्षणम् । अपूर्वदेवतास्वर्गैः सममाहुर्गवादिषु ॥ (Ibid, 119).
229	2	जातेः प्रत्यायके शब्दे या व्यक्तिरनुषङ्गिणी । न तद् व्यक्तिगतान् भेदान् जातिशब्दोऽवलम्बते ॥ (Ibid, 122).
,,	3	नियतास्तु प्रयोगा ये नियतं यच्च साधनम् । तेषां शब्दाभिधेयत्वमपरैरनुगम्यते ॥ (Ibid, 125).

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”	4	समुदायोऽभिधेयो वाप्यविकल्पसमुच्चयः । (Ibid, 126).
230	5	असत्यो वापि संसर्गः शब्दार्थः कैश्चिदिष्यते । (Ibid).
”	6	असत्योपाधि यत्सत्यं तद्वा शब्दनिबन्धनम् । (Ibid, 127).
231	7	शब्दो वाप्यभिजल्पत्वमागतो याति वाच्यताम् । (Ibid, 127).
”	8	लोकेऽर्थरूपतां शब्दः प्रतिपन्नः प्रवर्तते । शास्त्रे तूभयरूपत्वं प्रविभक्तं विवक्षया ॥ (Ibid, 130).
”	9	अशक्तेः सर्वशक्तेर्वा शब्दैरेव प्रकल्पिता । एकस्यार्थस्य नियता क्रियादिपरिकल्पना ॥ (Ibid, 131).
232	10	यो वार्थो बुद्धिविषयो बाह्यवस्तुनिबन्धनः । स बाह्यवस्त्विति ज्ञातः शब्दार्थः कैश्चिदिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, 132).
”	11	आकारवन्तः संवेद्या व्यक्तस्मृतिनिबन्धनाः । ये ते प्रत्यवभासन्ते संविन्मात्रं त्वतोऽन्यथा ॥ (Ibid, 133).

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,,	12	(a) यथेन्द्रियं संनिपतद्वैचित्र्येणोपदर्शकम् । तथैव शब्दादर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरनेकधा ॥ (Ibid, 134). (b) वक्त्रान्यथैव प्रक्रान्तो भिन्नेषु प्रतिपत्तृषु । स्वप्रत्ययानुकारेण शब्दार्थः प्रविभज्यते ॥ (Ibid, 135).
,,	13	द्विधा कैश्चित् पदं भिन्नं चतुर्धा पंचधापि वा । अपोद्धृत्यैव वाक्येभ्यः प्रकृतिप्रत्ययार्थवत् ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 1, l. 15-16).
234	14	जनयित्वा क्रिया काचित् संबन्धं विनिवर्तते । श्रूयमाणे क्रियाशब्दे संबन्धो जायते क्वचित् ॥ (Vāk. II, 147).
235	15	(a) क्रियाया द्योतको नायं संबन्धस्य न वाचकः । नापि क्रियापदाक्षेपी संबन्धस्य तु भेदकः ॥ (Ibid, 204). (b) क्रियागतविशेषद्योतनपूर्वकं हि संबन्धावच्छेदनमत्र वर्तमानम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 4, l. 3-4).
,,	16	(a) आकृत्यभिधानाद्वैकं विभक्तौ वाजप्यायनः । (M. Bhā. I, p. 242, l. 10). (b) द्रव्याभिधानं व्याडिः । (Ibid, p. 244, l. 8)

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236	17	यद्वा प्राधान्येनैव भिन्नविषयतया पाणिनिदर्शने जातिद्रव्ये शब्देनाभिधीयेते इत्ययमत्र पक्षः पदार्थौ इत्युक्तः । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 8, l. 9).
,,	18	आर्थस्तु जातिद्रव्ययोः गुणप्रधानभावः । (Ibid, l. 8-9).
237	19	नामपदगतया च कारकशक्त्या क्रियाजातिराख्यातपदगता व्यक्तिद्वारेण समन्वयमेति । (Ibid, l. 14-15).
,,	20	व्यक्तिद्वारकं चास्या नित्याया अपि साध्यत्वमुपपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 9, l. 2-3).
238	21	गुणशब्दानामपि शुक्लादीनां गुणजातिर्वाच्या । संज्ञाशब्दानामपि डित्थादीनां जातिवाचित्वं समर्थयिष्यते । (Ibid, p. 9, l. 6-7).
,,	22	केषांचित् साहचर्येण जातिः शक्त्युपलक्षणम् । खदिरादिष्वशक्तेषु शक्तः प्रतिनिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 10, l. 17-18).
,,	23	वाक्यार्थभूता हि बन्धिक्रिया प्रधानमिति तत्संपादनशक्तस्य पदार्थस्य परिग्रहो न्याय्यः । (Ibid, p. 12, l. 5-6).
,,	24	अस्वातन्त्र्यफलो बन्धिः प्रमाणादीव शिष्यते । अतो जात्यभिधानेऽपि शक्तिहीनं न गृह्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 12, l. 1-2).

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239	25	स्वा जाति. प्रथमं शब्दैः सर्वैरेवाभिधीयते । ततोऽर्थजातिरूपेषु तदध्यारोपकल्पना ॥ (Ibid, p. 16, l. 13-14).
,,	26	यथा च श्लोकः सकृत् पठ्यमानो नावधार्यते, अभ्यासेन तु स्फुटावभासः तथा चरमचेतासि चकास्ति रत्नतत्त्ववत् स्फोटतत्त्वम् । प्रथमाक्षरेण हि जातेराभास-मात्रं जन्यते तदुत्तरोत्तरवर्णकलापेन तु स्फुटतरस्फुटतमपरिच्छेदाधानम् । (Ibid, p. 18, l. 11-13).
240	27	(a) जातिशब्दैकशेषे सा जातीनां जातिरिष्यते । शब्दजातय इत्यत्र तज्जातिश्शब्दजातिषु ॥ (Ibid, p. 21, l. 15-16). (b) तथा जातय इमा इत्ययमपि जात्याश्रयापरजात्यभावाद् वाचकजात्य-ध्यासाश्रय उपपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 22, l. 5-6). (c) शब्दजातय इमा इत्यत्रैकपदप्रयोगे तस्योच्चरितस्य शब्दजाति-शब्दस्य या जातिः सा शब्दजातिषु गोशब्दत्वादिकासु व्यक्तिस्था-नीयासु प्रतिपाद्यास्वभिन्नशब्दप्रयोगे निबन्धनमित्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 22, l. 9-11).
241	28	वैशेषिकादीनां भवन्तु निःसामान्यानि सामान्यानि । तानि हि व्यक्तिष्वन्व-यप्रत्ययावसेयानि परोपाधिरूपाणि स्वतन्त्रव्यक्तिवदिदन्तावभासित्वाभावात् सामान्या-न्तरेण नोपाधीयन्ते । वैयाकरणानां तु शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इत्यभ्युपेयतामन्वयिरूपावच्छेदेन शाब्दस्य प्रत्ययस्योत्पत्तेर्जातिष्वपि जातिरविरुद्धाभ्युपगम्या । (Ibid, p. 24, l. 1-5).

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„	29	तथा चान्वयिरूपेण गुणोऽप्यभिधीयमानो जातिरेव । यथोपमानसमासे-श्यामादिः । (Ibid, p. 24, l. 9-10).
„	30	यद्यपि बहिर्वस्तूनि न सन्ति तथापि शब्दैस्तथा प्रत्याय्यन्ते । अतोऽभिधा-व्यापारवशादन्वयिरूपेण प्रत्यायनाद् व्याप्तिर्जातौ पदार्थे सिद्धेत्येषोऽप्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 25, l. 5-6).
„	31	तत्र द्रव्यधर्मा इदं तदिति प्रत्यवमर्शयोग्यत्वं परिनिष्पन्नता स्वातन्त्र्यं लिङ्ग-संख्यायोगश्चेत्येवमादयः । (Ibid, p. 26, l. 14—p. 27, l. 1).
242	32	सर्वपार्षदं हीदं शास्त्रं शब्दार्थोऽर्थ इति वा पदार्थव्यवस्थेयम् । (Ibid, p. 32, l. 13-14).
„	33	यथा च गोत्वादिजातिः सर्वा व्यक्तीर्व्याप्नोति तथैते धर्मा सर्वजातीर्व्याप्नुव-न्तीति जात्या तुल्यरूपत्वाज्जतिकार्याय कल्पन्ते । (Ibid, p. 27, l. 17-18).
„	34	(a) अनुप्रवृत्तिधर्मो वा जातिः स्यात् सर्वजातिषु । व्यावृत्तिधर्मसामान्यं विशेषे जातिरिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 27, l. 8-9). (b) ...इति सर्वविशेषेषु साधारणी व्यावृत्तिः सामान्यसमो धर्मो भवं-स्तेषु जातिः इत्युच्यते । (Ibid, p. 28, l. 2).
„	35	तथा चाभावेष्वपि सामान्याभ्युपगमे भावत्वापत्तेरभवनात्मकधर्मसामान्यादन्व-यिप्रत्ययविषयतेति सैव तत्रापि जातिः । (Ibid, p. 28, l. 16-17).

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243	36	आकाशो हि सर्वेषां मूर्तानामधिकरणम्। अवकाशदानाद्धि तदाकाशम्। (Ibid, p. 29, l. 5-6).
„	37	संयोगिधर्मभेदेन देशे च परिकल्पिते। तेषु देशेषु सामान्यमाकाशस्यापि विद्यते॥ (Ibid, p. 29, l. 1-2).
„	38	अतश्च प्रतिदेशम् इदमाकाशम् इदमाकाशमित्यभिन्नाभिधानप्रत्ययानुवृत्तिलक्षणमाकाशसामान्यमाकाशशब्दगोचरोऽस्ति। (Ibid, p. 29, l. 13-14).
„	39	(a) अदेशानां घटीदीनां देशाः संबन्धिनो यथा। आकाशस्याप्यदेशस्य देशाः संबन्धिनस्तथा॥ (Ibid, p. 30, l. 17-18). (b) आकाशं ह्यवच्छिन्दन्तोऽर्थो देशास्तस्य भवन्ति। तत्कृतावच्छेदं चाकाशमपि तेषामाधारभावापत्तेर्देश इत्यन्योन्यदेशत्वं मूर्तामूर्तयोः। (Ibid, p. 30, l. 5-6).
244	40	भिन्नवस्त्वाश्रया बुद्धिः संयोगिष्वनुवर्तते। समवायिषु भेदस्य ग्रहणं विनिवर्तते॥ अतः संयोगिदेशानां गौणत्वं परिकल्प्यते। अविवेकात् प्रदेशेभ्यो मुख्यत्वं समवायिनाम्॥ (Ibid. p. 31, l. 10-13). (b) यतो भिन्ना बुद्धिः संयोगिनाम्, अतः तत्प्रदेशानां गौणत्वम्। यतश्च समवायिनामभिन्ना बुद्धिः अतस्तत्र मुख्यत्वम्। (Ibid, p. 31, l. 17-18—p. 32, l. 1).

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,,	41	आत्मा तु प्रतिशरीरमन्य एवेति तत्राप्यस्त्येवात्मत्वसामान्यम् । (Ibid, p. 30, l. 4).
,,	42	एवं च बाह्यस्य सामान्यस्याभावादाकाशादावपि तत्समर्थने न प्रयतितव्यम- (Ibid, p. 32, l. 16-17).
,,	43	तस्माद् द्रव्यादयः सर्वाः शक्तयो भिन्नलक्षणाः । संसृष्टाः पुरुषार्थस्य साधिका न तु केवलाः ॥ (Ibid, p. 34, l. 7-8).
245	44	न तदुत्पद्यते किंचिद् यस्य जातिर्न विद्यते । आत्माभिव्यक्तये जातिः कारणानां प्रयोजिका ॥ (Ibid, p. 36, l. 2-3).
,,	45	व्यक्त्यधीना जात्यभिव्यक्तिरिति स्वाश्रयकारणानां प्रयोजककर्तृत्वमिवावलम्बते जातिः । (Ibid, l. 3-4).
,,	46	न हि जातिव्यक्ती अत्यन्तभिन्ने गवाश्ववत् संमूर्च्छितस्वभावत्वादित्युभयः रूपाश्रयो व्यपदेशोऽविरुद्धः । (Ibid, p. 32, l. 4-5).
,,	47	ऐन्द्रियके तु ज्ञाने विवेकानवसायाद् भवतु जातिव्यक्त्योः संमूर्च्छितावभासः । शब्दस्य तु यथासङ्केतं प्रतीतिहेतुत्वे न काचित् क्षतिः । (Ibid, p. 39, l. 7-8).
246	48	यथा जलादिभिर्व्यक्तं मुखमेवाभिधीयते । तथा द्रव्यैरभिव्यक्ता जातिरेवाभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 38, l. 20-21).

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,,	49	तथात्मरूपग्रहणात् केषांचिद् व्यक्तयो विना । सामान्यज्ञानभेदानामुपयान्ति निमित्तताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 39, l. 13-14).
,,	50	सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भागौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ । सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः स्मृताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 40, l. 13-14).
,,	51	संबन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु । जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 41, l. 8-9).
247	52	तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते । सा नित्या सा महानात्मा तामाहुस्त्वतलादयः ॥ (Ibid, p. 41, l. 17-18).
,,	53	प्रातिपदिकेन गवाश्रयायास्तस्या अभिधानम्, प्रत्ययेन तु निष्कृष्टाश्रयस्य सामान्यस्याभिधेत्यदोषः । (Ibid, p. 42, l. 13-14).
,,	54	इति सिद्धसाध्यरूपो द्विधा विवर्तः सन्मात्ररूपस्य परस्य ब्रह्मणः प्रतिपादितः । (Ibid, p. 43, l. 3-4).
,,	55	षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति ह स्माह भगवान् वार्ष्यायणिः । (Yāska—*Nirukta*—1-2-8).
,,	56	सैव भावविकारेषु षड्वस्थाः प्रपद्यते । क्रमेण शक्तिभिः स्वाभिरेवं प्रत्यवभासते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 43, l. 13-14).

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248	57	(a) तिरोभावाभ्युगमे भावानां सैव नास्तिता । लब्धक्रमे तिरोभावे नश्यतीति प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 45, l. 6-7). (b) सत्तैव तिरोभूता स्वकारणेषु शक्तिरूपेणावस्थिता वस्तूनां नाशो न तु निरूपाख्योऽसौ । (Ibid, l. 10-11).
,,	58	पूर्वावस्था अपक्षीयते इत्युच्यते, तदुत्तरा तु विनश्यति इति द्वौ भावविकारौ प्रातिलोम्यपरिणामलक्षणौ । (Ibid, p. 14-15).
,,	59	पूर्वस्मात् प्रच्युता धर्मादप्राप्ता चोत्तरं पदम् । तदन्तराले भेदानामाश्रयाज्जन्म कथ्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 45, l. 19-26).
,,	60	...इति जन्मविशेषा एवैतेन पृथगुपात्ताः । (Ibid, p. 46, l. 13).
,,	1	तदेवं द्वाभ्यां षड् व्याप्ताः ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 22, l. 7).
,,	62	पृथिव्यादिष्वभिव्यक्तौ न संस्थानमपेक्षते । अनुच्छिन्नाश्रयाज्जतिरनित्येऽप्याश्रये स्थिता ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 48, l. 3-4).
249	63	जातीनां त्वाश्रयप्रतिबद्धो नात्मलाभः ॥ (Ibid, l. 11).

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,,	64	अनुच्छेद्याश्रयामेके सर्वां जातिं प्रचक्षते । न यौगपद्यं प्रलये सर्वस्येति व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 48, l. 17-18).
,,	65	न हि गुरुत्वादधः पतनमासां मा भूदिदित्याधारः अभिव्यक्तिमात्रे तस्योपयोगात् । तदानीं चानभिव्यक्ता एवासताम् को विरोधः । (Ibid, p. 49, l. 22-23).
,,	66	(a) प्रकृतौ प्रविलीनेषु भेदेष्वेकत्वदर्शिनाम् । द्रव्यसत्त्वं प्रपद्यन्ते स्वाश्रया एव जातयः ॥ (Ibid, p. 49, l. 12-13). (b) एकत्वमभेदं मूलप्रकृत्या प्रधानेन सह परब्रह्मणा वा ये पश्यन्ति जगतः तेषां मते सर्वथा भावप्रपंचस्य निरन्वयविध्वंसाभावान्महासामान्यरूपे तत्र परस्मिन् मूलकारणे प्रविलयमात्रं महाप्रलय इति शक्तिरूपेषु पदार्थेषु यथायथं स्वजातियोगस्तदानीमविरुद्ध एवेति द्रव्यात्मना जातीनां तदानीमपि सत्त्वम् द्रव्यादर्थान्तराभावात् । (Ibid, l. 14-17).
250	67	सर्वज्ञानामीश्वरो गुरुरुपदेष्टा । (Ibid, p. 51, l. 18)
,,	68	(a) यच्च सातिशयं तदवश्यं क्वचित् काष्ठाप्राप्तं संभाव्यते । यथादित्ये तेजः दाहकत्वमग्नौ शैत्यमप्सु । तथा ज्ञानैश्वर्यशक्तिबलादयो गुणाः सातिशयाः पुरुषेषु दृष्टा सर्वज्ञेयव्यापिकाष्ठाप्राप्तमतिशयमावेदयन्तः तत्समुचितमाधारं पूर्णसमस्तसंपत्कमनुमापयन्त्येव । (Ibid, p. 54, l. 12–15).

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„		(b) तेन यत्र निरतिशयमैश्वर्यं स सर्वेश्वरः परमेश्वरः इत्यपि सिद्धम्। (Ibid, p. 22-23).
„	69	ज्ञानमस्मद्विशिष्टानां तेषु सर्वेन्द्रियं विदुः। अभ्यासान्मणिरूप्यादिविशेषेष्विव तद्विदाम्॥ (Ibid, p. 51, l. 11-12).
251	70	ब्राह्मणत्वादिष्वस्ति किंचित् सास्नादिस्थानीयमुपव्यंजनमस्माकं पुनरतीन्द्रियम्। (Ibid, p. 55, l. 6-7).
„	71	गौः गावौ, पचति पचतः इत्यादौ विशिष्टजातीयो विशिष्टसंख्यावच्छिन्नश्चार्थः प्राधान्येन प्रतीयत इति प्रत्ययार्थस्य विशेषणत्वं प्रकृत्यर्थस्य च विशेष्यत्वम्। (Ibid, p. 58, l. 2-4).
„	72	लक्षणा शब्दसंस्कारे व्यापारः कार्यसिद्धये। संख्याकर्मादिशक्तीनां श्रुतिसाम्येऽपि दृश्यते॥ (Ibid, p. 58, l. 15-16).
252	73	(ā) एकादिशब्दवाच्यायाः कर्मण्यङ्गत्वमिष्यते। संख्यायाः खनति द्वाभ्यामिति रूपाद्धि साश्रिता॥ (Ibid, p. 62, l. 14-15).
		(b) प्रकृतिवाच्यस्त्ववतिष्ठत एव। तदभावे हि शब्दप्रयोग एव निष्फल. स्यात्। (Ibid, l. 22).
253	75	यजेत पशुनेत्यत्र संस्कारस्यापि संभवे। यथा जातिस्तथैकत्वं साधनत्वेन गम्यते॥ (Ibid, p. 63, l. 7-8).

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,,	76	श्रुत्यादिप्रमाणषट्कव्यतिरिक्तोऽयमुपादानाख्यः । (Ibid, p. 75, l. 10).
254	77	(a) विधिवाक्यान्तरे संख्या पशोर्नास्ति विरोधिनी । तस्मात्सगुण एवासौ सहैकत्वेन गम्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 75, l. 7-8). (b) उत्पत्तिवाक्यगता च संख्या न त्यज्यत इत्युत्सर्गः । (Ibid, p. 64, l. 1).
,,	78	(a) एकेन चेत् प्रसिद्धायां क्रियायां यदि संभवात् । पश्वन्तरमुपादेयमुपादानमनर्थकम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 69, l. 8-9). (b) तस्मादुपायलाघवात् प्रथमेनैव पशुनावदानगणस्य निष्पत्तेरेकस्य पशोरालंभेऽपरस्यालंभो निष्प्रयोजनः । (Ibid, l. 14-15).
256	79	(a) ग्रहास्त्वन्यत्र विहिता भिन्नसंख्याः पृथक् पृथक् । प्रजापत्या नवेत्येवमादिभेदसमन्विताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 66, l. 5-6). (b) अङ्गत्वेन प्रतीतानां सम्मार्गे त्वङ्गिनां पुनः । निर्देशं प्रति या संख्या सा कथं स्याद्विवक्षिता ॥ (Ibid, l. 7-8). (c) सम्मार्जने विशेषश्च न ग्रहे कश्चिदाश्रितः । विहितास्ते च संस्कार्याः सर्वेषामाश्रयस्ततः । (Ibid, p. 68, l. 2-3).

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257	80	सादृश्यात्तु सदृश इति व्यवहारः, शक्तिमत्त्वात्तु शक्तिमानिति। अन्यच्च सादृश्यज्ञानं सामान्यज्ञानाद्, भिन्नजातीयेष्वपि गोगवयादिषु भावात् ॥ (Ibid, p. 96, l. 2-3).
,,	81	सकृत्प्रवृत्तावेकत्वमावृत्तौ सदृशात्मताम् । भिन्नात्मिकानां व्यक्तीनां भेदापोहात् प्रपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 98, l. 7-8).
,,	82	समूहावग्रहे हि समूहिनामनावृत्त्या सैव बुद्धिः सामान्यं गृह्णाति । (Ibid, l. 16-17).
258	83	गोगवययोस्तु पूर्वं भेदं प्रतिपद्यानन्तरमवयवसन्निवेशायत्तोऽभेदोऽवसीयत इति सादृश्यबुद्धिस्तत्र । (Ibid, l. 17-18).
,,	84	तस्या एकान्तेनाभेदावसायरूपत्वात् । (Ibid, l. 15).
,,	85	यथा ज्ञेयं व्यतिरिक्तसामान्यरूपेण रूप्यते रूपवत् क्रियते नैवं ज्ञानं संविदात्मसमवेतेन व्यतिरिक्तसामान्यरूपेण रूप्यते । (Ibid, p. 101, l. 14-15).
,,	86	(a) यथा ज्योतिः प्रकाशेन नान्येनाभिप्रकाश्यते । ज्ञानाकारस्तथान्येन न ज्ञानेनोपगृह्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 101, l. 21-22). (b) ....इति साकाराः स्वप्रकाशाः निःसामान्या बुद्धयः सिद्धाः। (Ibid, p. 102, l. 14-15).

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259	87	द्रव्यं च द्विविधं पारमार्थिकं सांव्यवहारिकं च । (Ibid, p. 106, l. 8).
,,	88	अनेन च द्रव्येण व्याडिदर्शने सर्वे शब्दा द्रव्याभिधायिनो भवन्ति । इह तु पारमार्थिकं द्रव्यं निरूपते । (Ibid, l. 11-12).
,,	89	सत्यं वस्तु तदाकारैरसत्यैरभिधीयते । असत्योपाधिभिः शब्दैः सत्यमेवाभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 107, l. 20-21).
261	90	सत्यमाकृतिसंहारे पदन्ते व्यवतिष्ठते । तन्नित्यं शब्दवाच्यं तच्छब्दतत्त्वं न भिद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 114, l. 7-8).
,,	91	(a) न तदस्ति न तन्नास्ति न तदेकं न तत् पृथक् । न संसृष्टं विभक्तं वा विकृतं न च नान्यथा ॥ (Ibid, p. 115, l. 12-13).
		(b) ...सर्वव्यपदेशातीतं तत्त्वं परं ब्रह्म । (Ibid, p. 116, l. 4).
262	92	तद् दृश्यं दर्शनं द्रष्टा दर्शने च प्रयोजनम् । (Ibid, p. 116, l. 16).
,,	93	अयमेव च पक्षद्वयेऽप्येकपक्षीभावरूपः सिद्धान्तः परमार्थदृष्ट्या । (Ibid, p. 43, l. 8-9).
263	94	वस्तूपलक्षणं यत्र सर्वनाम प्रयुज्यते । द्रव्यमित्युच्यते सोऽर्थो भेद्यत्वेन विवक्षितः ॥ (Ibid, p. 187, l. 2-3).

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		3. On Quality (*Guṇa*).
265	1	गुणशब्दोऽयं बह्वर्थः । अस्त्येव समेष्ववयवेषु वर्तते । तद्यथा । द्विगुणा रज्जुः त्रिगुणा रज्जुरिति । अस्ति द्रव्यपदार्थकः । तद्यथा । गुणवानयं देश इत्युच्यते यस्मिन् गावः सस्यानि च वर्तन्ते । अस्त्यप्राधान्ये वर्तते । तद्यथा । यो यत्राप्रधानं भवति स आह गुणभूता वयमत्रेति । अस्त्याचारे वर्तते । तद्यथा । गुणवानयं ब्राह्मण इत्युच्यते यः सम्यगाचारं करोति ! अस्ति संस्कारे वर्तते । तद्यथा । संस्कृतमन्नं गुणवदित्युच्यते । (M. Bhā. II, p. 367, l. 2-7).
,,	2	सत्त्वे निविशतेऽपैति पृथग्जातिषु दृश्यते । आधेयश्चाक्रियाजश्च सोऽसत्त्वप्रकृतिर्गुणः ॥ (M. Bhā. II, p. 217, l. 1-2).
266	5	उपैत्यन्यद् जहात्यन्यद् दृष्टो द्रव्यान्तरेष्वपि । वाचकः सर्वलिङ्गानां द्रव्यादन्यो गुणः स्मृतः ॥ (Ibid, 4-5).
267	6	समाने रक्ते वर्णे गौर्लोहित इति भवति, अश्वः शोण इति । समाने च काले वर्णे गौः कृष्ण इति भवति, अश्वो हेम इति समाने च शुक्ले वर्णे गौः श्वेत इति भवति अश्वः कर्क इति । (M. Bhā. I, p. 433, l. 12-14).
,,	7	तत्स्थैश्च गुणैः । (Vā. 2 on P. 2.2.8). तत्स्थैश्च गुणैः षष्ठी समस्यत इति वक्तव्यमम् । ब्राह्मणवर्णः चन्दनगन्धः पटहशब्दः नदीघोषः । (M. Bhā. I, p. 413, l. 1-3).

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268	8	गुणवचनेभ्यो मतुपो लुक् (M. Bhā. II, p. 394, l. 7).
,,	9	गुणवचनब्राह्मणादिभ्यः कर्मणि च । (P. 5.1.124).
,,	10	प्रकारे गुणवचनस्य । (P. 8.1.12).
,,	11	तस्मान्न वैयाकरणैः शक्यं लौकिकं लिङ्गमास्थातुम् । अवश्यं कश्चित् स्वकृतान्त आस्थेयः । (M. Bhā. I, p. 245, l. 21-23).
,,	12	सिद्धं तु यस्य गुणस्य भावाद् द्रव्ये शब्दनिवेशस्तदभिधाने त्वतलौ । (M. Bhā. II, p. 366, l. 10).
269	13	स्वरूपावेशेनार्थं प्रत्याययतः शब्दस्य स्वरूपमुपरंजकत्वाद् गुणः । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 193, l. 13).
270	14	राजपुरुषत्वं पाचकत्वमौपगवत्वमित्यादौ तु संबन्धो यथायथं स्वरूपेणोपरञ्जकं प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं भावप्रत्ययाभिधेयम् । (Ibid, p. 194, l. 3-4).
,,	15	संसीर्ग भेदकं यद् यद् सव्यापारं:प्रतीयते । गुणत्वं परतन्त्रत्वात्तस्य शास्त्र उदाहृतम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 192, l. 2-3).
271	16	भेदकत्वं चात्र मुख्यं गुणलक्षणम् । असमवेतस्यापि दण्डस्य दण्डिनि गुणत्वात् अदण्डिव्यवच्छेदेन । (Ibid, p. 204, l. 2-3).

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,,	17	गौरियं या समां समां विजायते । गोतरेयं या समां समां विजायते स्त्रीवत्सा च । (M. Bhā. II, p. 413, l. 18).
272	18	अतश्च जातेरतिशायकत्वासंभवात्तदेकार्थसमवायि भासुरत्वं वैमल्यं रागान्तराव्यतिभिन्नतेत्येवमादयो विशेषाः प्रकर्षप्रवृत्तिनिबन्धनम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 204, l. 18-19).
,,	19	न चाशब्दवाच्यधर्मनिमित्तः सः, अतिप्रसङ्गादिति भासुरत्वादीनामपि प्रयोगप्रामाण्यादत्र शब्दवाच्यत्वं निश्चीयताम् । (Ibid, p. 206, l. 4-6).
,,	20	(a) सर्वस्यैव प्रधानस्य न विना भेदहेतुना । प्रकर्षो विद्यते नापि शब्दस्योपैति वाच्यताम् । (Ibid, p. 204, l. 8-9). विद्यमानाः प्रधानेषु न सर्वे भेदहेतवः । विशेषशब्दैरुच्यन्ते व्यावृत्तार्थाभिधायिभिः ॥ (Ibid, p. 205, l. 13-14).
,,	22	सव्यापारे गुणस्तस्मात्स्वप्रकर्षनिबन्धनः । द्रव्यात्मानं भिनत्त्येव स्वप्रकर्षे निवेशयन् ॥ (Ibid, p. 207, l. 20-21).
273	23	(a) अरूपं पररूपेण द्रव्यमाख्यायते यथा । अप्रकर्षं प्रकर्षेण गुणस्याविश्यते तथा ॥ (Ibid, p. 208, l. 4-5).

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		(b) उपाध्युपाधिमतोश्च विवेकस्य दुरवधारत्वात् सङ्कर इति व्यवहारे गुणप्रकर्षो गुणिनि विश्राम्यति, न गुणात्मन्येव निष्कृष्टगुणिनि, नापि गुण्यात्मन्येव निष्कृष्टगुण इति सिद्धम् । (Ibid, l. 8-10).
		4. On Direction (*Dik*).
274	1	आकाशो हि सर्वेषां मूर्तानामधिकरणम् । अवकाशदानाद्धि तदाकाशम् । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 29, l. 5-6).
275	2	दिक् साधनं क्रिया काल इति वस्त्वभिधायिनः । शक्तिरूपे पदार्थानामत्यन्तमनवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 209, l. 2-3).
,,	3	व्यतिरेकम्य यो हेतुरवधिप्रतिपाद्ययोः । ऋज्वित्येव यतोऽन्येन विना बुद्धि; प्रवर्तते ॥ कर्मणो जातिभेदानामभिव्यक्तिर्यदाश्रया । सा स्वैरूपाधिमिर्भिन्ना शक्तिर्दिगिति कथ्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 209, l. 14-17).
276	4	इत इदमिति यतस्तद्दिशो लिङ्गम् । (*Vai Sū.* 2.2.10).
,,	5	न पृथिव्यादिवद् दिगुपलक्ष्यते । (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 210, l. 6).
,,	6	तया ह्यूर्ध्वदिक्संयोगविभागकार्याः कर्मक्षणाः विशिष्टाः सन्तो नियतजातिर्व्यंजने समर्था मवन्ति । (Ibid, p. 210, l. 13-14).

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,,	7	सवितुरहरहरादौ येन प्रकल्पितदिक्प्रदेशेन संयोगोऽभूद् भवति भविष्यति वा तस्मादादित्यसंयोगात् प्राचीति व्यपदेशः । (Ibid, p. 211, l. 1-2).
277	8	तथा हि मेरुं प्रदक्षिणमावर्तमानस्य सवितुर्लोकपालपरिगृहीतप्रदेशसंयोगापेक्षो दशधा विभागः । (Ibid, p. 211, l. 12-14).
,,	9	सूर्यसंयोगस्तु पूर्वापरादित्वं नापूर्वं तत्राधत्ते, अपितु स्वभावमेवाभिव्यनक्तीत्य-भिप्रायः । (Ibid, p. 213, l. 11-12).
,,	10	पूर्वमभूद् भविष्यति परमिति तु क्रियापौर्वापर्यं कालशक्तिकृतप्रतिबन्धाभ्यनु-ज्ञावशाद् व्यवतिष्ठत इति नास्ति दिक्कालयोर्लिङ्गसंकर इत्याशयः । (Ibid, p. 212, l. 11-13).
278	11	दिशो व्यवस्था देशानां दिग्व्यवस्था न विद्यते । शक्तयः खलु भावानामुपकारप्रभाविताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 213, l. 4-5).
,,	12	(a) प्रत्यस्तरूपा भावेषु दिक् पूर्वेत्यभिधीयते । पूर्वबुद्धिर्यतो दिक् सा समाख्यामात्रमन्यथा ॥ (Ibid, p. 213, l. 14-15). (b) अन्यथा तूपाधिरूपतानपेक्षायां स्वातन्त्र्यानाश्रयणे भावतो दिङ् न भवति, अपि तु सा तदानी समाख्यामात्रं दिगिति । (Ibid, p. 213, l. 18 ff).
,,	13	ननु च पूर्वापरादिप्रत्ययः सम्मुखासम्मुखादिनिमित्तो भविष्यति । (Ibid, p. 214, l. 8).

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279	14	देशव्यवस्थानियमो दिक्षु न व्यवतिष्ठते । रूढमप्यपरत्वेन पूर्वमित्यभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 214, l. 21-22).
,,	16	स्वाङ्गाद् व्यवस्था या लोके न तस्यां नियता दिशः प्रत्यङ्मुखस्य यत् पश्चात् तत् पुरस्ताद् विपर्यये ॥ (Ibid, p. 214, l. 14-15).
,,	17	प्राङ्मुख उदङ्मुखो वा भुंजीत । (Ibid, l. 18).
,,	18	शक्तिग्रहणेन तत्रार्थान्तरानपेक्षा रूढा पूर्वादिशब्दानां प्रवृत्तिः, देशकालयोस्तु तदुपाधित्वात् व्यवस्थानिमित्तेति सूचयति । तया च नियतमव्यभिचारि दिशि दर्शनं पूर्वादिशब्दानां प्रयोगः । देशकालयोस्तु व्यवस्थानिमित्तत्वेन न रूढः प्रयोगः । पूर्वा दिगित्युक्ते नामधेयत्वेनान्तर्णीतावाधिभावा रूढिप्रतीतिः । (Ibid, p. 218, l. 4-7).
280	19	पूर्वो घट इति तु कुत इत्यवधिमपेक्षते । (Ibid, p. 218, l. 7-8).
,,	20	न हि रूढीनां नैमित्तिकैः सहाभेदः संभवति । (Ibid, p. 218, l. 10).
,,	21	तद्यथा षष्टिं भूतः षाष्टिक इति जीवितपरिमाणे प्रतिपाद्ये कालवाची नियमेन संख्याशब्दोऽपि षष्टिशब्दः । (Ibid, p. 218, l. 15-16).
,,	22	छायाभाभ्यां नगादीनां भागभेदः प्रकल्पते । अतद्धर्मस्वभावेषु भागभेदो न कल्पते ॥ (Ibid, p. 220, l. 7-8).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
,,	23	(a) परमाणोरभागस्य दिशा भागो विधीयते । भागप्रकल्पनाशक्तिः प्रथमां तां प्रचक्षते ।। (Ibid, p. 220, l. 15-16).
		(b) अकृतकत्वान्नित्यानां निरवयवानामपि परमाणूनां पार्श्वचतुष्टयमूर्ध्वाधोभागरूपं च दिशा परिकल्प्यते । (Ibid, l. 17-18).
,,	24	ततश्च दिक्संबन्धादेव परमाणुवत् स्थूलोऽपि पदार्थः पूर्वापरादिभागव्यपदेशमुच्चनीचादित्वं च प्रतिपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 221, l. 20—p. 222, l. 1).
281	25	सर्वत्र तस्य कार्यस्य दर्शनाद्विभुरिष्यते । विभुत्वमेतदेवाहुरन्यः कायवतां स्थितिः ।। (Ibid, p. 224, l. 2-3).
,,	26	चैतन्यवत् स्थिता लोके दिक्कालपरिकल्पना । प्रकृतिं प्राणिनां तां हि कोऽन्यथा स्थापयिष्यति ।। (Ibid, p. 224, l. 8-9).
,,	27	सन्नपि हि पदार्थो यावन्न संवेद्यते तावदप्राप्तसत्त्व इव नार्थक्रियासूपयुज्यते इति चैतन्यं सर्ववादिभिरशक्यनिह्नवम् (Ibid, p. 224, l. 10-11).
,,	28	यथा हि चैतन्यं स्वभावभूतमेवं सर्वव्यवहाराणां पूर्वापरादित्वेन दिक्कालावपि रूढौ तावन्तरेणार्थक्रियानिष्पत्तेः । (Ibid, p. 224, l. 17-18).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
,,	29	(a) तस्यास्तु शक्तेः पूर्वादिभेदो भावान्तराश्रयः । भिन्ना दिक् तेन भेदेन भेदायैवोपकल्पते ॥ (Ibid, p. 225, l. 13-14). (b) भेदायैव इति स्वविशेषणोपरक्तविशेष्यप्रत्ययजननायेत्यर्थः । अवधारणेन भिन्नविशेष्यकाल एवौपाधिकं भेदं समवलम्बते नान्यदा स्वतोऽभिन्ना दिगित्याह । (Ibid, p. 225, l. 16-18).
,,	30	अवधित्वेन चापेक्षायोगे दिंग्लक्षणो विधिः । पूर्वमस्येति षष्ठ्येव दृष्टा धर्मान्तराश्रये ॥ (Ibid, p. 225, l. 20-21).
282	31	(a) अन्तःकरणधर्मो वां बहिरेवं प्रकाशते । अस्यां त्वन्तर्बहिर्भावः प्रक्रियायां न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 227, l. 5-6). (b) द्यौ क्षमा वायुरादित्यः सागराः सरितो दिशः । अन्तःकरणतत्त्वस्य भागा बहिरवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 264, l. 9-10). (c) परमार्थे तु कीदृशोऽन्तर्बहिर्भावः ? एकमेव संविन्मयं परं शब्दब्रह्म तथा तथावस्थितमिति कारिकार्थः । (Ibid, p. 264, l. 17-18).
,,	32	...परमार्थतो बाह्यस्यायोगात् स्वकुक्षावेव जगत् प्रत्यवभासते इत्यन्तरवस्थितस्यैव व्यापारः । (Ibid, p. 227, l. 8-9).

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,,	33	एवं च पूर्वापरत्वमविद्याध्यस्तं भावेष्वान्तररूपेष्वनादिमिथ्याभ्यासवासनालक्षणान्तःकरणधर्मरूपं चकास्तीति न बाह्या काचिद् दिगस्ति । (Ibid, p. 227, l. 17-18).
,,	34	(a) एकत्वमासां शक्तीनां नानात्वं वेति कल्पने । अवस्तुपतिते ज्ञात्वा सत्यतो न परामृशेत् ॥ (Ibid, p. 227, l. 21-22).
		(b) दिशः परमार्थतोऽवस्तुत्वाद् विज्ञाननये व्यतिरिक्तवस्त्वभावादित्यवस्तुविषये बुद्ध्वा परमार्थतो न विचारणीये इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 228, l. 3-4).
,,	35	(a) विकल्पातीततत्त्वेषु सङ्केतोपनिबन्धनाः भावेषु व्यवहारा ये लोकस्तत्रानुगम्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 228, l. 7-8).
		(b) तस्मादविचारितरमणीया लोकप्रसिद्धाः पदार्थाः समाश्रयणीया विद्वद्भिरपि । अलमेभिरप्रतिष्ठितैस्तर्कविकल्पैः। तथा च लोके प्रसिद्धा दश दिशः सिद्धाः (Ibid, l. 11-13).
,,	36	किं च परोपाधिरूपा शक्तिर्दिगित्युक्तम् । (Ibid, p. 229, l. 1).
,,	37	न शक्तीनां तथा भेदो यथा शक्तिमतां स्थितिः । न च लौकिकमेकत्वं तासामात्मसु विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 229, l. 3-4).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
		5. On the Means (*Sādhana*).
283	1	(a) शक्तिमात्रासमूहस्य विश्वस्यानेकधर्मणः । सर्वदा सर्वथा भावात् क्वचित् किंचिद् विवक्ष्यते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 232, l. 2-3). (b) अत एव ताः शक्तयस्तत्र मात्रा भागा इति शक्तिसमाहारमात्रं घटादयः । (Ibid, l. 5-6).
,,	2	काश्चित् स्वहेतोरेव प्रभवन्ति, आश्रयविनाशमन्वपि च विनश्यन्ति । यथा बोधप्रदीपादीनां प्रकाशशक्तयः । (Ibid, p. 232, l. 6-7).
,,	3	काश्चित् पौरुषेय्यः स्थित एवाश्रये निरुध्यन्ते । यथा बलादिशक्तयः । ता हि श्रमाभ्यासेन वृष्यद्द्रव्योपयोगेन च जायन्ते । (Ibid, p. 232, l. 7-9).
284	5	स्वाश्रये समवेतानां तद्वदेवाश्रयान्तरे । क्रियाणामभिनिष्पत्तौ सामर्थ्यं साधनं विदुः ॥ (Ibid, p. 230, l. 2-3).
285	7	द्रव्यस्य ह्येकस्वभावत्वात् साधनत्वे शेषभावः कर्मकर्तृभावश्च नोपपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 185, l. 17—p. 186, l. 1).
,,	8	शक्तिमात्रासमूहस्य विश्वस्यानेकधर्मणः । सर्वदा सर्वथा भावात् क्वचित् किंचिद् विवक्ष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 232, l. 2-3).
286	10	साधनव्यवहारश्च बुद्ध्यवस्थानिबन्धनः । सन्नसन् वार्थरूपेषु भेदो बुद्ध्या प्रकल्प्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 233, l. 10-11).

Page No.	Serial No	Text with reference
,,	11	निरूपितेऽर्थे शब्दप्रयोगाद् यथानिरूपणं शब्दोपपत्तिः । (Ibid, l. 13-14).
,,	12	तत्र शक्तेर्द्व्यायमाणाया बुद्ध्या स्वातन्त्र्येण निरूपणाच्छब्देनाभिधाने शक्त्यन्तरयोगेऽविरुद्धः । (Ibid, l. 17-18).
,,	13	अभावोऽपि बुद्ध्या निरूपिताकारो द्रव्यायमाण एव शब्दवाच्यः । (Ibid, p. 233, l. 19-20).
,,	14	एवं तनुतरकपालत्वात् स्थाली पाकेऽनपेक्षितकर्तृविनियोगात् स्वातन्त्र्येण विवक्ष्यत इति कर्त्री, इन्धनोपकारानपेक्षया तस्या एव साधकतमत्वविवक्षायां तु करणम्, वास्तवाधारविवक्षायां त्वधिकरणमिति सर्वमुपपद्यते । (Ibid, p. 233, l. 20—p. 234, l. 2).
287	17	बुद्ध्या समाहितैकत्वान् पञ्चालान् कुरुभिर्यदा । पुनर्विभजते वक्ता तदाऽपायः प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 235, l. 6-7).
,,	18	कारकप्रकरणे च तमब्ग्रहणात् प्रकर्षो न विवक्ष्यत इति गौणेऽप्यपायेऽपादानसंज्ञा भवति । (Ibid, p. 235, l. 20-21).
,,	19	शब्दोपहितरूपांश्च बुद्धेर्विषयतां गतान् । प्रत्यक्षमिव कंसादीन् साधनत्वेन मन्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 236, l. 2-3).
,,	20	बुद्धिप्रतिभास्येव ह्याकारो शब्दार्थो न वस्त्वर्थः । (Ibid, p. 236, l. 18).

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,,	21	तथा च कथकः श्रोत्ररि कंसाद्याकारप्रत्ययजननात् बुद्धिवासुदेवेन बुद्धिकंसं घातयतीति प्रयोजकत्वसमारोपात् प्रयोगोपपत्तिः । (Ibid, p. 236, l. 19-20).
288	22	शक्तयः शक्तिमन्तश्च सर्वे संसर्गवादिनाम् । भावास्तेस्वशब्देषु साधनत्वं निरूप्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 239, l. 1-2).
,,	23	एवमपि साधनत्वं भावानां पदार्थानामपादानादिशब्दैर्न प्रत्याय्यते, अपि तु विभक्तिभिरेव । (Ibid, p. 239, l. 7-8).
,,	24	घटस्य दृशिकर्मत्वे महत्वादीनि साधनम् । रूपस्य दृशिकर्मत्वे रूपत्वादीनि साधनम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 239, l. 17-18).
289	26	स्वैः सामान्यविशेषैश्च शक्तिमन्तो रसादयः । नियतग्रहणा लोके शक्तयस्तास्तथाश्रयैः ॥ (Ibid, p. 241, l. 11-12).
,,	27	द्रव्यं हि कदाचित् सामान्योपाधिना गृह्यते द्रव्यमिति, कदाचिद् गुणेन शुक्लमिति, कदाचित् कर्मणा गच्छति इति । (Ibid, p. 241, l. 16-17).
,,	28	इत्थं परस्परशक्तिशक्तिमन्तो भावाः तथा च न काचिन्नियता शक्तिः । संसर्गिणां परस्परं तत्त्वात् अन्यस्य च योग्यदेशत्वादेः सहकारिणः तथात्वात् (Ibid, p. 241, l. 21-23).
,,	29	इन्द्रियार्थमनःकर्तृसंबन्धः साधनं क्वचित् । यद्यदा यदनुग्राहि तत्तदा तस्य साधनम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 242, l. 1-2).

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290	30	अवयवानामवयविनिष्पत्तौ संयोगः शक्तिः । (Ibid, p. 242, l. 7).
”	31	गुणनिष्पत्तौ त्ववयविनः समवायः शक्तिः । (Ibid, p. 242, l. 7-8).
”	32	...इति परोपकारि परतन्त्रं सर्वं शक्तिलक्षणमनुपतति । (Ibid, p. 242, l. 8).
”	33	स्वशब्दैरभिधाने तु स धर्मी नाभिधीयते । विभक्त्यादिभिरेवासावुपकारः प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 242, l. 11-12).
”	34	(a) शतेन क्रीतः शत्यः शतिक इति क्रमे साधकतमत्वं प्रत्ययवाच्यम् । (Ibid, l. 17-18). (b) (See P. 5. I. 21).
291	35	निमित्तभावो भावानामुपकारार्थमाश्रितः । नतिरावर्जनेत्येवं सिद्धः साधनमिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 243, l. 2-3).
”	36	(a) स तेभ्यो व्यतिरिक्तो वा तेषामात्मैव वा तथा । व्यतिरेकमुपाश्रित्य साधनत्वेन कल्पते ॥ (Ibid, p. 243, l. 11-12). (b) तदत्राव्यतिरेकवादो वास्तु व्यतिरिक्ता वा शक्तयः सन्तु । नास्माकमत्र कश्चिद् ग्रहो व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकवादे । शब्दप्रमाणका हि वयम्, यच्छब्द आह तदस्माकं प्रमाणम् । शब्दश्च पदार्थानां व्यतिरिक्तमेव साधनभावं प्रत्याययति । (Ibid, p. 243, l. 19-22).

Page No.	Serial No.	Text with reference
,,	37	तथा च प्रातिपदिकेन द्रव्येऽभिहिते शक्तौ कृतबन्धा विभक्ति : प्रवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, p. 244, l. 2).
,,	89	संदर्शनं प्रार्थनायां व्यवसाये त्वनन्तरा । व्यवसायस्तथारंभे साधनत्वाय कल्पते ॥ पूर्वस्मिन् या क्रिया सैव परस्मिन् साधनं मता । संदर्शने तु चैतन्यं विशिष्टं साधनं विदुः ॥ (Ibid, p. 244, i. 5-8).
292	40	निष्पत्तिमात्रे कर्तृत्वं सर्वत्रैवास्ति कारके । व्यापारभेदापेक्षायां करणत्वादिसंभव :॥ (Ibid, p. 246, l. 1-2).
,,	41	सामान्यपूर्वकत्वाच्च विशेषस्यावान्तरव्यापारेऽपि कारकत्वमनुवृत्तमिति करणं कारकमिति सामानाधिकरण्योपपत्ति : । (Ibid, p. 246, l. 10-11).
293	42	गुणक्रियाणां कर्तारः कर्त्रा न्यतक्कृशक्तयः । न्यक्तायामपि सम्पूर्णैः स्वैर्व्यापारैः समन्विताः ॥ करणत्वादिभिर्ज्ञाताः क्रियाभेदानुपातिभिः । स्वातंन्त्र्यमुत्तरं लब्ध्वा प्रधाने यान्ति कर्तृताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 247, l. 14-17).
,,	43	यदेव हि स्वव्यापारे स्वातन्त्र्यं तदेव प्रधानक्रियायां पारतन्त्र्यं नान्यत् किंचित् । (Ibid, p. 248, l. 10-11).
,,	44	अत एवापादानसंप्रदानव्यापारे धातोर्न वृत्तिः, अपि तु कर्मकारणादिव्यापार एव, पच्यत ओदनः स्वयमेव, असिश्छिनत्ति, स्थाली पचतीत्यादौ । (Ibid, p. 249, l. 3-5).

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"	45	कारकाधिकारलब्धे स्वातंत्र्ये स्वतन्त्रः कर्तेति पुनः श्रुतिः पारतन्त्र्यानाच्छुरित-स्वातंत्र्यप्रतिपत्त्यर्थेति मुख्य एव स्वतन्त्रे कर्तृसंज्ञावतिष्ठते । (Ibid, p. 249, l. 7-8).
294	48	द्रव्यादिविषयो हेतुः कारकं नियतक्रियम् । (Ibid, p. 255, l. 14).
"	49	अनाश्रिते तु व्यापारे निमित्तं हेतुरिष्यते । (Ibid, p. 250, l. 19).
"	51	विद्यादेरपि वासादिनिश्चये व्यापारात् । (Ibid, p. 251, l. 11).
"	53	यावता संहिता नावधिमात्रेण वर्षणस्य परिच्छेदिका प्रतीयते, अपि तु जनकत्वेन । जनकश्च हेतुः, न लक्षणमिति हेतुरेवात्र ज्ञापकत्वसामान्याल्लक्षण-शब्देनोक्त इत्यविरोधः । (Ibid, p. 251, l. 15-17).
295	54	सकृद्दर्शनादपि हेतुभावोऽवगम्यते । यस्य हि यज्जनकं न भवति तस्मात (सकृदपि तन्न जायते ।) (Ibid, p. 252, l. 7-8).
296	57	क्रियायै करणं तस्य दृष्टः प्रतिनिधिस्तथा । हेत्वर्था तु क्रिया तस्मान्न स प्रतिनिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 256, l. 10-11).
"	58	तस्मादध्ययनेन वसतीति नेयं करणतृतीया, अपि तु हेतुतृतीयैवेति । न ह्यध्ययनेन व्यापाराविष्टेन वासो निर्वर्त्यते अपि तु वासस्याध्ययनमेव संपाद्यं प्रधान मिति निर्व्यापारं योग्यतामात्रेणोद्देश्यमध्ययनं वासस्य हेतुः । (Ibid, p. 257, l. 4-6).

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,,	59	प्रातिलोम्यानुलोम्याभ्यां हेतुरर्थस्य वाचकः । तादर्थ्यमानुलोम्येन हेतुत्वानुगतं च तत् ॥ (Ibid, p. 257, l. 11-12).
297	60	समासाद्भावप्रत्ययेन संबन्धस्योद्भूतरूपाभिधानम् । (Ibid, l. 21).
,,	61	सर्वत्र सहजा शक्तिर्यावद्द्रव्यमवस्थिता । क्रियाकाले त्वभिव्यक्तेराश्रयादुपकारिणी ॥ (Ibid, p. 258, l. 13-14).
,,	62	प्राङ्निमित्तान्तरोद्भूतं क्रियायाः कैश्चिदिष्यते । साधनं सहजं कैश्चित् क्रियान्यैः पूर्वमिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 260, l. 4-5).
298	63	प्रवृत्तिरेव प्रथमं क्वचिदप्यनपाश्रिता । शक्तीरेकाधिकरणे स्रोतोवदपकर्षति ॥ (Ibid, p. 260, l. 22-23).
,,	64	अपूर्वं कालशक्तिं वा क्रियां वा कालमेव वा । तमेवंलक्षणं भावं केचिदाहुः कथंचन ॥ (Ibid, p. 261, l. 10-11).
,,	65	(a) नित्याः षट् शक्तयोऽन्येषां भेदाभेदसमन्विताः । क्रियासंसिद्धयेऽर्थेषु जातिवत् समवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 262, l. 4-5). (b) निमित्तभेदादेकैव भिन्ना शक्तिः प्रतीयते । षोढा कर्तृत्वमेवाहुस्तत्प्रवृत्तेर्निबन्धनम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 262, l. 21-22).

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299	66	एकान्तेनार्थेभ्यश्चेद् भेदसमन्विताः अभिधीयेरन्नर्थस्य शक्तिवैकल्यान्नीरूपता स्यात् । अथाभिन्नाः कल्प्यन्ते तर्हि विभिन्नकार्योदयो नावतिष्ठते । (Ibid, p. 262, l. 8-9).
”	67	तत्त्वे वा व्यतिरेके वा व्यतिरिक्तं तदुच्यते । शब्दप्रमाणको लोकः स शास्त्रेणानुगम्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 263, l. 8-9).
”	68	परमार्थे तु नैकत्वं पृथक्त्वाद्भिन्नलक्षणम् । पृथक्त्वैकत्वरूपेण तत्त्वमेव प्रकाशते ॥ (Ibid, p. 263, l. 18-19).
		a. The Object
300	69	दृष्टो ह्यव्यतिरेकेऽपि व्यतिरेकोऽन्वये सति ! वृक्षाद्यर्थान्वयस्तस्माद्विभक्त्यर्थोऽन्य इष्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 265, l. 14-15).
”	70	सामान्यं कारकं तस्य सप्ताद्या भेदयोनयः । षट् कर्माख्यादिभेदेन शेषभेदस्तु सप्तमी ॥ (Ibid, p. 265, l. 21-22).
301	71	औदासीन्येन यत् प्राप्यं यच्च कर्तुरनीप्सितम् । संज्ञान्तरैरनाख्यातं यद्यच्चाप्यन्यपूर्वकम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 266, l. 21-22).
”	72	सती वाविद्यमाना वा प्रकृतिः परिणामिनी । यस्य नाश्रीयते तस्य निर्वर्त्यत्वं प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, p. 267, l. 16-17).

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,,	73	प्रकृत्युच्छेदसंभूतं किंचित् काष्ठादिभस्मवत् । किंचिद् गुणान्तरोत्पत्त्यां सुवर्णादिविकारवत् ॥ (Ibid, p. 269, l. 7-8).
,,	74	क्रियागतविशेषाणां सिद्धिर्यत्र न गम्यते । दर्शनादनुमानाद्वा तत्प्राप्यमिति कथ्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 269, l. 21-22).
302	75	विशेषलाभः सर्वत्र विद्यते दर्शनादिभिः । केषांचित्तदभिव्यक्तिसिद्धिर्दष्टिविषादिषु ॥ (Ibid, p. 270, l. 17-18).
,,	76	आभासोपगमो व्यक्तिः सोढत्वमिति कर्मणः । विशेषाः प्राप्यमाणस्य क्रियासिद्धौ व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 271, l. 11-12).
303	77	निर्वृत्त्यादिषु तत्पूर्वमनुभूय स्वतन्त्रताम् । कर्त्रन्तराणां व्यापारे कर्म संपद्यते ततः ॥ (Ibid, p. 272, 1-2).
,,	78	निवृत्तप्रेषणं कर्म स्वक्रियावयवे स्थितम् । निवर्तमाने कर्मत्वे स्वे कर्तृत्वेऽवतिष्ठते । Ibid, p. 272, l. 23-24).
304	79	कर्मस्थः पचतेर्भावः कर्मस्था च भिदेः क्रिया । मासासिभावः कर्तृस्थः कर्तृस्था च गमेः क्रिया । (Kāśikā on P. 3.1.87).
,,	80	कालभावाध्वगन्तव्याः कर्मसंज्ञा ह्यकर्मणाम् । देशश्च । (M. Bhā. I, p. 336, l. 1).

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305	81	कालभावाध्वदेशानामन्तर्भूतक्रियान्तरैः । सर्वैरकर्मकैर्योगे कर्मत्वमुपजायते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 282, l. 8-9).
,,	82	द्विविधं कर्म, अन्तरङ्गं, बहिरङ्गं, च । तत्र द्रव्यकर्मान्तरङ्गम्, तेनैव च पूर्वं संबन्धः । बहिरङ्गं कालादिलक्षणं कर्म !......तत्र सकर्मकत्वाकर्मकत्वव्यपदेशोऽन्तरङ्गेणैव न्याय्यः । (Ibid, p. 282, l. 22-25).
,,	83	आधारत्वमिव प्राप्तास्ते पुनर्द्रव्यकर्मसु । कालादयो भिन्नकक्ष्यं यान्ति कर्मत्वमुत्तरम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 284, l. 8-9).
,,	84	एतेषां कालादीनां सर्वैरेवाकर्मकैः सकर्मकैश्चापि धातुभिर्योगे प्राकृतमेव कर्मत्वमुपजायत इति नैषां कर्मसंज्ञोपसंख्येयेत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 283, 4-6).
306	85	सर्वं वाकथितं कर्म भिन्नभक्ष्यं प्रतीयते । धात्वर्थोद्देशभेदेन तन्नेप्सिततमं किल ॥ (Ibid, p. 286, l. 20-21).
,,	86	अनपेक्षिते तु पयसि गौरेव प्रधानम्, क्षीरविच्छेदस्तु तस्या मा भूदितित्येवमनर्थ्यपि क्षीरेण सम्प्रति गोसंस्कारार्थं दोहे प्रवर्तत इति । (Ibid, p. 287, l. 20-22).
,,	87	यथैवैकमपादानं शास्त्रे भेदेन दर्शितम् । तथैकमेव कर्मापि भेदेन प्रतिपादितम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 294, l. 2-3).
,,	88	एवं कर्मापीप्सिततममेकमेव, कर्तुः क्रिययाप्यमानत्वस्य सर्वत्र भावात् । (Ibid, p. 294, l. 11).

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„	89	निर्वर्त्यो वा विकार्यो वा प्राप्यो वा साधनाश्रयः । क्रियाणामेव साध्यत्वात् सिद्धरूपोऽभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 295, l. 20-21).
307	90	अहितेषु यथा लौल्यात् कर्तुरिच्छोपजायते । विषादिषु भयादिभ्यस्तथैवासौ प्रवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, p. 296, l. 12-13).
„	91	(a) यन्निर्वृत्ताश्रयं कर्म प्राप्तेरप्रचितं पुनः । भक्ष्यादिविषयापत्त्या भिद्यमान तदीप्सितम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 301, l. 21-22). (b) भिक्षभुज्यादिक्रियाविषयभावापत्त्या भिद्यमानं विशिष्यमाणं गुडादीप्सितं प्राप्यमेतत् कर्मेत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 302, l. 4-5).
308	92	धातोरर्थान्तरे वृत्तेर्धात्वर्थेनोपसंग्रहात् । प्रसिद्धेरविवक्षातः कर्मणोऽकर्मिका क्रिया ॥ (Ibid, p. 303, l. 8-9).
309	93	क्रियायाः परिनिष्पत्तिर्यद्व्यापारादनन्तरम् । विवक्ष्यते यदा तत्र करणत्वं तदा स्मृतम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 306, l. 18-19).
„	95	(a) वस्तुतस्तदनिर्देश्यं न हि वस्तु व्यवस्थितम् । स्थाल्या पच्यत इत्येषा विवक्षा दृश्यते यतः ॥ (Ibid, p. 307, l. 6-7). (b) इदमेव नियतजातीयं वस्तु करणमित्येवं निरूपयितुं न शक्यते । (Ibid, l. 8).
„	96	साधकतमं करणम् (p. i. 4. 42)

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310	97	स्वकक्ष्यासु प्रकर्षश्च करणानां न विद्यते । आश्रितातिशयत्वं तु परतस्तत्र लक्षणम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 307, l. 23-24).
,,	98	निष्पत्तिश्च तस्य कर्तृविनियोगादुत्तरकालं स्वव्यापारावेशे सति । तथा च तस्यां दशायामतिशयश्चिन्त्यमानोऽधिकरणादेस्तुल्यकक्ष्यात् करणस्यैवावतिष्ठते न तु कर्तुः । स हि स्वामी प्राक्प्रवृत्ति स्वतन्त्रो न भृत्यैः सह स्पर्धते । समानजातीयापेक्षो हि प्रकर्षः । कर्ता तु विजातीय एव कारकान्तराणां स्वतन्त्रपरतन्त्रत्वात् । (Ibid, p. 309, l. 5-9).
,,	99	अस्यादीनां तु कर्तृत्वे तैक्ष्ण्यादि करणं विदुः । तैक्ष्ण्यादीनां स्वतन्त्रत्वे द्वेधात्मा व्यवतिष्ठते ॥ (Ibid, p. 309, l. 14-15).
311	100	तथा हि तैक्ष्ण्यं छिनत्ति स्वसामर्थ्येनेति शब्दभेदोपहितरूपभेदादेकमपि तैक्ष्ण्यं भेदेनैव कर्तृकरणते प्रतिपद्यते । स्वाधीनत्वेन आश्रित आत्मा कर्ता साधक-तमत्वेनाश्रितः करणमिति द्वेधा व्यवस्थानम् । (Ibid, p. 309, l. 19-21).
,,	101	धर्माणां तद्वता भेदादभेदाच्च विशिष्यते । क्रियावधेरवच्छेदविशेषाद् भिद्यते यथा ॥ (Ibid, p. 311, l. 9-10).
,,	102	प्रागन्यतः शक्तिलाभान्न्यग्भावापादनादपि । तदधीनप्रवृत्तित्वात् प्रवृत्तानां निवर्तनात् ॥ अदृष्टत्वात् प्रतिनिधेः प्रविवेके च दर्शनात् । आरादप्युपकारित्वे स्वातन्त्र्यं कर्तुरुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 312, l. 5-8).

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312	104	c. The Agent and the Prompter (a) धर्मैरभ्युदितैः शब्दे नियमो न तु वस्तुनि । कर्तृधर्मविवक्षायां शब्दात् कर्ता प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 313, l. 6-7). (b) एवं च कृत्वाचेतनेषूपचरितमपि न भवति कर्तृत्वमू, सर्वत्रास्खलद्गतित्वात् प्रयोगस्य मुख्यतासंभवात् । व्याकरणे हि शब्दार्थोऽर्थः न वस्त्वर्थोऽर्थः । (Ibid, p. 313, l. 15-16).
”	105	एकस्य बुद्ध्यवस्थाभिर्भेदे च परिकल्पिते । कर्मत्वं करणत्वं च कर्तृत्वं चोपजायते ॥ (Ibid, p. 313, l. 21-22).
313	107	शब्दार्थ एवार्थ इत्यस्खलद्गतित्वात् प्रयोगस्य मुख्यतैव सर्वत्र नोपचारार्थः कश्चित् । (Ibid, p. 315, l. 5).
”	108	(a) कारणं कार्यभावेन यथा वा व्यवतिष्ठते । कार्यशब्दं तदा लब्ध्वा कार्यत्वेनाथ जायते ॥ (Ibid, p. 315, l. 8-9). (b) कारणमेव सद्रूपं कर्तृ भवदुत्तरावस्थासाधनलक्षणं जन्म प्रतिपद्यते । (Ibid, l. 16).
”	109	......जातिरेव कारणानां स्वाभिव्यंजकसंपत्त्यर्थं प्रयोजिकेति सैव व्यक्त्यात्मना जायत इति व्यवहाराज्जातिरूपेण कर्तृत्वं व्यक्तिरूपेण जन्यत्वमिति अत्यन्तं व्यतिरेकाभावाज्जातिव्यक्त्योः सामानाधिकरण्यादुपपद्यत इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 316, l. 9-11).

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314	110	(a) भावेष्वेव पदन्यास प्रज्ञाया वाच एव वा । नास्तीत्यपदे नास्ति न वासद् भिद्यते ततः ॥ (Ibid, p. 316, l. 13-14). बुद्धिशब्दौ प्रवर्तेते यथाभूतेषु वस्तुषु । तेषामन्येन तत्त्वेन व्यवहारो न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 316, l. 23-24). (b) बुद्धिशब्दविषयभावातिरेकेण व्यवहारे वस्तूनां बाह्या सत्ता न काचन विद्यत इत्याह । (Ibid, l. 21-22).
"	112	सम्भावनात् क्रियासिद्धौ कर्तृत्वेन समाश्रितः । क्रियायामात्मासाध्यायां साधनानां प्रयोजकः ॥ प्रयोगमात्रे न्यग्भावं स्वातंन्त्र्यादेव निश्चितः । अविशिष्टो भवत्यन्यैः स्वतन्त्रैर्मुक्तसंशयैः ॥ (Ibid, p. 323, l. 5-8).
"	113	(a) निमित्तेभ्यः प्रवर्तन्ते सर्व एव स्वभूतये । अभिप्रायानुरोधोऽपि स्वार्थस्यैव प्रसिद्धये ॥ (Ibid, p. 324, l. 24-25). (b) सर्वं इमे स्वभूत्यर्थं प्रवर्तन्ते । (M. Bhā. II, p. 36, l. 1).
"	114	एवं मन्यते चेतनावत एतद्भवति प्रेषणमध्येषणं—चेति भिक्षाश्चाचेतनाः । नैष दोषः । नावश्यं स एव वासं प्रयोजयति य आहोष्यतामिति । तूष्णीमप्यासीनो यस्तत्समर्थान्याचरति सोऽपि वासं प्रयोजयति भिक्षाश्चापि प्रचुरा व्यंजनवत्यो लभ्यमाना वासं प्रयोजयन्ति । (Ibid, p. 33, l. 4-8).

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315	115	प्रेषणाध्येषणे कुर्वंस्तत्समर्थानि चाचरन् । कर्तैव विहितां शास्त्रे हेतुसंज्ञां प्रपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 326, l. 6-7).
,,	116	गुणक्रियायां स्वातन्त्र्यात् प्रेषणे कर्मतां गतः । नियमात् कर्मसंज्ञायाः स्वधर्मेणाभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 330, l. 6-7).
316	117	क्रियायाः प्रेरकं कर्म हेतुः कर्तुः प्रयोजकः । कर्मार्थो च क्रियोत्पत्तिसंस्कारप्रतिपत्तिभिः ॥ (Ibid, p. 331, l. 5-6).
		d. The Recipient (*Saṃpradāna*).
,,	118	अनिराकणात् कर्तुस्त्यागाङ्गं कर्मणेप्सितम् । प्रेरणानुमतिभ्यां वा लभते सम्प्रदानताम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 331, l. 20-21).
,,	120	दानक्रियार्थं हि सम्प्रदानम्, न तु दानक्रिया तदर्था कारकाणां क्रियार्थत्वात संप्रदानार्थं तु दीयमानं कर्मेति वाक्यार्थभूताया दानक्रियाया अतादर्थ्यात् तादर्थ्य-चतुर्थ्या अप्राप्तौ तदर्थं संप्रदानसंज्ञा न्याय्या । (Ibid, p. 332, l. 12-14).
317	121	हेतुत्वे कर्मसंज्ञायां शेषत्वे वापि कारकम् । रुच्यर्थादिषु शास्त्रेण सम्प्रदानत्वमुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 333, l. 8-9).
,,	122	....अभिलाषविषयमापद्यामानं मोदकं देवदत्तः प्रयुङ्क्ते लौल्यात्तदानुगुण्यमाच-रतीति हेतुसंज्ञायां प्रयोजकस्य देवदत्तस्य प्राप्तायां संप्रदानसंज्ञा कथ्यते । (Ibid, p. 333, l. 13-14).

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„	123	यदा तु देवदत्ताय रोचते मोदक इत्ययमर्थो देवदत्तं मोदकः प्रीणयतीति तथा च प्रीयमाण इति विशेषणं तदा कर्मसंज्ञायां प्राप्तायां संप्रदानसंज्ञारंभः । (Ibid, p. 333, l. 23—p. 334, l. 1-2).
„	124	यतोऽसौ ददाति शतं न च तत्र ददातिक्रिया श्रूयते इत्यश्रूयमाणक्रियाविषयेऽत्र कारकशेषे षष्ठ्यां प्राप्तायां धारेरुत्तमर्ण इति संप्रदानसंज्ञा । (Ibid, p. 334, l. 9-12).
318	125	....इति शास्त्रीयलौकिकभेदेन द्विविधं संप्रदानं व्याख्यातम् । (Ibid, p. 335, l. 7-8).
„	126	अत्र क्रियांश एवेप्स्यतेऽपरेण सिद्धन क्रियांशेनेत्यारंभेण मानसव्यापारेणाप्यमानत्वाद् भौतिकी क्रिया कर्मेति तेनाभिप्रेयमाणस्य संप्रदानत्वं सिद्धम् युद्धाय सन्नह्यते श्राद्धाय निगह्नते ' इति । (Ibid, p. 245, l. 10-12).
319	127	(a) क्रियाणां समुदाये तु यदैकत्वं विवक्षितम् । तदा कर्म क्रियायोगात् स्वाख्ययैवोपचर्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 336, l. 5-6). (b) सन्दर्शनादिक्रियासमुदायः परस्परमङ्गाङ्गिभावमनापन्नः समकक्ष्यतया समुच्चीयमानरूपो यदैकफलत्वादभेदेन धातुनाङ्गक्रियते तदा भेदनिबन्धनस्य क्रियाकारकभावस्याप्रतीतेरप्रतिलब्धकर्मभावया क्रियया संबध्यमानमोदनादिकर्म स्वाख्ययैव क्रिययेप्सिततमत्वनिमित्तभूतया कर्मसंज्ञयैव व्यवह्रियते न तु संप्रदानसंज्ञयेत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 336, l. 7-10).
320	128	(a) भेदाभेदविवक्षा च स्वभावेन व्यवस्थिता । तस्माद्गत्यर्थकर्मत्वे, व्यभिचारो न दृश्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 336, l. 13-14).

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		(b) गत्यर्थधातुविषये संदर्शनादीनां भेदाभेदविवक्षा, पच्यादावभेदविवक्षैव, श्वाद्राय निगहृत इत्यादौ भेदविवक्षैवेति च वक्ष्यते । (Ibid, p. 245, l. 13-14).
		e. The Starting-point (*apādāna*).
„	129	निर्दिष्टविषयं किंचिदुपात्तविषयं तथा । अपेक्षितक्रियं चेति त्रिधापादानमुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 338, l. 7-8).
„	130	संरब्धोदासीनसाधनसाध्यस्त्यागः तदुभयकारकगतिविभागलक्षणफलोऽपायाख्यो गतिविशेष एव बोद्धव्यः । (Ibid, p. 339, l. 15-16).
„	131	ध्रुवावधिरपायोऽपि समवेतस्तथाध्रुवे । (Ibid, p. 339, l. 11).
321	132	मेषान्तरक्रियापेक्षमवधित्वं पृथक् पृथक् । मेषयोः स्वक्रियापेक्षं कर्तृत्वं च पृथक् पृथक् ॥ (Ibid, p. 341, l. 9-10).
„	133	गतिर्विना त्ववधिना नापाय इति गम्यते । वृक्षस्य पर्णं पततीत्येवं भाष्ये निदर्शितम् । (Ibid, p. 342, 1-2).
322	134	निर्धारणे विभक्ते यो भीत्रार्थानां च यो विधिः । उपात्तापेक्षितापायः सोऽबुधप्रतिपत्तये ॥ (Ibid, p. 345, l. 16-17).

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		f. The Abode (*adhikaraṇa*)
323	135	कर्तृकर्मव्यवहितामसाक्षाद्धारयत् क्रियाम् । उपकुर्वत् क्रियासिद्धौ शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 348, l. 3-4).
”	136	उपश्लेषस्य चाभेदस्तिलाकाशकटादिषु । उपकारास्तु भिद्यन्ते संयोगिसमवायिनाम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 348, l. 24-25).
”	137	खे शकुनय इत्यत्र चाकाशस्य तात्त्विकावयवाभावात् कल्पितप्रदेशतय संबन्धाद्वैषयिकमधिकरणम् । अनन्यत्र भावश्चात्र विषयार्थः ।...... गुरौ वसतीति शिष्याणां गुर्वधीनायां वृत्तौ वैषयिकमधिकरणं गुरुः । (Ibid, p. 349, l. 7-10).
”	138	एवं युद्धे सन्नह्यतीति युद्धाभिसंधिना सन्नहनस्य तनुत्रादिबन्धनरूपस्य प्रवृत्तेः युद्धं विषयः । (Ibid, p. 349, l. 10).
”	139	अविनाशो गुरुत्वस्य प्रतिबन्धे स्वतन्त्रा । दिग्विशेषादवच्छेद इत्याद्या भेदहेतवः ॥ (Ibid, p. 349, l. 15-16).
324	140	इदमत्रेति भावानामभावान्न प्रकल्पते । व्यपदेशस्तमाकाशनिमित्तं संप्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, p. 350, l. 22-23).
”	141	(a) तथा हि शब्दप्रमाणकानां शब्दार्थोऽर्थः अस्ति चायं शब्दः--इद नक्षत्रमत्र तिष्ठतीति । अत्र इति यन्निर्दिष्टं तत्किंचन वस्तु भवत् पृथिव्यादेरन्यत्वादाकाशाख्यामालंबते । (Ibid, p. 351, l. 1-3).

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		(b) अत एव शत्रोरभावे सुखमित्यादौ निरूप्यमाणस्याभावस्याधारभाव इत्यस्ति लोकप्रसिद्धव्यवहारनिमित्तमाकाशमाधारभावमापन्नम् । (Ibid, p. 351, l. 5-7).
,,	142	(a) कालात् क्रिया विभज्यन्ते आकाशात् सर्वमूर्तयः । एतावांश्चैव भेदोऽयमभेदोपनिबन्धनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 351, l. 11-12).
		(b) मूर्तिक्रियाविवर्तरूपं चेदं विश्वं भेदावभासबहुलं लभ्यते व्यवहारे यथायथमाद्यायां दशायामभिन्नमपीत्येतदपेक्षया कालाकाशाख्या-भेदनिमित्तः । (Ibid, p. 351, l. 16-18).
		(c) कालाकाशयोरपि च भेदः शक्तित्वादत्यन्ताभिन्नपरब्रह्मनिमित्तः । (Ibid, l. 20).
		g. *Śeṣa* and *Sambodhana.*
325	144	(a) संबन्धः कारकेभ्योऽन्यः क्रियाकारकपूर्वकः । श्रुतायामश्रुतायां वा क्रियायां सोऽभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 354, l. 20-21).
		(b) क्रियाकारकपूर्वकः इत्यनेन कारकत्वं व्याचष्टे शेषस्य । (Ibid, p. 355, l. 2).
,,	145	तथा हि राज्ञः पुरुषो वृक्षस्य शाखा पशोः पादः पितुः पुत्र इत्यादावश्रूय-माणक्रियाविषये स्वस्वामिभावावयवावयविभावजन्यजनकभावादौ संबन्धे ददातिस्थिति-जन्मादिक्रियाप्रभाविते पूर्वभाविकारकत्वमुत्तरावस्थायामप्यनुगतमिति भवत्येव शेषः कारकम् । (Ibid, p. 355, l. 3-5).

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,,	146	सिद्धस्याभिमुखीभावमात्रं संबोधनं विदुः । प्राप्ताभिमुख्यो ह्यर्थात्मा क्रियासु विनियुज्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 367, l. 12-13).
,,	147	संबोधनं न वाक्यार्थ इति वृद्धेभ्य आगमः । (Ibid, p. 367, l. 21).
		6. On Action (*Kriyā*).
326	1	तत्रैतन्नामाख्यातयोर्लक्षणं प्रदिशन्ति, भावप्रधानमाख्यातम्, सत्त्वप्रधानानि नामानि । (*Yāska-Nirukta*—1.1.9.)
,,	2	षड् भावविकारा भवन्तीति ह स्माह भगवान् वार्ष्यायणिः, जायतेऽस्ति विपरिणमते वर्धतेऽपक्षीयते विनश्यतीति । (Ibid, 1-2-8.)
327	5	पूर्वापरीभूतं भावमाख्यातेनाचष्टे व्रजति पचतीत्युपक्रमप्रभृत्यपवर्गपर्यन्तम् । (*Nirukta*—1.1.11.)
,,	8	पाठेन धातुसंज्ञायां समानशब्दप्रतिषेधः । (M. Bhā. I, p. 253, l. 13).
,,	9	(a) यदि पुनः क्रियावचनो धातुरित्येतल्लक्षणं क्रियेत । (Ibid, p. 254, l. 13). (b) कथं पुनर्ज्ञायते क्रियावचनाः पचादय इति । यदेषां करोतिना सामानाधिकरण्यम् । किं करोति पचति । किं करिष्यति पक्ष्यति । किमकार्षीत् अपक्षीदिति । (Ibid, p. 254, l. 20-21).

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328	10	इह सर्वेषु साधनेषु सन्निहितेषु कदाचित् पचतीत्येतद् भवति कदाचिन्न भवति। यस्मिन् साधने सन्निहिते पचतीत्येतद् भवति सा नूनं क्रिया। अथवा यया देवदत्त इह भूत्वा पाटलिपुत्रे भवति सा नूनं क्रिया। (Ibid, l. 17-19).
,,	11	अस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां धातुत्वम् अस्तिभवतिविद्यतीनां धातुसंज्ञा वक्तव्या। यथा हि भवता करोतिना पचादीनां सामानाधिकरण्यं दर्शितं न तथास्त्यादीनां निदर्श्यते। न हि भवति किं करोति अस्तीति। (Ibid, p. 255, l. 1-4).
329	12	(a) यदि पुनर्भाववचनो धातुः इत्येवं लक्षणं क्रियेत। (Ibid, p. 256, l. 18). (b) भाववचनः क्रियामात्रवाची। (Kaiyyaṭa on the above)
330	15	कारकाणां प्रवृत्तिविशेषः क्रिया। अन्यथा हि कारकाणि शुष्कौदने प्रवर्तन्ते अन्यथा च मांसौदने। (Ibid, p. 258, l. 11).
,,	16	अन्यथा हि कारकाण्यस्तौ प्रवर्तन्ते, अन्यथा हि म्रियतौ। (Ibid, p. 258, l. 12-13).
331	17	अन्ये तु विशेषपदे भरं कृत्वा प्रवृत्तीनां विशेषः (प्रवृत्तिविशेषः) इति सकलकारकजन्या विक्लित्त्यादिरूपा भूतिः फलभूता कारकप्रवृत्तेः क्रियेति व्याचक्षते। (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 2, l. 13-15).
332	18	अन्ये तु सामान्यभूता क्रिया वर्तते इत्येतद्भाष्यानुसारेण प्रवृत्तिमात्रमगृहीतविशेषं सकलकारकानुयायिनी क्रियेति मन्यन्ते। तथा हि फलजननैव साधारणात्मिका क्रिया प्रवृत्तिविशेष इत्युच्यते प्रवृत्तिश्चायं विशेषश्चेति। (Ibid, p. 3, l. 18-22).

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,,	19	तथा हि क्रिया क्रियाया निर्वर्तिका भवति द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य । (M. Bhā. I, p. 258, l. 15).
,,	20	एवं हि कश्चित् कचित् पृच्छति किमवस्थो देवदत्तस्य व्याधिरिति । स आह वर्धत इति । अपर आह अपक्षीयत इति । अपर आह स्थित इति । स्थित इत्युक्ते वर्धतेश्चापक्षीयतेश्च निवृत्तिर्भवति । (Ibid, p. 258, l. 16-18).
,,	21	क्रिया नामात्यन्तापरिदृष्टा । अशक्या पिण्डीभूता निदर्शयितुं यथा गर्भो-निर्लुठितः । सासावनुमानगम्या । (Ibid, p. 254, l. 15-17).
,,	22	(a) गुणभूतैरवयवैः समूहः क्रमजन्मनाम् । बुद्ध्या प्रकल्पिताभेदः क्रियेति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 9, l. 1-2). (b) क्रमवतां क्षणानामेकफलोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तानां सङ्कलनाबुद्ध्या समापादितैक्यानां क्रियात्वव्यवहारः । (Ibid, l. 3).
333	23	समूहः स तथाभूतः प्रतिभेदं समूहिषु । समाप्यते ततो भेदे कालभेदस्य सम्भवः ॥ (Ibid, p. 9, l. 16-17).
,,	24	(a) क्रमात् सदसतां तेषामात्मानो न समूहिनाम् । सद्वस्तुविषयैर्यान्ति संबन्धं चक्षुरादिभिः ॥ (Ibid, p. 10, l. 10-11). (b) एकस्मिन्नपि हि क्षणे समूहोऽध्यूह्यमानः समाश्रितपौर्वापर्य एवाध्यस्यते । तथारूपस्यैव क्रियात्वात् । तेन च रूपेणेन्द्रियाविषयत्वात् । (Ibid, l. 14-16).

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,,	26	(a) यथा गौरिति संघातः सर्वो नेन्द्रियगोचरः । भागशस्तूपलब्धस्य बुद्धौ रूपं निरूप्यते ॥ इन्द्रियैरन्यथाप्राप्तौ भेदांशोपनिपातिभिः । अलातचक्रवद्रूपं क्रियाणां परिकल्प्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 10, l. 18-21). (b) तत्र स्फोटः प्रत्यक्ष एवेति नासौ दृष्टान्तोऽक्रमोद्भिन्नश्च । समुदायस्तु वर्णानामुच्चरितप्रध्वंसिनामयुगपत्कालत्वादप्रत्यक्षो बुद्ध्या निरूपितैकत्वो दृष्टान्तो वर्णसमाहारमात्रदर्शनाश्रयेणात्र क्रियाया अप्येवंरूपत्वादसमसमयावयवसमाहारात्मकत्वात् । अत एवालातचक्रवद् इत्याह । (Ibid, p. 11, l. 1-4).
334	27	अल्पीयसः परमाणुप्रख्यस्याशक्यावयवविभागस्य क्रियाक्षणस्य क्रियात्वं नास्ति आश्रितक्रमरूपत्वात् क्रियाया इति न तेन क्रियाया अप्रत्यक्षताव्यभिचार उद्भावनीय इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, p. 11, l. 21-23).
,,	28	अयमर्थः । नेह वास्तवो भागभेदाश्चिन्त्यते, अपि तु शब्दात् प्रतीयमानः । शब्दाच्च क्षणमात्रस्वभावापि विप्रकीर्णावयवा समूहात्मनैव सर्वा क्रिया प्रतीयत इति सिद्धं शब्दवाच्यतया सक्रमत्वमतीन्द्रियत्वं । (Ibid, p. 12, l. 2-5).
335	29	तदेवं पूर्वोत्तरभागगतक्रमाश्रयेणाख्याताभिधेया सर्वैव क्रियाध्यारोपितक्रमेति न सत्ताया अपि काचित् क्रियात्वे विचिकित्सा । (Ibid, p. 14, l. 17-18).
,,	30	(a) व्यवहारस्य सिद्धत्वान्न चेयं गुणकल्पना । उपचारो हि मुख्यस्य संभवादवतिष्ठते ॥ (Ibid, p. 14, l. 20-21).

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		(b) गोशब्दस्य सास्नादिमति मुख्यत्वात् तत्समानगुणे वाहीकादावुपचरिता प्रवृत्तिरित्युच्यते। क्रियायास्तु समानकालानाश्रितपौर्वापर्यावयवाया क्रमाभावान्न मुख्यता काचित्। (Ibid, l. 22-24).
336	31	(a) जातिमन्ये क्रियामाहुरनेकव्यक्तिवर्तिनीम् । असाध्या व्यक्तिरूपेण सा साध्येवोपलभ्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 18, l. 16-17).
		(b) तथा च स्वतो नित्यत्वेऽप्यस्याः स्वाश्रयमुखेन साध्यत्वं सक्रमत्वं च क्रियालक्षणमवतिष्ठते । (Ibid, l. 23-24).
,,	32	भाव एव हि धात्वर्थ इत्यविच्छिन्न आगमः (Ibid, p. 19, l. 22).
337	33	तदेवं द्वाभ्यां षड् व्याप्ताः । (Ibid, p. 22, l. 7).
,,	34	क्रियामन्ये तु मन्यन्ते क्वचिदप्यनपाश्रिताम् । साधनैकार्थकारित्वे प्रवृत्तिमनपायिनीम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 27, l. 3-4).
,,	35	प्रथमावस्थायामपूर्वादिरूपतया सा प्रवृत्तिः सामान्येनभिधीयते । परतस्तु ययास्वं साधनव्यापारोपपादितप्रविभागा साध्यमानरूपतया क्रियेति व्यवह्रियते । तथा चानुद्भिन्नविशेषरूपदशायां कारकशक्तीनां प्रवर्तिका । (Ibid, p. 27, l. 12-14).
338	36	प्रकृतिः साधनानां सा प्रथमं तच्च कारकम् । व्यापाराणां ततोऽन्यत्वमपरैरुपवर्ण्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 27, l. 19-20).

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,,	37	बहूनां संभवेऽर्थानां केचिदेवोपकारिणः । संसर्गे कश्चिदेषां तु प्राधान्येन प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, p. 28, l. 6-7). साध्यत्वात्तत्र चाख्यातैर्व्यापाराः सिद्धसाधनाः । प्राधान्येनाभिधीयन्ते फलेनापि प्रवर्तिताः ॥ (Ibid, p. 28, l. 13-14).
339	41	(a) एकत्वावृत्तिभावाभ्यां भेदाभेदसमन्वये । संख्यास्तत्रोपलभ्यन्ते संख्येयावयवक्रियाः । (Ibid, p. 29, l. 18-19). (b) निःसंख्या एकापि क्रिया यदा आवर्तते तदा आवृत्तिनिबन्धनं भेदं स्वतश्चाभेदमुपादाय भेदाभेदयोगेऽस्याः संख्याः दृश्यन्ते । (Ibid, p. 29, l. 20-21).
340	43	(a) सिद्धस्यार्थस्य पाकादेः कथं साधनयोगिता । साध्यत्वे वा तिङन्तेन कृतां भेदो न कश्चन ॥ (Ibid, p. 30, l. 6-7). (b) एकाभिधान एकोऽर्थो युगपच्च द्विधर्मभाक् । न सम्भवति सिद्धत्वे स साध्यः स्यात् कथं पुनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 30, l. 23-24).
,,	44	एतावत् साधनं साध्यमेतावदिति कल्पना । शास्त्र एव न वाक्येऽस्ति विभागः परमार्थतः ॥ (Ibid, p. 31, l. 7-8).
,,	45	(a) आख्यातशब्दे भागाभ्यां साध्यसाधनवर्तिता । प्रकल्पिता यथा शास्त्रे स घञादिष्वपि क्रमः (Ibid, p. 31, l. 14-15).

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		(b) साध्यत्वेन क्रिया यत्र धातुरूपनिबन्धना । सत्त्वभावस्तु यस्तस्याः स घञादिनिबन्धनः ॥ (Ibid, p. 31, l. 22-23).
341	47	मृगो धावति पश्येति साध्यसाधनरूपता । तथा विषयभेदेन स्मरणस्योपपद्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 32, l. 23-24).
,,	48	साधनत्वं च न साध्यावस्थायामेव । अनिष्पन्नस्य परमनुपकुर्वतः साधनत्वायोगात् । उत्तरकालं तु साधनत्वं निर्वृत्तायाः क्रियायाः क्रियान्तरं प्रत्युपपद्यत एव । 5 (Ibid, p. 33, l. 4-5).
,,	49	लकृत्यक्तखलर्थानां तथाव्ययकृतामपि । रूढिनिष्ठाघञादीनां धातुः साध्यस्य वाचकः ॥ (Ibid, p. 33, l. 13-14).
,,	50	अत्र साधनसंबन्धादेव साध्यताध्यवसायः । धातुप्रातिपदिकाभ्यां हि स्वार्थस्य सिद्धसाध्यते नावेद्येते, अपि तु साधनसंबन्धायत्ता धात्वर्थस्य साध्यताप्रतीतिः । (Ibid, p. 33, l. 18-20).
342	51	(a) वनं वृक्षा इति यथा भेदाभेदव्यपाश्रयात् । अर्थात्मा भिद्यते भावे स बाह्याभ्यन्तरे क्रमः ॥ (Ibid, p. 36, l. 23-24). (b) एवं धात्वर्थो भावोऽभ्यन्तरे प्रकृतिरूपे वाच्यतया भवः प्राथमकल्पिकत्वाद् आभ्यन्तरः । (Ibid, p. 37, l. 3-4).

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,,	52	फलवत्त्वाच्च क्रियायाः कर्त्रभिप्रायादिनात्मनेपदादिद्योत्येन फलधर्मेणोपग्रहेण योगः । (Ibid, p. 37, l. 10-11).
,,	53	भाव्यत्वाच्च कर्त्रा न वियुज्यतेऽयमिति द्विविधो बाह्योऽपि भावो व्यवह्रियते तिङभिहित एकः कृदभिहितोऽपर इति । (Ibid, p. 37, l. 18-19).
343	54	(a) एकश्च सोऽर्थः सत्ताख्यः कथंचित् कैश्चिदुच्यते । लिङ्गानि चास्य भिद्यन्ते पचिरूपादिभेदवत् ॥ (Ibid, p. 39, l. 20-21) (b) स एकोऽर्थो भावशब्दाभिधेयः सकलधात्वर्थविषयसिद्धतासमवेतसामान्यरूपो घञादिप्रत्ययवाच्यः सत्ताख्यः स्वशक्त्या कैश्चिच्छब्दैः केनचित् प्रकारेणाभिधीयते भावः सत्तेत्येवमादिभिः सामान्यशब्दैः सामान्यरूपः । (Ibid, l. 22-24).
,,	55	(a) यच्च पचतेर्भवतिर्भवति न तद् भवतेः पचतिर्भवति । किं च पचतेर्भवतिर्भवति । सामान्यम् । किं च भवतेः पचतिर्भवति । विशेषः । (M. Bhā. II, p. 144, l. 23). (b) भवतिर्हि सामान्यं पाचिं स्वीकरोति, न तु पचिर्विशेषो भवतिमित्यर्थः । (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 40, l. 9).
		7. On Person and Aspect (*Puruṣa* and *Upagraha*).
344	1	प्रत्यक्ता परभावश्चाप्युपाधी कर्तृकर्मणोः । तयोः श्रतिविशेषेण वाचकौ मध्यमोत्तमौ ॥ (Vāk. III, pt. ii, p. 91, l. 3-4).

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„	2	अहङ्कारसमानाश्रयत्वं यदाख्यातात् प्रतीयते क्रियायाः स उत्तमपुरुषविषय इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, l. 7-8).
345	3	(a) सदसद्वापि चैतन्यमेताभ्यामेव गम्यते । चैतन्यभागे प्रथमः पुरुषो न तु वर्तते ॥ (Ibid, l. 23-24). (b) स्वपराधिष्ठानं चैतन्यं भाविकमध्यारोपितं वा आभ्यामभिधीयते कर्तृ-कर्मोपाधिभूतम् । शब्दादवगम्यमानस्येहार्थस्यान्वाख्याननिमित्तत्वाच्छाब्दं चैतन्य सर्वत्रास्ति । (Ibid, p. 91, l. 25-26).
„	4	बुधिजानातिचितिभिः प्रथमे पुरुषे सति । संज्ञानार्थैर्न चैतन्यस्योपयोगः प्रकाश्यते ॥ (Ibid, p. 92, l. 12-13).
346	5	सम्बोधनार्थः सर्वत्र मध्यमे कैश्चिदिष्यते । तथा सम्बोधने सर्वां प्रथमां युष्मदो विदुः ॥ (Ibid, p. 92, l. 22-23).
	6	(a) सम्बोधनं न लोकेऽस्ति विधातव्येन वस्तुना ॥ स्वाहेन्द्रशत्रुर्वर्धस्व यथा राजा भवेति च ॥ (Ibid, p. 93, l. 6-7). (b) सिद्धस्याभिमुखीभावमात्रं सम्बोधनं विदुरिति साध्यस्य विधीयमानस्य सम्बोधनं नास्ति । न ह्यपूर्वोऽर्थं उपदिश्यमानोऽनवाप्तसत्त्वोऽप्रतीयमाननियतरूपोऽभि-मुखीभावमर्हत्युपगन्तुम् । इह चेन्द्रशत्रुत्वं राजत्वं च विधीयमानमिति सत्यपि प्रैषे संबोधनाभावः । (Ibid, p. 93, l. 8-11).

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,,	7	गुणप्रधानताभेदः पुरुषादिविपर्ययः । निर्दिष्टस्यान्यथा शास्त्रे नित्यत्वान्न विरुध्यते ॥ यथानिर्देशमर्थाः स्युर्येषां शास्त्रं विधायकम् । किंचित् सामान्यमाश्रित्य स्थिते तु प्रतिपादनम् ॥ (Ibid, p. 94, l. 8-9).
347	8	चूर्णादीन्यप्राण्युपग्रहादिति सूत्रस्य पाठान्तरम्। तत्रोपग्रह इति षष्ठ्यन्तमेव पूर्वाचार्योपचारेण गृह्यते । (Kāśikā on P. 6.2.134).
,,	9	पुरुषोपग्रहयोस्तु पूर्वाचार्यव्यवहारादेव लक्षणप्रसिद्धिः (Vāk. III, pt. i, p. 185, l. 6).
,,	10	(a) उपग्रहप्रतिषेधश्च । (M. Bhā. II, p. 130, l. 7). (b) उपग्रहस्येति आत्मेनपदसंज्ञाया इत्यर्थः । Kaiyyaṭa's Pradīpa on (a)).
,,	11	लादेशव्यङ्ग्यक्रियाविशेषो मुख्य उपग्रहः इह तद्व्यक्तिनिमित्तत्वात् परस्मैपदात्मनेपदयोरुपग्रहशब्दो वर्तते । (*Nyāsa* on *Kāśikā* on P. 3.1.85).
348	12	इदानीमाख्यातार्थमुपग्रहं विचारयितुं स्वरूपमस्यालौकिकत्वात् प्रदर्शयति (Vāk. c. III, Up. 1 (comm.)).
,,	13	आत्मनेपदपरस्मैपदव्यङ्ग्यः कर्त्रभिप्रायतदितरादिरूपो विशेषो यः क्रियायाः साधनस्य स उपग्रह इति पूर्वाचार्यैरभ्युपगतः । (Ibid).

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„	14	यजमानादिना प्रधानफलोद्देशेन प्रवर्त्यमाना क्रियात्मनेपदात् प्रतीयते यजते पचते इति । (Ibid, Up. 3).
349	17	व्यतिहारस्तु क्रियाविशेषणमात्मनेपदाभिव्यङ्ग्यमुपग्रहः । (Ibid, Up. 4, comm.).
„	18	गन्धनावक्षेपणादयः क्रियाविशेषाः सन्तोऽपि विनात्मनेपदमनभिव्यक्ता इति आत्मनेपदाभिव्यङ्ग्यत्वादुपग्रहशब्दवाच्याभवन्ति । (Ibid, Up. 4, comm.).
350	20	(a) क्वचित् साधनमेवासौ क्वचित्तस्य विशेषणम् । साधनं तत्र कर्मादि व्यक्तवाचो विशेषणम् ॥ (Ibid, Up. 2). (b) व्यक्ता वाग् येषां व्यक्ता वाचि (वर्णाः) वा येषां ते व्यक्तवाचो धात्वर्थं समुच्चारणात्मकं विशिंषन्तोऽपि साधनस्य कर्तुर्विशेषणं सामर्थ्याद् भवन्तो भवन्त्युपग्रहशब्दवाच्याः । तद् यथा संप्रवदन्ते ब्राह्मणा इति । (Ibid, Up. 2 comm.).
351	21	(a) केषांचित् कर्त्रभिप्राये णिचा सह विकल्पते । आत्मनेपदमन्येषां तदर्था प्रकृतिर्यथा ॥ (Ibid, Up. 6). (b) आत्मनेपदाभिधेयो हि कर्ता संविधानमपेक्षते इति णिचा तुल्यविषयमात्मनेपदमिति विकल्पते तेन सह । (Ibid, Up. 6 comm.).
„	22	तदेवं भिन्नविषये णिजात्मनेपदे, संविधाने आत्मनेपदं तद्विशेषे तु प्रैषे णिजिति । (Ibid, Up. 6 comm.).

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„	23	तथा अजां नयति ग्राममित्यत्र धात्वर्थप्रैषमात्रविवक्षां भृत्ये कर्तर्यात्मनेपदं न भवति । धात्वर्थविषयापरप्रैषविवक्षायां तु स्वात्मनि कर्तरि भवत्यात्मनेवदम् । अजां नयते ग्राममिति । (Ibid).
„	24	एवं केशश्मश्रु वपते इति प्रयोगो भ्रान्तिबीजं दृश्यते । तथा हि । वपते वपनं मुण्डनमन्येन कारयतीत्यर्थः इति णिजात्मनेपदे समानविषये मन्यन्ते । अत्र च तिङन्तात् कर्तगामि क्रियाफलं प्रतीयत इत्यात्मनेपदं सामर्थ्यात् तु स्वयमशक्तोऽन्यं प्रयुङ्क्ते इत्यवगम्यते । (Ibid, Up. 7 comm.).
352	25	न हि सर्वे धातवो ण्यर्थेन संगच्छन्ते इत्येतावता संविधानाभिधायिनोऽपि स्युः । शक्तिभेदात् । प्रैषो हि ण्यर्थः । संविधानं ततोऽन्यत् । (Ibid, Up. 13, comm.).
„	26	या प्रापणे, णीञ् प्रापणे इति तुल्येऽप्यर्थनिर्देशे यातेः प्राप्तिः प्रापणमर्थः । नयतेस्तु प्रापणा प्रापणमिति संविधानमर्थोऽवगम्यते । (Ibid, Up. 12 comm.).
„	27	ये तु संविधानसमर्थास्ते स्वरितेत्संज्ञका ञकारेत्संज्ञकाश्च पठिता धातुपाठे संविधानविशिष्टक्रियावचनसामर्थ्यमवद्योतयितुमित्यर्थः । (Ibid, Up. 11 comm.).
„	28	(a) युक्तं पुनर्यद् वृत्तनिमित्तको नामानुबन्धः स्यान्नानुबन्धनिमित्तकेन नाम वृत्तेन भवितव्यम् । वृत्तनिमित्तक एवानुबन्धः । वृत्तज्ञो ह्याचार्योऽनुबन्धानासजति । (M. Bhā. I, p. 266, l. 19-21). (b) तथा च प्रयोगदर्शिनं च प्रति स्वरितञिद्ग्रहणं शक्यमकर्तुमिति प्रत्याख्यात एतद्भाष्ये । वचनानुसारिणं तु प्रति क्रियत एवैतत् । (Vāk. III, c. Upa. 12 comm.).

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„	29	गणपठितेऽर्थे समानेऽपि ईक्षते पश्यतीत्यनयोः प्रतिपूर्वयोर्नाभेदो न समानार्थता, अपि तु प्रतीक्षत इत्यन्य एवार्थः प्रतिपालनं नाम । प्रतिपश्यतीति प्रतीपदर्शनमर्थः दशीक्षी चोपलक्षणे रक्षतिपाल्यतोरपि प्रतिरक्षति प्रतिपाल्यतीत्यन्य एवार्थः । एवं हरतिनयत्योः सम्पूर्वःयो संहरति संनयतीत्याद्युदाहार्यम् । (Ibid, Up. 13 comm.).
353	30	(a)एवं तर्हि कर्त्रभिप्राये क्रियाफले इत्युच्यते । सर्वत्र च कर्त्तारं क्रियाफलमभिप्रैति । तत्र प्रकर्षगतिर्विज्ञायते । साधीयो यत्र कर्त्तारं क्रियाफलमभिप्रैति । न चान्तरेण यजिं यजिफलं वपिं वा वपिफलं लभन्ते । याजकाः पुनरन्तरेणापि यजिं गा लभन्ते भृतकाश्च पादिकमिति । M. Bhā. I, p. 293, l. 5-9). (b) यस्यार्थस्य प्रसिद्ध्यर्थमारभन्ते पचादयः । तत् प्रधानं फलं तेषां न लाभादि प्रयोजनम् । (Vāk. c. III, Up. 18).
		8. On Number (*Saṃkhyā*).
354	1	संख्यावान् सत्त्वभूतोऽर्थः सर्व एवाभिधीयते । भेदाभेदविभागो हि लोके संख्यानिबन्धनः ॥ (Vāk. c. III, *Saṃkhyā* 1).
„	2	न च पदार्थ एवासहाय एकत्वम्, ससहायश्च यथायोगं द्वित्वादीति सहायविरहतद्योगयोर्धर्मान्तरत्वाभावान्न कश्चिदन्यो द्रव्यात् संख्यालक्षणो गुण इति व्यतिरिक्तसंख्याभाव इति वाच्यम् । (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 1, comm.)
„	3	तथा ह्यत्यन्तभेदे तद्विशिष्टप्रत्ययानुदय इति काल्पनिक एव भेद इति मन्यन्ते । (Ibid).

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355	4	स भेदो व्यतिरिक्तो वा तेषामात्मैव वा तथा । भेदहेतुत्वमाश्रित्य संख्येति व्यपदिश्यते ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 2).
,,	5	एवं द्रव्यगता संख्या रूपादिषु समारोप्यत इति चतुर्विंशतिर्गुणा इति व्यवहारः । (Ibid, 3, comm.).
,,	6	(a) परत्वे चापरत्वे च भेदे तुल्या श्रुतिर्यथा । सङ्ख्याशब्दाभिधेयत्वं भेदहेतोस्तथा गुणे ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 4). (b) तथा च भेदहेतोर्द्रव्यसमवेताया एव संख्याया गुणादिविषयेऽपि तथैवेकादिशब्देन व्यवहारः न त्वपरा गुणादावेकत्वादिका संख्या विद्यत इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, comm.).
,,	7	अस्वतन्त्रे स्वतन्त्रत्वं परधर्मो यथा गुणे । अभेदे भेद्यभावोऽपि द्रव्यधर्मस्तथा गुणे ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 5).
356	8	(a) परोपकारतत्त्वानां स्वातन्त्र्येणाभिधायकः । शब्दः सर्वपदार्थानां स्वधर्माद् विप्रकृष्यते ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 7). (b) तथा च द्रव्यवद् गुणोऽपि पटस्य रूपमिति स्वातन्त्र्येणाभिधीयमानः संसर्गिसंख्यादिकृतोपकार एवाभिधीयते । (Ibid, comm. on text no. 8 (a))

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"	9	(a) सामान्येष्वपि सामान्यं विशेषेषु विशिष्टता । संख्यासु संख्या लिङ्गेषु लिङ्गमेवं प्रकल्पते ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 11). (b) स्त्रीत्वादिषु च लिङ्गेषु तथैव द्रव्यायमाणेषु शब्देनभिहितेषु द्रव्यधर्म. लिङ्गान्तरयोगः पुमान् पौस्नं पुस्तेति........ । (Comm. on the above).
"	10	(a) अतो द्रव्याश्रितां संख्यामाहुः संसर्गवादिनः । भेदाभेदव्यतीतेषु भेदाभेदविधायिनीम् ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 12). (b) यतो द्रव्यगतयैव संख्ययोक्तेन न्यायेन गुणादीनामपि तन्निमित्तो व्यवहारः सिद्ध्यति अतो धर्माणां संसर्गमेकत्र द्रव्ये येऽभ्युपयन्ति काणादास्ते द्रव्यसमवेतामेव सङ्ख्यां ब्रुवते निरूपाधिषु भेदाभेदव्यतिक्रान्तेषु द्रव्येषु गुणादिषु च भेदाभेदप्रत्ययनिमित्तभूताम् । (Comm. on the above).
357	11	द्वित्वादियोनिरेकत्वं भेदास्तत्पूर्वका यतः । विना तेन न संख्यानामन्यासामस्ति सम्भवः ॥ (Ibid, *Saṃkhyā* 15).
"	12	प्रक्रियाभेदोऽत्र ग्रन्थगौरवभयान्न प्रदर्श्यते । प्रथमकाण्ड एव तु कथितम् ॥ (Helārāja on *Saṃkhyā* 16).
		9. On Gender (*Liṅga*).
361	3	उपादानविकल्पाश्च लिङ्गानां सप्त वर्णिताः । विकल्पसन्नियोगाभ्यां ये शब्देषु व्यवस्थिताः ॥ (Vāk. III, 1. *Liṅga* 3).

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,,	4	स्तनकेशादिसंबन्धो विशिष्टा वा स्तनादयः। तदुपव्यंजना जातिर्गुणावस्था गुणास्तथा॥ शब्दोपजनितोऽर्थात्मा शब्दसंस्कार इत्यपि। लिङ्गानां लिङ्गतत्त्वज्ञैर्विकल्पाः सप्त कीर्तिताः॥ (Ibid, Linga, 1-2).
,,	5	स्तनकेशवती स्त्री स्याद् लोमशः पुरुषः स्मृतः। उभयोरन्तरं यच्च तदभावे नपुंसकम्॥ (M. Bhā. II, p. 196, l. 4-5).
362	6	असत्तु मृगतृष्णावत्, गन्धर्वनगरं यथा। (Ibid, p. 196, l. 21, 24).
,,	7	अन्योन्याश्रयं त्वेतत् (Vā)। अन्योन्याश्रयं त्वेतद्भवति। स्त्रीकृतः शब्दः शब्दकृतं च स्त्रीत्वम्। एतदितरेतराश्रयं भवति। इतरेतराश्रयाणि च न प्रकल्पन्ते। (Ibid, p. 197, l. 16-18).
,,	8	अर्थ–व्यक्ति–वस्तुशब्दानां तु त्रिलिङ्गानां सर्वभावेष्वव्याहतप्रसरत्वात् त्रिलिङ्गयोगस्तदाकारप्रत्ययान्यथानुपपत्त्यानुमीयते। तथा च परस्परविरोधिनियतव्यंजन-संबन्धरूपं लिङ्गत्रयं लौकिकं कथं स्यादिति तदवधीरणेन जातिपक्षावलम्बनम्। **(Vāk. III c. *Linga* 1-2 comm.).**
363	9	(a) तिस्रो जातय एवैताः केषांचित् समवस्थिताः। अविरुद्धा विरुद्धाभिर्गोमहिष्यादिजातिभिः॥ (Ibid, *Linga* 4). (b) हस्तिन्यां वडवायां च स्त्रीति बुद्धेः समन्वयः। अतस्तां जातिमिच्छन्ति द्रव्यादिसमवायिनीम्॥ (Ibid, *Linga* 5).

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,,	10	भावशब्देन पुंस्त्वोपाधिः सत्तोच्यते, सत्ताशब्देन स्त्रीत्वोपाधिः सामान्यशब्देन नपुंसकत्वोपाधिः । (Ibid, *Linga* 5 comm.).
,,	11	तथाहि भावप्रत्ययान्तैर्लिङ्गाभिधायिभिः शब्दैरेषां स्त्रीत्वादीनां लिङ्गनियमेन प्रत्यायनं स्त्रीत्वं स्त्रीता स्त्रीभाव इति । (Ibid, *Linga* 7, comm.).
,,	12	स्त्रीत्वविशिष्टस्य द्रव्यस्य स्त्रीशब्देनाभिहितस्य भावप्रत्ययेन प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तं नपुसकत्वादियोगि स्वभावात् प्रकाश्यते । (Ibid.)
,,	13	तस्मान्न वैयाकरणैः शक्यं लौकिकं लिङ्गमास्थातुम् । अवश्यं च कश्चित् स्वकृतान्त आस्थेयः । (M. Bhā. II, p. 197, l. 25-26).
,,	14	संस्त्यानप्रसवौ लिङ्गमास्थेयौ स्वकृतान्ततः । (Ibid, l. 27).
364	15	तथाहि सांख्याः सत्त्वरजस्तमसां गुणानां सततपरिणामिनामुपचयापचयमाध्यस्थ्यलक्षणा अवस्थाविशेषा यथायोगं पुस्त्वदिलिङ्गमातिष्ठन्ते । तदेतद्भाष्यकाराभिमतं दर्शनम् । Vāk. III c. *Linga* 1-2 comm.),
,,	16	संस्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिश्च पुमान् । कस्य पुनः संस्त्यानं स्त्री प्रवृत्तिश्च पुमान् गुणानाम् । केषाम् । शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धानाम् । सर्वाश्च पुनर्मूर्तय एवमात्मिकाः संस्त्यानप्रसवगुणाः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धवत्यः । (M. Bhā. II, p. 198, l. 4-6).
,,	17	न हीह कश्चिदपि स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि मुहूर्तमप्यवतिष्ठते, वर्धते वा यावदनेन वर्द्धितव्यम् अपायेन वा युज्यते । (Ibid, p. 198, l. 8-9).

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365	18	संस्त्यानं संहननं तमोनिवृत्तिरशक्तिरुपरतिः प्रवृत्तिः प्रतिबन्धस्तिरोभावः स्त्रीत्वम्, प्रसवो विष्वग्भावो वृद्धिशक्तिर्वृद्धिलाभोऽभ्युद्रेकः प्रवृत्तिराविर्भाव इति पुंस्त्वम्, अविवक्षातः साम्यं स्थितिरौत्सुक्यनिवृत्तिरपरार्थत्वमङ्गाङ्गिभावनिवृत्तिः कैवल्यमिति नपुंसकमिति । (Vāk. III c. *Liṅga* 1-2, comm.).
„	19	आविर्भावस्तिरोभावः स्थितिश्चेत्यनपायिनः । धर्मा मूर्तिषु सर्वासु लिङ्गत्वेनानुदर्शिताः ॥ (Ibid, *Liṅga* 13).
365	20	क्वथितोदकवच्चैषामनवस्थितवृत्तिता । अजस्रं सर्वभावानां भाष्य एवोपवर्णिता ॥ (Ibid, Liṅga. 16).
„	21	चैतन्यमात्मा चिदिति नित्यभूतेऽप्यात्मनि देहाश्रयत्वेन गुणमध्यव्यवस्थितत्वात् तद्धर्माविर्भावतिरोभावोपपत्तिः । (Ibid, Liṅga, 12. comm.).
„	22	सर्वमूर्त्यात्मभूतानां शब्दादीनां गुणे गुणे । त्रयः सत्त्वादिधर्मास्ते सर्वत्र समवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, Liṅga. 14).
366	23	पुरुषार्थं हि परिणामिनां गुणानां प्रतिकल्पमवस्थाविशेषो भावतत्त्वदृगवसेयः सौक्ष्म्यात् स्थूलदृग्भिर्नावधार्यते । (Ibid, Liṅga. 15. comm.).
	25	प्रवृत्तेरेकरूपत्वं साम्यं वा स्थितिरुच्यते । अविर्भावतिरोभावप्रवृत्त्या वावतिष्ठते ॥ गुणा इत्येव बुद्धेर्वा निमित्तत्वं स्थितिर्मता । स्थितेश्च सर्वलिङ्गानां सर्वनामत्वमुच्यते ॥

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„	26	उपचयापचयलक्षणे द्वे अवस्थे पदार्थानम् । तत्रोपचयप्रवाहे या वृद्ध्यारव्या प्रवृत्तिः तस्या अभेदेनाध्यवसायात् स्थितिर्व्यवस्थाप्यते । एवमपचयप्रवाहे यापाय-लक्षणा प्रवृत्तिः तस्या अभेदमध्यवसायः स्थितिः कल्प्यते । (Ibid, Ling. 17. comm.).
„	27	प्रतिकलं प्रवाहयोर्भेदे वा प्रवृत्तिरूपसाम्यात् स्थितिः । वृद्धिपरिणामेऽपाय-परिणामे च प्रवृत्तिरूपं तुल्यमिति तदेव साम्यं स्थितिः । (Ibid.).
367	28	यद्वा आविर्भावतिरोभावयोर्या निरन्तरा प्रवृत्तिस्तया हेतुभूतया स्थितिरव-कल्पते । तथाहि कस्याश्चित् कलायास्तिरोधानानन्तरमेव यदा कलान्तराविर्भावस्तदा तिरोधानस्यानिष्ठितत्वात् स्थितिरेवावसीयते । (Ibid.).
„	29	गुणा इत्येव बुद्धेर्वा निमित्तत्वं स्थितिर्मता । स्थितेश्च सर्वलिङ्गानां सर्वनामत्वमुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, Linga. 18 Comm.)
„	30	यथाहि तदादि सर्वनाम वस्तुमात्रप्रत्यवमर्शजनकमविहतप्रवृत्ति सर्वत्र तथा नपुंसकमपि विशेषाविवक्षायामभेदेन सर्वलिङ्गपरामर्शकं किं जातमित्यादावव्यक्ते गुणसन्देहे प्रयोगार्हमिति । (Ibid, Linga. 18. comm.).
„	31	संनिधाने निमित्तानां किंचिदेव प्रवर्तकम् । यथा तक्षादिशब्दानां लिङ्गेषु नियमस्तथा ॥ (Ibid, Linga. 20).
„	32	(a) भावतत्त्वदृशः शिष्टाः शब्दार्थेषु व्यवस्थिताः । यद् यद् धर्मेऽङ्गतामेति लिङ्गं तत्तत् प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, Linga. 21).

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		(b) इह लोकशब्देन शिष्टा विवक्षिताः । तेषां च वस्तुपरमार्थसाक्षात्कारिता लक्षणम् । ते हि निरावरणख्यातयोऽभिधेयेषु समवेतं स्त्रीत्वादि लिङ्गमभ्युदये यद् यद् यस्य शब्दस्य साधनतामेति तत्तदेव तस्याचक्षते । अतश्च यल्लिङ्गस्य शब्दस्य धर्मसाधनत्वं शिष्टैरुपलब्धं तस्य तथाभूतस्यैव प्रसिद्धस्य सतः साधुत्वमभ्युपगन्तव्यम् । (Ibid, comm.).
368	33	स्थितेषु सर्वलिङ्गेषु विवक्षानियमाश्रयः । कस्यचिच्छब्दसंस्कारे व्यापारः क्वचिदिष्यते । (Ibid, Liṅga. 19).
,,	34	दृष्टं निमित्तं केषांचिज्जात्यादिवदवस्थितम् । दृष्टवच्छब्दसंस्कारमात्रं तु परिकल्पितम् ॥ (Ibid, Liṅga. 28).
,,	35	प्रयोगात् किलावसितस्य लिङ्गस्य चेतनविषयादन्यत्र समारोपाच्छब्दसंस्कारहेतुमात्रं न तु वास्तवरूपतेत्यनेनापि नयेन व्याप्तिसिद्धिरित्यर्थः । (Ibid, Liṅga 28 comm.)
369	36	इदं वेयमयं वेति शब्दसंस्कारमात्रकम् । निमित्तदर्शनादर्थे कैश्चित् सर्वत्र वर्ण्यते ॥ (Ibid, Liṅga. 30).
,,	37	एवमपि च बाह्यत्वेनावसायान्नोदात्तादिधर्मवच्छब्दधर्मत्वं लिङ्गस्य किं तु स्त्रियां पुंसि नपुंसक इति शब्दान्वाख्याननिमित्तभावदर्शनाच्छब्दसंस्कारत्वमस्य । (Ibid, Liṅga. 1-2. comm.).
,,	38	कैश्चिदिति वचनाद् ये गुणावस्थारूपं लिङ्गं वस्तूनां विवेकेन परिज्ञातुमशक्तास्तेषामिदं दर्शनमिति प्रतिपादयति । सति तु विवेककौशले यथाप्रविभक्तमेव लिङ्गं न्याय्यमिति ध्वनयति । (Ibid, Liṅga. 30, comm.).

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,,	39	नावश्यं विषयत्वेन निमित्तं व्यवतिष्ठते । इन्द्रियादि यथादृष्टं भेदहेतुस्तदिष्यते ॥ (Ibid, Liṅga. 31).
		10. On Complex Formations (*Vṛtti*).
371	1	अनुस्यूतेव भेदाभ्यामेका प्रख्योपजायते । यदा सहविवक्षां तामाहुर्द्वन्द्वैकशेषयोः ॥ (Vāk. III. c. Vṛ. 28).
372	2	समुदायश्चात्र नावयवव्यतिरिक्तः अपि तु त एवावयवाः संहन्यन्ते । तथा चात्रावयवभेदाभासानुविद्धा प्रतीतिर्नैयमिकी । (Ibid, comm.).
,,	3	(a) इतरेतरयोगस्तु भिन्नसंघाभिधायिनाम् । प्रत्येकं च समूहोऽसौ समूहिषु समाप्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 29). (b) सहविवक्षायामनेकानुस्यूतैकप्रख्यारूपायां द्वैतम्, अवयवप्राधान्यं संघप्राधान्यं च । तत्रावयवप्राधान्यमितरेतरयोगस्य विषयः । ....संघप्राधान्ये तु समाहार इत्यर्थादुक्तम् । (Ibid, comm.).
,,	4	व्यापारसमुदायस्य यथाधिश्रयणादिषु । प्रत्येकं जातिवद् वृत्तिस्तथा द्वन्द्वपदेष्वपि ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 30).
373	5	शौण्डार्धर्चपुरोडाशच्छत्रिणोऽत्र निदर्शनम् । ते विष्णुमित्रा इति च भिन्नेषु सहचारिषु ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 31).

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,,	6	एवं द्वन्द्वैकशेषयोर्द्विवचनबहुवचनान्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रतिपदमनेकार्थत्वमवस्थाप्यते । (Ibid, comm.).
,,	7	युगपदेकेन शब्देन यदाधिकरणमभिधेयं द्वन्द्वपदवाच्यमभिधीयते समुदायरूपं परस्परारोपितार्थं तदा द्वन्द्वो वक्तव्य इत्यर्थः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 32, comm.).
,,	8	एवं चेतरेतरसंनिधाने भारोद्यन्तृवत् परस्परशक्त्याविर्भावनाद् नियतविषयमेव परस्पराभिधानं शब्दानामित्युक्तम् । (Ibid, comm.)
374	9	दुःखा दुरुपपादा च तस्माद् भाष्येऽप्युदाहृता । युगपद्वाचिता सा तु व्यवहारार्थमाश्रिता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 34).
,,	10	समुदायमुपक्रम्य पदं तस्यां प्रयुज्यते । विभागेन समाख्याने ततस्तद् द्व्यर्थमुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 35).
,,	11	वृत्तिरन्यपदार्थे या तस्या वाक्येष्वसंभवः । चार्थे द्वन्द्वपदानां च भेदे वृत्तिर्न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 38).
375	12	भेदे सतिनिरादीनां क्रान्ताद्यर्थेष्वसंभवः । प्राग्वृत्तेर्जातिवाचित्वं न च गौरखरादिषु ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 39).
,,	13	(a) सामर्थ्यमविशेषोक्तमपि लोकव्यवस्थया । वृत्त्यवृत्त्योः प्रयोगज्ञैर्विभक्तं प्रतिपत्तृभिः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 43).

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		(b) लक्ष्यज्ञैस्तु लक्ष्यमूलत्वात् स्मृतेः सूत्रकाराशयमनुसृत्य वृत्तावेकार्थीभावो वाक्ये व्यपेक्षेति विभागः कृतः । (Ibid, comm.).
376	16	तुल्यश्रुतित्वात्तत्त्वेऽपि राजादीनामुपाश्रिते । वृत्तौ विशेषणाकाङ्क्षा गमकत्वान्निवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 46).
”	17	संबन्धिशब्दः सापेक्षो नित्यं सर्वः प्रयुज्यते । स्वार्थवत् सा व्यपेक्षास्य वृत्तावपि न हीयते । (Ibid, Vṛ. 47).
377	18	(a) अबुधान् प्रत्युपायाश्च विचित्राः प्रतिपत्तये । शब्दान्तरत्वादत्यन्तभेदो वाक्यसमासयो : ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 49).
		(b) तच्च व्यपेक्षैकनियतमेकार्थीभावविषयात् समासादन्यदेव । अर्थभेदेन शब्दानां भेदात् । संख्याविशेषादिश्चार्थभेदः प्रदर्शितः । क्वचित् समासान्तादेश्च संभवाद् रूपभेदोऽप्यस्ति । (Ibid, comm.).
”	19	(a) असमासे समासे च गोरथादिष्वदर्शनात् । युक्तादीनां न शास्त्रेण निवृत्त्यनुगमः कृतः । (Ibid, Vṛ, 50).
		(b) न वासामासेऽदर्शनात् । न वा वक्तव्यम् । किं कारणम् । असमासेऽदर्शनात् । यद्ध्यसमासे दृश्यते समासे च न दृश्यते तल्लोपारंभं प्रयोजयति । न चासमास उपसिक्तशब्द संसष्टशब्दो युक्तशब्दः पूर्णशब्दो वा दृश्यते ॥ (M. Bhā. I. p. 387, l. 14-17).

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378	20	इति कार्यशब्दवादिनो वृत्तिवाक्ययोः प्रधानार्थभेदेन पर्याययोः सर्वथैक्यं भान्त्याध्यवस्यन्ति । नैकार्थीभावो नाम विशेषकरः कश्चित्, व्यपेक्षैव षत्वादिविषयेऽपि संभवात् सर्वत्र सामर्थ्यमिति प्रतिपन्नाः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 52. comm.).
,,	21	पदं यथैव वृक्षादि विशिष्टेऽर्थे व्यवस्थितम् । नीलोत्पलाद्यपि तथा भागाभ्यां वर्तते विना ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 53).
,,	22	श्रोत्रियक्षेत्रियादीनां न च वासिष्ठगार्ग्यवत् । भेदेन प्रत्ययो लोके तुल्यरूपासमन्वयात् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 54).
379	23	सप्तपर्णादिवद् भेदो न वृत्तौ विद्यते क्वचित् । रूढयरूढिविभागोऽपि विद्यते प्रतिपत्तये ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 55).
,,	24	(a) न वानभिहितत्वात् । (M. Bhā. I. p. 421, l. 20). सामान्याभिधाने हि विशेषानभिधानम् । (Ibid, l. 24). (b) अन्यपदार्थसामान्यं ह्यन्तर्भवति, न तु तद्विशेषाः । (Vāk. III. c. Vṛ. 64. comm.).
380	25	विशेषकर्मसंबन्धे निर्भुक्तेऽपि कृतादिभिः । विशेषनिरपेक्षोऽन्यः कृतशब्दः प्रवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 65).

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,,	26	(a) अकर्मकत्वे सत्येवं क्रान्तं भावाभिधायि तत् । ततः क्रियावता कर्त्रा योगो भवति कर्मणाम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 66). (b) वृत्तिवाक्ययोरत्यन्तभेदाद् वाक्ये विशिष्टकर्मसमन्वययोग्योऽपि कृतशब्दो वृत्तौ विशेषस्यभिधानासंभवात् सामान्यकर्मैव प्रतीयते । तच्च नान्तरीयकत्वादविवक्षितमित्यकर्मकोऽयं कृतशब्दो भावाभिधायी सम्पद्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 66. comm.)
,,	27	(a) अविग्रहा गतादिस्था यथा ग्रामादिकर्मभिः । संबध्यते क्रिया तद्वत् कृतपूर्व्यादिषु स्थिता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 67) (b) See M. Bhā. I. p. 437, l. 18 ff).
381	28	विशेषणाद् विशेष्येऽर्थे तद्भावाभ्युच्चये सति । पुनश्च प्रतिसंहारे वृत्तिमेके प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 88).
,,	29	अन्तःकरणवृत्तौ च व्यर्था बाह्यार्थकल्पना तस्मादनुपकारो वा ग्राह्यं वा न तया स्थितम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 91).
,,	30	अनुस्यूतेव संसृष्टेरर्थे बुद्धिः प्रवर्तते । व्याख्यातारो विभज्याथ तां भेदेन प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 92).
382	31	तदात्मन्यविभक्ते च बुद्ध्यन्तरमुपाश्रिताः । विभागमिव मन्यन्ते विशेषणविशेष्ययोः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 93).

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„	32	यद्यपि विभागावस्था वाक्यदशा तथापि वाक्यावस्थागतज्ञानवासनया वृत्तावपि विशेषणविशेष्यप्रतीतिरस्त्येव । (Ibid, Vṛ. 92-93, comm.)
		(d) On the nature of the Vṛtti.
„	33	अबुधान् प्रति वृत्तिं च वर्तयन्तः प्रकल्पिताम् । आहुः परार्थवचने त्यागाभ्युच्चयधर्मताम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 94).
383	34	अन्वयाद् गम्यते सोऽर्थो विरोधी वा निवर्तते । द्व्यर्थमर्थान्तरे वापि तत्राहुरुपसर्जनम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 95).
„	35	केचित्तु जहत्स्वार्थायां वृत्तावुपसर्जनपदस्य सर्वथैवार्थत्यागं प्रधानार्थवृत्तित्वं च मन्यन्ते । वणवदनर्थकं ह्युपसर्जनपदं वृत्तिपदस्यावयवभूतम् । पर्यायश्चायं पुरुषशब्दस्य राजपुरुषशब्दः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 95. comm.).
„	36	उपायमात्रं नानात्वं समूहस्त्वेक एव सः । विकल्पाभ्युच्चयाभ्यां वा भेदसंसर्गकल्पना ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 96).
„	37	वृत्तिं वर्तयतामेवमबुधप्रतिपत्तये । भिन्नाः संबोधनोपायाः पुरुषेष्वनवस्थिताः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 97).

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		(e) On the number expressed by the secondary word in a compound (abhedaikatvasaṃkhyā).
384	40	(a) वाचिका द्योतिका वापि संख्यानां या विभक्तयः । तद्रूपेऽवयवे वृत्तौ संख्याभेदो निवर्तते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ 98). (b) इत्थं सादृश्यमात्रं भ्रान्तं वृत्तिवाक्ययोः, न तत्त्वत ऐक्यम्, वाक्ये संख्याभेदसद्भावात् । वृत्तौ तदभावादित्यत्र तात्पर्यम्, (Ibid, Vṛ. 98 comm).
385	41	(a) अभेदैकत्वसंख्या सा तत्रान्यैवोपजायते । संसर्गरूपं संख्यानामविभक्तं तदुच्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 99). (b) द्वित्वादिप्रतिपक्षं त्वेकत्वं द्वित्वाद्यपावर्तनान्न समस्तसंख्याभेदस्वीकार समर्थम् । इदं त्वभेदैकत्वं सर्वानुयायि । (Ibid, Vṛ. 99. comm.).
”	42	यथौषधिरसाः सर्वे मधुन्याहितशक्तयः । अविभागेन वर्तन्ते तां संख्यां तादृशीं विदुः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 100).
”	43	भेदानां वा परित्यागात् संख्यात्मा स तथाविधः । व्यापाराज्जातिभागस्य भेदापोहेन वर्तते । (Ibid, Vṛ. 101).
”	44	अगृहीतविशेषेण यथा रूपेण रूपवान् प्रख्यायते न शुक्लादिभेदरूपस्तु गृह्यते । भेदरूपसमावेशे तथा सत्यविवक्षिते । भागः प्रकाशितः कश्चिच्छास्त्रेऽङ्गत्वेन गृह्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 102, 103).

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386	45	(a) तथा चैकस्यामपि यो गवि चरति सोऽपि गोषुचर इन्द्रगोपोऽभिधीयते । (Ibid, Vṛ. 106. comm.).
		(b) एकस्यां गवि द्वयोर्वापि गवोश्चरति गोषुचर इत्यभिधानस्य गोषु कुक्कुटाख्ये पक्षिविशेषे रूढेरित्यर्थः (Ibid, Vṛ. 108-109. comm.)
387	46	(a) भेदः संख्याविशेषो वा व्याख्यातो वृत्तिवाक्ययोः । सर्वत्रैव विशेषस्तु नावश्यं तादृशो भवेत् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 132).
		(b) एवं वाक्ये सर्वत्रैव संख्याभेदप्रतीतेः क्वचिद् तद्रूपापि वृत्तिस्ततोऽन्या भवत्येत्र ज्ञापिता । सर्वं हि लक्षणं सामान्येनैव प्रवर्तते । प्रतिव्यक्त्यशक्यत्वात् तन्प्रणयनस्य । (Ibid, Vṛ. 132. comm.).
		(f) On the Possessive compound (Bahuvrīhi).
,,	47	यथा गौरिति शुक्लादेरभिधानं न विद्यते । एवं यस्याभिसंबन्धो गोभिस्तावत् प्रतीयते । (Ibid, Vṛ. 211).
388	48	(b) संबन्धी नियतो रूढश्चित्राणां न च विद्यते । गवां यथा वज्रपाणिस्त्र्यक्षो वापि व्यवस्थितः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 212).
,,	11	
,,	49	(a) शब्दान्तरत्वाद् वाक्येषु विशेषा यद्यपि श्रुताः । वृत्तिशब्दोऽन्य एवायं सामान्यस्याभिधायकः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 213).

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		(a) न तु सर्वतः परिच्छिन्ने वाक्यार्थे वृत्तिपदस्याभिधानशक्तिः, संख्या-विशेषादेरतोऽप्रतीतेः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 213. comm.)
"	50	(a) सामान्यस्यैव तर्ह्यनुप्रयोगो न प्राप्नोति । चित्रगु तत् । चित्रगु किंचित् । चित्रगु सर्वमिति । सामान्यमपि यथा विशेषस्तद्वत् । (M. Bhā. I. p. 422, l. 4-5).
		(b) सर्वादयो विशेषास्तु प्रदेशानां निवर्तकाः । यथा प्रदेशाः सामान्यप्रदेशान्तरबाधकाः ॥ (Vāk. III. c. Vṛ. 216).
"	51	विभक्त्यर्थाभिधानाद्वाषष्ठी नानुप्रयुज्यते । द्रव्यस्यानभिधानात्तु तच्छब्दोऽनुप्रयुज्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 217).
389	52	असंभवात्तु संबन्धे सबन्धसहचारिणि । जातिसंख्यासमाहारकार्याणामिव संभवः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 222).
"	53	(a) साधुत्वं न विभक्त्यर्थमात्रे वृत्तस्य दृश्यते । कृत्स्नार्थवृत्तेः साधुत्वमित्यर्थग्रहणं कृतम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 225).
		(b) इति लिङ्गसंख्यावत् पदार्थभूतं द्रव्यमेतान्यपदार्थ इति पदार्थाभिधा-नपक्ष एव ज्यायान् । ततश्चानुप्रयोगः समर्थितः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 225. comm.).
"	54	संबन्धिभिर्विशिष्टानां संबन्धानां निमित्तता । संबन्धैर्वा विशिष्टानां तद्वतां स्यान्निमित्तता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 232).

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,,	55	केचित् संयोगिनो दण्डाद् विषाणात् समवायिनः । तद्वति प्रत्ययानाहुर्बहुव्रीहिं तथैव च ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 233).
390	56	भिन्नं संबन्धिभेदेन संबन्धमपरे विदुः । निमित्तं सविभक्त्यर्थः समासेनभिधीयते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 234).
		(g) On the negative compound (*nañsamāsa*).
,,	57	शब्दान्तरेऽपि चैकत्वमाश्रित्यैव विचारणा । अब्राह्मणादिषु नञः प्रयोगो न हि विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 249).
391	58	प्राक् समासात् पदार्थानां निवृत्तिर्द्योत्यते नञा । स्वभावतो निवृत्तानां रूपाभेदादलक्षिता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 250).
,,	59	ब्राह्मणादिस्थया वाक्येष्वाख्यातपदवाच्यया । क्रियया यस्य संबन्धो वृत्तिस्तस्य न विद्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 251).
392	60	(a) क्रियायाः साधनाधारसामान्ये नञ् व्यवस्थितः । ततो विशिष्टैराधारैर्युज्यते ब्राह्मणादिभिः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 255).
		(b) ततश्चाभावोपरक्तमस्तिक्रियासाधनाधारसामान्यं वृत्तिविषये नञ्वाच्यमिति नास्तीत्येवंरूपो नञोऽर्थः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 255. comm.).
393	61	वृत्तौ यथा गताद्यर्थमुपादाय निरादयः । युज्यन्ते साधनाधारैर्नञ्समासेऽपि स क्रमः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 256).

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,,	62	कामचारे च सत्येवमसतः स्यात् प्रधानता । गुणत्वमितरेषां च तेषां वा स्यात् प्रधानता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 258).
,,	63	अत एवालिङ्गसंख्यत्वमव्ययधर्मो नञर्थस्य वाक्ये, न तु वृत्तौ सत्त्वभूतार्थवाचित्वात् । (Ibid, Vṛ. 258. comm.).
,,	64	(a) प्राधान्येनाश्रिताः पूर्वं श्रुतेः सामान्यवृत्तयः । विशेष एव प्रक्रान्ता ब्राह्मणक्षत्रियादयः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 259). (b) नञ्पदप्रयोगे तु स विशेषः प्रकाशते इति विरोधाभावाद् कल्पते विशेषणविशेष्यभावः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 259, comm.).
394	65	यथा सत्ताभिधानाय सन्नर्थः परिकल्प्यते तथा सत्ताभिधानाय निरूपाख्यो विकल्प्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 261).
,	66	क्षत्रियादौ पदं कृत्वा बुद्धिः सत्तान्तराश्रया । जात्या भिन्नां ततः सत्तां प्रसक्तामपकर्षति ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 262).
395	67	अनेकधर्मवचनैः शब्दैः सङ्घाभिधायिभिः । एकशब्देषु वर्तन्ते तुल्यरूपाः स्वभावतः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 264).
,,	68	ब्राह्मणोऽब्राह्मणस्तस्मादुपन्यासात् प्रसज्यते । अकृते वा कृतासङ्गादविशिष्ट कृताकृतात् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 266).

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„	69	एकस्य च प्रधानत्वात् तद्विशेषणसन्निधौ । प्रधानधर्मव्यावृत्तिरतो न वचनान्तरम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 282).
396	70	प्रधानमत्र भेद्यत्वादेकार्थो विकृतो नञा । हित्वा स्वधर्मान् वर्तन्ते द्व्याद्योऽप्येकतां गताः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 283).
„	71	ब्राह्मणत्वं यथापन्ना नञ्युक्ताः क्षत्तियादयः । द्वित्वादिषु तथैकत्वं नञ्योगादुपचर्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 284).
„	72	एकार्थे वर्तमानाभ्यामसता ब्राह्मणेन च । यदा जात्यन्तरं बाह्यं क्षत्रियाद्यपदिश्यते ॥ (Ibid, Vr. 296).
397	73	श्यामेव शस्त्री कन्येति यथान्यद् व्यपदिश्यते । असन् ब्राह्मण इत्याभ्यां तथान्ये क्षत्रियादयः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 297).
„	74	असास्नो गौरिति यथा गवयो व्यपदिश्यते । जात्यन्तरं न गोरेव सास्नाभावः प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 298).
„	75	अवृष्टथो यथावर्षा नीहाराभ्रसमावृताः । तद्रूपत्वात् स हेमन्त इत्यभिन्नः प्रतीयते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 301).
398	76	अपरे ब्राह्मणादीनां सर्वेषां जातिवादिनाम् । द्रव्यस्यान्यपदार्थत्वे नञा योगं प्रचक्षते ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 302).
„		न चैवंविषयः कश्चिद् बहुव्रीहिः प्रकल्पते । अगुरश्च इति व्याप्तिर्नञसमासेन यस्य न ॥
„	78	(a) सामान्यद्रव्यवृत्तित्वान्निमित्तानुविधायिनः । अयोगो लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां स्याद्वा सामान्यधर्मता ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 307).

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		(b) यश्चेहार्थोऽभिधीयते न तस्य लिङ्गसंख्याभ्यां योगोस्ति । (M. Bhā. I. p. 410, l. 14-15).
399	79	प्रागसत्त्वाभिधायित्वं समासे द्रव्यवाचिता । निमित्तानुविधानं च न सर्वत्र स्वभावतः ॥ निमित्तानुविधाने च क्रियायोगो न कल्पते । तथा चाव्यपदेश्यत्वादुपादानमनर्थकम् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 308, 309).
400	80	असत्सामान्यवृत्तिर्वा विशेषैः क्षत्रियादिभिः । प्रयुक्तैराश्रयैर्भिन्नो याति तल्लिङ्गसंख्यताम् । (Ibid, Vṛ. 310).
,,	81	(a) एकार्थविषयौ शब्दौ तस्मिन्नन्यार्थवर्तिनौ । असतैव तु भेदानां सर्वेषामुपसंग्रहः ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 313). (b) सर्वेषां भेदानां क्षत्रियादीनामभावेन नञर्थेनैव स्वीकारादुत्तरपदस्य तद्द्योतनमात्रे व्यापारात् पूर्वपदार्थप्राधान्यम् । Ibid, Vṛ. 313, comm.).
,,	82	ते क्षत्रियादिभिर्वाच्या वाच्या वा सर्वनामभिः । यान्तीवान्यपदार्थत्वं नञो रूपाविकल्पनात् ॥ (Ibid, Vṛ. 314).
401	83	(a) विशेषस्याप्रयोगे तु लिङ्गसंख्ये न सिध्यतः । अवर्षादिषु दोषश्च हेमन्तोऽन्याश्रयो यतः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 315). (b) हेमन्तग्रहणस्योपलक्षणार्थत्वात् पूर्वपदार्थप्राधान्याच्च वर्षार्थस्योपसर्जनत्वाद्ध्रस्वप्रसङ्ग इति पूर्वपदार्थप्रधानपक्षोऽपि दुष्टः । (Ibid, Vṛ. 315. comm.).
,,	84	उत्तरपदार्थप्राधान्यमेव त्वत्र सिद्धान्तः । (Ibid.)

ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI	..	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
BDCPGRI	..	Bulletin of the Deccan College Post-Graduate and Research Institute.
BORI	..	Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.
BSOAS	..	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies.
DCBCSJS	..	Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series.
DCMS	..	Deccan College Monograph Series.
Études		Etudes Védiques et pāṇinéennes by L. Renou.
IA	..	Indian Antiquary.
IHQ	..	Indian Historical Quarterly.
IIJ	..	Indo-Iranian Journal.
IPK	..	*Iśvarapratyabhijñākārikā.*
IPV	..	*Iśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī.*
IPVV	..	*Iśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī.*
JBBRAS	..	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JGRI	..	Journal of the Ganganath Jha Research Institute.
JOAS	..	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JOR	..	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
JRAS	..	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
M. Bhā.	..	*Mahābhāṣya* of Patañjali, ed. Kielhorn.
M. Bhā. dī.	..	*The Mahābhāṣya dīpikā* of Bhartṛhari, pt. I, (BORI 1967)

M. Bhā. ṭī.	..	*The Mahābhāṣya ṭīkā* of Bhartṛhari pt. I, (Hindu Viśvavidyālaya Nepal Rājya Sanskrit Series Vol. II.)
NS	..	*Nirṇayasāgara.*
P	..	*Aṣṭādhyāyī* of Pāṇini.
SS	..	*Sphoṭasiddhi.*
TA	..	*Tantrāloka* of Abhinavagupta.
up.	..	*upagraha.*
Vāk.	..	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, edited by K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. II).
Vāk. a.	..	*Vākyapadīya* with commentary (Benares Sanskrit Series, 1887 onwards).
Vāk. b.	..	*Vākyapadīya* I and a part of II, with commentaries, edited by Pt. Charu Deva Shastri, Ramlal Kapoor Trust, Lahore 1934).
Vāk. c.	..	*Vākyapadīya* III with the *Prakīrṇakaprakāśa* of Helārāja. Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, no. cxvi and University of Travancore Sanskrit Series no. CXLVIII.
Vāk. I.	..	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. (Deccan College Monograph Series 32).
Vāk. III. pt. i	..	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. (Deccan College Monograph Series 21).
Vāk. III. pt. ii	..	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari with the commentary of Helārāja, edited by K. A. Subramania Iyer. (In the press).
VIJ	..	Vishveshvarānand Indological Journal.
Vṛ.	..	Vṛtti.
Y. Dar.	..	*Yogasūtras* of Patañjali with the *Vyāsabhāṣya* and the *Tattvavaiśāradī* of Vācaspatimiśra (Anandaśrama Edition).

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ERRATA

Page No.	*For*	*Read*
2	Add '7. See Texts.'	at the bottom.
3	Omit '7. See Texts'	before '8 See Texts'.
4	Aeāryas	Ācāryas
6	Prakīṇa	Prakīrṇa
8	Bharatṛhari	Bhartṛhari
9	āgrama°	āgama°
9	Pyśyantī	Paśyantī
10	Śuddhattvam	Śuddhatattvam
10	talah	tataḥ
11	Vākyapadalya	Vākyapadīya
12	substaantial	substantial
12	Vaināgya	Vairāgya
13	identify	identity
14	Puruṣakāna	Puruṣakāra
34	°Vāttika	°vārttika
35	conscious	cautious
37	°prabhaā	°prabhā
37	°Kāṇa	°Kāṇḍa
43	external	eternal
44	Puddhati	Paddhati
57	Kṇḍa	Kāṇḍa
58	niḥśreyas	niḥśreyasa
60	dhavani	dhvani
62	analysted	analysed
65	Karma	karaṇa
65	ekaśeśa	ekaśeṣa
65	tuddhita	taddhita
66	reference	references
67	in three	three
68	śadhana	sādhana
70	°sanūkṣā	°samīkṣā
71	Vārrttākṣa	Vārttākṣa
73	anly	only
74	niyatā	nityatā
74	sternity	eternity
81	Pramāṇas	Darśanas
87	intutive	intuitive
89	amen°	emen°

Page No.	*For*	*For*
90	viśṣṭo°	viśiṣṭ°
93	Darśanas	Pramāṇas
94	Saṃhita	Saṃhitā
95	Darśanas	Pramāṇas
96	Niruka	Nirukta
97	protibhā	pratibhā
99	śad	ṣad
101	whey	when
101	Vɪeya	vācya
105	Vāgru°	vāgrū°
106	Prakīnaka	Prakīrṇaka
106	howevevr	however
106	refer kā	refer to kā
107	°śeṇa	°śena
107	noccāna°	noccāra°
111	Diety	Deity
119	elemnets	elements
122	iis	is
127	alwayys	always
129	Śānra°	Śāntara°
129	102	103
129	103	104
129	omit 104	
131	Théoric	Théorie
132	universay	universal
136	eighth	eight
136	in	is
136	he	the
137	vyākarṇa	vyākaraṇa
142	explanttion	explanation
143	thtt	that
144	mahdyamā	madhyamā
144	Paśyantī	Paśyantī
164	sphoras	sphoṭas
164	thhins	thinks
173	omit '69 See Texts'.	
180	Bharttḥari	Bhartṛhari
181	Vaiśeṣitas	Vaiśeṣikas
185	concey	convey
189	he	the
190	n	ṇ
194	eash	each
195	onalyse	analyse

Page No.	*For*	*Read*
200	sated	stated
207	heros	heroes
225	evplain	explain
233	akhyāta	ākhyāta
233	preparations	prepositions
237	Add '21. See Texts'.	
238	Omit '21 See Texts'.	
239	cācaka	vācaka
240	śābdajāti	śabdajāti
243	amūrṭa	amūrta
248	which it did not	which did not
249	parabraman	parabrahman
258	on the basis	on that basis
263	chaareter	character
266	ava	tva
267	jātiśu	jātiṣu
268	malup	matup
271	gotrā	gotarā
277	praṭīcya	pratīcya
278	purrastāt	purastāt
280	dyaṇuka	dvyaṇuka
287	vèślesa	viśleṣa
292	prarthanā	prārthanā
293	roof	root
293	patti	patati
297	he	the
299	follow	follows
300	thererfore	therefore
301	kāryakas	kārakas
302	inferrable	inferable
303	karmasthadhā°	karmasthabhā
303	karmakaria	karmakartā
306	°bredena	°bhedena
306	dhāvartha°	dhātvartha°
308	often than its	other than its
314	(prayojakaQ	(prayojaka)
317	ṭasmai	taśmai
324	tiṣṭhali	tiṣṭhati
325	resnlt	result
332	stihitaḥ	sthitaḥ
333	inferrable	inferable
334	he	be
336	vyati	vyakti

Page No.	*For*	*Read*
340	pEkaḥ	pākaḥ
346	Add 6 above the word sentence in 1. 12.	
347	Mahābhāṣa	Mahābhāṣya
348	Science Grammar	Science of Grammar
348	he performs	he performs his
352	Dṛṣ	Dṛś
357	°kāruṇa	°kāraṇa
361	arnyānī	araṇyānī
364	there	three
372	°khadiram	°khadirau
377	κaṇtakavūn	kaṇṭakavān
403	feel	feels
404	hs	he
412	० दभच्ज्छ्री०	० दभजच्छ्री ०
414	Add Edition) after the word University'.	
421, 423	The page heading should be 'Bhartṛhari and the Darśanas'.	
425, 427, 429, 431	The page heading should be Bhartṛhari and the Pramāṇas'.	
423	विर्वक्षित :	विवक्षितः
423	परतन्त	परतन्त्व
428	नानुमाविकम्	नानुमानिकम्
430	० प्यामगहे ०	० प्यागमहे ०
432	० मिनं वि ०	० मिदं वि ०
436	० र्शथ्र ०	० र्शश्व ०
436	पृचुकु ०	पृचक् ०
443	चद ०	यद ०
453, 455, 457, 459, 461, 463	The page heading should be 'The Doctrine of Sphoṭa'.	
465, 467, 469, 471, 473	The page heading should be 'Bhartṛhari on the Sentence'.	
475, 477, 479	The page heading should be 'Relation between the word and the Meaning'.	
460	ज्ञानस	ज्ञानस्य
460	० दास्तयो ०	० दास्त्वयो ०
463	० न्तरल ०	० न्तराल ०
467	० द्रीहि ०	० द्वीहि ०

Page No.	*For*	*Read*
475	वातोक्षौ ०	वार्तोक्षौ ०
479	० रपैति	० रूपैति
481	० कक्ष्येता	० कक्ष्यता
486	तद्वदेष्पा ०	तद्वदेवा ०
494	० त्युभयः रू ०	० त्युभयरू ०
495	निया	नित्या
499	प्रजापत्या	प्राजापत्या
501	निरूपते	निरूप्यते
501	पदन्ते	यदन्ते
501	सोऽ र्यो	सोऽ र्थो
504	सत्यापारो	सव्यापारो
506	० मन्यधा	० मन्यथा
512	० योगे	० योगो
513	श्रोत्ररि	श्रोतरि
515	० मिहिते	० भिहिते
515	० स्थैर्व्या ०	० स्वैर्व्या
521	कर्तृरि ०	कर्तुरि ०
528	० र्शतय	० शतया
532	० ऽ घ्यूस्य ०	० ऽ घ्यस्य ०
533	मागभेदाश्च ०	भागभेदश्चि ०
550	एकवयवाः	एवावयवाः
558	० व्यमेतान्य ०	० व्यमेवान्य ०
559	वर्तौ	वृत्तौ

